234 replies to this topic

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

OnionAhaiReborn, on 03 April 2012 - 10:26 PM, said:

You would only object that alternative explanations are based on arbitrary values and are unverifiable. As someone said upthread, we can't come to an agreement on basic assumptions- and we never can if you're going to object that nothing is verifiable. Why would I go down that path?

no, I won't if you don't assert them as fact but rather as a thought experiment. I didn't always think the way I do now and I presume I won't always in the future.  To this point however no one has presented as viable alternative.  Usually they say something like morality is good therefore people should be moral.  When I challenge your assertions usually its because 1) I want to know what your underlying assumptions are and 2) I want to know if you know what your underlying assumptions.  Is your premise derived by logically extend a set of basic assumptions or does it really on the Dothraki principle "It is known"?  

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Believing that it is better to rely on fewer assumptions is, itself, arbitrary and unverifiable. The existence of the concept of quantity is unverifiable.  If they're all assumptions, I see no reason why less of them should be better than more.

hmm...yes, I did mention that earlier, that we can't be certain of the integers, they're suspicious.... Now your second point is quite good.  Which is why I prefer to examine things in this manner. Let me think about that...  

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But you don't know what Ned's objective is or how he meets that objective. Take Ned and Jory and friendship out of it. It is perfectly conceivable that a hypothetical individual would have as an objective an absolute trust in another individual. Meeting this objective would require trusting someone. And it doesn't really matter that the individual they absolutely trusted could not actually be absolutely trusted. Being wrong about the trust would only mean that they failed in their objective if their friend betrayed them- and even then, only if they [i]knew their friend betrayed them and they could no longer trust them. But that trust would still be their objective.

Well, yes that's also not a bad point.  Further, it shouldn't really matter whether the other person betrays them or not.  I suppose the objective of absolute trust could be fulfilled even after knowing of the betrayal.  Which is fine.  As long as Ned cares more about those objectives than he does about his family, his small folk, the king and the people of the realm, then he met his objective.  I would just say Ned brought death and destruction upon himself his family and his realm and that he and his objective were stupid because it cost him other things he also claimed to care about.  But that is a subjective opinion. And because its subjective its the reason I use words like stupid.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

James Arryn, on 04 April 2012 - 02:25 AM, said:

Holy ****.

I just read this thread, and to my surprise there's me, already pontificating. Totally don't remember writing that...was really falling asleep.

Will give your response the response it deserves when I am able/decipher what point I was making. Cheers for taking the time.

uhhhh....what?

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

Qhorin Halfhand and Yoren, on 04 April 2012 - 06:57 AM, said:

Ned trusted LF in Kings Landingand because LF (and perhaps Catelyn too) convinced him to trust him due to LF relationship with Catelyn and LF seemingly helping Ned in various ways and being part of a conspiracy with them. Also Ned did need friends in KL to accept various objectives, including his investigation and other stuff, so there was a need to trust LF so that shit could get done. Also once you start trusting someone out of need and that person seems to follow through, it is harder for that to change.

If littlefinger hadn’t told Ned not to trust him.  And then explained to Ned why it was not in Littlefinger’s interest to support Stannis then I would agree with you. I might give that to you.  Now compare this to how Brienne deals with the not-inn-keeper in aSoS.  

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Ned didn't think that LF suddenly grew honorable he thought that LF was on his side despite generally not be a very honorable guy. People like these exist and are plentiful. So he was willing to cooperate with someone like that if he thought he absolutely needed him. Categorizing people as just Hawks or Doves seems rather silly. Now LF was someone willing to betray the Starks from the start, and send the letter, was behind the death of Jon Arryn but I am not sure why characters should necessarily have assumed it.  

The shouldn’t assume it of Littlefinger in particular, but of everyone in general

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  The reason that LF is so unpredictable in this story is because there are not really that many who behave like him.

well that’s not really true. Most people act the way he does to greater and lesser extents.  Littlefinger is just better at it than most.

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  So various characters who are at least in some ways, somewhat rational, can't figure him out. Yes, you can be selfish, even somewhat power hungry but still not betray someone else necessarily, no people will not always betray others for their own benefit, especially in the unpredictable way LF does.

Its not that everyone will be treacherous at all times.  Its that distinguishing between the treacherous and non-treacherous is will be impossible so one as to act as if, treachery is possible from anyone at any time. Take Roose Bolton for example, Catelyn said Ned never trusted him even though Bolton never gave Ned a reason to feel this way.

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I don't really think it was that obvious for Ned to take a different course of action as some might think in regards to trusting LF. Maybe in the end when LF told him about his own plan and Ned rejected him but perhaps then it was too late to do anything but follow that plan.

Why would you say that?  He woke up the next morning to the pitter-patter of little horse feet.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

butterbumps!, on 04 April 2012 - 11:41 AM, said:

I have a question I meant to include in my earlier post, to LLL.

What do you hope to achieve or discuss by analyzing Westeros through the lens of this very circumscribed model? It seems like the model just shows that in a binary analysis of aggression v non-aggression, it is more successful for an individual to be aggressive, and shows that having aggressive individuals keeps the "system" in equilibrium.   It doesn't seem like there's any way to contest this, because you either accept the model or not, and I suppose contesting the model based on laws, morals or evolutionary progress is beside your point.   So I guess my question is if you wouldn't mind articulating an application of this model to Westeros, and explaining how your findings enrich your interpretation of the narrative?  Because I'm not sure what "findings" I should take away from this binary model- it sort of seems like a moot point.

  Well first of all.  You should reread the PM i sent you or the OP.  That is not what the model says.  The model says you can expect a continuum of strategies. From Hawk to Bully to Retaliator to Dove.

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The hawk and dove story is, of course, naively simple. It is a 'model', something that does not really happen in nature, but which helps us to understand things that do happen in nature. Models can be very simple, like this one, and still be useful for understanding a point, or getting an idea. Simple models can be elaborated and gradually made more complex. If all goes well, as they get more complex they come to resemble the real world more....
...This theoretical conclusion is not far from what actually happens in most wild animals. We have in a sense explained the 'gloved fist' aspect of animal aggression.

Second of all I use the same set of models for everything.  We just happen to be discussing Westeros.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

Qhorin Halfhand and Yoren, on 04 April 2012 - 07:24 AM, said:

Anyway, in any society there will be the power hungry and immoral. You can limit the number of those people and their power in various ways. Compare any functional democracy to Westeros and you get an idea. Morality also has a rather obvious role to play, it can provide incentives and influence behaviors.

I don't think so.  This is why I say morality is irrelevant. Morality rely's on the agent to restrain their own behavior, based on its standards.  There's no reason to expect anyone to do that. They might, but you can't rely on it so its ultimately meaningless for the purpose of inferring other people's potential actions.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

Faceless Syrio, on 04 April 2012 - 09:52 AM, said:

That's not what I would respond, actually.  I think the difference is in our understanding of what the model really says.  It does not say that all individuals always act in their self-interest, making "self-interest" the amorphous and ultimately useless concept you correctly point out it would then become.  It says that, when a group of individuals competes for a resource, whatever that resource is, someone - not all, but at least one -- will always choose to further his or her own self-interest to the detriment of others.  The important relationship is that there is an action the person could take to benefit both himself and others, but taking another action gives that particular person more for himself than the first, and someone will always make that choice.  In that sense, it's the choice between making it zero sum (totally self-interested and harmful to others) and mutually beneficial (sacrificing a little individually so all can benefit).

But the point is explicitly not that everyone will always act in their own "self-interest." Some will always act less self-interested than others, in relationship to the competition for a resource.  (And fwiw, I agree that it is usually in the context of material resources, but it does not have to be.  It just has to be something people fight over that is not inexhaustible.)

self interest is a bit of an amorphous term, but it would always be so because no two individual will ever exactly the same conditions anyway.  So even when limiting the model to self-interest  to the detriment of others formaterial goods.  Each individual will still derive a different utility from said material good anyway and can be expected to compete more or less vehemently for this resource accordingly, this does not mean that these individuals can be said to be behaving in a more or less self-interested manner relative to one another.

[butterbumps!]

LLL,

I have read the PM and OP, and I do think I understand it pretty well.   It is a binary model of agression/ non-aggression, albeit where the aggression of the players varies according to their interaction with others in the scenario.

I'm asking you a specific question though.   What insight to do you gain about Westeros or even the real world from this specific model?   Both you and the the quote say, essentially, "this model is simple, but can be useful for understanding an idea."   But I'm asking what is it specifically that is being proven here by this model- what new knowledge of life or Westerosi behaviors does this model elucidate?  

I'm taking a guess, because I don't think you've fully articulated it yet.   Are you saying simply that based on this binary model (and only based on this model- so suspending normative arguments and moral complexity)  Littlefinger's actions are reasonable in the context of Westeros, and that without people like LF, the Neds and Edmures would be otherwise unsustainable?  If this is what you are trying to say, it would be more helpful if instead of reposting that very dense quote, you formulated an argument as to why this is the case.   I have read your posted quote 10 times, and I honestly cannot figure out what it is trying to say as a larger statement on human behavior, nor can I figure out why an entirely dove-comprised society is unsustainable.  All I'm asking is that you really articulate out a thorough application of this theory 1. in terms of what the model is actually saying, and 2. how you see these "insights" as they apply to Westeros.

[SerBarristan]

Lord Littlefinger, on 04 April 2012 - 01:50 PM, said:

I don't think so.  This is why I say morality is irrelevant. Morality rely's on the agent to restrain their own behavior, based on its standards.  There's no reason to expect anyone to do that. They might, but you can't rely on it so its ultimately meaningless for the purpose of inferring other people's potential actions.

Thought experiment:

Country A has a population of 100. There are 2 police officers in country A to enforce laws. Rape is against the law in Country A. 20 young droogies of country A like themselves a bit o' rape and ultraviolence. They reasonably conclude they can overwhelm the 2 officers and remainder of population in direct conflict. What prevents the 20 from going on a raping rampage?

In a world stripped bare to the cold, simple calculus of interests and incentives, I'd say "not much." Now take country B, which is roughly akin to the world most of the posters on the board are familiar with. In country B, this scenario is unlikely. Not because the cost/benefit analysis is any different -- see any good zombie movie -- but because morality/ethics/virtue/moral education etc is a big piece of culture and is effective in producing compliance from the vast majority of the population. I'd say it's effective in a couple ways, it not only dissuades folks who might be interested in doing "bad" things, but also fundamentally alters our wants and interests.

In Westeros, I'd argue the prevailing moral codes/belief system/etc is effective in policing a majority of the smallfolk. It's the lords and ladies, the wolves or "hawks" in your model who don't care about the norms and thus misbehave. To the extent that the incentive structure isn't enough to police them, I agree. But I take issue with this notion that morality is irrelevant or doesn't have any meaning. I understand your original intent was a thought experiment where we took morality off the table, but you opened the door to this discussion with your own statements later on in the thread. (And I agree with Butterbumps in my general skepticism about how useful such a simplistic model is to the real world or Westeros).

The vast majority of people obey the law because they perceive the law to be legitimate/good/promoting the general welfare. It's not because they fear the consequences of breaking said law.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

OnionAhaiReborn, on 04 April 2012 - 05:33 AM, said:

What is the purpose of game theory and rational choice models more broadly? They offer an explanation for human behavior. That theorists admit their explanations are imperfect does not affect my ability to be unsatisfied with the imperfection of their explanations. My problem with game theory and rational choice models more broadly is that they don't offer the useful insights that at first glance they appear to offer:

"The model is actually incredibly valuable, in the sense that you can know that someone will always choose to act in his or her own self interest to the detriment of the group (or at least other individuals) when allowed to do so. If a group knows this, it can then make better decisions about laws, methods of redistribution, rules apportioning power to individuals, all in consideration of the choice between increasing the collective good or allowing individuals the right to make self-interested choices."

I might object and say, but individuals can't possibly know what is actually in their self interest. And you respond, yes, but it only matters that individuals act in accordance with what they believe is their self interest. So then I object and say, no, individuals will not always choose their self interest (at this point I am seeing self interest as seeking material utility*), they might do something in the benefit of the group instead of their self interest. And you respond that I am misunderstanding self interest and, in fact, they placed some greater immaterial utility on materially benefiting the group over materially benefiting themselves, making it in their self interest- even if that immaterial utility is simply that they highly value doing 'nice' or 'right' things. My mistake was in thinking that self interest had to be material. So self interest, thus clarified, is just 'what an individual wants to do.'

So self interest has been drawn out to a sufficiently diffuse concept that it is not really objectionable to most people, sure, it seems fairly obvious that people want and seek what they want. But how do we know what they want? I've just been told, in answer to this question, that individuals want their perceived self interest, but without any objectively verifiable self interest we can't test this.

No but we can surmise that an individual completely incapable of discerning their self interest would not survive.  Further, we can surmise that an individual who defined their self interest solely as material goods for their consumption would not reproduce, so individuals who behaved based on this standard would tend to be eliminated from the population. We can observe and postulate situations where individuals pool their resources and cooperate to serve their self interest.  Now we could assume that people knowingly cooperate to their detriment.  But individuals who did this who did this would be at a disadvantage and would tend to die out over time as compared to those who cooperated selfishly and took advantage of those who cooperated to their own detriment.

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It's just an assumption that people are choosing their perceived self interest, because we have no way of proving that this is true, without asking and answering the question of how

by any means available to them?

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they satisfy the diffuse standard of getting what they want, which I believe requires understanding why individuals want what they want

I'm not sure it does.   Its not clear that individuals themselves understand why they want what they want

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, and then putting to the test whether this actually happens in the real world. But, no problem, I'm willing to accept the assumption that people want and seek what they want.

So accepting that assumption, game theory and rational choice models will tell you that people will always choose whatever path brings them the most utility (whatever it may be that gives them utility), and will therefore 'cheat'- or break laws, rules, codes of honor and morality, because the only real choices are over self interested incentives and costs and until you can structure incentives and costs to enforce those laws, rules, codes, there is no reason to follow them. This insight tells me that if I want to change behavior, I need to change incentives and costs. But wait- how will I know how to structure costs and incentives unless I know what people want and how they get it? And how can I know what people want if I don't know why they want it? What was the usefulness of that insight, again?


*and most models I've seen do rely on some quantifiable, material form of utility.

. You don't need know what people want or how they get.  All you need to do is pick your arbitrary set of behaviors that you find objectionable and enforce penalties in order to discourage them.  Randall Tarly does this in Maiden Pool.  And then pick your arbitrary set of behaviors you want encourage and reward people.  Currency is the easiest reward, but Lands and Titles, sex and respect also work in Westeros, sometimes better.  Kevan Lannister does this, as he's administering the Riverlands after Tywin's death.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

SerBarristan, on 04 April 2012 - 03:32 PM, said:

Thought experiment:

Country A has a population of 100. There are 2 police officers in country A to enforce laws. Rape is against the law in Country A. 20 young droogies of country A like themselves a bit o' rape and ultraviolence. They reasonably conclude they can overwhelm the 2 officers and remainder of population in direct conflict. What prevents the 20 from going on a raping rampage?

what's a droogie? So you're saying it makes you feel better?

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In a world stripped bare to the cold, simple calculus of interests and incentives, I'd say "not much." Now take country B, which is roughly akin to the world most of the posters on the board are familiar with. In country B, this scenario is unlikely. Not because the cost/benefit analysis is any different -- see any good zombie movie -- but because morality/ethics/virtue/moral education etc is a big piece of culture and is effective in producing compliance from the vast majority of the population.

does it there are more than 200,000 reported rapes a year in the US with 1/6 women and 1/33 men reporting being raped at some point in their life

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I'd say it's effective in a couple ways, it not only dissuades folks who might be interested in doing "bad" things, but also fundamentally alters our wants and interests.

In Westeros, I'd argue the prevailing moral codes/belief system/etc is effective in policing a majority of the smallfolk. It's the lords and ladies, the wolves or "hawks" in your model who don't care about the norms and thus misbehave. To the extent that the incentive structure isn't enough to police them, I agree. But I take issue with this notion that morality is irrelevant or doesn't have any meaning. I understand your original intent was a thought experiment  

for the purpose of the model whether morality exists or not does not matter. I personally do not think that it exists.  But those are separate things

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where we took morality off the table, but you opened the door to this discussion with your own statements later on in the thread. (And I agree with Butterbumps in my general skepticism about how useful such a simplistic model is to the real world or Westeros).

The vast majority of people obey the law because they perceive the law to be legitimate/good/promoting the general welfare. It's not because they fear the consequences of breaking said law.

How do you know that?

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

butterbumps!, on 04 April 2012 - 02:10 PM, said:

LLL,

I have read the PM and OP, and I do think I understand it pretty well.   It is a binary model of agression/ non-aggression, albeit where the aggression of the players varies according to their interaction with others in the scenario.

I'm asking you a specific question though.   What insight to do you gain about Westeros or even the real world from this specific model?   Both you and the the quote say, essentially, "this model is simple, but can be useful for understanding an idea."   But I'm asking what is it specifically that is being proven here by this model- what new knowledge of life or Westerosi behaviors does this model elucidate?  

I'm taking a guess, because I don't think you've fully articulated it yet.   Are you saying simply that based on this binary model (and only based on this model- so suspending normative arguments and moral complexity)  Littlefinger's actions are reasonable in the context of Westeros, and that without people like LF, the Neds and Edmures would be otherwise unsustainable?  If this is what you are trying to say, it would be more helpful if instead of reposting that very dense quote, you formulated an argument as to why this is the case.   I have read your posted quote 10 times, and I honestly cannot figure out what it is trying to say as a larger statement on human behavior, nor can I figure out why an entirely dove-comprised society is unsustainable.  All I'm asking is that you really articulate out a thorough application of this theory 1. in terms of what the model is actually saying, and 2. how you see these "insights" as they apply to Westeros.

Well not quite. Hawk and Dove are strategies undertaken by individuals.  Bully and Retaliation are also strategies.  Because by definition a Hawk always attacks and a Dove always surrenders, any deviation from this is a unique strategy.  No what the model says is that given a world consisting only of doves.  This may be best possible world.  Every individual person may benefit the most from this world. But give a world where everyone always surrenders and no one ever fights, the benefits to be gain by any person willing to deviate from the pattern would be enormous.  So even if such a  place ever did exist, it would be constantly in endanger of individuals within the society deciding to deviate from "always peaceful" and from individuals from other non-peaceful societies infiltrating their utopia.

[SerBarristan]

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what's a droogie? So you're saying it makes you feel better?

What makes me feel better? It's a reference to A Clockwork Orange...

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does it there are more than 200,000 reported rapes a year in the US with 1/6 women and 1/33 men reporting being raped at some point in their life

Yeah ok. Rape is a bad example for multiple reasons. (And no, not because the numbers don't support my general point. Rape is a lot more complicated than other crime and I'm just looking for a placeholder for something heinous). Sub out rape for murder for the sake of the thought experiment.

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for the purpose of the model whether morality exists or not does not matter. I personally do not think that it exists.  But those are separate things

I don't care whether you think it exists or whether your model says it matters, and I'm skeptical whether your model means anything at all. My point is to the extent that lots of people believe morality exists and teach their kids ideas of "right and wrong" and all the cultural "stuff" that's wrapped up in that, morality is meaningful and important because it does regulate human behavior for a big chunk of the population, imo. I'm not arguing the existence of objective morality. Just the power of its existence as a cultural force in real life.

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How do you know that?

Same way you "know" that it's only about incentives. If you're demanding a lengthy quote from some 1920's expert, I'll go drudge one up.

But if you look at society, there's strong evidence you need both the moral underpinning and the incentives to create a stable, sustainable society. Without some idea of "moral good" or "legitimacy" laws are just arbitirary threats of violence/imprisonment. While I generally eschew the idea that humanity is moving down a linear path, I do think that in the "marketplace of ideas" societies based on the caprice and brutality of despots tend to collapse, whereas societies rooted in some fundamental, popular ideas (freedom, equality, general welfare whatever) are going to last longer because the people are more invested in and support said regimes.

I'd be interested to see a breakdown of democratic vs authoritarian regimes by security forces/police/paramilitary expenditure per capita. (U.S. should be taken out of that analysis because we're an empire and increasingly a non-democratic police state). My guess is that the authoritarian regimes spend a lot more on domestic security forces because they have they need to increase the costs of noncompliance, whereas ostensibly democratic societies do not because the populace believes the regime and its laws are more legitimate/moral/etc.

I also think the zombie reference is meaningful (it sounds silly but I'm serious). If everyone decided tomorrow to go crazy and start killing each other, the security forces in most societies are overwhelmed, ya? In great enough numbers, the system of incentives/deterrants no longer matter. Why then don't more people get together and start killing folks? Because we're socialized from birth not to indulge anti-social impulses. We're inculcated these norms, and I think most of the public takes it for granted. I'm not dismissing incentives. I think they're probably more important than the ideas in a lot of cases. But norms are an important component too and absent those you have a lot more chaos.

Another point on your model is that straight up rational self-interest is kind of a myth. There's a lot of literature out now that says people do not behave rationally and that the assumptions of modern economics are very wrong in this respect.

Edited by SerBarristan, 04 April 2012 - 04:47 PM.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

butterbumps!, on 04 April 2012 - 07:18 AM, said:

I think your answer is really reasonable, but I think it ultimately speaks against the acceptance of game theory as a device for analyzing human behavior.   I think it's also a bit different than how I was imagining your hypothetical.

Regarding sports, a big issue is that there is a single set of rules that the players, coaches and fans understand, and these rules are enforced in realtime by an impartial referee.  

Well see this is precisely my point. intentionally violating the rules in order to gain an advantage is an accepted practice. and of course there are supposed to higher penalties for intentionally committing a foul

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There are consequences, in real time, when players do not adhere to the rules, as well as consequences for a referee who is incompetent or not impartial.   I know that there are behaviors that really toe the line of legality in sports, but a player who excessively uses unsportsman-like behavior does not ultimately "win" solely based on this semi-legal practice  

I don't know what you mean by this. And I never knew what unsportsmanly-behavior was.  I just play to win. But anyway there isn't a consensus there is a rule book, most of the players have never seen.  And there are unwritten rules that players enforce again each other. So as I said, holding may be considered OK by players while a legal "dirty" hit is not ok.  Then there are entire tactical methodologies that are ignored because of normative social pressures http://www.newyorker...a_fact_gladwell

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, and besides, fouls result in penalty shots since they aren't actually legal moves.  Michael Jordan may have played a little dirty as you say, but he's respected for having transcendent talent in the sport.

OK? What's your point? He still cheated all the time.  

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But this example is very unlike the hawk/ dove model for a few reasons- while "morality" is beside the point in both, sports have a set of universally accepted "laws" and enforcement of those "laws," which is decidedly absent from your model.   Sports are a highly contained world, and legality is what applies there, whereas in your model, you attempt to elucidate human behavior at its core, without a rule framework to govern one's actions.   (Please correct me if I'm wrong), but if I go with your hawk/ dove premise, it is a model to explain how people interact with no system other than "human behavior" to govern the outcomes, right?   So there really is no external system but the one that humans (hawks and doves) themselves create through social interactions.   And as this model precludes a system of "law and enforcement" from developing in order to regulate behavior, it is only to be expected that those willing to use force are the most successful, as it only considers the duality between aggression/ non-aggression.

I (think) I understand the essence of your model, but I can't help but think that it only proves the necessity of laws (or a notion of morality) to emerge for the sake of sustainability, if nothing else.  In evolutionary terms, going back to pre-law and notions of morality, the strongest and most violent "monkeys" had great advantages (which speaks to your model).  But what about the smaller monkeys who couldn't compete with the hawks and turned instead to developing tools and other intellectual pursuits?  

well you're sort of begging the question. in this particular model the assumption is that all agents are equal and only their strategies are different. in a chimpanzee the Hawk strategy could well include picking up a stick and using it to menace doves into surrendering.  There's nothing that says the Hawk strategy has to rely on brute force and not intelligence. In fact its quite possible humans became so intelligent precisely in order to manipulate one another.

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It also seems that you are not exactly "anti-law" either, but believe that those who creatively interpret or toe the line should not be found reprehensible for their actions.  I don't disagree with this.  It sort of reminds me of arguments I get into about the spirit of Scrabble-  there are players who filibuster, wanting to make the most beautiful 8 syllable words as being intellectually rigorous, whereas I don't shy away from tiny words placed on bonus tiles in order to win the game.  It's a silly example, but I think it illustrates neutrally the kind of "cheating" you're talking about that isn't really cheating, but about interpreting the "rules" for maximum personal benefit.   But again, that's a game, with very delimited, incontestable rules, with nothing at stake but "winning." I'm less happy, for example, when a serial rapist gets off because the arresting officer failed to read him the Miranda clause, or because it wasn't explicitly legislated that bonuses would not be covered by government bailout money, that the CEOs took bonuses anyway.

But one last thing regarding your thoughts on "stealing."   The "intellectual theft" you'd mentioned is very different then how I first understood it.   When I think of stealing, cheating, violating someone, I was more railing against goods that were rivalrous and exclusionary (such that my taking of your things directly infringed on your ability to enjoy them).   Intellectual property is somewhat different, and a very modern concept that is incredibly hard to govern or enforce, because ideas are not tangible or necessarily ownable.   I think in some cases- like the emergence of programming, artists like Picasso-- that those thefts are something a lot different than what your model suggests.  The Picasso thing speaks back to "there's nothing new under the sun," and he was directly referring to his "theft" of primitive art- and in reality, he did make it his own.   These examples have more to do with invention, using someone else work to engineer a newer, better product than what had come before (in a word, progress).  What the model suggest, conversely, is that taking by force something rivalrous and exclusionary from others for your sole personal benefit is ok and sustainable, which I don't believe in either case.  And there's no reward for those who just plagiarize someone else's work- as a society, we don't tolerate (or at least admire) completely regurgitated intellectual theft where the author contributes nothing of his own.

In the Steve Jobs case, what Picaso meant is a little beside the point.  What Jobs meant basically is, the rules do not apply to me.  And of course, intellectual property is not new.  There really were kings who killed or imprisoned their stone mason so the secrets of their building techniques would not spread, like Megor the Cruel.  That's why Gendry had to pay a fee before becoming a apprentice to master Mott.

I'll respond to the rest of this stuff later.

Edited by Lord Littlefinger's Lash, 04 April 2012 - 04:48 PM.

[Faceless Syrio]

Lord Littlefinger, on 04 April 2012 - 02:07 PM, said:

self interest is a bit of an amorphous term, but it would always be so because no two individual will ever exactly the same conditions anyway.  So even when limiting the model to self-interest  to the detriment of others formaterial goods.  Each individual will still derive a different utility from said material good anyway and can be expected to compete more or less vehemently for this resource accordingly, this does not mean that these individuals can be said to be behaving in a more or less self-interested manner relative to one another.

In the context of the game theory being discussed, self interest is not an amorphous term.  Addressing the latter part of the hawk/dove scenario, where one can choose the strategy one wants to employ, a self-interested actor will act to maximize his own points.  It's an objective, tangible measurement.  One who is less self-interested will try to implement a strategy for the overall pie to increase.  I think the scenario expressly stated that to be best achieved by all choosing to be doves (+15 for everyone).  It won't work without other factors in place, but it is still objectively less self-interested.  Therefore, the way to measure self-interested is seeking a) as much indiividual ownership as possible at all times; and b ) doing so even in the face of depriving others of that same thing.

Getting into the value one derives from living up to a set of moral values, or receiving friendship, or getting that one stamp in existence to fill a collection -- otherwise known as measuring the happiness/self-fulfillment/etc. one gets out of taking a certain action -- is not really in the scope of the model.  You have to assume that people want and benefit from the "points" they obtain, whether for survival or not; you can also just assume that aggregate demand sets the value of the resource, and if one wants that thing less than others, he can exchange it for what he does want.  Either way, how much utility someone derives is not an open question.

Edited by Faceless Syrio, 04 April 2012 - 06:25 PM.

[Faceless Syrio]

SerBarristan, on 04 April 2012 - 04:42 PM, said:

I don't care whether you think it exists or whether your model says it matters, and I'm skeptical whether your model means anything at all. My point is to the extent that lots of people believe morality exists and teach their kids ideas of "right and wrong" and all the cultural "stuff" that's wrapped up in that, morality is meaningful and important because it does regulate human behavior for a big chunk of the population, imo. I'm not arguing the existence of objective morality. Just the power of its existence as a cultural force in real life.

I don't think you have to disagree with anything about the game theory model to accept morality's influence over culture and behavior.  Continuously conflating the idea of predicting inevitable behavior of some individual in a group with predicting the behavior of a particular individual screws up the point.  Lots of people, even 99%, could live to a moral code, but you cannot deny that someone will eventually break it to seek their advantage.

Another hidden assumption in your comment here is that the very act that we are talking about someone doing – seeking to maximize a resource -- is immoral.  That’s not at all true.  The point, in fact, is that the resource is a good thing.  So moral people living by a code will still seek it and use it.  They will also try to find a way for the immoral people to not take it from them.  That’s the entire reason the model works – regardless of the dictates of the morality of the actors on almost every issue, people will start to behave in a self-interested way; if they don’t, they will lose out completely.  I said this before: the only moral choice in the game is whether you act for the collective good or for yourself to the detriment of others in competing to gain the resource.  That’s it.  After you get it, you could turn around and give it all away.  In fact, that’s what a lot of Conservatives base their whole (expressed out loud) political ideology on: free market all the way, then individuals can help others through charity if they want, just without the government’s involvement.

Regarding whether the model means anything at all, it absolutely does.  It is a fundamental influence on all forms of government; in a way, it’s the very heart of the concept of “checks and balances.”  Unions, environmental protection law, tort law, rules about electoral districts, redistributive taxes, levels of judicial scrutiny of legistlation – all of it flows from the basic concept that you have to prevent people from doing things that only serve themselves when those things inflict harm on the collective good.

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But if you look at society, there's strong evidence you need both the moral underpinning and the incentives to create a stable, sustainable society. Without some idea of "moral good" or "legitimacy" laws are just arbitirary threats of violence/imprisonment. While I generally eschew the idea that humanity is moving down a linear path, I do think that in the "marketplace of ideas" societies based on the caprice and brutality of despots tend to collapse, whereas societies rooted in some fundamental, popular ideas (freedom, equality, general welfare whatever) are going to last longer because the people are more invested in and support said regimes.

This seems a little too focused on preventing violent crime.  While that is part of it, the real “problem” the model shows that can be addressed by law is the uneven distribution of power and wealth due to people acting for their own benefit.  Both of those things are classically and tragically overlooked by systems of morality.  Which is why it is so hard to get a “white collar” criminal put into jail.
The analysis that applies to the world of ASOIAF is the competition for power.  Not material resources, per se, but power and control over others.  That is what motivates and is the central struggle.  It is why the first book is called Game of Thrones and the second Clash of Kings (well, that one is more literal...but still).

I may be able to elaborate more on this later, but since I can’t now, I just wanted to point out that the assumption has been this the whole time that Ned Stark is a dove in the example.  He is not.  He is the retaliator who plays dove when around doves but is (theoretically) ready to be a hawk when facing a hawk.  The reason he lost is not because he was a dove, but because in the real (fantasy) world, hawks don’t just tell you right away what they are.  They wait until they have the advantage and strike when it gives them the most gain, especially if you are an obvious retaliator.  If they’re good at it, that is.  Which LF clearly is.

[butterbumps!]

Lord Littlefinger, on 04 April 2012 - 04:48 PM, said:

Well see this is precisely my point. intentionally violating the rules in order to gain an advantage is an accepted practice. and of course there are supposed to higher penalties for intentionally committing a foulI don't know what you mean by this. And I never knew what unsportsmanly-behavior was.  I just play to win. But anyway there isn't a consensus there is a rule book, most of the players have never seen.  And there are unwritten rules that players enforce again each other. So as I said, holding may be considered OK by players while a legal "dirty" hit is not ok.  Then there are entire tactical methodologies that are ignored because of normative social pressures http://www.newyorker...a_fact_gladwell  OK? What's your point? He still cheated all the time.  

well you're sort of begging the question. in this particular model the assumption is that all agents are equal and only their strategies are different. in a chimpanzee the Hawk strategy could well include picking up a stick and using it to menace doves into surrendering.  There's nothing that says the Hawk strategy has to rely on brute force and not intelligence. In fact its quite possible humans became so intelligent precisely in order to manipulate one another.

In the Steve Jobs case, what Picaso meant is a little beside the point.  What Jobs meant basically is, the rules do not apply to me.  And of course, intellectual property is not new.  There really were kings who killed or imprisoned their stone mason so the secrets of their building techniques would not spread, like Megor the Cruel.  That's why Gendry had to pay a fee before becoming a apprentice to master Mott.

With all due respect, LLL, I still do not understand precisely what you're trying to say regarding game theory.

I'm going to try to respond in such a way that better articulates which parts of your arguments I do not follow.   Firstly, cheating is something that only happens when there are legitimate rules, even if everyone does not fully accept them.   If I interpret the rules in Scrabble to use short banal words for maximum benefit to myself, I am still operating within the rules, even if my companions think I'm being "cheap."   However, if I were to sneak new letter tiles or the like, that would be cheating, because that is in direct violation of the rules.    In your hawk-dove model, there are no such things as rules, and that is your whole point.  You keep referring to "cheating" and the like which makes no sense, and is only confusing me further, because you keep telling us to suspend our belief in laws/ rules/ morals.  If you're looking at an example in which laws play no role, then there is no such thing as cheating (kind of like why the lion is neither good nor evil for killing antelope, and why there's no such thing as "virgins" in the animal kingdom).

I think you need to disaggregate the pieces of your argument, as contradictory parts keep becoming colluded by imprecise terminology and arguments that do not logically follow.  I'm really not trying to give you a hard time, I am just so confused by what you're trying to say.   I get the fact that you use these kinds of models as a lens through which you analyze real life situations.   What I've been trying to ask is for you to show us how to use these models.    You keep referring back to the model as though it is self-evident that it applies to more complex situations.  I am asking for you to show me how to interpret behaviors using this model, because I am legitimately not sure how, as it is not self-evident, and because you persist in using terminology like stealing, cheating, etc that have legal/ moral connotations.  If you want to use this model, you have to use aggression/ non aggression exclusively, so that there is a consistent framework to form logical arguments around.

Lord Littlefinger, on 04 April 2012 - 04:09 PM, said:

Well not quite. Hawk and Dove are strategies undertaken by individuals.  Bully and Retaliation are also strategies.  Because by definition a Hawk always attacks and a Dove always surrenders, any deviation from this is a unique strategy.  No what the model says is that given a world consisting only of doves.  This may be best possible world.  Every individual person may benefit the most from this world. But give a world where everyone always surrenders and no one ever fights, the benefits to be gain by any person willing to deviate from the pattern would be enormous.  So even if such a  place ever did exist, it would be constantly in endanger of individuals within the society deciding to deviate from "always peaceful" and from individuals from other non-peaceful societies infiltrating their utopia.

I do not see how this is not what I said- that it is a binary model in which aggression/ non-aggression is the sole factor to evaluate.   I recognized that the roles shift.
But what I still don't understand about the model specifically is this:
Let's assume that everyone is a dove.   You say that this is unsustainable because there will inevitably be hawks from outside the particular community of doves who will threaten the doves.   Thus every community needs hawks around in case of an external invasion.  Am I understanding this correctly?
Now, what if there is no external threat- since we're using such a highly circumscribed model, why can't we assume that all communities are entirely made up of doves.  What then?   Is that still unsustainable?

But, for a second, I'll go with your hypothetical.  Let's say that Westeros is entirely full of doves.  Winter comes, and it turns out the Others are a big threat to human life (so they're hawks).  So, when confronted by these hawks, the doves stand up to this aggression by themselves becoming hawks in order to diffuse the threat.   The Others are defeated, Westeros goes back to peace, and let's assume the doves go back to being doves, since they are no longer threatened.   So what?   What does this tell us?   Frankly, those you call "doves" in the story tend to know how to stand up for themselves.  What does this analysis really yield?

[butterbumps!]

Faceless Syrio, on 04 April 2012 - 06:59 PM, said:

Regarding whether the model means anything at all, it absolutely does.  It is a fundamental influence on all forms of government; in a way, it’s the very heart of the concept of “checks and balances.”  Unions, environmental protection law, tort law, rules about electoral districts, redistributive taxes, levels of judicial scrutiny of legistlation – all of it flows from the basic concept that you have to prevent people from doing things that only serve themselves when those things inflict harm on the collective good.

Can you explain how this model means something?   Because what you state about how it is used for checks and balances, and how it stems from the concept that you have to prevent people from inflicting harm on the collective good is something that several of us have been arguing for the last 11 pages of this thread, and LLL has repeatedly insisted that this is not what to derive from the model.

[OnionAhaiReborn]

Faceless Syrio, on 04 April 2012 - 09:52 AM, said:

That's not what I would respond, actually.  I think the difference is in our understanding of what the model really says.  It does not say that all individuals always act in their self-interest, making "self-interest" the amorphous and ultimately useless concept you correctly point out it would then become.  It says that, when a group of individuals competes for a resource, whatever that resource is, someone - not all, but at least one -- will always choose to further his or her own self-interest to the detriment of others.  The important relationship is that there is an action the person could take to benefit both himself and others, but taking another action gives that particular person more for himself than the first, and someone will always make that choice.  In that sense, it's the choice between making it zero sum (totally self-interested and harmful to others) and mutually beneficial (sacrificing a little individually so all can benefit).

But the point is explicitly not that everyone will always act in their own "self-interest." Some will always act less self-interested than others, in relationship to the competition for a resource.  (And fwiw, I agree that it is usually in the context of material resources, but it does not have to be.  It just has to be something people fight over that is not inexhaustible.)

Ok. There are a couple of points here that are muddling the issue up a bit. I think the most important is the point that I am not attempting to talk only about the hawk/dove model. I purposely broadened the discussion to what my experience has been with game theory/rational choice models more broadly, and the underlying assumptions used to justify these things. My experience has been that humans are assumed to be solely rationally self-interested actors in these models, and that we predict their actions based on their self interest. LLL has held to this position, that even if actors are only choosing their perceived maximum utility, and even if their self-interest is immaterial, they are still always seeking what they believe to be their self-interest. And I do think that holding that position stretches self-interest out to something exceedingly diffuse.

Now, in the case of the hawk/dove model. You're right, the purpose of the model is to say that a society of all doves (non aggressors) will always be at risk of having a hawk arrive/evolve/aggressive strategy arise to the detriment of others. And you don't hold the view that humans are always self-interested actors. Ok. I still don't see the usefulness of this insight. It tells me that someone, although not necessarily everyone, will act in their own interest rather than the interest of the group. What am I going to do with this insight? Well, it's still going to tell me that I need to change incentives in order to stop that someone from acting in their own interest to the detriment of the group. But there is still nothing about this model that tells me in a useful way why that someone is defecting. (Especially when you've removed even the diffuse attempt rational choice theorists usually use to explain behavior- utility maximization). You're saying some people will maximize group utility, and others will maximize their own utility at the expense of the group. Now we really have no idea why people are doing what they're doing. And I will still say that unless we are coming to an understanding of why, we're not providing any useful information about how we ought to change the incentives of the game being played in order to produce an outcome we consider more desirable. If you don't know what collection of incentives and costs are leading some to choose selfish strategies while others choose strategies that benefit the group, how can we hope to change the behavior of the self-interested?

Lord Littlefinger, on 04 April 2012 - 12:16 PM, said:

no, I won't if you don't assert them as fact but rather as a thought experiment. I didn't always think the way I do now and I presume I won't always in the future.  To this point however no one has presented as viable alternative.  Usually they say something like morality is good therefore people should be moral.  When I challenge your assertions usually its because 1) I want to know what your underlying assumptions are and 2) I want to know if you know what your underlying assumptions.  Is your premise derived by logically extend a set of basic assumptions or does it really on the Dothraki principle "It is known"?

Assumptions are asserting 'It is known' and then drawing conclusions off of those assumptions. But no, I would not say 'morality is good and therefore people should be moral'. For the purposes of human behavior, my assumption is that there is such a thing as morality that is defined by common human experience, that it is observable as a tendency to build societies that seek less harm and greater good for the greatest numbers, and that this moral concept is an important factor in driving behavior.

Lord Littlefinger, on 04 April 2012 - 03:33 PM, said:

No but we can surmise that an individual completely incapable of discerning their self interest would not survive.  Further, we can surmise that an individual who defined their self interest solely as material goods for their consumption would not reproduce, so individuals who behaved based on this standard would tend to be eliminated from the population. We can observe and postulate situations where individuals pool their resources and cooperate to serve their self interest.  Now we could assume that people knowingly cooperate to their detriment.  But individuals who did this who did this would be at a disadvantage and would tend to die out over time as compared to those who cooperated selfishly and took advantage of those who cooperated to their own detriment.

You're saying that individuals who weren't interested in the right things would not survive, not that individuals who were incapable of discerning their self interest would not survive. One can conceivably know that their self interest does not lead to survival and reproduction and it would still be self interest.

In any case, you're right that we could surmise that based on the assumptions. That's still not proving that the assumptions were correct in the first place.

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by any means available to them?

'How' doesn't mean what you are taking it to mean in this context. I'm saying how in the sense of what methods they use to bring them utility, as in more utility from eating a cookie over eating a cupcake. I'm not saying how in the sense of what methods they would use to get the cookie.

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I'm not sure it does.   Its not clear that individuals themselves understand why they want what they want . You don't need know what people want or how they get.  All you need to do is pick your arbitrary set of behaviors that you find objectionable and enforce penalties in order to discourage them.  Randall Tarly does this in Maiden Pool.  And then pick your arbitrary set of behaviors you want encourage and reward people.  Currency is the easiest reward, but Lands and Titles, sex and respect also work in Westeros, sometimes better.  Kevan Lannister does this, as he's administering the Riverlands after Tywin's death.

But of course it matters that we understand how people decide subjectively what things they value. If we don't know what things a potential rule-breaker values, we won't know what punishments will serve as the best deterrents to keep them from breaking our rules (even if our rules are arbitrary).

Edited by OnionAhaiReborn, 04 April 2012 - 07:49 PM.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

Faceless Syrio, on 04 April 2012 - 06:25 PM, said:

In the context of the game theory being discussed, self interest is not an amorphous term.

yes yes yes.

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  Addressing the latter part of the hawk/dove scenario, where one can choose the strategy one wants to employ, .

well in this game, I don't actually think they can chose their strategy. they're just born employing a particular strategy

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a self-interested actor will act to maximize his own points.  It's an objective, tangible measurement.  One who is less self-interested will try to implement a strategy for the overall pie to increase. .  I think the scenario expressly stated that to be best achieved by all choosing to be doves (+15 for everyone).  It won't work without other factors in place, but it is still objectively less self-interested

um...i need you to walk me through your logic.  I'm not sure it is objectively less self interested.

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.  Therefore, the way to measure self-interested is seeking a) as much indiividual ownership as possible at all times; and b ) doing so even in the face of depriving others of that same thing.

Getting into the value one derives from living up to a set of moral values, or receiving friendship, or getting that one stamp in existence to fill a collection -- otherwise known as measuring the happiness/self-fulfillment/etc. one gets out of taking a certain action -- is not really in the scope of the model.

i'm not sure. does it matter why people one something as long as they're competing for it?

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You have to assume that people want and benefit from the "points" they obtain, whether for survival or not; you can also just assume that aggregate demand sets the value of the resource, and if one wants that thing less than others, he can exchange it for what he does want.  Either way, how much utility someone derives is not an open question.

yeah we're basically saying the same thing. however most of the things in question in game of thrones aren't commodities.  each item is essentially unique.  There's only one Erie, one winterfell, one iron throne, one master of coin ect, ect. and there' no market mechanism for pricing them.

[Lord Littlefinger's Lash]

butterbumps!, on 04 April 2012 - 07:21 PM, said:

Can you explain how this model means something?   Because what you state about how it is used for checks and balances, and how it stems from the concept that you have to prevent people from inflicting harm on the collective good is something that several of us have been arguing for the last 11 pages of this thread, and LLL has repeatedly insisted that this is not what to derive from the model.

none of those things are part of the model, and is precisely what I have been saying.  My point is that Westeros doesn't have any of those things.  And that if you want to prevent people from acting like Tywin and Littlefinger then you have an independent system to impose the costs of negative externalities upon them. Otherwise someone is going to do what Tywin and Littlefinger do.