KAH, on 19 March 2013 - 04:10 AM, said:
Well, I gather part of the problem is that all the local autonomous bits of resistance have only a notional link to the FSA leadership, proclaiming their support and allegiance, but not receiving acting orders (or if they do, choose for themselves whether they'd like to follow them or not).
Offering material support to the FSA leadership could change that; they would not simply be people in fancy uniforms trying to tell you what to do - they would have something helpful to offer their nominal subordinates.
Of course, you'd need a careful vetting process; setting down clear lines between what is FSA and what is not FSA...
As the piece points out, the 'FSA leadership' consists of a couple dozen defector generals, almost all of them outside Syria and with no armies to match their big titles. There's no FSA for them to lead, and few of the groups doing the fighting have any respect or alliegence to them.
Arming one leader or another will make them a magnet for fighting groups who need the arms but it won't of itself improve combat capacity or command and control. Weapons could just as easily be used for settling scores with other groups, or handed out on the basis of political and personal preferences instead of need and ability. The latter, and probably the former are inevitable given the tensions that already exist between jihadist and 'moderate' fighting groups.
This is a Syrian problem, requiring a Syrian solution. The opposition has to knit itself together if it's going to hold in the face of the regime and what comes after. The West and the Gulf make an effective, credible Syrian resistance less likely when they seek to bring into being a unity that can only come from Syrians themselves.
Edited by Horza, 19 March 2013 - 05:13 AM.