#16 Ukraine the brave, the whole World is watching!

[Erik of Hazelfield]

2 hours ago, Gorn said:

All of that stopped being relevant when Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezh accords in 1991, promising to respect each other's territorial integrity in the present Soviet Republic borders. This was confirmed by a bunch of other agreements that Russia and Ukraine signed in the 90's (CIS founding agreement, Black Sea Fleet partition agreement, Russian-Ukrainian Friendship agreement, etc.).

Thanks for the info - I didn’t know that.

This brings us to another crucial point that needs to be part of any peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia - international enforcement of said treaty. I think you discussed it in the thread already, but without such security commitments by other countries, it would be all too easy for Russia to promise whatever and then a few years later when they’ve rebuilt their army they can just attack again, using better tactics. 

[Padraig]

4 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

This is dificult/a bad idea. Ukraine doesn't meet the criteria for EU membership. To fast track them and put them at the top of the cue (ahead of likesay Serbia) is not gonna go down well.

Did you misread this?  Its just about being accepted as an official candidate.  Not actual membership.  I doubt there will be any real interest in fast-tracking them.

Although, as Toth mentioned, Serbia doesn't present itself as a very attractive member these days (although it did score a little higher than Ukraine a year ago based on the full EU criteria.  See here.)

[A Horse Named Stranger]

11 minutes ago, Padraig said:

Did you misread this?  Its just about being accepted as an official candidate.  Not actual membership.  I doubt there will be any real interest in fast-tracking them.

Although, as Toth mentioned, Serbia doesn't present itself as a very attractive member these days (although it did score a little higher than Ukraine a year ago based on the full EU criteria.  See here.)

Well, I read somewhere, that the non-EU states of former Yugoslavia are watching that with sorta clenched jaw, that would do Stannis Baratheon honour. From their perspective: They are basically being disected under a microscope for years, and Ukraine is suddenly the new favored child.

[Gorn]

1 hour ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Well, I read somewhere, that the non-EU states of former Yugoslavia are watching that with sorta clenched jaw, that would do Stannis Baratheon honour. From their perspective: They are basically being disected under a microscope for years, and Ukraine is suddenly the new favored child.

As someone from ex-Yugoslavia, I would happily see Ukraine accepted into EU. If we're screwed, it doesn't mean others need to be too.

Let's look at ex-Yu countries one by one:

- Bosnia is never getting in. I wouldn't even accept us if it was entirely my decision to make.

- Serbia and Kosovo are not getting in until they permanently settle their conflict, which, let's be real, also means never.

- That leaves Montenegro and North Macedonia, and of the two, North Macedonia is the one that really got shafted. They even committed the ultimate self-humiliation of forced name change, all for nothing. Now they're being blackmailed by Bulgaria that they need to change the phrase "Bulgarian fascist occupiers" on WWII monuments into "Bulgarian administrators", in addition to denying them their language and national identity.

[Werthead]

11 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Well, I read somewhere, that the non-EU states of former Yugoslavia are watching that with sorta clenched jaw, that would do Stannis Baratheon honour. From their perspective: They are basically being disected under a microscope for years, and Ukraine is suddenly the new favored child.

The concerns over issues in Ukraine have been pretty huge until relatively recently. Things have improved in Ukraine since 2014, but it's been slow going and right up to the invasion there were still areas where Ukraine needed to improve a lot, especially in corruption. The same was true of Serbia, but to a lesser degree and it has been seen as improving under the EU admittance criteria, though with some concerns over its relationship with Russia and China (although Serbia has also indicated its ties with those countries are partially due to the EU dragging its feet over admitting Serbia, so there you go) and the unresolved issues regarding Kosovo.

There has been a concern amongst other countries that, given the behaviour of Hungary and to a lesser degree Poland, they don't want another situation of admitting a country, that country rolling back on its various pledges, and then people being reluctant to sanction or kick them out in case they defect into Russia's orbit entirely (although that is 100% not a problem with Poland, it is seen as one for other countries).

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Yes, the EU lacks a clear expulsion mechanism (as demmonstrated by Hungary and to a lesser degree by Poland). 

[broken one]

I think they will behave, at least in the years to come, but in some time after the accession, when it will be already all well and membership taken for granted, some "saviour of nation" may show up and try to turn back time.

As for Poland I think it should be enough to block cohesion funds until the garbage is swept out of the legal system. Just hope the EU won't bend.

 

[Padraig]

1 hour ago, broken one said:

I think they will behave, at least in the years to come, but in some time after the accession, when it will be already all well and membership taken for granted, some "saviour of nation" may show up and try to turn back time.

Certainly a danger.  But that danger exists across a number of countries.  France has skirted close enough to that edge over the past couple of elections there.

Reforms of the procedures is definitely called for but a number of countries wouldn't approve those changes because they know they will be targeted.  It is difficult.

And its hard to know how Hungary can improve.  Orban is still relatively young (59), so he could be around for a couple more decades if he so chooses.  And the opposition doesn't seem able to mount a proper campaign against him (especially given his domination of the media there).

Anyhow, I can understand a little bit of frustration in the Balkans but there was a marked reluctance in the EU to admit anyone in recent years.  This conflict has reasserted the original mission for the EU (peace in our times).  If anything, they may now regain momentum around membership.

Now, if Ukraine did join before they did, I can see why they'd be very frustrated but I think we are years from that.

@Gorn What are your views on Albania?  It is barely ever in the news but it is a candidate state.  And I know little about them.  And as you say, you'd have to sympathise with those from North Macedonia.

Anyhow, that CEPS article I linked to above suggests that Ukraine is not that far off most of the other candidates (and ahead of Albania) based on the current criteria, so being a candidate seems reasonable enough.  It is Georgia that fails a lot more boxes.

[Gorn]

48 minutes ago, Padraig said:

@Gorn What are your views on Albania?  It is barely ever in the news but it is a candidate state.  And I know little about them.  And as you say, you'd have to sympathise with those from North Macedonia.

Anyhow, that CEPS article I linked to above suggests that Ukraine is not that far off most of the other candidates (and ahead of Albania) based on the current criteria, so being a candidate seems reasonable enough.  It is Georgia that fails a lot more boxes.

I'd say that Albania and Montenegro are the next most likely countries to enter EU, although not very soon. Montenegro is being held back by a large pro-Russian minority of population, and Albania is unofficially held back by being a majority-Muslim country (despite being about as secular as say, Sweden).

[Maithanet]

Russia has lost an Su-25 seemingly to an accident, as well as Ukrainians destroying a helicopter and the naval vessel Vasily Bekh (a 1,600 ton ship) doing supply runs to Snake Island. 

I also wanted to touch on something about the way the war is characterized/percieved.  In the opening weeks, Ukraine was determined to project strength, to shore up their own morale and to convince the world that they can indeed fight the Russians on equal footing.  Thus, even though they lost a substaintial amount of ground in the first weeks, they were portrayed as "winning". 

In the Donbas offensive, the narrative has flipped.  Ukraine wants to emphasize their weaknesses so that they can elicit more foreign aid.  Thus, the situation in the Donbas has been somewhere between alarming and critical for almost a month now.  But is it really?  The Russians have been trying to close the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway for weeks, and in spite of being only a few kilometers away, they haven't done it.  Why not?  That's not an urban area where the defender has all the advantages.  It's a highway, and all you need to do is find the most accessible point to attack, pound it with artillery and then take the ground.  I'm not saying it's easy, but it's clearly doable.  And yet, the Ukrainians have had the strength to keep that from happening day after day for almost a month.  The fact that the Russians cannot overpower them in that one spot says that the Ukrainians are stronger than they let on.

I'm not trying to say that the situation isn't really challenging in the Sieverodonetsk pocket.  It is.  But that's just one pretty small area of the front, and they have held it for over a month against Russia's maximal effort.  That isn't the sign that the war has turned in Russia's favor.  Instead it's a sign that even in a lopsided fight with good logistical supplies and vastly superior artillery, the Russians can't manage more than anemic progress. 

[Werthead]

7 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

I also wanted to touch on something about the way the war is characterized/percieved.  In the opening weeks, Ukraine was determined to project strength, to shore up their own morale and to convince the world that they can indeed fight the Russians on equal footing.  Thus, even though they lost a substaintial amount of ground in the first weeks, they were portrayed as "winning". 

In the Donbas offensive, the narrative has flipped.  Ukraine wants to emphasize their weaknesses so that they can elicit more foreign aid.  Thus, the situation in the Donbas has been somewhere between alarming and critical for almost a month now.  But is it really?  The Russians have been trying to close the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway for weeks, and in spite of being only a few kilometers away, they haven't done it.  Why not?  That's not an urban area where the defender has all the advantages.  It's a highway, and all you need to do is find the most accessible point to attack, pound it with artillery and then take the ground.  I'm not saying it's easy, but it's clearly doable.  And yet, the Ukrainians have had the strength to keep that from happening day after day for almost a month.  The fact that the Russians cannot overpower them in that one spot says that the Ukrainians are stronger than they let on.

I'm not trying to say that the situation isn't really challenging in the Sieverodonetsk pocket.  It is.  But that's just one pretty small area of the front, and they have held it for over a month against Russia's maximal effort.  That isn't the sign that the war has turned in Russia's favor.  Instead it's a sign that even in a lopsided fight with good logistical supplies and vastly superior artillery, the Russians can't manage more than anemic progress. 

This analysis I think is accurate.

Rather panicky analyses from a couple of weeks to even a few days ago of imminent Ukrainian collapse seem to have calmed down and are now describing the situation as a stalemate in the Donbas, where Russia has massive advantages in artillery and airpower, but deficiencies in ground troops and infantry numbers. The Ukrainians have the opposite problem, with reasonable amounts of ground troops but not the supporting material (particularly artillery) to retake ground.

The Russian hope was for a gap to open in the lines that they could exploit, as briefly happened when they took Popasna and even more briefly when they initially reached Severodonetsk. If that happens, they can win a major advantage. But more recently it's been the Ukrainians exploiting gaps in the Russian lines instead and pushing them back, sometimes permanently and sometimes temporarily. But the Ukrainians lack the heavy firepower to really turn the tide and the Russians lack the manpower to exploit the advantages of their heavier firepower.

Until one side remedies their issue - Russia brings in more reinforcements or Ukraine deploys heavier weapons - we may see the grinding attrition continue. Although I wouldn't rule out either a Russian reversal due to its manpower problems (that earlier report that some Russian BTGs holding the line are down to just 30 men and would probably break if directly attacked) or a Ukrainian reversal if the Russian firepower superiority manages to blow open a hole in the Ukrainian lines in an area where they do have a lot of troops able to exploit it.

[Maithanet]

22 minutes ago, Werthead said:

Until one side remedies their issue - Russia brings in more reinforcements or Ukraine deploys heavier weapons - we may see the grinding attrition continue. Although I wouldn't rule out either a Russian reversal due to its manpower problems (that earlier report that some Russian BTGs holding the line are down to just 30 men and would probably break if directly attacked) or a Ukrainian reversal if the Russian firepower superiority manages to blow open a hole in the Ukrainian lines in an area where they do have a lot of troops able to exploit it.

The question is whether Russia can keep this up.  In the first maximal campaign in feb-march lots of people predicted (fairly accurately) that the Russians would culminate in 4-6 weeks and then need an operational pause to replace losses, bring up supplies and regroup.  Some of those same people said that same thing about the Donbas offensive, that the losses in equipment and men were unsustainable and the offensive would be exhausted in about a month.  But those predictions were that Russia would run out of steam in ~ mid-May, and we're entering the second half of June with no end in sight.  Russian losses have declined in the past month, but they are definitely still happening, and while they can bring out old T-80s and even old T-62s, they can't do that for infantry. 

It feels like there's a lot of ways this Donbas offensive could end.  The Russians could cut the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway and force a hasty retreat by the Ukrainians.  The offensive could just peter out, with some continued shelling, but much less movement.  Or the Ukrainians could make a counterattack somewhere which forces the Russians to divert their attention from Sieverodonetsk to elsewhere on the front. 

If the Ukrainians could effectively counterattack in the South and threaten a link up with the Dniper anywhere between Kherson and Nova Kakhovka, that would be a potential strategic disaster for Russia.  Ukraine is apparently making small attacks there every night, taking advantage of better night vision gear.  I don't know how realistic a surprise big advance with tanks over the final ~20 km is, but it would be a huge win if they could pull it off. 

[Maithanet]

UK Minister of Defense says that Russia is losing the war.
 

Quote

 

"President Putin has used about 25% of his army's power to gain a tiny amount of territory and 50,000 people either dead or injured."

Russia is now a "more diminished power" diplomatically and economically than several months ago, he said.

 

"Any notion that this is a success for Russia is nonsense. Russia is failing.

"It might be getting some tactical successes over the last few weeks. And those might continue for the next few weeks.

"But Russia is losing strategically."

 

50k killed or injured is a higher number than we've seen previously.  I have to assume that includes LPR and DPR.  Even still that is a really big number considering their pre-war buildup was 190k. 

[Werthead]

46 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

UK Minister of Defense says that Russia is losing the war.
 

50k killed or injured is a higher number than we've seen previously.  I have to assume that includes LPR and DPR.  Even still that is a really big number considering their pre-war buildup was 190k. 

Previous figures including Wagner, Chechnya, LPR and DPR were around 32,000 so that's a big increase. But there was a good month when we weren't really getting any figures at all.

[Maithanet]

14 minutes ago, Werthead said:

Previous figures including Wagner, Chechnya, LPR and DPR were around 32,000 so that's a big increase. But there was a good month when we weren't really getting any figures at all.

I saw Ukraine claimed recently that total forces committed by Russia + proxies is something like 320k thus far.  So of all forces deployed that would be 16% killed or seriously wounded.  When you consider that the casualty rates are surely very low for some units like aviation support personnel and various desk jobs, the casualties for actual deployed frontline troops has got to be at least double that 16% figure.  That is just such a huge number, no wonder morale is low in the Russian forces. 

[Maithanet]

Good article about the logistical challenges of delivering HIMARs and ammunition to Ukraine.

TLDR version is:  The US sensibly didn't want to give Ukraine really advanced weapons prior to the war starting, because there was still the risk of Ukraine collapsing and the Russians getting a free, working HIMARs would be really unfortunate.  Once the war started, Ukraine's logistical system was already strained, and the requests from Ukraine were for things like radios, rifles, mortars, body armor, etc.  It is really only since the Donbas offensive and in particular the artillery duel portion in May that the request changed to heavy artillery.  First the US deployed the 155 mm guns, because those are easier to transport/supply and require less training.

The HIMARs is a different beast, it is the most logistically challenging thing in the US army.  The vehicle weighs 18 tons.  But the real challenge is the rocket ammo.  A single rocket volley weighs 2.5 tons and is fired in just a few seconds.  Even if you are redeploying after every shot, a HIMARs can realistically shot 2 volleys an hour, or 60 tons of ammo in a single 12 hour period.  For a single HIMARS in a single day.  This ammo requires special trucks, which can each carry 2 volleys.  Unless you are going to send the HIMARs to Ukraine, shoot off a few rockets and then wait a week, you are going to need a LOT of logistical support to accommodate the amount of rockets that they consume.  That supply chain is getting spun up in 3 weeks, and frankly that is a very tight timeframe.  So while it is frustrating that Ukraine has to endure the pounding of Russian guns while the HIMARs arrive, that is more or less a logistical necessity. 

[JGP]

I don't know why I make myself read this risible shit when it also just makes me want to punch him in the face until his head caves in. 

 

 

 

[Maithanet]

22 minutes ago, JGP said:

I don't know why I make myself read this risible shit when it also just makes me want to punch him in the face until his head caves in.

I don't find Putin's speeches nearly as infuriating as I did back in Jan/Feb.  Back then he was trying to bully the entire world with his "Don't make me hit you" intimidation act.  But now, he's just a feeble autocrat who has discovered that he cannot in fact dictate the way the world works.  He can say that he's winning and he had no choice and the Russian economy is unaffected by the sanctions, but it's all just bullshit.  Putin is trapped in a disaster of his own making, and is still trying to pretend everything is fine.  Anyone with even a tiny bit of intellectual curiosity can see through his lies. 

[JGP]

I know. I just hate him, so fucking much. 

Sorry.

[Derfel Cadarn]

51 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

I don't find Putin's speeches nearly as infuriating as I did back in Jan/Feb.  Back then he was trying to bully the entire world with his "Don't make me hit you" intimidation act.  But now, he's just a feeble autocrat who has discovered that he cannot in fact dictate the way the world works.  He can say that he's winning and he had no choice and the Russian economy is unaffected by the sanctions, but it's all just bullshit.  Putin is trapped in a disaster of his own making, and is still trying to pretend everything is fine.  Anyone with even a tiny bit of intellectual curiosity can see through his lies. 

Yeah. At the start of the year it was “don’t make me fuck you up’”

Now it’s “don’t make me headbutt your knee and bleed over your jeans.”