Ukraine 12: When is this an existential threat?

[Werthead]

22 minutes ago, Gorn said:

It ignores the logistical reality that Russia is running out of modern weaponry and ammunition for those weapons, with no way of replenishing them quickly. Sure, they can mobilize their adult male population, hand them a bunch of AK47s and Mosin-Nagants from old stocks and employ human-wave tactics, but the military value of such troops is close to zero, plus those conscripts might not be too keen on the idea themselves.

Even if they win, Russians will be licking their wounds for at least the next decade, and more likely two.

I believe the latest analysis was that Russia still has 30-40% of its cruise missile inventory available. Earlier reports that it had expended more seem to have been optimistic. Similarly, it has no shortage of more primitive missiles, ammunition, shells and so on. Its vehicle inventory has certainly taken a beating, though, and it's unclear how many fresh tanks have been sent to the front. I suspect they will make more free use of aircraft, since the flight paths into Donbas are much less contested by AA then over Kyiv and Kharkiv.

Russia also has reorganised its command with all Russian forces in Ukraine now operating under one CO (General Alexander Dvornikov) who has extensive combat experience in Syria. This may improve Russian command and control.

Balanced against that is an analysis today that Russian military forces are being pulled in two different directions: the need to regroup properly to achieve an actual victory with the forces needed to do so, and the need for a victory (or at least a half-convincing VINO) by May 8/9. There are signs of some units being pulled out completely for refreshing and others literally diving from one battle into another, which is not going to help (well, the Russians).

11 minutes ago, Kalibuster said:

If Ukraine wants to keep fighting we give them what they need or want to do so. If they want to win against Russia, not just a slight loss, we give them what they need and support them.

I understand this might be a gamble. I would rather gamble that putin will continue to attack and take things over until prevented than gamble that giving him something they want will be the last thing they ask for.

That said, if Ukraine wants to sue for peace that needs to be supported too.

I think this is a good attitude.

1 minute ago, Maithanet said:

I still think that the best case scenario of a negotiated peace where Ukraine recognizes the territories Russia already held in Jan 2022 and agrees not to join NATO is on the table.  That is a very meager victory for Russia, since they almost assuredly could have gotten that without invading at all, but nonetheless it's something they could spin as a victory. 

If Russia fights to exhaustion over the coming months and Ukraine is still standing strong, then there certainly is the threat of Russian escalation.  Obviously everyone is hoping that wouldn't happen.  But I don't think it's likely that Russia will take that escalation step. (Possible, certainly, not IMO likely.  Maybe 30% or something.) 

The reason I say that is just that if Russia was going to escalate, the window for that making sense has kind of passed.  Russia's army is getting absolutely chewed up in Ukraine.  Their ability to resist any sort of escalation at all from NATO (not talking about nukes or a full-on conventional war, just any additional assistance) is diminishing rapidly.  If Russia wanted this war to get bigger and uglier, why didn't they do that in early March, rather than retreating from Kyiv and leaving a bunch of equipment and war crimes behind?  If Russia ups the ante with chemical or (god forbid) tactical nukes, then they will need to get a bigger win in order to justify that cost.  That means subjugating most if not all of Ukraine, in which case giving away all the hard fought ground in the North makes little sense. 

These are also excellent points.

I saw an argument against Putin planning to confront NATO, at least not without external forces weakening NATO and making it more viable: if he was, then Ukraine or Finland or anyone else joining NATO would not be a concern, since if he's planning a maximalist campaign to defy NATO and carve off territory from it, then it's irrelevant if the country in question is in it or not. The fact he gets so grumpy about NATO is in itself a sign he is not seriously contemplating an attack on NATO under existing circumstances.

I'm not entirely sure if I buy that line of reasoning, but I think there is some logic to it.

[Maithanet]

28 minutes ago, Werthead said:

I saw an argument against Putin planning to confront NATO, at least not without external forces weakening NATO and making it more viable: if he was, then Ukraine or Finland or anyone else joining NATO would not be a concern, since if he's planning a maximalist campaign to defy NATO and carve off territory from it, then it's irrelevant if the country in question is in it or not. The fact he gets so grumpy about NATO is in itself a sign he is not seriously contemplating an attack on NATO under existing circumstances.

I'm not entirely sure if I buy that line of reasoning, but I think there is some logic to it.

There are a lot of reasons why Putin seeking a direct conflict with NATO makes no sense and indications are that Putin knows this.  He might not be getting great information about how poorly the war is going, but he has to know that if his army is struggling with Ukraine that they are going to have a massive problem if there were NATO jets providing the Ukrainians air cover.  Hell, even a relatively minor escalation by NATO such as a larger gift of drones + a bunch of heavy artillery would significantly reduce the chances of Russian success in a conventional war.  Russia's only hopes of a meaningful victory (slim as they are) are to win a conventional war against Ukraine where NATO's support remains limited. 

The more I think about this the more I wonder which side is likely to be able to outlast the other.  There are just so many factors that go into it that it feels very hard to predict:

 - Will NATO support dry up if the conflict settles into a stalemate over coming months?  Will the US lose interest?

 - Will the Russian air force gradually win the air war over the Eastern part of the country?

 - Is the Russian army capable of adapting and improving to counter Ukrainian strategies? 

 - Will Russia go for some sort of meaningful mobilization of its population?  Not a full mobilization (that feels very unlikely) but another 100k conscripts could meaningfully tip the balance. 

 - Will Russia's economy gradually adapt to sanctions, or collapse?  My instincts say collapse, but it definitely isn't happening yet. 

 - Is there any escalation Russia could take that is large enough to make a difference, but small enough that NATO wouldn't meaningfully respond?

[Ghjhero]

Speaking of escalation, Russia is planning to call up 60k reservists according to US Defense officials. The only way out is through for Russia right now. 

[Maithanet]

1 minute ago, Maithanet said:

 - Will Russia go for some sort of meaningful mobilization of its population?  Not a full mobilization (that feels very unlikely) but another 100k conscripts could meaningfully tip the balance.

Well that was poorly timed.

 

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

43 minutes ago, Ghjhero said:

Speaking of escalation, Russia is planning to call up 60k reservists according to US Defense officials. The only way out is through for Russia right now. 

How well trained and equipped are such reservists?

[Maithanet]

10 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

How well trained and equipped are such reservists?

I am not an expert, but my understanding is that these troops would have some training, but nothing special.  Perhaps equivalent to the less trained units currently in the army. 

They would be as well equipped as the Russian army can make them, but they aren't bringing any new equipment with them. 

[HoodedCrow]

I am not an expert. I believe that tanks get horrible gas mileage and are not very maneuverable, no matter who is driving.

[mormont]

3 hours ago, Werthead said:

If we believe the propaganda, Russia wants all its old buffer states back and will risk nuclear confrontation to achieve that.

When I read this, I assume there's an unspoken qualifier along the lines of 'but not the 'stans, obviously'?

Because my understanding is that Russia is never going to get back any former Soviet state east of the Caspian. China basically bought them all.

 

[ThinkerX]

USA Today went a fact checked a long, long lineup of rumors, pics, and vids making claims about the war in the Ukraine. These are the ones they deemed 'false' or 'missing context' or some such:

Fact check roundup: What's true and what's false about the Russian invasion of Ukraine (msn.com)

 

[SpaceChampion]

2 hours ago, Toth said:

Can't we have a year again that doesn't warrant a full chapter or two in future history books?

As I like to say, we was promised a technological singularity, not a historical singularity!!!

[Corvinus85]

1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

I am not an expert, but my understanding is that these troops would have some training, but nothing special.  Perhaps equivalent to the less trained units currently in the army. 

They would be as well equipped as the Russian army can make them, but they aren't bringing any new equipment with them. 

I tend to rely on Beau of the Fifth Column regarding military matters. I don't know how accurate he is but according to him, these guys will likely have problems being thrown into the grinder, because being a Russian reservist is not like being an American reservist. They don't conduct regular training. Here is his video on this

 

[Winterfell is Burning]

7 hours ago, Werthead said:

Jeremy Bowen is a veteran BBC journalist who has covered many conflicts and international relations since the 1990s. His article here is very good.

It does identify what I think is the crux of the problem, and one people will be carefully considering in the coming weeks all over the world. Ukraine has done much better than expected and theoretically, if it weathers the storm in Donbas, could achieve a military victory on the ground. The risk then becomes Russia refusing to accept that and escalating sharply, either through the deployment of larger-scaled and more indiscriminate weapons, or through full mobilisation and invading again with a much larger army later on, which Ukraine might not be able to resist.

Against that is the warning that Ukraine has sounded which Russian propaganda has amplified: a Russian success in Ukraine could be seen as emboldening Putin for a second push somewhere else, either another non-NATO country like Georgia or Moldova or even Kazakhstan (the new Kazakh government is not as rabidly pro-Putin as the old one, though it still accepted Russian help in January to neutralise protestors), or a direct confrontation with NATO. If we believe the propaganda, Russia wants all its old buffer states back and will risk nuclear confrontation to achieve that. Whether Russia will really do that is unclear (see the prior arguments on rationality or not). It might be that Putin will be content to wait until at least 2025 and hope that a Republican President will either agree to not reinforce NATO or will obfuscate and delay (i.e. maybe not defending the Baltic States but defending Germany) in a confused manner that will pretty much only serve to destroy NATO's effectiveness as a deterrent. OTOH, if Putin really does feel like his time is running out and he wants to personally oversee the restoration of Greater Russia, he might not wait, and that is concerning. As noted previously, Russia's belief in the weakness and lack of unity in the West might be far more dangerous than the West underestimating Russia (which I don't think anyone will be doing again in the near future).

It is difficult to see a best-case scenario solution here. The way of threading the needle might be Ukraine resisting the next wave of attacks, but Russia still gaining enough ground for it to declare a victory (if only in name only), accepting Ukraine's negotiated settlement (no NATO membership etc) and withdrawing. The problem is that this still is hugely problematic (Putin can claim victory and use it to embolden himself for a later move elsewhere, or even back in Ukraine again).

The hopes for a Russian collapse seem slim at this time. The Russian economy is sustaining major shocks but it doesn't seem close to collapse, and Russia can use any hardship to generate greater invective against the West, maybe even generating the support for an attack on NATO that otherwise would not be acceptable. Similarly, Putin's political power base seems fairly secure at this time.

Regarding the italic- even if that happens- and it's doubtful, because even if Republicans win, they'll have to push anti-Russia/Putin rhetoric to the max, or otherwise will face the prospect of them being the ones perceived as soft on defense- a NATO with the entire Europe, including a reinforced Germany, is clearly more than enough to beat any chance of Russia making any serious advancement. If anything, this conflict proves to Europe they could actually be strong enough to challenge Russia without the US being involved, considering how well Ukraine is doing being much poorer, well-armed and well-trained.

Also, a massive recruitment drive is inevitable to cause civil unrest in Russia, no matter how oppressive the regime is, particularly considering the younger generations are much less pro-war than the older ones. 

And of course economic collapses tend to happen slowly at first, then all at once.

 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

31 minutes ago, Winterfell is Burning said:

with the entire Europe, including a reinforced Germany, is clearly more than enough to beat any chance of Russia making any serious advancement. If anything, this conflict proves to Europe they could actually be strong enough to challenge Russia without the US being involved

Time is of the essence here.

It will take about 10 years to catch up in terms of arming Europe. 2025 is in 3 years, which is devissively less than 10.

[SeanF]

13 hours ago, mormont said:

When I read this, I assume there's an unspoken qualifier along the lines of 'but not the 'stans, obviously'?

Because my understanding is that Russia is never going to get back any former Soviet state east of the Caspian. China basically bought them all.

 

After revealing that their armed forces are a paper tiger, I'd be very concerned about the Chinese taking back territory in Eastern Siberia, if I were a Russian strategist.

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Not on the agenda for China. The territory they feel is rightfully theirs is Taiwan. And while Russian regular troops have failed to impress, the prospect of confronting a nuclear power directly is certainly a big deterrent towards ideas of just taking territory by force. Besides, the sanctity of the territorial integrity of states is kinda raison d'etat for China. Taiwan is merely a breakaway province for them, and not a recognized state. Long story short, the probability of China laying claim to Russian territory is extremely low.

[polishgenius]

If this is true what a dumbass, but could it also explain the bus full of radiation poisoning victims that the expert was saying wouldn't be likely just from digging in the surrounding forests and stuff? cobalt-60 doesn't play.  

[SeanF]

31 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Not on the agenda for China. The territory they feel is rightfully theirs is Taiwan. And while Russian regular troops have failed to impress, the prospect of confronting a nuclear power directly is certainly a big deterrent towards ideas of just taking territory by force. Besides, the sanctity of the territorial integrity of states is kinda raison d'etat for China. Taiwan is merely a breakaway province for them, and not a recognized state. Long story short, the probability of China laying claim to Russian territory is extremely low.

It was however, a part of China, in the not too distant past.  And has valuable natural resources.

[Winterfell is Burning]

Vladivostok and the area were part of China until the 19th century and there's very large numbers of chinese and ethnically chinese in the area. That said, I don't see China making a move unless there's a collapse of the Russian state.

[Werthead]

16 hours ago, mormont said:

When I read this, I assume there's an unspoken qualifier along the lines of 'but not the 'stans, obviously'?

Because my understanding is that Russia is never going to get back any former Soviet state east of the Caspian. China basically bought them all.

During recent invective on state media and even amongst the looser nuts in the Duma, they've mentioned Kazakhstan as being a viable future target for denazification alongside the Baltic States and Poland. That's had people scratching their heads, as Kazakhstan is already Russia-friendly (if not quite as Russia-friendly as it used to be), has Russian bases on its soil and a military operation against Kazakhstan would be challenging (it's almost five times the area of Ukraine, albeit with only half the population). Uzbekistan also looks like it wants to develop more away from Russian influence and towards Turkey and China.

Good article here on concerns over Russian ambitions in Kazakhstan, and the contrast of a Duma member suggesting that Russia invade Azerbaijan being harshly rebuked in public, whilst suggestions that they do the same to Kazakhstan have passed in silence.

1 hour ago, Winterfell is Burning said:

Vladivostok and the area were part of China until the 19th century and there's very large numbers of chinese and ethnically chinese in the area. That said, I don't see China making a move unless there's a collapse of the Russian state.

Kamil Galeev, whose Twitter is worth reading, has argued that he believes there is a strong possibility of Russian fragmentation. If the outside world is able to maintain the sanctions, then the capabilities of both Russian internal air and rail transport will become limited, and as Russia loses more troops in Ukraine (neutralised or just committed), the power of the regions will increase. Regional governors may be loyal to Moscow, but when Moscow is very far away and it's no longer possible for someone to pay you a visit within 24 hours and Moscow is demanding you send them all your sugar and there's local power brokers suggesting you might not want to send the sugar, there's the possibility for unrest (not to mention there are multiple nascent nationalist movements in Russia which Moscow has kept a lid on which may feel emboldened once they sense weakness).

I'm not 100% sure I agree with his conclusions or the timeframes - the "this will be over one day and Russia will remember who played ball with it and who did not" argument is strong - but the argument is interesting.

[Werthead]

American defence officials saying their observations of some of the Russian BTGs pulling back from northern Ukraine are almost beyond belief. BTGs that went in with tanks and artillery are re-crossing the border with a bare handful of trucks and more than a third of their manpower killed, wounded or captured. Multiple BTGs that went into the Kyiv area, to all intents and purposes, no longer exist. They need to be reconstituted, but it looks like the Russians are trying to merge them with other shattered units to create a new, fully-functional unit out of two or three old ones.

Ukrainian forces have closed up to Bilozerka, due west of Kherson, and have engaged Russian forces there. Some indications that Ukrainian forces in Chornobaivka (on the NW fringes of Kherson) are waiting for that force to advance to secure their southern flank before pushing into Kherson. However, Ukrainian forces NE of Kherson have not completed driving Russian forces back over the Dnieper, and might be waiting for that to happen before they can cut off Kherson from resupply. It does look like Kherson is now more vulnerable to Ukrainian attack then Mykolaiv is to a renewed Russian counter-offensive. The Ukrainians retaking Kherson would, by far, be the biggest Ukrainian victory of the war after repulsing the Kyiv offensive. Also some signs that the Russians might pull their forces west of the Dnieper back across the river to strengthen defensive lines. They might be willing to give up Kherson (on the NW banks of the river) to tighten up their lines to ensure there is no threat towards the Crimean border.

Unbelievably, Mariupol continues to hold out. Ukrainian resupply runs by helicopter are still getting through and the Russians are sustaining huge losses. This is a good sign why:

That appears to be two T-72s being either disabled or damaged by a fricking BTR4 (an amphibious infantry fighting vehicle). You can see the armour repulsing some of the fire, as it should, but not all of it because the tanks appear to have turned around and presented their less-armoured rear to the enemy to shoot out. This is very dumb.