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Celestial

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  1. The simplest and most logical explanation to this paradox is that Earth-sized rocky planets where life is likely to evolve do not possess enough resources and energy to allow an intelligent species to actually develop into an interstellar civilization. We have already reached a point where we use more resources than the planet can regenerate within a year and we are nowhere close to possessing the engineering capability to exploit the resources of own Solar system, although there is nothing in the laws of physics that says we can't. In terms of the laws of physics, mining the asteroid belt, Mars or the rocky moons of the gas giants is easy. Yet, at the current moment, doing more than taking pictures and mineral samples is beyond our grasp. There is a finite amount of oil, hydrogen, uranium, rare metals, etc on Earth and it might not be enough to provide us with the capability of building at least interplanetary ships capable of taking significant amounts of resources from the Solar system and bringing them back to Earth. Most of your statements also assume that technological progress can continue forever, which is not a given. We know, for instance, that fusion happens, but we have no idea if an artificial fusion reactor is technologically possible (to be economically viable, not just as an exotic toy in a lab). It does not have to be something as dramatic as "intelligent species effectively ending themselves". At one point, technological development can stall because most which was feasible for a sentient civilization was achieved or, if theoretical developments would still occur, putting them into practice might not be achievable within the constraints of a planetary civilization.
  2. That's a nonsensical argument. If those "adversaries" target western countries' refineries, they won't do that based on Ukraine's decisions. It is fear of retaliation which held those adversaries back, not concern for warfare decorum.
  3. Werthead, do you have a source about this news and Macron's statement? I am from Romania and I have not heard anything, neither from the French press, nor the Romanian one. I briefly saw a tweet from France 24 about it, but the tweet has disappeared in less than 30 minutes. PS: Don't count on Romania too much, though. While (most of) the public opinion is on Ukraine's side, the government is weak and wimpy and the Romanian army leaves a lot to be desired.
  4. Because humans are world champions at deluding themselves when inconvenient decisions have to be made. And the kind of politicians which Europe and America have at the moment are even better at this then your average human. Biden and Europe slow dripped the military aid not as part of some clever strategy, but because, at every step, they clung to the hope that maybe will be enough and Ukraine will manage with what they got, so US/Europe won't need to commit more. If you have trouble understanding this mindset, think of the gambling addicts, who always make one more bet despite losses piling up, in the deluded belief that "maybe next time I'll win" - until they squander all their fortune away. This a similar mindset at play: "maybe Javelins will be enough" , "maybe several Himars will be enough", "maybe 100 tanks will be enough", etc. US and Europe has been (and still is) playing this game at Ukraine's expense, until they will squander all Ukraine's defensive capabilities away. Truth be told, it is not just the fault of the politicians. If Scholz were to come tomorrow and announce that Germany must institute a 5% war tax to rebuild its weapon industry and draft 300,000 troops to rebuild its army, what do you think the German public would say? European/American public opinion is indeed supporting Ukraine (although Russia is chipping away at that)... as long as the support remains cheap. As for not having a "a viable strategy to deal with the Russian invasion", of course they don't. They cannot have one, because they have a very limited understanding of how power works in Russia. The whole idea that a ruler (Putin) will accept casualties in the range of 500,000 in WW1-style trench warfare (or that his population won't rise up and lynch him for that) is unfathomable for any Western leader. The fact that the West seriously thought that 100 MBTs and 300 IFVs would be enough for a major offensive also tells its own story. This is a question which needs to be addressed to the European public, first and foremost. The politicians have vacillated, indeed, but if Macron were to announce tomorrow that France must mobilize in support of Ukraine, the French would just vote for Le Pen.
  5. I do not think it is a case of "the pool of competent leadership dried up, right across Western democracies, at some point in the 1990's" as SeanF put it, but rather the fact that NATO and the United States have not faced a major threat from a near-peer adversary for more than 30 years. Just like muscles atrophy if you don't use them, so could strategic thinking. Basically, we have a political class who has lived in a kind of "la belle epoque" for 30 years and who suddenly found itself required to deal with a kind of brutal military expansionism from a near-peer adversary not seen since WW2. It is no surprise that they all, without any single exception, displayed massive complacency, lack of imagination and total incapacity to think outside the box. It is like taking a person who lived for 30 years in a luxury penthouse, all his need covered by a trust fund, and suddenly asking him to plough. And the same thing can be said about the population of Europe and US. If the politicians lived "la belle epoque", so did their constituencies. If you take a population who had not experienced major hardships for decades and suddenly ask them to make significant sacrifices, they are going to scream and whine. Just look at the European farmers recently: the climate change IS coming and is likely to be brutal, yet they don't give a fuck, all they care about is to have cash NOW. If that's how they react to the global warming which is going to affect everyone no matter where they live, to expect them to show better judgment with regard to Russia (which is not likely to march through Berlin or Paris, no matter what turn the events will take) is pointless. This kind of politicians and this kind of constituencies is a match made in hell. Say what you want about Churchill, but, despite all his other flaws, he at least had the boldness to tell point blank that "blood, toil, tears and sweat" was what was required. Any politician of today would rather hang themselves than tell their constituency the same. It's safer for their careers to bury their heads in the sand, offer off-ramps to Putin and hope everything will solve itself away by some kind of divine intervention. This applies to American internal politics as well: because Biden and the democrats never had to deal in their whole life with a situation where a president attempted a coup and with a major political party doing the bidding of a foreign power, they have no clue how to deal with this problem. However, going soft on putschists is a very bad idea, because, if there are no consequences for plotting a coup, they would try again. In Jan 2021, someone like Stefanik claimed the insurrectionists had to be punished. Now, the same Stefanik says there was no insurrection. Why this happened is pretty obvious: in Jan 2021, the MAGA-affiliated politicians thought Trump was done for and will end up in jail quickly. But nothing happened to Trump on that account and, as a result, we have the Republican party back in his thrall and the Project 2025, with the fascists preparing to have a second try and to do it right, this time.
  6. The problem with this kind of comment is that it assumes a dictator's thought process functions the same as for your typical Western politician. I said it before and I will say it again: NATO is as strong as the resolve of its member to actually fight. It is completely pointless to point how much stronger NATO is economically than Russia, when many European armies are in a state of total disrepair and the political future of US is so uncertain. The example of Japan shows the opposite what Darzin implies. How many times does history have to show us that dictators are prone to overestimate their strength and underestimate their opponents? A dictatorial regime tends to think that their willingness and capacity to force their citizenry to starve or take millions of casualties in order to win a war is evidence of strength - while democracies' incapacity to do the same is a sign of weakness. And it is not a 100% bet that such an assessment is absolutely deluded. Yes, Hitlerite Germany, Japan or Saddam were wrong when they thought they could discourage their enemies through high losses. But North Vietnam and the Talibans won by exploiting this exact same scenario: in their case, the assessment that they could outlast America in the long-term was proven correct. And Russia won't try to zerg rush EU. But if it would try to do that to Lithuania, are you absolutely convinced that NATO will send a declaration of war to Moscow in the next 24 hours and start bombing Russian columns? NATO is not some magical formula, where you get to say abracadabra and millions of troops with thousands of tanks and aircraft spring from the ground. Taking it for granted is a major mistake.
  7. Someone probably stole the money intended to pay the guards.
  8. In case of India and Japan, that is one hell of a stretch. That would be the equivalent of saying that Britain and France fear they will be next on Russia's target list. Even I am not saying that, although I think it is obvious I am more pessimistic than you on this matter. But even if I were to grant your point, what is the specific effect of your argument on a potential China-Taiwan clash? My original point was that a defeat of Ukraine might diminish faith in America's promises up to the point that Taiwan might consider yielding rather than relying on American support. Do you argue that India, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Japan will step in and replace American support? Is there any reason for Taiwan to believe this will actually happen? That they feel threatened by Chinese expansionism is clear, but, in response, they will beef their own militaries, not send aid to Taiwan. Also, what exactly means "next"? In case of Russia's neighbours, the threat is very specific: in case of the Baltics, direct annexation and reintegration into "Russki Mir". In case of Romania, the most likely scenario is annexation of Moldova (which is a former Romanian province, known as Bessarabia and which constituted half of the medieval Moldavia, taken away by Russia in 1812 and again by USSR in 1940 and a sore spot both for the Romanian population and the government): in the worst case scenario, Russia could support its puppets from Chisinau to demand parts of the Western Moldavia (pro-russian Igor Dodon is on record claiming that it is a pity Russia did not annex the whole region in 1812) - even if the threat does not actually materialize, Russia would use it to destabilize Romania. Poland is the least threatened from this group and I do not think Russia will actually try to take Polish territory, but covert retaliation and using Polish puppets to stir trouble is possible. What exactly do Japan or India need to fear from China? Actually, 3.5 times. And the disparity is likely larger, because many ended in the occupied territories or fled the country. Then factor in the draft dodging due the drop in morale caused by a seeming endless war which has turned into a meat grinder... Yes, Russia also has issues with draft dodging, but it is easier for them to simply dragoon men into the army than it is for Ukraine. PS: I also want to add that the ratio of 10:1 seems fanciful. All the Western sources I've seen estimate an overall ratio around 3:1, max. Which is not enough. The bolded part IS the problem: whenever you and others say "against NATO", you work with the assumption that NATO will form a united front to confront a Russian aggression against one of its weaker members. It's not certain at all. Putin is banking on NATO blinking and, until now, he has been proven only partially wrong. While the initial NATO reaction was more drastic than he hoped, he still managed to prevent a massive reinforcement of Ukraine with the best gear NATO had available, has several Quislings undermining the alliance from within and whether NATO will manage to support Ukraine in 2024 has become an open question. I would estimate that the chance of NATO similarly dragging their feet to send help to the Baltics is at 50%. This chance in case of Romania is 25% and in case of Poland 10%.
  9. I do not necessarily disagree with the bolded part, but I disagree that in the case of Taiwan the calculation is probably different. I am willing to bet that the same crowd who does not understand the strategic implication of Ukraine's defeat does not even know that Taiwan makes the best chips or what those chips are good for.
  10. I am not sure what you are suggesting here. That India, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Japan will declare war on China if it moves to annex Taiwan? From a Western perspective, yes. From a Russian perspective, less so. And even in this case, Russia has more men and weapons to spend than an unsupported Ukraine does. Having in mind the slow pace of Western decision making and of actual deliveries, what happens now on the diplomatic front shapes what will happen on the military front in the next 6 months, at least. The grim mood of both Ukrainian and Western officials is evidence of this.
  11. The problem is that actions speak louder than words. When this debate will be had in the Taiwanese society and the proponents of resistance to China will argue along those lines, all the proponents of surrender will have to do is point at Ukraine. And, besides, the matter is not as clear cut as you make it to be. 1. Ukraine might not have much things which the Wests need, but the West has not decided to support Ukraine because it needs "wheat and sunflower oil". It did so because Russia has given clear indications that it is trying to go back to its expansionist ways from the tsarist period. From this perspective, Ukraine has massive strategic value because it can be the rock on which the new Russian expansionism can flounder - or its springboard. Do I need to remind you that Putin asked in December 2021 for NATO to go back to the situation from 1997 or the constant threats from Russian propagandists and officials against the Baltics, Finland, Poland or Romania? Taiwan might have the "chips", but it will also require a much greater effort (in money and actual blood) from the US to defend it, the success is much more uncertain even if the US were to go all in and a Chinese take-over does not pose the same risk of the conflict extending further as a Russian victory in Ukraine would. All these would weigh against supporting Taiwan. 2. Whether "the current US President and with it a large part of "the West" doesn't view Ukraine as something that is really worth fighting for" is questionable. The last statements from US and European officials suggest that they actually understand the issue described at point 1. Over the last months, with the war turning against Ukraine, there has been a ton of grim predictions and assessment along these lines, which I am sure you have noticed. The problem is that both US and Europe cannot overcome the institutional inertia embedded in their political and social systems. The root cause of Ukraine's problem is not a conscious decision that Ukraine is not "worth fighting for". It's a combination of complacency, pettiness, internal division, a population who has not been asked to endure any major hardships since WW2 and the stupid hope that the problem might go away on its own (hence the "Putin drops dead" scenarios). Democratic countries also think mostly in electoral cycles and are world champions at passing the can down the road, in the hope that some deux ex machina will solve the problem by then, without them having to make any sacrifices. All these factors still apply to Taiwan as well, they will not magically disappear just because Taiwan makes a lot of chips. If China gives Taiwan an ultimatum, "surrender or be bombed to bits", would you be surprised to see the same crowd which sabotages Ukraine today arguing that "Taiwan really belongs to China and maybe we can cut a deal with Xi Jinping"?
  12. Yeah, ask the Kurds. I've seen this scenario described, to which I agree: Asian countries have every reason to expect the Ukraine scenario in the Pacific: US give promises they cannot fulfil -> You stand against the invader -> Get steamrolled -> Be left to your fate among ashes and ruins. Why not accept your fate now, skipping ashes & ruins part? Ukraine provided US with the most favorable circumstances the US would ever have to support an ally: the US did not have to fight at all, Ukraine did and it was very effective; while 100 billion a year seems much, is the same amount US spent in Iraq/Aghanistan against much weaker foes and, to boot, a lot of these money were not real money, because it represent the theoretical value of old equipment which was destined for the scrapyard anyway. Yet, US is still failing. Until now, the value of the US alliance was that other countries were convinced US would support its allies to the hilt. If that belief goes up in smoke and other countries start testing it at the same time, the value of that alliance will seriously diminish. They don't have to be, because it's not about getting into a reliable alliance with them but simply yielding to their demands. The problem is that, despite its material advantages, US seems uncommitted to win and can be easily distracted or made to back off. Russia and even China, on the other hand, might marshal less resources, but they are much more committed to win. Here is a case in point: if Ukraine fails due to lack of American support, do you really think Taiwan will still considering standing up against China with US support? Or maybe that is the plan, make countries lose faith in America, so US won't have to make the choice whether to fight or not itself?
  13. Even if NATO were to send help, that has to be fast. If NATO will reinforce a member state just like they did with Ukraine, like 1 tank per week and 3 missiles on Saturdays, the alliance is dead. If Roosevelt had reinforced his forces in the theatres of war like Biden did with Ukraine, the US military would have rioted. And morons then ask why Ukraine is not grateful enough. If that happens, I believe US would gradually lose all its alliances in the hot spots of the world, because the lesson of this development will be: always bet against US allies. Why fight together with the US when the latter can (and will) always abandon you at the drop of a hat, and not because of any fault of your own? Wouldn't it just be better to skip the bombing phase and seek an accommodation with America's enemies from the very beginning? If it is shown that the US can be easily intimidated away, then Russia, China, Iran will start testing the waters. And any country in their crosshairs would have to decide their policy without factoring in the US anymore.
  14. I totally blame Biden and the Dems for dragging their feet on the help for Ukraine. Even if the Republican majority in the House had been more sensible and approved the aid, did they intend to send the heavy gear two years into the conflict? Any person with half a brain would know that in two years losses would pile up, morale would drop and war fatigue would set in. Imagine the US sending just a bunch of destroyers and a few subs in the Pacific to fight the Japanese immediately after Pearl Harbor, then sending some cruisers in the summer of 1942, then adding some old battleships at the beginning of 1943, then sending in the carriers near the end of 1943. How the Pacific War would have developed with this "strategy" is pretty easy to guess. That is exactly what Biden did in the Russian-Ukrainian War. That US and Europe hesitated in february-march can be understood: they did not know how effective the Ukrainian resistance would be. But the fact that both US and Europe reinforced Ukraine at the ponderous pace they did after it became clear the Russian first assault failed is criminally incompetent. Europe at least has the excuse that it is not a single country and it is simply not set up to deal quickly with a crisis of this sort - and its arms industry literally rotted after the Cold War. But the US? Biden allowed himself to be bluffed by Putin and that is on him. Frankly, this starts to feel like 1938 all over again (and the excuses for throwing Czechoslovakia to the nazies are eerily similar) and I fear US and Europe might be heading for a very nasty wake up, just like Britain and France did. We all made fun of the Russian army before, but if that is the measure of American/European resolve, I honestly don't see why Putin won't try for more. US spent 100 billions $ a year to fight a bunch of rag tag militias in Iraq and Afghanistan. If giving the same amount to Ukraine to fend off Russia is apparently too much of a hurdle, would America actually fight for some Eastern European countries like the Baltics or even Poland or Romania, even with their NATO status? Because all that bellicosity and determination of last year seems to have melted like snow in the spring at the first hardships - and not just amongst the MAGA. If that is how things are, would Russia really risk that much by attacking NATO? After all, why not? If things go south fro Russia, Putin can always ask for an off-ramp, no?
  15. I would argue that they do. It is just that this MAGA version of GOP does not care: I am willing too bet that they would be perfectly willing to trade half of Europe to Putin if this means they would get to rule the United States of Gilead as they saw fit. Denying aid to Ukraine hurts Biden politically and that is all they care about on this issue.
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