The Ontological Necessity of a God Thread?: Religion II

[Matrim Fox Cauthon]

May as well just have a general religion, spirituality, and mysticism thread available for people who want to talk more broadly about these sort of issues.

Just resume from our previous religion discussion.

Play nice.

[Stubby]

Fair enough that we have a general thread.

There is already a Christian thread, which probably won't get a rerun once it hits 400, so all discussions of this nature should be centred here, much like the US Politics threads.

[Sci-2]

Fair enough that we have a general thread.

There is already a Christian thread, which probably won't get a rerun once it hits 400, so all discussions of this nature should be centred here, much like the US Politics threads.

I thought the Christian thread had a larger number of starting premises though? The Religion thread was more of a free for all so there seems to be a difference?

@True Metis:

Think I need a definition of what consensus reality means. Is the consensus in this just agreeing on the parts we're sure of, or could the consensus actually change things? Starting to think some of my problems might be coming from definitions.

(Again, forgive the copious number of links & quotes. This stuff isn't really my expertise so I figure it's best for interested parties to check out the source material than for me to present a mangled interpretation as the truth.)

Hoffman goes into the nature of consensus in the paper Objects of Consciousness, where he discusses his math in more detail.

But yeah, it's weird. The conscious agents are not necessarily humans. It's more like panspychism*, with experience as fundamental. (Chalmers offers discussion of panpsychism and critiques on the idea here & here respectively.)

Basically the way I see it is these granules of consciousness are akin to the experiential bits panpsychists would extend to matter, save Hoffman gets rid of the matter and leaves those bits of experience as parts of his conscious agents. It intuitively seems maddening/delusional, and I suspect he'd be wrong even if Idealism is true but I would agree with his assessment that the idea of conscious agents rather than strings or membranes as fundamental isn't logically unsound.

That said I think Hoffman has a way to go before Conscious Realism reaches a completely coherent state. Some of his language almost feels intentionally confusing, and he might be better off rewriting a lot of his stuff via the language Chalmer's uses in his discussion of Panpsychism*.

But where Hoffman has an advantage is he offers some mathematics that will either be shown as incorrect and unable to account for known physics, or if he gets passed that stage he can offer predictions to see if his model can tell us something about the world. It seems to me - and physicists please offer correction if you read this! - if more models assuming realism are seemingly falsified** via results like the ones Leggett and Zeilinger got perhaps he might gain some traction - but as noted in the last thread there are still models assuming realism which haven't been shown to be false.

*There is a distinction between panpsychism and idealism, but it's better stated by Kastrup than Hoffman:

When I say that everything is in consciousness, I am saying that things exist only insofar as they play themselves out in the mind of a conscious observer. For instance, when you dream at night, everything in your dream exists only insofar as it is in your mind; the stuff in your dream does not have an independent existence. But that does not mean that every person or animal in your dream has a consciousness of their own; they do not ground a subjective point of view separate from yours; there is nothing it is like to be a character of your dream. So my worldview entails that, like a dream, reality exists only insofar as it is in consciousness, but not that everything in it is conscious. For instance, while acknowledging that other living entities are likely conscious (i.e. statement 2), I do not subscribe to the notion that rocks, windmills, home thermostats, or computers are conscious.

**Leggett doesn't think realism is false despite the IQOQI results. He wants to redo the tests in space to make sure there's no interference that could affect the results.

[Gears of the Beast]

Which premise is wrong? That there isn't a Hard Problem of Consciousness, or we have no way to access objective reality without recourse to sensory - and thus subjective - experience?

Remember, I'm not saying Idealism is definitively right and definitely not saying Hoffman is correct - in fact I just emailed him some points of criticism made by Artem Kazatcheev and am now awaiting his response.

I'm just pointing out from a philosophical perspective you can't rule out the possibility Idealism, rather than Materialism, is the right paradigm.

In any case, my point isn't to say Idealism is real. I'm just pointing out that taking it on as an assumption is a perfectly valid starting point since:

1) There is a Hard Problem.

2) There's no objective reality we could get to outside our subjective conscious experience.

Ok, so I wrote out a fairly extensive response to this in the last thread but accidentally deleted it. Wasn't gonna bother re-writing it but there's a new thread and you're still on about consciousness. I'm not gonna be as thorough in this one.

So first of all, there's a difference between asserting that idealism is a possibility and asserting that it's valid to assume idealism is true. A very big difference. So no, you're not "just pointing out from a philosophical perspective you can't rule out the possibility Idealism, rather than Materialism, is the right paradigm." That's where my problems begin, this statement that "Oh, I'm not asserting it's real but it is valid to assume it's real because..." is completely absurd. If any possibility of a cogent argument remained (which is doubtful) after that first statement it quickly evaporated with the 2 "premises" you use to support the assertion that it's valid to assume idealism is true.

1. 'There's a "hard problem". I find it quite baffling how you both assert this without any argument to back it up, as if to say that everyone agrees that this premise is true and that you made no effort whatsoever to explain how this could possibly support your extraordinary claim that it's valid to assume idealism is true. So first off, no, you haven't convinced me there's a hard problem. I don't think there is one. I'll refer you to Daniel Dennett (a highly respected philosopher). You'll want to read his essay on the matter, reading his book Intuition Pumps And Other Tools for Thinking where he puts forward his 'tuned deck' argument would also be useful. Also, I strongly recommend you read his other book Consciousness Explained because that would help you out (a lot!).

Anyway, let's just assume you're right for a second. We have this 'hard problem'. So we have this problem. We don't know. It's a mystery. So how the fuck does that lead you to assume a claim about reality is true!? This is an argument from ignorance. And a very bad one.

2. "There's no objective reality we could get to outside our subjective conscious experience." So generally we use stuff like independent verification to figure out what exists independently from ourselves, everyone appears to experience the same reality that I do. Of course, you're right that I cannot know for certain that all these other minds I'm interacting with aren't a product of my mind but so what? When we talk about absolute certainty in that sense it's utterly useless, I don't need to absolute certainty to believe anything, I'm not absolutely certain of anything. But now you're trying to go down this pointless rabbit hole of solipsism. No, I'm not absolutely certain that I'm not just essentially a brain in a jar...you got me. I actually responded a lot more in depth to this problem of solipsism but I really can't be fucked now and there aren't many things that annoy me more than solipsism. If you want to talk more about solipsism don't bother, you might as well talk to yourself about it (which is funny considering that's what solipsists actually believe they're doing whenever they converse with someone). Anyway, without forcing me to go further into solipsism (again) I'll just get back to this "premise". Because of how strangely you worded it, it's difficult to see exactly what you're arguing so I'll just respond to what I see as the 2 possibilities.

1: "There's no objective reality", that's just simply false to assert. You couldn't possibly know that.

2: "We can't know for certain there's an objective reality..." True. However, this does not allow you to just assert that reality must therefore be subjective and it definitely does not allow you to assume that idealism is true. It seems to me that this whole thing is a massive argument from ignorance. (I'd probably go over the character limit if I tried to list all the logical fallacies here but that's the main one).

edit: this is addressed to Sci btw, if that wasn't clear.

[Sci-2]

@Gears:

Try to tone down the condescension and pejoratives. It might give you a temporary high to get so indignant over nothing, but I assure you that in the long run it only makes you look childish.

Remember, no one is demanding you accept Idealism. I'm just saying that from a philosophical point of view there's no way to immediately discount it.

I find it quite baffling how you both assert this without any argument to back it up, as if to say that everyone agrees that this premise is true and that you made no effort whatsoever to explain how this could possibly support your extraordinary claim that it's valid to assume idealism is true.

It's commonly [accepted] by most people thinking about this stuff that there's a Hard Problem. As for a reference, I believe I already brought up Chalmer's Consciousness and Its Place in Nature.

Anyway, let's just assume you're right for a second. We have this 'hard problem'. So we have this problem. We don't know. It's a mystery. So how the fuck does that lead you to assume a claim about reality is true!? This is an argument from ignorance. And a very bad one.

I didn't assume anything. I've said repeatedly that what's valid as an assertion is different from what is true.

So generally we use stuff like independent verification to figure out what exists independently from ourselves, everyone appears to experience the same reality that I do.

This has nothing to do with my claim, though I also had the same challenge when reading Berkeley. However, all our verification comes through sensory experience. So this doesn't get around the problem.

The materialist Lehar makes note of this here.

But now you're trying to go down this pointless rabbit hole of solipsism.

Nope. Nothing I've said leads to solipsism. Not even my point about being skeptical of one's own assertions, as you can also just doubt solipsism and conclude other minds being real is the better assumption to make.

The distinction between idealism and solipsism is made by pointing out that saying everything is mind does not suggest everything is in one person's mind.

However, this does not allow you to just assert that reality must therefore be subjective and it definitely does not allow you to assume that idealism is true. It seems to me that this whole thing is a massive argument from ignorance.

There's a huge difference between saying something is true and something is tenable. I actually do agree Berkeley doesn't prove Idealism is true, I just said he showed us we can't get to reality without going through subjective experience.

Feel free to list all these supposed fallacies. Argument from ignorance isn't valid here. There's a difference between saying something is true because we don't have other explanations and saying something is tenable due to the very nature of how we experience reality through conscious experience.

You'll want to read his essay on the matter, reading his book Intuition Pumps And Other Tools for Thinking where he puts forward his '

' argument would also be useful. Also, I strongly recommend you read his other book Consciousness Explained because that would help you out (a lot!).

Thanks for the links.

[Sci-2]

Gears, I've found a way for you to test if you can remain calm when arguing something. :hat: ->

Getting back to actual discussion of God, there's an interesting assertion by Kaku in The Future of Mind when discussing interpretations of the measurement problem - that Wigner's Idealism remains a valid interpretation.

I've no idea if that's true but I am fairly confident Wigner rejected Idealism, due to a paper by Zeh. This seems like agreed upon history. The general charge against "Wigner's" Idealism seems to be the assumption of an immaterial consciousness acting on a material world. That seems like the basic argument against Dualism but if Idealism or Neutral Monism were true would this objection still apply?

Anyway, here's Kaku's thoughts:

In 1967, the second resolution to the cat problem was formulated by Nobel laureate Eugene Wigner, whose work was pivotal in laying the foundation of quantum mechanics and also building the atomic bomb. He said that only a conscious person can make an observation that collapses the wave function. But who is to say that this person exists? You cannot separate the observer from the observed, so maybe this person is also dead and alive. In other words, there has to be a new wave function that includes both the cat and the observer. To make sure that the observer is alive, you need a second observer to watch the 1st observer. This second observer is called “Wigner’s friend,”and is necessary to watch the 1st observer so that all waves collapse. But how do we know that the second observer is alive? The second observer has to be included in a still-larger wave function to make sure he is alive, but this can be continued indefinitely.Since you need an infinite number of “friends” to collapse the previous wave function to make sure they are alive, you need some form of “cosmic consciousness,” or God.

Now I thought Wigner decided against this Idealism later, and it seems anyone looking into the history of this agrees a paper by Zeh convinced him. But according to Kaku:

Wigner concluded: “It was not possible to formulate the laws (of quantum theory) in a fully consistent way without reference to consciousness.” Toward the end of his life, he even became interested in the Vedanta philosophy of Hinduism. In this approach, God or some eternal consciousness watches over all of us, collapsing our wave functions so that we can say we are alive.

This interpretation yields the same physical results as the Copenhagen interpretation, so this theory cannot be disproven.But the implication is that consciousness is the fundamental entity in the universe, more fundamental than atoms. The material world may come and go, but consciousness remains as the defining element, which means that consciousness, in some sense, creates reality. The very existence of the atoms we see around us is based on our ability to see and touch them.

eta: Looks like Wikipedia agrees with Kaku, though the text is so similar I wonder if that's a recent edit merely reflecting the book's passage.

[Sci-2]

Silent communion: Christian meditation may sound like an uneasy hybrid, but that awkwardness is hiding something important

This made me think of the Christian-Buddhist syncretism Sturn had mentioned some time ago.

Interesting to see the cultural shift toward Eastern thought partially inspires a revival of these aspects of Christianity. MFC, curious if you've seen any of this either as a response to Eastern and New Age practices or just having always been a larger part of Christian culture us outsiders might not see.

The simple wooden cross a few feet away from me on the carpet is offset — aesthetically and theologically — by some ambiguously spiritual pieces of crumpled coloured linen that are strewn in front of it. The linen says: ‘Don’t worry about the cross so much.’ The cross says: ‘Take the linen seriously.’

We sit down on the floor. Others come to join us, choosing cushions, wooden chairs or little kneelers according to taste and physical condition. Eight of us in all, gradually forming a horseshoe around this enigmatic centrepiece, whose final touch is a Tibetan singing bowl. With the cross and the crumples, it makes up the Holy Trinity of contemporary Christian meditation.

Just how happily those two words sit together — ‘Christian’ and ‘meditation’ — is part of my difficulty here, as I get used to my surroundings in this Edinburgh prayer group. That same question has been a matter of some controversy ever since the movement to revive the contemplative dimension of Christianity got going in the 1970s....

I especially like the part about how Christian meditation inspires activism:

...Teaching meditation to business leaders in the US, Freeman finds that they often start out expressing avowedly secular goals, yet some go on to have an experience that leaves such concerns looking rather pale — they experience things that are ‘undeniable… that they don’t even want to deny’.

This gives Christian meditation the potential to function as rather more than a woolly indulgence. Offering techniques of meditation to people who lack money, power, control — Freeman recently worked with young people in Haiti, their economy and prospects in ruins — is a ‘political act’, in his words. When people are able to yield, even a little, to what they find in silence, Freeman says that tangible effects follow: they reject the idea that their status quo is somehow ‘fate’ and discover fresh moral resources to do something about their situation. And when similar shifts occur in those who do have power — those business leaders, say, or the members of Ireland’s Royal College of Physicians, for whom Freeman recently ran a retreat — the various parts of society can start moving towards one another on the basis of something greater than calculation or guilt...

[Gears of the Beast]

@Gears:

Try to tone down the condescension and pejoratives. It might give you a temporary high to get so indignant over nothing, but I assure you that in the long run it only makes you look childish.

Hmm, you make a compelling case but that intense high is just too satisfying.

Remember, no one is demanding you accept Idealism. I'm just saying that from a philosophical point of view there's no way to immediately discount it.

No, you're not. At a certain point repeating myself is going to become tiresome. Asserting that it's valid to assume idealism is true is not the same as simply saying you can't discount it. "In any case, my point isn't to say Idealism is real. I'm just pointing out that taking it on as an assumption is a perfectly valid starting point since..." - Sci-2, 2014.

It's commonly [accepted] by most people thinking about this stuff that there's a Hard Problem. As for a reference, I believe I already brought up Chalmer's Consciousness and Its Place in Nature.

Hmm... it's commonly accepted by most people thinking about this stuff that there's a 'Hard Problem' (which we're capitalising for some reason). Do I really need to explain the problem with asserting that most people thinking about this stuff accept it, with your reference being a 2003 paper by the guy that came up with the idea? This is again, simply baffling. How have you concluded that most people thinking about this stuff accept it!? And why do you think that would make it ok to assert it's true? This may shock you; even if 'most' people 'thinking' about this 'stuff' accept it, that doesn't make it true. Now that's an appeal to popularity and/or possibly an argument from authority - if you're trying to use 'people who think about this stuff' as an authority.

So to sum up that one. No you can't just assert there's a hard problem without any kind of effort to support this assertion even if you're pretty sure most people who think about this stuff accept it. Also you kinda need to explain how this leads you to claim that it's valid to assume idealism is true.

I didn't assume anything. I've said repeatedly that what's valid as an assertion is different from what is true.

Ok this is very problematic. The first problem here is that you weren't talking about 'valid as an assertion' before. It was 'valid as an assumption'. So I'm not sure if you've intentionally switched them for some reason or it's a mistake. Anyway, I'll just cover both because what you've said there is quite troubling. This is what assertion means: "a confident and forceful statement of fact or belief." Now I'm pretty sure you meant to say assumption. This is what assumption means: "a thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof." So, I'll ask very calmly Sci, how is something that is valid as an assertion OR an assumption different from what is true? This is like the very first point that I made, I was hoping you would see the problem with what you said but that's clearly not the case.

This has nothing to do with my claim, though I also had the same challenge when reading Berkeley. However, all our verification comes through sensory experience. So this doesn't get around the problem....Nope. Nothing I've said leads to solipsism. Not even my point about being skeptical of one's own assertions, as you can also just doubt solipsism and conclude other minds being real is the better assumption to make.

Ok. So please, explain what your claim actually is and how it leads you to assume that idealism is true. What is "the problem" in this case by the way? The problem of solipsism? The problem that we can't ever be absolutely certain that anything exists but our own minds? Because that's what "There's no objective reality we could get to outside our subjective conscious experience" seems to support rather than idealism. I'm aware that there's a distinction between idealism and solipsism (although I think the distinction is more significant than the one you articulated), I just don't see how you're linking this claim back to idealism...mostly because you haven't even attempted to do that.

There's a huge difference between saying something is true and something is tenable.....There's a difference between saying something is true because we don't have other explanations and saying something is tenable due to the very nature of how we experience reality through conscious experience.

Sure. But that's not what you're doing here.

In any case, my point isn't to say Idealism is real. I'm just pointing out that taking it on as an assumption is a perfectly valid starting point since:

1) There is a Hard Problem.

2) There's no objective reality we could get to outside our subjective conscious experience.

[Sci-2]

I really think you're splitting hairs here. Even if people don't accept Chalmers explanation they recognize there's a challenge in explaining subjective experience. Even Valera, a neuroscientist, thought there was an experiential dimension to reality that at least seemed more than the physical.

[Recall that claiming a problem exists is different than claiming a particular solution. Which is why appeal to authority doesn't apply here.]

I may have made some language errors here, apologies for the bad English - you're technically correct assumptions and assertions aren't the same.

Beyond that it's such a minor point maybe we should just agree to disagree.

eta: Here's Bertrand Russel's take

"The word 'idealism' is used by different philosophers in somewhat different senses. We shall understand by it the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental. This doctrine, which is very widely held among philosophers, has several forms, and is advocated on several different grounds. The doctrine is so widely held, and so interesting in itself, that even the briefest survey of philosophy must give some account of it.

Those who are unaccustomed to philosophical speculation may be inclined to dismiss such a doctrine as obviously absurd. There is no doubt that common sense regards tables and chairs and the sun and moon and material objects generally as something radically different from minds and the contents of minds, and as having an existence which might continue if minds ceased. We think of matter as having existed long before there were any minds, and it is hard to think of it as a mere product of mental activity. But whether true or false, idealism is not to be dismissed as obviously absurd."

Note he dissects Berkeley's argument, and agrees with both of us it isn't a valid proof. His point, and mine, is the bold.

[Gears of the Beast]

I really think you're splitting hairs here. Even if people don't accept Chalmers explanation they recognize there's a challenge in explaining subjective experience. Even Valera, a neuroscientist, thought there was an experiential dimension to reality that at least seemed more than the physical.

I don't think I'm splitting hairs at all, if you look at what you said and my response I'm not sure how you could say that. If anything I'm felling large trees with a bulldozer. We really don't need get into the 'hard problem', that would just be a red herring since my problem is that you're using it to argue that it's valid to take idealism on as an assumption. Once you've conceded that you were wrong or at the very least misspoke it becomes arbitrary.

I may have made some language errors here, apologies for the bad English - you're technically correct assumptions and assertions aren't the same.

That's hardly the extent of the problem I had with what you said. The problem is the use of the word assumption/assertion in the first place not the fact that you're using them interchangeably.

[Gears of the Beast]

Anyway. That really had nothing to do with God/religion. The title - was someone arguing for the ontological necessity of a God? Or is that just where the OP wanted us to go? I would certainly love to see someone try to argue for the ontological necessity of a God. Any argument for a God would be nice actually.

[Sci-2]

I'd suggest taking it up with Bertrand Russel then as I don't think my position is all that different from his.

At this point I leave it to the discerning reader as to whether they wish to adopt the philosophy of Idealism. They can take your word that it's invalid from the start of they can take Russel's word and check out the options.

=-=-=

The God decision: Christian parents teach their children to believe in God, atheists teach them not to. Who is doing the right thing?

Ever since I read Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion (2006), one thing has stayed with me above all the fiery polemics. It is an answer that Dawkins gave in the book to a question about priestly abuse of children: ‘I replied that, horrible as sexual abuse no doubt was, the damage was arguably less than the long-term psychological damage inflicted by bringing the child up Catholic in the first place.’ In the five or six years since I read this, it has disturbed me, put me off balance, to an extent that I would not have expected.

I was raised a Quaker, a member of the Religious Society of Friends, and lost my faith around the age of 20. I am as much a non-believer as Dawkins is, yet I look back on my religious training positively. We young Quakers were encouraged to think for ourselves and this was the foundation of my lifetime commitment to philosophy. The moral and social concerns of Quakers have been guides to my life as a teacher. In an entirely secular way, I see the inner light – what Quakers call ‘that of God in everyone’ – in each of my students. So I cannot see religious training as abuse. Nor is this simply because Quakers are a special case. There are Catholic beliefs, such as transubstantiation, that I could never accept, nor do I approve of every aspect of a Catholic education. But, intellectually, I am pretty small beer compared to thinkers such as John Henry Newman, the 19th-century theologian. Socially and morally, I could never measure up to people such as Vincent de Paul or Dorothy Day, whose actions were inspired by their religious beliefs.

[Gears of the Beast]

I'd suggest taking it up with Bertrand Russel then as I don't think my position is all that different from his.

Bertrand Russel never said it's valid to assume idealism is correct.

At this point I leave it to the discerning reader as to whether they wish to adopt the philosophy of Idealism. They can take your word that it's invalid from the start of they can take Russel's word and check out the options.

When did I say that?

And just in response to that article title. I think it's extremely dishonest to assert that atheists teach their kids not to believe in God. Kinda like the classic "well atheists are just as wrong as theists because they assert there is no god". There's a difference between teaching your kids not to believe in god and not teaching your kids to believe in god. A very big difference. I can't speak for all atheists but when/if I have kids I'll teach them how to think, not what to think.

[Formerly Tetrarch42]

Bertrand Russel never said it's valid to assume idealism is correct.

When did I say that?

And just in response to that article title. I think it's extremely dishonest to assert that atheists teach their kids not to believe in God. Kinda like the classic "well atheists are just as wrong as theists because they assert there is no god". There's a difference between teaching your kids not to believe in god and not teaching your kids to believe in god. A very big difference. I can't speak for all atheists but when/if I have kids I'll teach them how to think, not what to think.

Ya but we need god or there will jst be wanton anarchy and hedonsm.

[Castel]

=-=-=

The God decision: Christian parents teach their children to believe in God, atheists teach them not to. Who is doing the right thing?

However, let us suppose that part of your Christian belief is that gays are in some sense deviant. In the case of Catholics, their Catechism ‘reaffirms that every such inclination, whether innate or pathological, incurable or curable, permanent or transitory, is an objective disorder, an intrinsically disordered inclination’. But psychology and biology have taught us enough about the nature and origins of sexual orientation that to make this kind of claim is simply false. Let us say what seems to be reasonable, that about five per cent of people are gay. Apart from anything else, evolutionary biology says you don’t get those kinds of numbers without some good biological cause, being maintained by natural selection. So clearly and morally, I don’t think you should hold these beliefs – and I don’t think you should teach any children, including your own, these beliefs. They fail Clifford’s criteria of having good grounds.

Any Catholics here? Because I am very suspicious of this part of the article. It seems as if he's deliberately conflating sin with a psychological disorder despite the quote making it clear that the judgement applies regardless of the status of a whole bunch of things relevant to the definition of "disorder".

Quite convenient of him to try to ground religious moral beliefs in some sort of empiricism but this seems like rationalizing to reach a politically convenient solution. Depending on the religion it doesn't actually solve the problem he's trying to solve.

I’d say you have an obligation to teach your children your beliefs, thus purified, so to speak. However, if people hold religious beliefs that I consider false on grounds that should be accepted by all (like the findings of modern science), then I’d argue it’s wrong to teach those beliefs to children, and the rest of us have an obligation to speak out against what is happening.

Lack of truth value is only one reason to reject religious teachings on homosexuality. I don’t like Catholics – or Protestants – teaching their children that gay people are ‘intrinsically disordered’ because such teaching leads to unhappiness and regressive social policies

What am I supposed to do with this? As long as religious people are doing what I consider right they get to act? Okay.I was under the impression that that was already true. This is part of my problem with a lot of atheist discussion on the topic:it's so boring.

[Gears of the Beast]

Any Catholics here? Because I am very suspicious of this part of the article. It seems as if he's deliberately conflating sin with a psychological disorder despite the quote making it clear that the judgement applies regardless of the status of a whole bunch of things relevant to the definition of "disorder".

Quite convenient of him to try to ground religious moral beliefs in some sort of empiricism but this seems like rationalizing to reach a politically convenient solution. Depending on the religion it doesn't actually solve the problem he's trying to solve.

I'm not really sure what exactly you see wrong with that part. The bit you bolded is from the Catechism. It's my understanding that the 'disorder' is not sinful itself but choosing to act on these 'inclinations' is sinful. I don't see how he's conflating sin and the disorder there. He said the belief is that gays are in some sense deviant which is pretty evident in that quote. I also don't see how he's trying to "ground religious moral beliefs in some sort of empiricism". Please explain.

edit:

Ya but we need god or there will jst be wanton anarchy and hedonsm.

As an evil atheist moral relativist I see nothing wrong with that.

[Castel]

I'm not really sure what exactly you see wrong with that part. The bit you bolded is from the Catechism. It's my understanding that the 'disorder' is not sinful itself but choosing to act on these 'inclinations' is sinful. I don't see how he's conflating sin and the disorder there. He said the belief is that gays are in some sense deviant which is pretty evident in that quote. I also don't see how he's trying to "ground religious moral beliefs in some sort of empiricism". Please explain.

He's trying to claim that disliking homosexuals/homosexual acts is wrong because it is not a disorder according to the scientific understanding of the day. He also interprets the bold part as meaning that homosexuals have a psychological disorder. This then allows him to dismiss homophobia because science doesn't consider it a psychological disorder any more. Voila, no religious person needs to have unkind views on gay people!

This is only true if the "sin" only comes from having a psychological disorder and there is no such thing as ( that particular) sin as in something that is wrong in it's own right. Possible, but not certain.

[Gears of the Beast]

He's trying to claim that disliking homosexuals/homosexual acts is wrong because it is not a disorder according to the scientific understanding of the day. He also interprets the bold part as meaning that homosexuals have a psychological disorder. This then allows him to dismiss homophobia because science doesn't consider it a psychological disorder any more. Voila, no religious person needs to have unkind views on gay people!

I actually pretty much agree there, the only thing I would say no-one should have homophobic views, regardless of their religious affiliation or lack thereof.

This is only true if the "sin" only comes from having a psychological disorder and there is no such thing as ( that particular) sin as in something that is wrong in it's own right. Possible, but not certain.

Why?

[Castel]

Why?

If something is a sin because of reasons that can be pointed to easily it can cease being a sin if those reasons turn out to be false. If homosexuality is a sin because it is a choice then if that was proved wrong it would not be a sin. If homosexuality is a disorder in the psychological sense -as he assumes- it can cease being a disorder if the psychological consensus shifts.

However, if it is merely a moral position taken from some holy book or belief then the above is meaningless. It is wrong in and of itself, so talking about how penguins have gay sex and how natural that is does nothing at all for us.

[Gears of the Beast]

If something is a sin because of reasons that can be pointed to easily it can cease being a sin if those reasons turn out to be false. If homosexuality is a sin because it is a choice then if that was proved wrong it would not be a sin. If homosexuality is a disorder in the psychological sense -as he assumes- it can cease being a disorder if the psychological consensus shifts.

However, if it is merely a moral position taken from some holy book or belief then the above is meaningless. It is wrong in and of itself, so talking about how penguins have gay sex and how natural that is does nothing at all for us.

I see your point. It pretty much highlights the problem of attempting to derive objective moral standards from a 2000 year old book written by superstitious desert people with their bronze age morality. But I don't really see the problem with criticising various moral positions in Christianity from our contemporary point of view. To say it's beyond criticism because it purports to be absolute would be ridiculous.