Ukraine 13: Pavlov's Bellum

[Maithanet]

51 minutes ago, Werthead said:

The Ukrainians will see a declared victory that leaves Russia in control of a huge swathe of new territory (even if limited to Luhansk and Donetsk and the land bridge, which is a lot but not the whole country or "Novorussia") as a springboard and platform that will allow Russia to resume the offensive later on, whether that's six months or six years or whatever. Russia could cut Ukraine to pieces, bit by bit, over several years or even decades. Ergo, Ukraine cannot accept such an outcome. That's not even mentioning that it leaves millions of Ukrainian citizens behind enemy lines to the not-so-tender mercies of the regime, and they've already seen the outcome of that elsewhere.

I share that concern.  Putin has said repeatedly that Ukraine must be within Russia's sphere.  Ceding even a small amount of territory would nonetheless reduce Ukraine's population and ability to resist.  Russia's economic, military and population are not going away anytime soon and there's no guarantee that Russia's next invasion will be so inept. 

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If Russia was willing to negotiate in good faith after using the invasion as a "demonstration" of their ability and Ukraine was willing to give up Crimea, then some sort of negotiation that sees Russia return to February 23 lines as possible (Russia ever giving back Crimea and the republics within the line of contact is impossible, I agree). However, any chance of that seems gone now. Russia will not settle for just that a neutrality guarantee, and probably never would have done.

Ukraine has said several times it would look at Crimea and even the Donbas republics with the idea of a phased transition of ownership backed by UN-monitored elections, but Russia has never really been keen on that.

 

I don't see the scenario where Russia is stymied in this offensive and then agrees to Feb 23 lines is impossible.  That is basically the "Russia is defeated" scenario.  Russia has the option of doubling down with either WBDs or a massive mobilization, but there's no certainty that they will take that path.  Either of those escalations carry significant risks for Putin and Russia (although admittedly, so does accepting a VINO). 

I feel like there are four possible scenarios, and in every case there are arguments against why that is likely.

1.  Russia is defeated in the next few weeks, declares a hollow "victory" and agrees to Feb 23 lines.

2.  Russia makes minimal gains in the next few weeks and over time both militaries become exhausted.  The two sides agree to a ceasefire, but negotiations to end the war go nowhere and the war solidifies into a new stalemate.  Russia and Ukraine are both huge losers from this conflict, and the Russian dream of subjugating Ukraine remains alive. 

3.  Russia's spring offensive is at least somewhat successful, and the Russian military demonstrates the ability to defeat the Ukrainians at least in the East.  This means Ukraine has fewer options and bitterly accepts the loss of some territories, including all access to the Sea of Azov. 

4.  The Russian spring offensive does not achieve political results and rather than accepting scenarios 1 or 2, Russia escalates.  This could be either WMDs or mass mobilization, but regardless it would be the war gets bigger and bloodier, with risks of spinning out of control for Putin. 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

1 hour ago, broken one said:

The west can raise production capacity if it wants (and maybe even take advantage of it), while Russia cannot buy micro chips.

Can the west really increase production capacities by that much? However the unsustainable argument also holds true for Russia. They can't churn out new equipment indefinitely either, esp. with the sanctions and lack of access to parts. If this goes down to, who has the last bullets in their guns I'd put my money on the western backed Ukrainians (as long as supply lines work obviousy).

[Toth]

So Chancellor Scholz has today set up a surprise press conference... to tell us that in accordance with our NATO allies Germany has decided to... still support Ukraine with small arms, we have nothing else.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FMWb3w6agAM6I5n.jpg

Unbelievable...

[DMC]

8 hours ago, Liffguard said:

I agree with all of this, but in regard to the bold, my concern is that western governments may not respect that. At the moment, Ukrainian interests and intentions (to resist the invasion with force) align with the interests of western governments (to see Russia's military sustain damage, to see Russian influence and reputation weakened). If that ever stops being the case, if we reach a point when it does become in the interests of the Ukrainian people to offer concessions, or even some kind of conditional surrender, then I strongly suspect our governments in the west would not encourage that.

While generally I'd agree with this, not anymore as long as Zelenskyy remains in power.  The guy has addressed world leaders, the EU parliament, the US Congress, etc., publicly criticizes them all for not doing enough to help Ukraine, and still gets universally praised.  If the US/the west tried to unduly pressure Zelenskyy into taking a deal, I have every confidence he would go public with it - which means it'd be very unwise for the US/west to try to do so.

8 hours ago, Werthead said:

If Russia manages to convince China of the benefits of an anti-NATO alliance needing to be formed, then that would change the equation as well (North Korea and Syria would join such an alliance immediately, and Iran would strongly consider it as well). However, China is wary of Russian unpredictability and Russia would have to accept being the junior partner in such an alliance, which would be a bitter pill to swallow.

I don't see how China would be interested in this (or Iran, for that matter, who are still currently trying to revive the nuclear deal).  Especially compared to the status quo which is pretty ideal for them - Russia is already much more dependent on them but they aren't incurring any of the blame/wrath/punitive measures from the west.

[Werthead]

13 minutes ago, DMC said:

I don't see how China would be interested in this (or Iran, for that matter, who are still currently trying to revive the nuclear deal).  Especially compared to the status quo which is pretty ideal for them - Russia is already much more dependent on them but they aren't incurring any of the blame/wrath/punitive measures from the west.

I think it would be more of a Russian initiative. I think Russia wants to get like-minded countries to join it in opposing US hegemony, which is fine as far as it goes (from Russia's POV), but China makes most of its money from the US and the West (its deals with Russia are chicken feed in comparison) and China would only be interested in such an idea if they were preparing to invade Taiwan, which would likely trigger the same kind of response as Ukraine (if not moreso). However, despite rumours China was considering an operation in the medium term, it does look like that they want a lot more time, especially with COVID causing them a lot of problems at the moment. China is definitely interested in the idea, though, as they signed a "security pact" with the Solomon Islands just today, likely aimed at Australia.

[DMC]

3 minutes ago, Werthead said:

China would only be interested in such an idea if they were preparing to invade Taiwan, which would likely trigger the same kind of response as Ukraine

Fair enough, that makes some sense.  But like you said, the timing doesn't really align.

[broken one]

1 hour ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Can the west really increase production capacities by that much? However the unsustainable argument also holds true for Russia. They can't churn out new equipment indefinitely either, esp. with the sanctions and lack of access to parts. If this goes down to, who has the last bullets in their guns I'd put my money on the western backed Ukrainians (as long as supply lines work obviousy).

Werthead referred to the part of Maithanet's post in which the latter talks about the West stuffing Ukraine with weapons during an interval between fights. Like period od peace between 2 wars or long stalemate. That's what I referred to, assuming that sanctions against Russian military industry exist. I believe in longer period the West would be able to increase the capaticity much enough, unlike Russia.

[Maithanet]

15 minutes ago, broken one said:

Werthead referred to the part of Maithanet's post in which the latter talks about the West stuffing Ukraine with weapons during an interval between fights. Like period od peace between 2 wars or long stalemate. That's what I referred to, assuming that sanctions against Russian military industry exist. I believe in longer period the West would be able to increase the capaticity much enough, unlike Russia.

I agree, if Russia were to accept 3 months of low level fighting to train up a new round of recruits that NATO could supply a very problematic amount of arms in that time. 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

3 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

I agree, if Russia were to accept 3 months of low level fighting to train up a new round of recruits that NATO could supply a very problematic amount of arms in that time. 

That's probably why Russia pushed for the offensive now, while the supplies have not been delivered. 

[Clueless Northman]

2 hours ago, Werthead said:

China would only be interested in such an idea if they were preparing to invade Taiwan

Taiwan should be relieved that China isn't ready at all, because with Western ammo stocks going down quickly with all the help sent to Ukraine, it would be very tricky for the West to try to defend both.

 

3 hours ago, Maithanet said:

2.  Russia makes minimal gains in the next few weeks and over time both militaries become exhausted.  The two sides agree to a ceasefire, but negotiations to end the war go nowhere and the war solidifies into a new stalemate.  Russia and Ukraine are both huge losers from this conflict, and the Russian dream of subjugating Ukraine remains alive. 

3.  Russia's spring offensive is at least somewhat successful, and the Russian military demonstrates the ability to defeat the Ukrainians at least in the East.  This means Ukraine has fewer options and bitterly accepts the loss of some territories, including all access to the Sea of Azov. 

Even Zelensky must see that a frozen or lasting conflict would be bad for Ukraine, unless it ends with a blatant defeat of Russian troops - clearer defeat than the Winter War and like the Persian Wars basically.

 

It's frustrating that I can't clearly see who's proposing what and who's refusing what (or "was" since discussions seem to have mostly ceased for now); I wonder if there are any pressure on Zelensky not to concede much, if Zelensky thinks he can refuse concessions, and if Russia is proposing any settlement or just has ludicrous requests like annexing more than 1/4 of the country or it's full invasion.

Frankly, from my totally-not-Ukrainian and quite removed point of view, ceding territory, even the 2 complete Donbas provinces, would be a far worse outcome than just giving up on Crimea and opting for neutral (non-NATO) non-nuclear status, but with non-aggression treaty with Russia, with independence guaranteed by NATO/US (and for good measure a fully neutral status would also imply no possible Russian alliance with guarantees against NATO interference in case Ukraine ever gets a pro-Russian government - quite unlikely of course), coupled with an official status of some kind for Russian language at least across the Eastern half of the country. Though I'm curious to know which option would appear to be the least bad outcome for Zelensky himself.

[Gorn]

Russia issued its 4th or 5th "final ultimatum" to defenders of Mariupol to surrender, which will likely be ignored like the previous ones.

That's the problem when you develop a reputation for war crimes and violating your own ceasefires - you don't get to end sieges easily or cleanly.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

1 hour ago, Gorn said:

Russia issued its 4th or 5th "final ultimatum" to defenders of Mariupol to surrender, which will likely be ignored like the previous ones.

That's the problem when you develop a reputation for war crimes and violating your own ceasefires - you don't get to end sieges easily or cleanly.

Who says they want to?

[Gorn]

12 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

Who says they want to?

Do you think their generals are thrilled at having to spend their limited resources on this siege, having their forces tied down, and continually failing to achieve a major political war goal?

They're evil, not stupid. Of course they would prefer a surrender. They prefer torturing their prisoners to death in FSB cellars to having to face them with guns in their hands.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

54 minutes ago, Gorn said:

Do you think their generals are thrilled at having to spend their limited resources on this siege, having their forces tied down, and continually failing to achieve a major political war goal?

They're evil, not stupid. Of course they would prefer a surrender. They prefer torturing their prisoners to death in FSB cellars to having to face them with guns in their hands.

And yet if they'd prefer a quick surrender why are they doing things that will obviously make that harder to achieve? I'm sure there are plenty of people in leadership who are fine delaying surrender if that means they can turn the brutality up to 11. 

[Makk]

39 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

And yet if they'd prefer a quick surrender why are they doing things that will obviously make that harder to achieve? I'm sure there are plenty of people in leadership who are fine delaying surrender if that means they can turn the brutality up to 11. 

You are aware you are talking specifically about Mariupol?

I guess it is actually possible that generals are not actively engaging the defenders there so that they don't get redeployed to the more dangerous frontlines in Donbas. However if they were deliberately protracting the siege they would have to be careful not to get on Putin's hitlist (which they may already be on). I highly doubt he is happy with them right now.

There is no actual military advantage for the Russians in not having Mariupol surrender though.

 

[Werthead]

Interesting. Putin has ordered that Russian stocks by removed from overseas exchanges. This will further reduce the wealth (and possibly power/influence) of Russian oligarchs.

In one of the better bits of obfuscation since hostilities commenced, the USA has said that Ukraine has more aircraft than it started the war with, suggesting that after the MiGs-from-Poland deal was scuttled, allied countries instead pooled spare parts to get Ukraine's mothballed MiGs (of which it reportedly has dozens in deep storage) operational. Those are apparently now online. Some rumours that Eastern European MiGs have indeed been sent into Ukraine under deep opsec, but the USA and its allies' commentary has been totally vague on that point.

The Russians have mined the Kherson-Snihurivka highway, apparently in fear of being outflanked from the north.

One Ukrainian official suggesting that their estimates are that Russia's current fighting power will be completely spent by September, necessitating mobilisation or a political solution. There seems to be growing consensus today (from multiple western sources) that the May 9 "victory day" may be downplayed, especially if Russia is achieving successes but more slowly than expected. However, a couple of of the more rabid pro-Putin media outlets have given voice to more moderate voices in recent days talking about a withdrawal from Ukraine in the near future (whilst a couple of yahoos are of course discussing invading Germany, Brazil and Triton, the primary moon of Neptune).

US DoD and UK MoD briefings indicate that the Russian main offensive is underway, but is getting bogged down due to the weather and the strength of resistance. They acknowledge it's only 24 hours into this phase, however. The Ukrainians have fortified strongpoints that remain highly effective and abandoned positions that are more vulnerable and would just be overwhelmed immediately. Even then, the Russians apparently encountered more problems than expected (hence the battle for Kreminna killing a senior Luhansk commander when the Ukrainians weren't even contesting it that much).

Russian coastal defence batteries have been repurposed into medium-range ground attack batteries, which is weird. Coastal defence Kh-35 missiles have expensive rangefinders and shaped charges, and are wasted on close-range land attacks, not to mention it is reducing capacity to repel a naval assault (the threat of which to be fair is non-existent at the moment). Possibly a sign of continued supply issues for more suitable weaponry.

Western intelligence now agrees there were no nuclear weapons on the Moskva when it sank.

Chechen fighters have apparently returned to Chechnya with 3 combine harvesters, a tractor, 3 seeders and 20 tons of products. They probably could have just gotten a discount from a farm surplus store in Nebraska or something for much less trouble.

Russian media and some politicians are apparently now on the outskirts of Mariupol, with an expectation of victory being declared there in the next few days, possibly before fighting is fully concluded.

Excellent reporting on the view of the conflict from the Russian countryside.

[Werthead]

Navalny on how to counteract Kremlin propaganda:

 

 

[broken one]

According to this source 100 Polish T72 and some BM-21 Grad launchers are in Ukraine for some time already.

https://www.wnp.pl/przemysl-obronny/polskie-czolgi-t-72-walcza-na-ukrainie-coraz-wiecej-na-to-wskazuje,567235.html

Earlier I've encountered an info that they went there already in the middle of March (maybe even before Zelensky officially asked for them), I did not believe the information then, but the number of vehicles was the same... neat.

[Gorn]

Supposedly, Ukraine now has more operational planes than they had at the beginning of the war. Apparently, the majority of airplanes that they inherited from the USSR were decommissioned due to lack of budget for maintaining them. They were now provided with spare parts and help in getting them operational again.

[broken one]

I wonder if the "spare parts" were not (among others) NATO MIGs, dismantled after the blooper.