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.H.

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About .H.

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  1. .H.

    Cartoons you'd like to see remade?

    I was actually thinking the exact same. Well, I haven't seen the show since it was literally still on TV, but yeah, the plot has some holes in it. I think you could solve most of them by simply expanding the time frame of things and adding in that while humans focused on other planets and exploiting neo-sapien labor, in a sort "master-slave dialectic," the humans simply aren't able to capably defend themselves much any more. Not to mention, a sort of "go-to" theme where humans are too fractious to be able to defend against a unified neo-sapien offensive.
  2. .H.

    True Detective Season 3 (SPOILERS)

    Right, I should have had a "just" in there, as in, "not just dementia." Otherwise, what is with "her" saying that to him? In other words, why is he saying that to himself there? Unless we suppose that there is something supernatural at hand. In either case, there is something up with what he doesn't want to remember, in my estimation.
  3. .H.

    True Detective Season 3 (SPOILERS)

    I thought Hayes' 2015 (that's the right year?) imagined Amelia's comment about something "he left in the woods" is likely important, but I don't think we can really know what that is supposed to mean. Also, I think the implication was that he ended up somehow being complicit? Not sure. What if part of his memory issues isn't actually dementia, but rather repression of what he found out? Kind of jives a bit with what Hayes implies to the doctor, how they don't know what the problem with his memory is, as I thought the implication was not so much that he has actual dementia (or the like) but rather that he is getting old. Might be misreading that though.
  4. .H.

    Bakker LVI: the Rectum of Creation

    I imagine you are talking about Wutteät, when Akka and Cleric encounter him. It's chapter 15 of White-Luck Warrior. I'm not sure what information you are looking for though. Like, who Wutteät is?
  5. .H.

    Bakker LVI: the Rectum of Creation

    How about this: https://img1.wsimg.com/isteam/ip/c172640c-de47-42b3-ad05-2492648bafc9/5ab6e099-270e-483f-8a9e-937b96048532.jpg That's the original, unresized image from the site, it's 2231x2560. I have no idea where it came from, I think someone just "colorized" the one from the book (probably Jason).
  6. Although I think I had pretty firmly driven off anyone from this thread, since we were discussing Kant (or at least I was) I found this quote (while researching Hegel) from Kant in Anthropologie: My point was never to really say that Kant was indispensably correct, but only to say that his take has merit, even if that merit is solely to illuminate just where such an approach breaks down. In being so against "passion" (not surprising, considering his life) it is little wonder then how and why Kant would arrive at such an "absolute" morality. So, while it is "reasonable" that there could be things absolute, we, as humans, are decidedly not (which is likely for the "best"). Hopefully some looking at Hegel will illuminate some other things as well.
  7. Well, I think that is why it is harder to just toss away (at least for me) Kant's premise. Because there isn't anything wrong with what he says, there is something wrong with bad actors. Which is, pretty much, that they aren't on the Kantian system. So, Kant gives us a good system, but a totally impractical one. I can't say why, but that distinction makes a difference to me. I guess it is something like the distinction between "Absolutes don't exist" and "Absolutes are not practical." Right, ok, I'd agree with you in general, really. But I do actually think that if anyone asks for your opinion and you give them one honestly and they dislike you for that they are the bad actor, not you. Of course there is nuance, because I'm something of a "language is never neutral" sort of person, so how you say something will always matter, but I think it is a very bad idea, in general, to punish people for honesty. If someone is apt to chastise honesty, they are the asshole, not the honest person. I actually think that, like this talk here, Kant's point actually illuminates complexity, rather than dismisses it. Which is to say, maybe that wasn't Kant's aim, but I think that is why not dismissing his point outright has merit. So, even if Kant is wrong, the way in which he is wrong gives us better understanding. To bring this back around, I don't think Chidi's problem is Moral Absolutism. It's that he entertains the idea, while neither committing or dismissing it, along with a ton of other "counter" ideas. That's what gets him into so much trouble. At some point you need to shit or get off the pot. He does neither. Except when it comes to Eleanor.
  8. .H.

    Bakker LVI: the Rectum of Creation

    I edited out the parts that don't matter. TUC, chapter 18. Makes me wonder though, that does "that you would begin, as I began" mean here? Who were the "decrepit masters" Kellhus pander to?
  9. Maybe there isn't a difference? Maybe every thread is really the Bakker thread? Well, it's something of my nature to think about things in a convoluted manner. I don't know that it's deep, but I am trying to understand Kant and I'm not really smart enough to read Kant directly. Well, our daughter, at 3, would lie about who did things, even when the person she said did it was not even present. She "quickly" realized that it was better to blame it on someone who actually could have done it though. So, I think the "instinct" to lie likely comes before a theory of knowledge, or even rudimentary knowledge of the fact of knowledge, even if that does later comes into play. Well, he is also flatly over-the-top risk averse. I'm really not sure if that is self-satisfaction though, although that is probably part of it. I think though, that being "hard-line Kantian" isn't what gets Chidi into the most trouble. It's that he wants to be, but still doubts it, second guesses and then, crafting counter-arguments, does nothing. It's really less that a "hard-line Kantian" line is bad, it's that Chidi can't even stick with that. The ectreme nature of the doctrine really isn't his problem. His problem is that he doesn't actually buy it, but still considers it the ideal. I'd, in general, agree that Moral Absolutism can be sticky at time. But so can Moral Relativism, or Moral Realism. My only real aim, was to look at if there was "more to" Kant than just something to be dismissed as "too Absolute." I think there is, because we likely need some kind of Transcendental or Absolute, societally, to function.
  10. Well, this is where the whole Kantian notion gets interesting to me. Because I think that the notion is correct, of course, in isolation. The case of the the murderer at your door though, or Chidi in the Bad Good Place, is that you are effectively being coerced into practical compromise of your morals. Of course Kant can, from his armchair, decree that the correct thing to do is be honest. And he'd be right, from his armchair. But you can't make calls from the armchair. We don't get to be perfect rational creatures. So we have to make "judgement" calls all the time. I can't really say, with clarity, that lying because you have good intentions is OK. Remember that one of Kant's foundational, categorical imperatives is "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." From the Kantian perspective, if your lying is permissible based on subjective discretion, than so is everyone's. Which means, everything is subject to the arbitrary nature of everyone's discretion, vis-a-vis truth. I think maybe the "hole" in it all is that honesty isn't necessarily the "highest virtue." But again, I'm apt to point out, that the overall Kantian notion that allowance for lying based on discretion is a route of rather bad things in the long run, because discretion won't always be so "clear" as in the case direct choice of someone's immediate life or death. What makes it interesting is what he gets into about "virtue ethics." Which is to say, that he values caring for Eleanor over honesty. Which is a different ball-game, to a degree, because it invokes a vastly different ontology. Which, I think is part what throws Chidi off so much, because Eleanor is not abstract, she is real and concrete, thus undeniable. Even though, he has problems with abstract things too. But Eleanor and more importantly his feelings for her, is not a rational exercise and he doesn't know how to deal with things outside of that. Well, it's where the proverbial rubber meats the road. Just like the "trolley problem." Notions are well and good, but in practical application, how does it work? Although the "trolley problem" is less about what you would do, but rather, why you would do it. Because it is a forced lose-lose situation. Which is actually the situation that Chidi is in, with Eleanor and lying. Loser her or compromise his ethics. Well, yes, but the foundation is that he was not honest. And not honest to an extreme, of course, because the show is a dramatization. But I'm curious, since we know what his incorrect response was, what are the grades of "correct" response. Like, "less of an asshole and somewhat honest" sounds like what? Or, "even less of an asshole and socially acceptable?" I'm not being rhetorical, I am generally bad with social skills. Sure, flatly blunt would be an asshole thing, like saying, "wow, those are hideous, how could you?" Because the other person might well like them and good for them. But something honest like, "wow, those seem too bright and a little busy, I don't think I'd really like to wear them." Is also honest and speaks to your own subjectivity. Sure, someone seeking affirmation would consider that an "asshole" thing to say, but is it, really? Is the "socially acceptable" thing to do to say you think they look good? To go back to my example, am I an asshole if I say to my wife, "I think you should wear the black dress instead of the red one, it's more flattering" if she asked my opinion on both?
  11. But what generally gets Chidi into trouble isn't hard-line Kantian adherence to truth. It's inaction due to weighing too many options. Right? Like with the boots, he ditches the Kantian notion of honesty and goes for a Utilitarian approach, which fails. I guess what we are asking is some kind of variations of "is it better to die for the truth, or live for a lie?" I'm not really seeing why you being honest in that situation precludes you being an asshole. So, in the case of Chidi with the boots, he was right to not be honest?
  12. .H.

    Bakker LVI: the Rectum of Creation

    Yeah, that's actually true. I guess the only way to actually "square" this is that Kellhus actually wanted the Consult to capture and be taken over by the Dunyain. I think this only could be "made sense of" in a manner of Kellhus, being Dunyain, actually wants to face other Dunyain, because their actions are more "intelligible" to him, than alien rape-monsters'.
  13. .H.

    Bakker LVI: the Rectum of Creation

    I think this is just a flat example of Kellhus making a mistake. He isn't actually infallible. Likely he probably discounted the possibility of the Consult finding Ishual and then further, discounted some of them being taken alive. Perhaps this was before he really, fully realized just how important Rule Zero is. There is the possibility that he actually thought that he could use the Dunyain to further his aim. Of course, in retrospect that is pretty dumb, but so is not killing Akka, and Mimara for that matter, and definitely stupid not killing little Kel as soon as he seemed aberrant. Kellhus does make mistakes. He just happens to be somewhat smarter and a lot more powerful than almost every one else.
  14. Well, you do need to evaluate what Kant is saying within the Kantian ethical paradigm, I think. So, how I understand it (which might well be wrong) is that Kant is saying don't lie, even if it seems expedient in the situation, one, because you can't know that what you are doing serves anything so unknowable as the "greater good" and two, because if you allow for the admission of lying at your discretion, what happens when your discretion is just wrong? Even worse, how do you know if your discretion could or would be right? Kant would seem to be saying, just don't do it and more importantly, don't force people to do that (which is the point I quoted above about the issue really being on a side of the murderer). By allowing room for discretion, or forcing it, you are doing violence to the "sacred" nature of the truth. It's plausible that maintaining that nature is actually a "good." Maybe even the "highest good." Consider a less extreme example: your partner puts on an outfit to go to a party and asks you "does this make me look bad?" What if it does? Knowing that if you say, "yes" the likely interpretation could be an emotional breakdown over how you never did find them attractive or something related. So, for the sake of expedience, you lie. Say "you look great." This too is a likely pitfall. One, they may know already it doesn't fit right and want to see if you'd be forthright, or two, they may be oblivious and go to the party wearing something unflattering, embarrassing them. If you went with the truth, as you knew it, well, perhaps they'd call you callous but at least you are honest and value the truth. Lie and the floodgates open. At best, you are a buffoon, oblivious and with no taste. At worst, you are a liar who will say anything expedient. Now, of course there is nuance there, but I think what Kant is getting at, generally, is that the truth can stand "on it's own" of sorts. Lies beget more lies and undermine trust and people's "right" to know the truth. Even if they asked it in a manner seeking affirmation and you deny it in the name of truth, you stood to give them what they rightly deserved. If they asked it in a manner that was unbecoming of you being actually honest, the moral failing is on their part (like the murderer), not yours, so long as you be honest. Not that Kant is unshakable right, but I think this part of Kantian thought gets a bad rap.
  15. Well, yeah, I mean, I didn't write the show of course, but I can't figure it is anything but something like this. It's unclear if you are actually disagreeing with me or not though, Consider a quote that Kalbear pointed out a few pages ago from the show's creator: Well, Kant was a smart guy. Like, approximately a zillion times smarter than me, even on his worst day. He actually addressed just this, in On a supposed right to lie from Benevolent Motives. Now, if we suppose that perhaps this was indeed written on Kant's "worst day" it is likely that it is still more cogent than anything I could muster on my own best-of-best days. If you are actually interested in how and why Kant comes to the conclusion here that he does, I'd offer you this: Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis (which, even if you end up disagreeing with Kant and the author, is at least a far more cogent analysis of what Kant was getting at than simply saying "Kant says you aren't allowed to lie"). Here is a very small part: Also: Plus: The paper does go off on something of a tangent at a point though, but I tend to agree with it's overall point and, generally, Kant's position. It's the best I could approximately find with Google though. I the end, I do think lying is indeed always morally wrong. It might be expedient and practical, but it is always morally wrong. I'd be amenable to a "caveat" more along the lines of "virtue ethics" whereby "This doctrine states that the virtuous person, the ideal person we continuously strive to be, cannot achieve one virtue without achieving them all. Therefore, when facing a seeming conflict between virtues, such as a compassionate lie, virtue ethics charges us to imagine what some ideal individual would do and act accordingly, thus making the ideal person's virtues one's own. In essence, virtue ethics finds lying immoral when it is a step away, not toward, the process of becoming the best persons we can be." I still think this is not really correct and basically for the same reason Kant did. I don't think it works practically, because it presupposes that that subjective valuation, in this case about the "balance" of virtue will be served by the lie. However, again, the show, with it's (as it seems to me) post-Modern aim, might be more aimed at Utilitarianism, mixed with "Virtue Ethics." Which, I think, from the Kantian viewpoint (or at least my flawed understanding of it), still "fails" at the same sort of juncture, mostly that one can, subjectively "know" the moral balance of the weight of the lie versus the truth. I really hope the show doesn't actually go "full post-Modern." Never go full post-Modern. I hope, whatever the "team" is writing is more nuanced than that. But that "shallow" analysis of Kant is worrisome to me, especially since I generally hope the show writers are demonstrably smarter than I am. Which they almost certainly are, so I hope they show that.
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