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Ukraine War Part 7: Delete your army


Kalbear

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7 minutes ago, Werthead said:

Not really. The 2003 operation was predicated on the Iraqis not fighting because they'd be scared or could be bought off. That proved to be the case, with a few small exceptions. Hussein did not give inspiring speeches or roused the country into defence, and as his regime crumbled, people came out on the streets against him and his regime in their tens of thousands. The quality/technical difference between troops and equipment in Iraq 2003 was also vastly greater than it is in Ukraine 2022.

The initial military operation did achieve its objective of reach Baghdad and unseating Hussein, it was the attempted occupation that turned into a total clusterfuck disaster of epic proportions afterwards.

The main similarity was using far too few troops for the mission at hand. The US are lucky it didn't end up being even more of a clusterfuck than it ended up being, whilst the Russians are getting into that stage already.

What I'm talking about is more the strategic goals of the war than the tactical military situation.  Yes, the US invasion was successful in toppling the Hussein regime and defeating Iraq's standing army with minimal casualties.  But the war planning just assumed that things would go smoothly from there, that a new government could be installed and the US could remove most/all of its troops in relatively short order.  Basically all of the planning for the post-Saddam era in Iraq was either neglected or entirely absent, because of hubris.  They assumed things would go right because they were so confident/capable.  I remember an anecdote that one analyst proposed how many troops the US would have to maintain in Iraq in the post-war period and it was something like 200k, and Rumsfeld laughed at the notion. 

Likewise in Moscow the war planning assumed that they would just shatter the Ukrainian military and leadership in a few days.  They neglected robust contingency planning for if things did not go well, and sent troops into battle with minimal food or ammo. 

In both cases, hubris led to poor planning for things potentially going wrong, and allowed them to enter a war with unrealistic political objectives and no exit strategy in the event those objectives cannot be achieved. 

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19 minutes ago, Werthead said:

The main similarity was using far too few troops for the mission at hand. The US are lucky it didn't end up being even more of a clusterfuck than it ended up being, whilst the Russians are getting into that stage already.

Another big difference - there were only 4431 total deaths of US troops as of July 2021.

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5 hours ago, Derfel Cadarn said:

Lithuania and Latvia have renamed the streets the Russian embassies are on. 
Lithuania has renamed it “Ukranian Heroes”, and Latvia has renamed it “Independent Ukraine Street”.

Glasgow Council did this to the South African consulate in the 80’s durign Apartheid - renamed the street it was in to Nelson Mandela Place.

 

Iran did the same to the British embassy in Tehran, they renamed the street after Bobby Sands. We responded by moving the front door round the corner.

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2 hours ago, Week said:

Have also read that many of the labs are suspected to be Soviet-era labs. Haven't seen that confirmed or verified but fits the lie. They are biolabs, they are in Ukraine, but they were built and funded by the USSR.

The labs are real but apparently not that many as the Russian claims. They have received funding from the US DoD (instead from the NIH as usual in scientific collaboration, think on the Wuhan collaboration) but it appears to be insufficient for high tech facilities. Victorian Nuland has gone on record to assure Congress they are working with the Ukrainians to safeguard whatever materials are in there. Little else is known that it's not muddled with propaganda. 

Whether those labs are important in the great scheme of things is a different question.

 

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37 minutes ago, Darzin said:

I think this is overestimated. If this was Ukrainian civil war it wouldn't get nearly so much attention. People are reacting so strongly to this because it is a 1939, roll the tanks across the border style conquest. The last time this happened in 1991 with Iraq and Kuwait there was also a huge global reaction.

Iraq 2003 surely counts, although that was also a pretty big deal in the international media. 

But you are right that civil wars and border disputes, while they can be extremely bloody, almost always attract less media attention than full scale wars between different nations. 

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Here is another article on the fascinating alternative reality Russians are experiencing during this war. It's a bit long, but here is a salient quote.

Quote

During the first two weeks of fighting in Ukraine, many journalists reported that most Russians believed official propaganda and did not even know their country was at war. Powerfully written accounts of daily life in St. Petersburg documented citizen willingness to parrot state media tropes. For them, the “special military operation” Putin announced was strictly about “good” Russian soldiers engaged in acts of “defense,” “liberation,” and “peacekeeping.” In a BBC piece, one woman told of phoning her family in Russia while trapped in a bombardment in Kyiv, only to be rebuked for hysteria, as her mother assured her that Russian troops would never attack the Ukrainian capital.

However, history and psychology suggest that the issue of “belief” in propaganda is not straightforward, and that the majority of Russian society cannot simply be dismissed as “brainwashed” by the Putin regime. Russian people do not have a record of gullibility, but rather a long tradition of irreverent humor and coded criticism of dictatorial power discernible only by “reading between the lines.” Soviet archives are packed with letters from the 1920s, written by peasants who only a few years earlier had learned to read, challenging the truth of newspaper stories about all manner of topics relating to the condition of the countryside. 

More recently, the 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer, a survey conducted in 28 countries, identified Russia as the nation with the lowest level of trust in media, reaching only 29 percent.

Such statistics indicate that Russians might not believe official media, but might also choose—perhaps subconsciously—not to acknowledge the extent to which they allow themselves to be deceived. (It bears mentioning that social media analysts of the 2016 US presidential election noted a similar phenomenon: Citizens can, and often do, choose to believe comfortable falsehoods, instead of admitting to truths that disrupt their desired way of seeing the world.) Looking at Russian television news after the takeover of Crimea in 2014, journalist Maria Lipman concluded that the more extreme and far-fetched the claims of various programs became, the more their audiences grew.

Russian viewers tuned into shows,” she and two colleagues argued in a 2018 essay, “in search of not truth, but emotional gratification.” Viewers wanted to believe wildly distorted media stories that affirmed “national pride and a sense of vindication.”

This situation of willing self-deception, some suggest, starts at the top, and is likely affecting the Russian president. Oligarch-turned-dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky describes Putin as a man living in a fantasy world, unwilling to use the internet, surrounded by people who tell him only what he wants to hear. According to celebrity novelist and Kremlin critic Boris Akunin, a resident of Moscow until 2014, Putin genuinely expected jubilant Ukrainians to welcome Russian soldiers with flowers, and now cannot accept that he has made a calamitous mistake.

The Russian people, taken by surprise at news of the invasion, may be similarly holding onto explanations that help keep chaos at bay. Russian sociologist Grigory Yudin, who was arrested at one of the first anti-war demonstrations and beaten so badly he had to be hospitalized, says he understands the hesitation of fellow citizens to speak out. In an interview with the independent news agency Meduza just days before its Russian office was forced to shut down, Yudin explained: “After a shocking event you’re ready to accept any convenient interpretation on offer. [Here] many people are clinging to the most immediate explanation, courtesy of government propaganda. That’s the most comfortable choice.”

Speaking to popular Russian YouTuber Yury Dud, Akunin predicted most Russians will try to retreat into family life—a phenomenon that can be seen across many Russian social media accounts. The Instagram page of one Moscow resident features a picture of a family ski trip in Sochi, reading “Here it is so easy not to think about war, not to get hysterical, and not to be afraid. Here at least something depends on you.” Even this comment has been restricted to a small group of relatives and friends.

Ukrainian journalist Dmitry Gordon thinks such a trend will continue. “Honestly, I don’t believe that Russians en masse will go into the streets,” he said last week as he interviewed Khodorkovsky. “It’s obvious to me that if, today, half a million or a million people turned out in Moscow, Putin would be finished.”

 

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WTF.

The FSB has been really lukewarm on this entire operation and now it looks like many of them are abandoning ship.

However, alternative possibilities that some were thinking they might be redeployed to occupied areas of Ukraine, so no point holding onto them. Also, FSB officers tend to be well-paid and many of them have bought second homes in Crimea, and with the economy nosediving they're looking to offload ASAP.

Still, weird. I see no viable peace agreement or military outcome in which Ukraine reclaims Crimea (and I suspect the Ukrainians themselves might fear that would trigger a WMD retaliation by Moscow, if they even think of taking Sevastopol or cutting off the Black Sea Fleet).

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5 minutes ago, Werthead said:

The FSB has been really lukewarm on this entire operation and now it looks like many of them are abandoning ship.

However, alternative possibilities that some were thinking they might be redeployed to occupied areas of Ukraine, so no point holding onto them. Also, FSB officers tend to be well-paid and many of them have bought second homes in Crimea, and with the economy nosediving they're looking to offload ASAP.

Still, weird.

I would love to get a better idea of what is going on with the FSB.  The snippets of news I'm hearing don't make a lot of sense.  Is the FSB out of favor with Putin?  If so, how?  As a former KGB guy, I would think he'd have close ties with the FSB. 

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Looking at the overall picture, it appears there has been no major shift in territory since the fall of Kherson and the encircling of Mariupol. Things have remained static for almost five days. Ukrainian counter-attacks in some areas have even retaken territory, though this is limited in scope. General assessment is that the Russian military forces assigned to the invasion surpassed 100% deployment within the last few days and Russia has shown an unwillingness to deploy more en masse. Russian military command may be faced with a choice of winning with what they have - which manifestly is not enough - or maybe escalating to WMD use. Likely very taut meetings in the Kremlin about what that might mean, including the fact the the Americans unexpectedly and violently intervened in Syria when Russian allies used chemical weapons, and that could change the calculus on Western intervention in the theatre in a very dangerous manner, one which would see the Russians lose strategic control (or what's left of it). The Russians do badly when put on the back foot.

The diplomatic efforts are intensifying. China seems to be trying to keep Moscow happy (by, for example, supporting its story about American biolabs in Ukraine and not calling the operation an invasion) whilst also very mildly rebuking it (a warm joint meeting with the French and Germans, repeated claims about Ukraine, sending aid, if desultory, to Ukraine). Turkey seemed more interested in a photo op than genuine talks, but Israel seems to be more genuine in its attempts to broach a peace. The French and Germans have also resumed direct talks with Putin in the last couple of days.

I think there's a breaking point approaching where the Russians look at an escalation, either throwing what they have into the cauldron of Kyiv and hoping somehow they get lucky, or flattening the city through conventional or non-conventional means, or Russia takes a diplomatic off-ramp that gets them some of what they want, even if all is no longer tenable. Which they take depends on the resolve of the international community and the prospective economic damage to Russia of the sanctions long-term. I don't think the critical mass of anger in Russia is there for Putin to be overthrown in a popular coup, and an internal Kremlin realignment still seems improbable. Russia's normally unperturbed facade has been rattled by admitting mistakes over sending in conscripts and by suffering significant casualties, though, which might be a sign of Russia preparing a diplomatic pivot which they sell internally because of bad planning (expect a few months of heads rolling in the Kremlin and all ranks of the military if this is the case).

Another possibility is a unilateral ceasefire and Russia basically digs in where it is now and declares that Russian territory and spends months reinforcing for another push later on. But I think that would also be too much of an acknowledgement of failure.

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1 hour ago, Darzin said:

I think this is overestimated. If this was Ukrainian civil war it wouldn't get nearly so much attention. People are reacting so strongly to this because it is a 1939, roll the tanks across the border style conquest. The last time this happened in 1991 with Iraq and Kuwait there was also a huge global reaction.

Wasn't  there horrified 'western' reaction to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia at the time?

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27 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

But you are right that civil wars and border disputes, while they can be extremely bloody, almost always attract less media attention than full scale wars between different nations. 

I mean, sure, this is a significant difference.  Another huge difference is the specter of nuclear powers potentially clashing in this conflict.  Still, I think the original point stands.  If Kenya invaded Somalia or even if Venezuela invaded Guyana it would not receive the same amount of attention and response than if one European state invaded another.

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It's worth noting that, in effect, Russia has switched its military strategy from targeting Ukrainian military forces to targeting civilian infrastructure and actual civilians in recent days. This usually shows a strategic or tactical (or both) failure to destroy enemy military forces that are out of reach of your assets and switching to hitting hard-to-miss towns and cities to break the morale of the enemy.

As any Brit from 1940 will tell you, this is usually highly unsuccessful as a strategy.

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4 minutes ago, Zorral said:

Wasn't  there horrified 'western' reaction to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia at the time?

Well I mean there have been horrified "western" reactions to a lot of things over the years but there weren't weapons pouring in or thousands of volunteers and no one thought the Warsaw pact was going to annex Czechoslovakia.

4 minutes ago, DMC said:

I mean, sure, this is a significant difference.  Another huge difference is the specter of nuclear powers potentially clashing in this conflict.  Still, I think the original point stands.  If Kenya invaded Somalia or even if Venezuela invaded Guyana it would not receive the same amount of attention and response than if one European state invaded another.

I do think it's true that a European war will get more attention. That said if either of your examples happened it would certianly get more attention than current conflicts in the global south. Also if either of those happened it would get smacked down by US, UN or French intervention pretty quick. 

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1 minute ago, Darzin said:

I do think it's true that a European war will get more attention. That said if either of your examples happened it would certianly get more attention than current conflicts in the global south. Also if either of those happened it would get smacked down by US, UN or French intervention pretty quick. 

I think the respective responses to Rwanda and Bosnia during the Clinton administration elucidates the difference.

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1 hour ago, rotting sea cow said:

The labs are real but apparently not that many as the Russian claims. They have received funding from the US DoD (instead from the NIH as usual in scientific collaboration, think on the Wuhan collaboration) but it appears to be insufficient for high tech facilities. Victorian Nuland has gone on record to assure Congress they are working with the Ukrainians to safeguard whatever materials are in there. Little else is known that it's not muddled with propaganda. 

Whether those labs are important in the great scheme of things is a different question.

 

These are not bioweapons labs, despite Russian claims.

Politifact link

Also another Bulletin link, because they’ve being doing a lot of excellent coverage of the war.

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1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

In both cases, hubris led to poor planning for things potentially going wrong, and allowed them to enter a war with unrealistic political objectives and no exit strategy in the event those objectives cannot be achieved. 

Not too go too far down a tangent, but Rumsfeld absolutely should've known better too. His whole spiel about "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns" was on point, and there were a million unknown unknowns that could, and did, go badly. But he never connected A to B, except long after the fact when he tried doing his rehabilitation tour.

1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

I would love to get a better idea of what is going on with the FSB.  The snippets of news I'm hearing don't make a lot of sense.  Is the FSB out of favor with Putin?  If so, how?  As a former KGB guy, I would think he'd have close ties with the FSB. 

I think there's still a decent chance that Ukraine is making up all stories about FSB support as a psyops against Russia. Assuming they aren't though, I'm shocked at how far the FSB is going. Being against a decision is one thing; acting as independent entity that works against the government, the way Pakistan's ISI sometimes does, is another entirely.

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

Another possibility is a unilateral ceasefire and Russia basically digs in where it is now and declares that Russian territory and spends months reinforcing for another push later on. But I think that would also be too much of an acknowledgement of failure.

I'm not sure that would work out for them either. Ukraine has the capacity for counter-attacks, and those would likely only intensify if there were less concerns about defending positions. 

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