Ukraine 13: Pavlov's Bellum

[DMC]

2 hours ago, Werthead said:

Most, if not all, of Putin's stated aims when the conflict began were put on the table in those negotiations: Ukraine would stay out of NATO

While I wholeheartedly agree with the point of this post - the ball is squarely in Putin's court when it comes to negotiations at this point and there's virtually nothing else the West and/or Ukraine can do to get them to the table - I do wanna quibble with this. 

Up until the invasion Zelenskyy/Ukraine remained adamant that they would continue to pursue NATO membership.  Granted, there was that one slip up by the Ambassador to the UK, but the fact it was immediately walked back by the administration serves to demonstrate that Zelenskyy really hadn't put this on the table.  That didn't happen til about a month ago when Zelenskyy admitted Ukraine wouldn't join NATO.

I mention it because that is one "concession" Putin could sell as achieved through the invasion with some credibility.

[Padraig]

2 hours ago, Rippounet said:

In all honesty, I'm just pissed that the West didn't do better at preventing this, and I darkly suspect that there were some that knowingly allowed it to happen to wage a war by proxy against Russia.

I find that very hard to believe.

These "people" had to be confident that Russia would actually invade, rather than just threaten to do so.  And then do a lot worse than expected and Ukraine a lot better.  Because a Russian victory (and it still may "win" to a degree) would have been a disaster geopolitically.  The idea of that kind of strategic genius fits far better in a comic book movie than real life.

It still amazes me that we are watching an old fashioned (in the very worst meaning of that phrase) war of conquest.  All wars are horrific but we had generally gone beyond the point where one country could actually invade another and say its ours now.  Not a high bar to reach but you take what you can get.  Or thought you could get.

There was Iraq's failed invasion of Kuwait.  Indonesia did invade East Timor in the 1970s but again (eventually) relinquished it.  The one "recent" still open example may be Western Sahara (and that dates from the 1970s too.  And its a little complicated).  Now sure, Russia possibly didn't expect to seize the whole of Ukraine but even the whole of the south-east would have been a disaster.

Some people more knowledgeable than me may come up with a few others over the last 50 years.  Any one I considered didn't feel right to me (e.g. the Yugoslav wars was a very ugly break up of a state rather than a traditional war of conquest, although there were aspects there.  For all its ills, the US never intended on adding another state to the union in Asia.  The conflict around Israel/Palestine needs its own category).  So yes, I do think this is quite unique in a modern sense.  I do think that uniqueness matters.  And is extra horrifying because of that.

[a free shadow]

16 minutes ago, Padraig said:

I find that very hard to believe.

...

The idea of that kind of strategic genius fits far better in a comic book movie than real life.

On point.

When Russian forces were gathering at the borders, Western countries were reluctant to provide any aid and then encouraged Zelensky to evacuate, suggesting the general line of thinking was that there is no chance for the Ukrainians to hold the front.

3 hours ago, Rippounet said:

BTW, if the West was serious about getting rid of Putin, the economic pressure would have kept growing after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. But we needed all those sweet fossile fuels to keep flowing from Russia so we can keep burning the planet, didn't we? So sanctions were lax, and Ukrainians paid the price for it. But we sent them javelins so I guess it's all good.

...

Nonetheless, it's a huge waste of life, and for lots of wrong reasons.
 

It was hard to even choose what to point out from this wall of self-indulgent conjenctures, but let me just say that advocating for throwing more bones to Russia and then saying too many concessions were made before is contradictive.

Those wrong reasons (at this current moment and not imaginary lead up to it) are what? What would you point out to a fighting Ukrainian today as a wrong reason to be fighting?

[SeanF]

35 minutes ago, Padraig said:

I find that very hard to believe.

These "people" had to be confident that Russia would actually invade, rather than just threaten to do so.  And then do a lot worse than expected and Ukraine a lot better.  Because a Russian victory (and it still may "win" to a degree) would have been a disaster geopolitically.  The idea of that kind of strategic genius fits far better in a comic book movie than real life.

It still amazes me that we are watching an old fashioned (in the very worst meaning of that phrase) war of conquest.  All wars are horrific but we had generally gone beyond the point where one country could actually invade another and say its ours now.  Not a high bar to reach but you take what you can get.  Or thought you could get.

There was Iraq's failed invasion of Kuwait.  Indonesia did invade East Timor in the 1970s but again (eventually) relinquished it.  The one "recent" still open example may be Western Sahara (and that dates from the 1970s too.  And its a little complicated).  Now sure, Russia possibly didn't expect to seize the whole of Ukraine but even the whole of the south-east would have been a disaster.

Some people more knowledgeable than me may come up with a few others over the last 50 years.  Any one I considered didn't feel right to me (e.g. the Yugoslav wars was a very ugly break up of a state rather than a traditional war of conquest, although there were aspects there.  For all its ills, the US never intended on adding another state to the union in Asia.  The conflict around Israel/Palestine needs its own category).  So yes, I do think this is quite unique in a modern sense.  I do think that uniqueness matters.  And is extra horrifying because of that.

At the outset, I expected Russia to win quite easily, and it may well be that a lot of NATO countries' politicans also believed that. Had they known what a bloody nose Russia would get, I suspect that Western European governments would have been pushing back against Russia a lot harder before the invasion began.

[Gorn]

18 minutes ago, a free shadow said:

On point.

When Russian forces were gathering at the borders, Western countries were reluctant to provide any aid and then encouraged Zelensky to evacuate, suggesting the general line of thinking was that there is no chance for the Ukrainians to hold the front.

I'm guessing that the Afghanistan debacle made everyone wary of providing military aid at first. Why send expensive equipment if it will just be captured by Russia?

It was only after Ukrainians proved that they would not surrender and that any weapons would be used effectively that the real help started to flow.

[a free shadow]

8 minutes ago, Gorn said:

I'm guessing that the Afghanistan debacle made everyone wary of providing military aid at first. Why send expensive equipment if it will just be captured by Russia?

Yes, exactly, that was my point, to the conclusion that were was no confidence in Ukraine being able to hold Russia back. Unless you mean that you disagree with that conclusion?

[Kalbear]

6 hours ago, DMC said:

....And yet polls continue to show about three quarters of Americans think the US should keep sanctions on Russia and keep sending Ukraine weapons.  Even among the 25% that think "Biden should take less of a leadership role," 46% of them still think the US should send weapons/supplies to Ukraine. 

Here's a slightly more recent poll with crosstabs so we can look at just Trump voters.  Among Trump voters, 74% think imposing sanctions on Russia is a good idea, 16% think it's a bad idea (pg. 104).  69% of Trump voters think sending weapons to Ukraine is a good idea, 17% think it's a bad idea (108).  Even when asked if they would still approve of additional sanctions if prices increase, 58% of Trump voters said yes they would still approve while 21% said they would not approve (100).  63% of Trump voters think it's a good idea to ban Russian imports compared to 17% that think it's a bad idea (124).

Another thing often mentioned, Putin's favorability, has also evaporated.  76% of Trump voters do still think Putin is at least a somewhat strong leader (as do 48% of Biden voters, btw).  But only 9% of Trump voters have a favorable opinion of Putin (compared to 6% for Biden voters) - and 85% of Trump voters have an unfavorable opinion (142-3).  Meanwhile, 69% of Trump voters have a favorable view of Zelenskyy, with 16% having an unfavorable view (150).

Not only is there absolutely no indication of "fickleness" among the American public when it comes Ukraine, but the efforts of FNC pro-Putin propagandists continues to fall on deaf ears when it comes to most Trumpists.

It's been 50 days. Slow your roll. The idea that polling right now- which btw is trending toward being more favorable to Russia! - means it will always be bad for Russia is ridiculous.

[DMC]

3 minutes ago, Kalibuster said:

It's been 50 days. Slow your roll. The idea that polling right now- which btw is trending toward being more favorable to Russia! - means it will always be bad for Russia is ridiculous.

My roll needs no slowing.  Of course it doesn't mean the numbers won't change with time, I never remotely implied they wouldn't.  I said there's no evidence of the American public being "fickle" on Ukraine, at least according to the data I've seen.  If you have any evidence that polling is "trending towards Russia," please share.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

41 minutes ago, DMC said:

My roll needs no slowing.  Of course it doesn't mean the numbers won't change with time, I never remotely implied they wouldn't.  I said there's no evidence of the American public being "fickle" on Ukraine, at least according to the data I've seen.  If you have any evidence that polling is "trending towards Russia," please share.

TBF, it's hard to have any evidence that will be useful in predicting what will happen if the war drags on through the summer. I personally believe the numbers will remain relatively static through say the end of May, but if six months out not much has changed I would expect public support for the current war effort to decline, probably by a reasonably large margin, especially if energy prices are still crushing and nothing has been done about the inflation problem. 

[DMC]

8 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

especially if energy prices are still crushing and nothing has been done about the inflation problem. 

This is what matters.  Frankly it's all that matters.  If history is any guide, the numbers are likely to wane if/as the war drags on, but that's not what the GOP will be running on this November if the environment looks like it does today, or is worse.  Which, unfortunately, seems very likely at this point.  The GOP will be running on inflation and price increases regardless of what's happening in Ukraine, or at least they ones with any sense will - because that's how they'll maximize their gains.  The only way Ukraine overcomes those fundamentals of the cycle is if there's escalation I really don't care to speculate on - especially in regards to how it will impact the midterms.

[ThinkerX]

8 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

TBF, it's hard to have any evidence that will be useful in predicting what will happen if the war drags on through the summer. I personally believe the numbers will remain relatively static through say the end of May, but if six months out not much has changed I would expect public support for the current war effort to decline, probably by a reasonably large margin, especially if energy prices are still crushing and nothing has been done about the inflation problem. 

I have severe doubts Russia in general and Putin in particular can survive a six-month slow motion Ukrainian war.  Russia will be lucky to sustain this conflict even two months before a near total economic collapse cripples everything and gets a large segment of the populace extremely ticked off. 

This comes down to Russia being a kleptocracy - a government of thieves. The whole system, top to bottom, runs on graft and personal connections. Putin *cannot* significantly reform the army and improve military readiness without undercutting his own power.  

Then there is the global economy aspect of things, specifically supply chain shortages. Here in the US, those are an annoyance. For Russia, they will be crippling in short order. Trains not running. Planes not flying. Crops not getting harvested. Multiple major factory closures for lack of parts - civilian and military both, throwing massive numbers of people out of work. A kleptocracy is totally incapable of dealing with these issues. 

 

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

15 minutes ago, DMC said:

This is what matters.  Frankly it's all that matters.  If history is any guide, the numbers are likely to wane if/as the war drags on, but that's not what the GOP will be running on this November if the environment looks like it does today, or is worse.  Which, unfortunately, seems very likely at this point.  The GOP will be running on inflation and price increases regardless of what's happening in Ukraine, or at least they ones with any sense will - because that's how they'll maximize their gains.  The only way Ukraine overcomes those fundamentals of the cycle is if there's escalation I really don't care to speculate on - especially in regards to how it will impact the midterms.

Show me the lie.

18 minutes ago, ThinkerX said:

I have severe doubts Russia in general and Putin in particular can survive a six-month slow motion Ukrainian war.  Russia will be lucky to sustain this conflict even two months before a near total economic collapse cripples everything and gets a large segment of the populace extremely ticked off. 

This comes down to Russia being a kleptocracy - a government of thieves. The whole system, top to bottom, runs on graft and personal connections. Putin *cannot* significantly reform the army and improve military readiness without undercutting his own power.  

Then there is the global economy aspect of things, specifically supply chain shortages. Here in the US, those are an annoyance. For Russia, they will be crippling in short order. Trains not running. Planes not flying. Crops not getting harvested. Multiple major factory closures for lack of parts - civilian and military both, throwing massive numbers of people out of work. A kleptocracy is totally incapable of dealing with these issues. 

 

I don't think Russia could sustain the war effort for that long either, but you still have to plan for it. Most of us probably expected, much like Putin, that Russia would roll into Kyiv with ease in a week or two. So much for that, right? 

[DMC]

3 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

Show me the lie.

Uh, what?

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

6 minutes ago, DMC said:

Uh, what?

That means I was agreeing with you 

[DMC]

1 minute ago, Tywin et al. said:

That means I was agreeing with you 

Looked it up after I responded.  Still, it was initially confusing for this old, out of touch stoner.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

10 minutes ago, DMC said:

Looked it up after I responded.  Still, it was initially confusing for this old, out of touch stoner.

Gotta stay hip to the current slang if you want to connect with the undergrads. Just don't go full Prof. Jennings. 

[Loge]

10 hours ago, Padraig said:

I find that very hard to believe.

These "people" had to be confident that Russia would actually invade, rather than just threaten to do so.  And then do a lot worse than expected and Ukraine a lot better.  Because a Russian victory (and it still may "win" to a degree) would have been a disaster geopolitically.  The idea of that kind of strategic genius fits far better in a comic book movie than real life.

It still amazes me that we are watching an old fashioned (in the very worst meaning of that phrase) war of conquest.  All wars are horrific but we had generally gone beyond the point where one country could actually invade another and say its ours now.  Not a high bar to reach but you take what you can get.  Or thought you could get.

There was Iraq's failed invasion of Kuwait.  Indonesia did invade East Timor in the 1970s but again (eventually) relinquished it.  The one "recent" still open example may be Western Sahara (and that dates from the 1970s too.  And its a little complicated).  Now sure, Russia possibly didn't expect to seize the whole of Ukraine but even the whole of the south-east would have been a disaster.

Some people more knowledgeable than me may come up with a few others over the last 50 years.  Any one I considered didn't feel right to me (e.g. the Yugoslav wars was a very ugly break up of a state rather than a traditional war of conquest, although there were aspects there.  For all its ills, the US never intended on adding another state to the union in Asia.  The conflict around Israel/Palestine needs its own category).  So yes, I do think this is quite unique in a modern sense.  I do think that uniqueness matters.  And is extra horrifying because of that.

There are at least two more: The Ogaden war, where Somalia invaded Ethiopia, and the war between Iraq and Iran, where Iraq tried to seize the Khuzestan province. Oh, and the Falklands war.

ETA: If we extend the time frame and scope a bit then there's China's invasion of Tibet and various wars involving India on one side and either Pakistan or China on the other. There's also the brutal re-conquest of the seceded Biafra province by Nigeria. And an attempted invasion of Vietnam by China.

[Corvinus85]

18 minutes ago, Loge said:

There are at least two more: The Ogaden war, where Somalia invaded Ethiopia, and the war between Iraq and Iran, where Iraq tried to seize the Khuzestan province. Oh, and the Falklands war.

ETA: If we extend the time frame and scope a bit then there's China's invasion of Tibet and various wars involving India on one side and either Pakistan or China on the other. There's also the brutal re-conquest of the seceded Biafra province by Nigeria. And an attempted invasion of Vietnam by China.

A lot of these wars come mainly from territorial disputes, with the primary goal being to take over a certain piece of land. The more recent is Armenia v Azerbaijan. Russia's invasion strategy made it clear they wanted to conquer Ukraine.

[Loge]

46 minutes ago, Corvinus85 said:

A lot of these wars come mainly from territorial disputes, with the primary goal being to take over a certain piece of land. The more recent is Armenia v Azerbaijan. Russia's invasion strategy made it clear they wanted to conquer Ukraine.

That's far from certain. Obviously, Putin wanted to establish some kind of control over Ukraine, plus annex some territory, but not all of it. He has recognised these two "peoples republics," so he wasn't going to annex Ukraine wholesale.

[Makk]

1 hour ago, Loge said:

That's far from certain. Obviously, Putin wanted to establish some kind of control over Ukraine, plus annex some territory, but not all of it. He has recognised these two "peoples republics," so he wasn't going to annex Ukraine wholesale.

Why attack kyiv with paratroopers and then a massive force if you are not trying to conquer the country? That was not a decoy.