Ukraine War Part 7: Delete your army

[Martell Spy]

New mayor installed in Russia-controlled Melitopol after the Ukrainian city's elected mayor was detained

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-12-22/index.html

Quote

 

The Zaporozhye regional administration says a new mayor has been installed in the Ukrainian city of Melitopol, which is under Russian military control, after the elected mayor was detained on Friday. 

Ivan Fedorov, the elected mayor of Melitopol, was detained by armed men on Friday and accused of terrorism offenses by the prosecutor's office for the separatist Russia-backed Luhansk region.

The newly installed mayor is Galina Danilchenko, a former member of the city council, according to a statement on the Zaporozhye regional administration website.

Danilchenko, who was not elected by the people, was introduced as the acting mayor on local TV, the statement said.

In her televised statement, which was posted by the administration on Telegram, Danilchenko said her "main task is to take all necessary steps to get the city back to normal." 

 

 

[DireWolfSpirit]

51 minutes ago, Gorn said:

While humane, it defeats the entire point of sanctions. They're not about reducing fast food choices, they are intended to reduce Russia's capability to wage war (both the current one and potential future ones).

The tanks and planes which kill Ukrainians are financed by Russian payroll taxes, including those paid by McDonald's.

Sighs....I suppose so then.

I am not perfectly versed on sanctions though. If what you say is the case then I'm wondering if McDonald's could face penalties for violating the sanctions? It's hard to decipher what is okay and what isn't under these rules.

[Werthead]

35 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

Agreed.  It's actually kind of surprising that Russia's hasn't prioritized taking Odessa.  If Ukraine has to get either Odessa or Kyiv at the negotiating table (because they lost them in battle), then Ukraine is in a very, very weak position.  Much more so than Kharkiv or Mariupol.

I think Odesa is a higher value target because it links up Crimea to Transnistria and puts a Moldova annexation back on the table. It also landlocks a rump Ukraine, which Putin thinks will make the country nonviable.

He may have not considered that a rump Ukraine might still get access to the sea through trade routes via Romania and Poland, or not cared because a rump Ukraine would lose a lot of its mineral wealth in the east and a huge amount of its wheat-growing capacity.

[Werthead]

Oh shit. US consulate in Erbil hit by 5 missiles fired from Iran. 5-6 Fateh-110s fired from Khasabad base in Tabriz.

Reportedly a reprisal for Israel killing two IRGC officers in Syria earlier this week.

No US casualties, which immediately dials down the expected lethality of a response.

Nothing to do with Ukraine but it throws a huge distracting wrench in the US calculus at the same time it is dealing with Ukraine and having to account for renewed sabre-rattling from North Korea.

[sologdin]

probably 'kitchen sink' time for the invasion.

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Some have said that even then the West might have won the day, had all their hosts proved faithful. For the Russians wavered, and their onslaught was stayed, and already some were turning to flight. But even as the vanguard of Zelensky came upon the Belarussians, Putin loosed his last strength, and Moscow was emptied. There came bears, and bearriders, and there came leshii, and vodyanoi, and Baba Yaga, mother of witches. The strength and terror of Koschei the Deathless was now great indeed, and Ukrainians and their International Brigades withered before him.’

 

[A True Kaniggit]

Silmarillion yeah?

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

14 minutes ago, sologdin said:

probably 'kitchen sink' time for the invasion.

 

I sincerely hope not.

[Werthead]

11 hours ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

I sincerely hope not.

They can redeploy the forces they have, but they don't have more forces to bring in, or at least there is no sign of them doing so. Ukraine can weather Syrian reinforcements and might weather Belarusian forces coming in, but unless Putin is going to deploy another 200,000 troops from elsewhere in the country (note: he doesn't have 200,000 troops elsewhere in the country, he'd have to start conscripting or moving up untested reserves), it seems unlikely they can throw more troops in and there are signs that they might be limited in how many more aircraft, artillery pieces etc they can bring in in a reasonable timeframe. Even if Belarus deploys, it likely won't make much material difference due to relatively low numbers (more than twice as many Ukrainians have returned to fight for their country as Belarus realistically has available) and most of them being conscripts. The only concerning thing is that if they deploy in the far north-west, that area has not seen any action yet and would pin down more Ukrainian forces. However, Belarus I think is wary of operating that close to the Polish border. Or indeed, at all.

Interesting article here by Hu Wei, a prominent Shanghai-based analyst. He seems reasonably well-situated with the CCP. The article argues there is no material benefit of China continuing to play the middleman and that China's future economic and political prospects are not enhanced by a continued relationship with a small and faltering economy. He argues that China can use its influence over Putin to make a strong argument for a negotiated settlement, more forcefully than any other interlocutor, and then try to smoothly pivot to constructive engagement with the West over enhanced economic relationships to both powers' long-term advantage. He lowballs and barely mentions Taiwan as a problem, though.

I consulted with a very good friend in Beijing and he noted the article had been doing the rounds of his Chinese colleagues. The consensus was that Beijing sees Russia as a useful collaborator in resisting the attempts to establish a Western hegemon over the world, but it also that Russia was something of a liability and it was a losing horse in this war. Even if Russia captures the country (they are also very dubious of that being possible with the forces assigned), they can't see how Russia holds it, and the damage that will be done to Chinese economic interests could be considerable, particularly the disruption to the global grain supply. They also noted questions on who is paying to rebuild Ukraine and the Russian economy post-conflict, and the dangers of China recognising a Ukraine with massively disrupted borders as being incompatible with their traditional belief in the stability of internationally-recognised borders (apart from India's, apparently).

[Werthead]

Russian offensive between Irpin and Bucha, NW of Kyiv and just south of Hostomel Airport, repelled with heavy Russian losses this morning. It looks like these were part of the forces massing for a direct assault on the capital, and were aiming to cut Irpin off from the rest of the city.

 

[JGP]

13 minutes ago, Werthead said:

Russian offensive between Irpin and Bucha, NW of Kyiv and just south of Hostomel Airport, repelled with heavy Russian losses this morning. It looks like these were part of the forces massing for a direct assault on the capital, and were aiming to cut Irpin off from the rest of the city.

 

As well, appears a NYT correspondent was killed and another wounded in Irpin. 

[Martell Spy]

Protests over suspected Russian plans to turn occupied Ukrainian province into breakaway state

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-13-22/h_57b59c9208bc10e9ceb921cbc76405dc

Quote

 

Hundreds of demonstrators have flocked the streets of Russian-occupied Kherson to protest against suspected Russian plans to turn the southern Ukrainian oblast into a breakaway republic.  

In recent days, at least one Kherson regional council official warned that occupation forces were laying the groundwork for the “Kherson People’s Republic.” If true, the move would mirror Moscow’s establishment of two breakaway states in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Ukraine considers those breakaway regions — the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic — to be Russian occupi

 

ed.  

[IheartIheartTesla]

2 hours ago, JEORDHl said:

As well, appears a NYT correspondent was killed and another wounded in Irpin. 

Not that it matters all that much, but he (Brett Renauld) was not on assignment for the NYT. He has contributed to them in the past and was wearing a press badge issued to him many years ago by the NYT.

[Zorral]

The Russian mercenaries in West Africa --

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/09/mali-russia-wagner/

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.... Wagner — seen by the United States as a covert extension of the Kremlin — arrived in Mali after a 2020 coup d’etat isolated the West African country from its democratic partners. As Russia invades Ukraine, the Kremlin is pushing to amplify influence worldwide, and ostensibly private military groups like Wagner offer a deniable way to advance its goals, researchers say. Since 2016, the Russian mercenary footprint has grown from four nations to a total of 28, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Eighteen are in Africa.

“Wagner comes in, further destabilizes the country, ravages the mineral resources and makes as much money as they can before they choose to leave,” U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Milton Sands, head of Special Operations Command Africa, told The Washington Post. “The country is left poorer, weaker and less secure. Every time.”

This story is based on interviews with 13 local, regional and Western officials who have reviewed intelligence, have access to internal reports or have been briefed on the details of Mali’s security partnership with Russia. Several spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters and avoid retaliation. ....

 

The photos on the Twitter Wert posted -- they don't look like winter at all, unless winter is different in that region on the Polish border? 

[Ran]

11 minutes ago, Zorral said:

The Russian mercenaries in West Africa --

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/09/mali-russia-wagner/

The photos on the Twitter Wert posted -- they don't look like winter at all, unless winter is different in that region on the Polish border? 

The third photo is from Google Streetview to match up the location of the engagement. That was obviously in spring/summer in some happier past. But you'll notice the same leafy trees seen in that image are, in the first two images, completely without leaves.

[Werthead]

Depending on what way you look at it, Russia got lucky or had great intelligence to know there were no NATO or US personnel at the base they hit this morning. I believe NATO announced that all personnel had been withdrawn from Ukraine before the conflict began, but still, a higher risk to take. One missile overflying the target by five miles and landing on Polish territory could have made this a lot more fraught.

At the moment, Russia, for all its brutality, is seemingly acting within something approaching the rules of engagement that were understood during the Cold War: anyone on contested territory is fair game if they have no real good reason to be there and if the country they are from is not a belligerent. And after their warning to target weapons supplies, this seems to be a clear sign that they mean that to be on Ukrainian soil.

It is an escalation but a very carefully calculated one. I think it is also a sign perhaps of a lack of Russian confidence: in other conflict zones the US and Russia have supplied opposite sides and it's turned into a proxy war of who can get the most supplies in. The very rich and capable USSR could match the US and its allies, but clearly Russia cannot, to the point where Russia fears that the amount of weapons pouring in could turn the tide of the conflict or occupation.

NATO must also be broadly comparing the risks involved of continuing to supply Ukraine versus the staggering amount of firepower that are already in the country and not yet engaged, versus Russia's dwindling resources in the theatre.

It's hard to see where this can go. I think from one POV, Russia making an all-out play for Kyiv and, if repulsed, engage in negotiations makes sense (on the grounds of threatening to raise a second army and resume the fight later, even if it's a while). If they take Mariupol in the meantime that gives them more leverage to get a strong outcome favourable to their ends. Russia obviously wanted to get Ukraine to return to their sphere of influence, but might have to settle for a neutral Ukraine that's not going to be part of either. It all depends on if they can take Kyiv and if they can succeed in dividing the country.

[Werthead]

High-level US and Chinese discussions to take place in Italy tomorrow. I was expecting a move like this, but thought it might take a while longer.

[SpaceChampion]

 

[Werthead]

Putin is arranging a battery of options from which he can choose how to proceed.

• Blame the fuck out of the FSB to explain poor intelligence and higher-than-expected losses.
• Getting Belarus to put fresh troops on the border as a possible new (if limited) strategic reserve.
• Bringing in Syrian troops to reinforce the lines (limited manpower).
• Reinforce an attack on Kyiv, which is so far completely failing to make significant headway (I've seen some analysts who expected the major assault days ago starting tentatively to suggest this is the main assault and it's just poor; I'm not so sure as some artillery has been shown north of the city which has not so far engaged, and Russia has not hit the city as hard as Kharkiv and Mariupol, suggesting either they have chosen not to do so or they are unable to do so).
• Prepare a battery of diplomatic and negotiable options so Russia can strike a deal favourable to it (or which can be spun as highly favourable), ranging from taking the whole country, partitioning it in half, taking the sea coast but leaving a rump Ukraine in the interior, all the way to basically the borders of the day before the invasion with just Crimea and Donbas recognised and an agreement not to join NATO for x years (this best-case scenario I fear is unlikely to materialise unless Ukraine makes a sweeping counter-offensive which reclaims taken areas).
• Escalate tensions with NATO and engage in further sabre-rattling but do not step over the line where NATO will engage. If NATO engages Russia in this theatre, Russia loses the theatre. The question Putin has been very successful in asking - "Will you risk a nuclear war over Ukraine?" will instead be asked of Putin, and Putin may not know which way he will jump when that is asked, especially if he feels his life or at least his legacy will be endangered. NATO needs to factor this into their considerations as well.
• The WMD question. Chemical weapons are horrific, but they are useful for one thing from a strictly military perspective: for flushing out a small city that's withstanding siege for day after day after day. The military value of overwhelming and taking Mariupol and maybe Chernihiv quickly is significant. However, using chemical weapons risks escalation into NATO's only "grey area." If there is one good thing Donald Trump ever did in his entire life, it was making chemical weapon use in Syria a red line that he swatted down the second Russia stepped over it, and when Russia complained and vaguely threatened a nuclear response he ignored them and they basically did nothing. Putin may assume that was a Trumpism, and the stakes in a deniable operation in a third country where technically Russia was not responsible (its ally Syria was) are far lower than here, but it is a concern for both sides. Russia may feel it needs a gamechanger to win a major battlefield victory it can take to negotiations or a spur for further advances, but they know the escalation risk is dangerous.

 

 

 

[Werthead]

 

Huh.

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Are Russians and Ukrainians making progress in their talks about the war? We’ve been given some indications that maybe they are.

“I think that we’ll achieve some results literally in a matter of days,” Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian negotiator and adviser to President Volodymir Zelensky, said.

He cautioned, however, that Ukraine would not “concede in principle on any positions”.

“Russia now understands this. Russia is already beginning to talk constructively,” he added.

From Russia, Leonid Slutsky was quoted as saying: “According to my personal expectations, this progress may grow in the coming days into a joint position of both delegations, into documents for signing.”

The comments are a bit encrypted, and this can be seen as a sign of how difficult these negotiations are. And there was no detail on what exactly they’re talking about. Ceasefire? End of the war? And what exactly are their demands at the negotiation table?

Both sides have already held three rounds of talks in Belarus, which focused mainly on humanitarian issues.

It’s day 18 of the war. Thousands of civilians are in desperate need of aid. Dozens are still dying every day. A deal to end all of this couldn’t come soon enough.

 

 

[Maithanet]

Maybe I'm just succumbing to wide eyed optimism, but I'm moving more and more towards the opinion that Russia cannot take Kyiv without using WMDs.  I mean, I guess if this thing grinds on for many more months it would be possible, but there's little chance of it falling in the next month.  So if Russia is going to pin thier strategy on taking Kyiv to improve thier bargaining position, that sounds pretty dubious to me. 

I would think that a renewed focus on taking Mariupol and then isolating and taking Odessa feels more viable, as then the Russian Navy would be involved, which Ukraine had little answer for.  Alternatively Mariupol + Kharkiv would also be a strong negotiating position, if the intention is to give Kharkiv back and make Ukraine shoulder the huge burden of rebuilding the city.