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.H.

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  1. .H.

    Star Trek: Picard

    That is a fair point also. We could hypothesize, perhaps, that the removal of the majority of implants, plus the assumption of "normative" human interaction (that is, interacting as a human, within a society) could "jogg" more memory (even just on the notion of reverting back to previous conditioning). Hugh was never "not a Borg" he was just a Borg outside the Collective.
  2. .H.

    Star Trek: Picard

    Seems plausible, but isn't the question at hand, "Why did 7 not revert back to Annika?" In other words, to what do we owe the difference between the cases of Picard, Hugh and Seven. I think the first part would be that the Picard case differs radically from the others, for the reason @DaveSumm points to. The assimilation of Picard is not "standard issue." Two, we don't know the circumstance of loss of identity. As you point out, since we don't know who Hugh was pre-assimilation, we have no idea to what his identity could revert, even if it could. I guess we could say that, perhaps, if Annika was older, or maybe say, more set-in an identity for some reason, when she was assimilated, then it could be the case that it was more "deeply rooted." Or, just down to "individual" differences, that is Annika had a particularly "strong" memory, or the like. We could go another route and perhaps link it to the duration assimilated. I don't think Borg would "die" of old age (although maybe I am wrong) so far all we know, Hugh could be 100's of years old, whatever personality he had lost along the way. Seven, assimilated for less time, might still have had vestigial memories (identity). Of course, there is no Borg as a fact-of-the-matter to point to, there is only the Bog as a narrative contrivance, so it's no wonder many things don't add up. Then again, I might have just missed the point of the discussion at hand.
  3. From what I understand Objectivism also regards Kant as "anti-rational" and, along these lines, is where Stephen Hicks starts his "critique" of post-Modernism and from whom Jordan Peterson picks up this "notion" of "post-Modern neo-Marxists. Essentially, it really seems like a way to beat a straw-man called post-Modernism, rather than deal with the breadth of what is (to me) the whole lineage of post-Kantian thought. But, who the hell am I to say?
  4. I guess I would call that "collective subjectivity" or "objective seeming." It's not Objective in the absolute sense, because, say everyone's brain melted, it wouldn't "exist" in-and-of itself. For practical purposes, "objective seeming" works well enough to get things done. Or, as Deleuze sort of says, gives us a "plane of reference" (that is, something we can refer to, or a "ground" to stand collectively on). The thing is, what happens when we don't agree on that "ground?"
  5. Well, I don't know, honestly. I don't think post-Modern thinking must "attack" everything as an existential necessity. People do that, for what I'd guess is a variety of social, psychological, economic and political reasons. Just that you get a "ready-made" framework to do so with the nature of Scucutalist (or post-Structuralist) thought. What they, of course, fail to do, is render the criticism complete, in the sense of using the same lense on themselves. Which, of course they don't, that is psychological projectionism 101, right there, it would seem to me. Well, like any process, it has it's application and it misapplication. There isn't, as far as I can tell, a universal manner to critique anything. It might be the case that in some instances, the background is relevant. Also, it might not be. For example, if a scientific study comes out and says "Sugar is 100% healthy, eat all of it you can, as often as you can." And someone were to realize that the people doing to study are sugar company stock-holders, or were payed by sugar companies to do the research, we'd likely be pretty right to question the findings in light of this. But, of course, this notion can be misapplied. Why someone's background would be relevant to the sum of one and one needs to be founded on something, not just the notion of critique itself. Likely this is what separates "real" thinkers from hacks. Just because you might acquire a philosophy degree, doesn't mean you are "good at it" of course.
  6. Well, what's the saying? "Everything is a nail to someone with a hammer."
  7. I'd agree with all of that. Of course, that is precisely why I don't much like math, because I don't buy that reality is precise or concise in-itself. I guess maybe I am apt to take De Beauvoir's notions in The Ethics of Ambiguity too literally? Probably because I haven't read the whole thing. But the notion that the world isn't clear and objectively "knowable" in an exact sense leads me in the direction that, yes, no matter what, things will be ambiguous to some degree or other. Even the notion of what "truth" is in-itself, is not clear or concise as far as I can tell. To quote Zizek in Less Than Nothing: That doesn't mean some stuff won't be bullshit. But it does mean, to me, that we need to really consider not just what someone is saying, but why they are saying it and why we should or should not "believe" it.
  8. Well, first, I am really not at all qualified to say. However, I think the point is that mathematics is a normative claim. You set the rules, then you figure out what the "output" of those rules are, according to the normative interpretation and exposition of those rules. You can't actually know if those rules are "in reality" or are just concepts over-layed onto reality. I think. So it seems that to her, human mathematics will always fail to the Absolute Mathematics that is "ideal." Or so it seems. So, there is an objective mathematics, but it is inaccessible. That doesn't mean we can't work toward it. Or, so my flawed reading would seem to imply. I'm not a scholar or a smart person though and this is just a random book I happened to have on hand.
  9. Not really a critique, but, well, isn't this Structuralism? And to then lump post-Structuralists into there under the label of it all being post-Modern doesn't really get us anywhere, since then this thing is espousing both the idea and the counter-idea at the same time? I don't buy math as objective. Not to mention, it's already been done (most likely): From Jane McDonnell's The Pythagorean World: Also: So, it is a sort of "objectivity" through a normative claim. Not sure I agree, but also hard to disagree. (Although I actually don't think McDonnell is a post-Modernist, just to make this all the less clear.)
  10. Sure, I'd agree with all that, but along the lines of Gödel, we can't "prove" that the underlying assumptions are "true" from within the system (I think). However, this is where we go back to Popper's sort of notion about an "evolutionary approach" to the objective. We never get there, but we can get things that "work." For example, General Relativity is not "complete" however, we can get satellites into orbit and have them stay there (for a good amount of time) which we couldn't do if we just figured "well, Newton's theory is just as good as Einstein's." I'd actually ask them if their phone works, or if a GPS has ever actually gotten them where they wanted to go. There is something out there, something objective seeming, even if we can't have explicit knowledge of it, or so my little brain would think.
  11. Well, I agree with this. And, to note, I wouldn't call myself a post-modernist, nor would I count myself as a defender of it. I think there is a ton of things that are "not good" about a large number of post-modern works and you lay them out well. However, I don't think that necessarily makes them wrong, per se. Rather, it makes them flawed and we should, rightly, point that out when and where we can. I mean, it's not as if post-modern though is the only obscure stuff there is. If you try to read Hegel or Heidegger, or even Kant, directly, it's a hell of a time. But I don't think that makes them wrong either. Sure, I mean, it seems like it would be hard (read: nearly impossible) to be a post-Kantian and insist that somehow you had access to the noumena and not (rightly) be laughed at and lampooned. If you start with the notion that all knowledge must be subjective, all subjective knowledge is (potentially) biased and should be questioned, then you should (rightly, again) be applying your own method to your own position. However, the dogmatists (that are likely the ones on the margins making what I'd call nonsense claims) aren't doing this, because their positions could not abide such a sustained criticism without falling to such a radical skepticism that posits that there is nothing (essentially) and thus being largely totally useless. Totalizing claims are likely to almost always best be dismissed. Even critiques of Hegel for his "totalizing schema" are likely misplaced, since Hegel's point is (as Zizek presents it and I kind of agree) that The Absolute is incomplete, therefor the totality of Being is not a unified whole, but the dialectic of incompleteness. But I do think one should be weary of any and all dogmatists, regardless of what they are peddling. Is this an argument for mathematical realism? I mean, I admit that I have a very hard time accepting that somehow math is "objective" let alone the knowledge of math is "objective knowledge." Then again, it might be due to me not understanding the argument there.
  12. A good talk by Rick Roderick on the notion of relativism, vis-a-vis Nietzsche. (Since that first article made the claim that this could be "traced back" to him.)
  13. I'm not sure what to draw from either of those articles. If people take issue with Kuhn, it might be rightly so. Let us not pretend that science, and the scientific method, is perfect, as is. Now, is their criticism making valid points? I don't know, I'm neither a scientist nor a philosopher, so I can't really give you an answer worth anything there. However, the notion that any and all post-modern thinkers must consider that there is nothing like "truth" or that "all perspectives are equally valid" is kind of nonsensical and I've never come across any thinker who would actually espouse that stance. If you want to aim deconstruction at "science" for example, it is equally well aimed right back at you. I think it is 100% fair game to look critically at science and the scientific method, because it is not something "objective" in being completely outside human subjectivity, as far as I can tell. Look at how "research" on nutrition has changed. First sugar was fine, fat was bad, now, fat is likely fine, sugar is horrible for you. You can look back in the past and find many, many examples of this and it's not likely to end any time soon. There is nothing wrong with being critical, but to lump any and all "post-modern" thought in the same boat, well, that is going to be a very strange, very contentious ride.
  14. Being very much a philosophical layperson, and also in general just an idiot, I don't understand this topic. To go all the way back, so as to not obscure things, maybe, are we saying that Kant is flatly wrong? That we do (somehow) have access to Noumena, not just Phenomena? If not, then we return back to the first post, we might not have access to things-in-themselves, so then what should we do? I don't know (perhaps born more of ignorance than anything) that I agree with the notion that all "post-modern" thought (whatever that could possibly be) is just a form of solipsism. I don't know that you would find much "serious scholarship" for people who deny there is, say, a material world, or that there are "objects" or something like that in there. Of course though, if you take the the margins, you are bound to find some wild stuff but that hardly (to me) means we should definitely throw the baby out with that bathwater. Likely I'd have something better to say about what we could work towards with "objective knowledge" in light of this, had I actually finally read Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. I just got it though, so it's in the massive backlog I have. But I suspect he has something "important" in there, if you'll excuse the supposition and innuendo. Also, I don't think I buy that we have a linguistic problem, per se, in that "objective truth" exists but we can't express it because language is insufficient (although maybe it is) but we can't access a noumenal truth, because how could we? All we can "access" is phenomena and only infer what the noumenal would (possibly) be. (Might be a whole other can of worms there though.) I'm not sure I believe this and I feel like you could likely find many who would probably align themselves with something like "post-modernism" and still "believe" in climate change. I think Zizek would probably be a good example, although he does call himself a Hegelian, rather than a post-modernist, but he is very much a post-Kantian. Deleuze and Guattarri, in What is Philosophy: That hardly seems "anti-science" or anything like that, to me. Of course, perhaps I am just not smart or well-read enough to grasp the "argument" here though. However, there is such a wide breadth of what could "count" as post-modern thought, I don't really understand how one could really typify it exactly in any case, except in the broadest of broad terms. But again, perhaps my ignorance just shows.
  15. .H.

    Converting the library

    You could also try getting an scanner that can do OCR and just scan in all your print books. It would probably save you some money, but would likely cost you a great deal of time.
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