#16 Ukraine the brave, the whole World is watching!

[A Horse Named Stranger]

9 hours ago, KalVsWade said:

Also interesting to me - the combination of cheap drones, cheap 3d printing hold/release mechanism and cheap vanes put onto the grenade make for a kind of ridiculously useful anti-trench system:
 

 

Let's hope Proud Boys and those other nitwits never figure that out.

[Werthead]

It looks like a small number of Russian units have managed to into Lysychansk and fighting has begun in the city there, even though Severodonetsk is still holding out.

Some Ukrainian accounts of fighting there: Russian artillery hits an area, the Ukrainians take cover, and then regroup just as Russian/LPR troops attack. The Ukrainians repulse the infantry attack but then have to immediately retreat because artillery will then fire on their position. If they get the timing right, they can then reoccupy the position in time to repulse the next infantry attack. If they're unlucky, the position will be completely destroyed and rendered useless for defence, but at least the Ukrainian soldiers get to fall back to the next line. If they're very lucky, they "hug" the Russians as they retreat and actually move forwards. If they've very unlucky, the Ukrainians are still there when the artillery strike comes in. Rinse and repeat for days on end.

However, the Russians are showing increased willingness to put their artillery fire and their infantry movements so close together they risk causing their own casualties. That's causing morale problems, but it's also causing obvious problems for the defenders.

Excellent analysis as normal from Jomini, though his updates have become less frequent:

Significantly poor weather for the next four days which may slow the tempo of operations and might limit Russian air support.

The Russians have shored up their lines north of Kharkiv and exchanged attacks and counter-attacks with Ukrainian forces. Forces staging outside Belgorod in Russia are under regular Ukrainian artillery and drone attack, but Kharkiv itself is also taking incoming fire. The Ukrainians have failed to retake Kozacha Lopan on the Russian border but they have prevented break-outs from that direction. The Ukrainians have reinforced their forces east of Kharkiv and managed to gain ground towards Vovchansk. Taking or cutting off Vovchansk would be a major strategic victory for Ukraine, which the Russians are well aware of.

Partisan activity around Izium and across northern Luhansk is hindering Russian resupply, but is unlikely to be a major decisive factor. Russia has concentrated 900 artillery pieces in the Donbas, whilst Ukraine is estimated to have less than 200, with limited ammunition and a difficult resupply route (the Ukrainians claim that this disparity is more like 10-to-1 when ammo limitations are factored in). However, Ukraine is continuing to hold and inflict damage on the Russian forces. In particular, the Ukrainian Air Force is continuing to fly sorties directly over the main area of contention, which is remarkable given UAF losses and Russian ground AA dominance.

Partisan activity around Melitopol has apparently now grown into a major problem and Russia has deployed "specialists" to contain the situation (probably Chechens and Wagner unwilling to fight on the front line). Partisan activity has spread to neighbouring Tokmak, pinning down Russian troops who could be released for the Zaporizhzhia front. The Russians on that front are apparently massed near Orikhiv and Hulyaipole, but are wary of a large Ukrainian formation to the north that could break through their flanks and target Polohy. Retaking Polohy would be a major strategic success, putting Ukrainian forces within striking distance of Melitopol and, unbelievably, Mariupol.

Mariupol remains a major problem. The DPR forces are not getting their requested medical and food support needed to help supply the city. Instead, the Russians seem intent on looting the port's remaining stores and ships and hurriedly burying or burning masses of bodies. Some partisan activity outside the city has been indicated. The city is currently suffering from a major cholera outbreak, which can't be contained because almost all medical infrastructure (and infrastructure full stop) has been destroyed. Retaking and rebuilding Mariupol has been a major goal of the DPR for years ever since Ukraine recaptured it after the 2014 war, so not being allowed to restore the city seems to be causing dissent.

There is now widespread partisan activity in and around Kherson city. The Ukrainians have strongly reinforced their salient  NE of Kherson and are positioned well for a major assault on the city. However, Russian forces in the area have apparently built double and triple layers of defence, which are very slow to break down and clear. The main key here will be the Ukrainian attacks on Davydiv Brid and Vysokopillia, although it looks like the Russians have pulled their supplies back from the latter to prevent a major roll-up of the line if it falls. This area has remained static but is probably the area where the Ukrainians have the highest hope for success. The Russians seem to agree, and have surprisingly created new defensive lines as far back as the 23 February Crimea-Ukraine border, suggesting they foresee the possibility of losing Kherson altogether. Apparently newly-mobilised Ukrainian forces are now on the Transnistrian border to contain any breakout from there, but reportedly both Russian and Transnistrian forces there (and the "Russian" forces there are actually mostly Transnistrians with Russian passports) have refused to take action against either Moldova or Ukraine without much more support.

Interesting reports that the Ukrainians have adapted several of their S-300 SAM batteries to operate in an alternate anti-ship mode. They have not test-fired these yet, but if true and well-supplied with ammunition, they could clear most of the western Black Sea quite quickly. An S-300 AA missile hitting a Russian warship at high speeds would not be pleasant. Ukrainian AA and antiship operations along the NW Black Sea coast have forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to move way out to sea. 

7 hours ago, Wilbur said:

Well, maybe four units will be a game-changer, if TT is correct:   

The systems the US have sent (and comparable systems the UK has sent, and systems I believe the Netherlands have sent with an upgrade package that gives them comparable range) outrange anything in the Russian artillery inventory, I believe, so even 4 will make something of a difference. If you ask a Ukrainian soldier in a trench in Donbas or a basement in Severodonetsk if they'd take 4 Russian artillery pieces firing on them being knocked out every half hour or so, they'd take that in a heartbeat, and the maths they put together there do make sense up to a point.

Russian air superiority and a lack of Ukrainian AA to cover the artillery will be a problem, but it is mitigated by the range allowing them to shoot and scoot.

[SeanF]

6 hours ago, Werthead said:

It looks like a small number of Russian units have managed to into Lysychansk and fighting has begun in the city there, even though Severodonetsk is still holding out.

Some Ukrainian accounts of fighting there: Russian artillery hits an area, the Ukrainians take cover, and then regroup just as Russian/LPR troops attack. The Ukrainians repulse the infantry attack but then have to immediately retreat because artillery will then fire on their position. If they get the timing right, they can then reoccupy the position in time to repulse the next infantry attack. If they're unlucky, the position will be completely destroyed and rendered useless for defence, but at least the Ukrainian soldiers get to fall back to the next line. If they're very lucky, they "hug" the Russians as they retreat and actually move forwards. If they've very unlucky, the Ukrainians are still there when the artillery strike comes in. Rinse and repeat for days on end.

However, the Russians are showing increased willingness to put their artillery fire and their infantry movements so close together they risk causing their own casualties. That's causing morale problems, but it's also causing obvious problems for the defenders.

Excellent analysis as normal from Jomini, though his updates have become less frequent:

Significantly poor weather for the next four days which may slow the tempo of operations and might limit Russian air support.

The Russians have shored up their lines north of Kharkiv and exchanged attacks and counter-attacks with Ukrainian forces. Forces staging outside Belgorod in Russia are under regular Ukrainian artillery and drone attack, but Kharkiv itself is also taking incoming fire. The Ukrainians have failed to retake Kozacha Lopan on the Russian border but they have prevented break-outs from that direction. The Ukrainians have reinforced their forces east of Kharkiv and managed to gain ground towards Vovchansk. Taking or cutting off Vovchansk would be a major strategic victory for Ukraine, which the Russians are well aware of.

Partisan activity around Izium and across northern Luhansk is hindering Russian resupply, but is unlikely to be a major decisive factor. Russia has concentrated 900 artillery pieces in the Donbas, whilst Ukraine is estimated to have less than 200, with limited ammunition and a difficult resupply route (the Ukrainians claim that this disparity is more like 10-to-1 when ammo limitations are factored in). However, Ukraine is continuing to hold and inflict damage on the Russian forces. In particular, the Ukrainian Air Force is continuing to fly sorties directly over the main area of contention, which is remarkable given UAF losses and Russian ground AA dominance.

Partisan activity around Melitopol has apparently now grown into a major problem and Russia has deployed "specialists" to contain the situation (probably Chechens and Wagner unwilling to fight on the front line). Partisan activity has spread to neighbouring Tokmak, pinning down Russian troops who could be released for the Zaporizhzhia front. The Russians on that front are apparently massed near Orikhiv and Hulyaipole, but are wary of a large Ukrainian formation to the north that could break through their flanks and target Polohy. Retaking Polohy would be a major strategic success, putting Ukrainian forces within striking distance of Melitopol and, unbelievably, Mariupol.

Mariupol remains a major problem. The DPR forces are not getting their requested medical and food support needed to help supply the city. Instead, the Russians seem intent on looting the port's remaining stores and ships and hurriedly burying or burning masses of bodies. Some partisan activity outside the city has been indicated. The city is currently suffering from a major cholera outbreak, which can't be contained because almost all medical infrastructure (and infrastructure full stop) has been destroyed. Retaking and rebuilding Mariupol has been a major goal of the DPR for years ever since Ukraine recaptured it after the 2014 war, so not being allowed to restore the city seems to be causing dissent.

There is now widespread partisan activity in and around Kherson city. The Ukrainians have strongly reinforced their salient  NE of Kherson and are positioned well for a major assault on the city. However, Russian forces in the area have apparently built double and triple layers of defence, which are very slow to break down and clear. The main key here will be the Ukrainian attacks on Davydiv Brid and Vysokopillia, although it looks like the Russians have pulled their supplies back from the latter to prevent a major roll-up of the line if it falls. This area has remained static but is probably the area where the Ukrainians have the highest hope for success. The Russians seem to agree, and have surprisingly created new defensive lines as far back as the 23 February Crimea-Ukraine border, suggesting they foresee the possibility of losing Kherson altogether. Apparently newly-mobilised Ukrainian forces are now on the Transnistrian border to contain any breakout from there, but reportedly both Russian and Transnistrian forces there (and the "Russian" forces there are actually mostly Transnistrians with Russian passports) have refused to take action against either Moldova or Ukraine without much more support.

Interesting reports that the Ukrainians have adapted several of their S-300 SAM batteries to operate in an alternate anti-ship mode. They have not test-fired these yet, but if true and well-supplied with ammunition, they could clear most of the western Black Sea quite quickly. An S-300 AA missile hitting a Russian warship at high speeds would not be pleasant. Ukrainian AA and antiship operations along the NW Black Sea coast have forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to move way out to sea. 

The systems the US have sent (and comparable systems the UK has sent, and systems I believe the Netherlands have sent with an upgrade package that gives them comparable range) outrange anything in the Russian artillery inventory, I believe, so even 4 will make something of a difference. If you ask a Ukrainian soldier in a trench in Donbas or a basement in Severodonetsk if they'd take 4 Russian artillery pieces firing on them being knocked out every half hour or so, they'd take that in a heartbeat, and the maths they put together there do make sense up to a point.

Russian air superiority and a lack of Ukrainian AA to cover the artillery will be a problem, but it is mitigated by the range allowing them to shoot and scoot.

For all their boasting about WW2, Russia has forgotten the lessons of that war.  They’ve failed to back up armour with infantry, let themselves be drawn into urban warfare, which usually favours the defender, and face problems with partisans.

[Maithanet]

20 minutes ago, SeanF said:

For all their boasting about WW2, Russia has forgotten the lessons of that war.  They’ve failed to back up armour with infantry, let themselves be drawn into urban warfare, which usually favours the defender, and face problems with partisans.

There was no way to avoid urban conflict or partisans in this war.  Unless you're solution is "don't invade Ukraine", in which case, sure.

[SeanF]

Just now, Maithanet said:

There was no way to avoid urban conflict or partisans in this war.  Unless you're solution is "don't invade Ukraine", in which case, sure.

They expected a walkover.

[Wilbur]

Perun's assessment of infantry forces in Ukraine is very interesting, and it addresses the weird dichotomy of views of what is going on with the doctrine and performance of the Russian military forces in play:

 

[Maithanet]

4 hours ago, Wilbur said:

Perun's assessment of infantry forces in Ukraine is very interesting, and it addresses the weird dichotomy of views of what is going on with the doctrine and performance of the Russian military forces in play:

 

That's a good video, I'm only halfway through and I've learned a few things.

- The Russian btgs were understrength. Normally in a war, they would bolster those btgs with conscripts, but this isn't a declared war so there's no influx of conscripts (technically they cannot be deployed at all, but that rule is getting broken).  The btgs generally gave all the technical jobs to contract soldiers, and saved the infantry roles for conscripts.  This makes sense, because it takes a year to train some people on operating communications or aa or ew equipment.  Why train someone who will be leaving in a year?  But this means the btgs are understrength, and disproportionately so in infantry.

- Going further, some infantry is needed for things like driving an apc or protecting headquarters.  When those jobs are filled, you can have apcs with zero infantry inside.  That's a recipe for disaster.

- Russians are now desperate for infantry.  One solution (unclear how common this is) is to deploy the training units.  These are experienced troops with their own equipment.  But if you deploy them, then there's nobody training new troops, and if they get shot up, it will take years to recover.

[Maithanet]

More things from that video.  

-lpr and dpr are being called on to fill the gap in infantry in a huge way.   Those two "republics" had a population of 3 million in 2014.  They had 40k good, experienced troops at the beginning of 2022. 

Dpr/lpr have required conscription of all men under 65, and have been very thorough. All replacement for Dpr/lpr are conscripts, many of them old, barely trained, and poorly equipped.  Old rifles, no anti tank capabilities, no comms, bad/no body armor.  These troops are extremely poor and are getting killed in stunning numbers.  These troops are being used up by Russia and can only reduce Russian casualties so much.  The numbers of lpr/Dpr is much higher than that of Wagner or Chechen troops.

[Werthead]

6 hours ago, Maithanet said:

More things from that video.  

-lpr and dpr are being called on to fill the gap in infantry in a huge way.   Those two "republics" had a population of 3 million in 2014.  They had 40k good, experienced troops at the beginning of 2022. 

Dpr/lpr have required conscription of all men under 65, and have been very thorough. All replacement for Dpr/lpr are conscripts, many of them old, barely trained, and poorly equipped.  Old rifles, no anti tank capabilities, no comms, bad/no body armor.  These troops are extremely poor and are getting killed in stunning numbers.  These troops are being used up by Russia and can only reduce Russian casualties so much.  The numbers of lpr/Dpr is much higher than that of Wagner or Chechen troops.

I think the DPR/LPR started this conflict with 15-20,000 troops in total, so by scraping the bottom of the barrel they've been able to muster twice that but there's not much more to find.

Stories of press gangs roaming the streets in both oblasts, literally snatching anyone of the right age and sending them into combat. There used to be jobs that were protected because they were economically vital, but that's being ignored, meaning that the economies of both statelets are crashing hard. The last few people not recruited are basically hiding in family attics and things, or even fleeing across the lines into Ukraine proper.

[Maithanet]

5 hours ago, Werthead said:

I think the DPR/LPR started this conflict with 15-20,000 troops in total, so by scraping the bottom of the barrel they've been able to muster twice that but there's not much more to find.

Stories of press gangs roaming the streets in both oblasts, literally snatching anyone of the right age and sending them into combat. There used to be jobs that were protected because they were economically vital, but that's being ignored, meaning that the economies of both statelets are crashing hard. The last few people not recruited are basically hiding in family attics and things, or even fleeing across the lines into Ukraine proper.

The video definitely said 40k combined troops at the beginning of the conflict from the two statelets. (Obviously different sources can differ, but that's what it said).  But I don't agree that they'd be scraping the bottom of the barrel to get to 40k.  With a population of 3 million, 40k is ~1.5% of the population in arms.  That's a huge number for peacetime, but hardly the upper ceiling for a country at war.  In WW2 the rule of thumb was much closer to 10% mobilization.  Now I can definitely see reasons why DPR/LPR wouldn't be able to get to 10%.  The population is disproportionately older, lots of people have fled the area and casualties in the past 8 years would all reduce that number.  But getting to 4-5% sounds doable, which would be 120-150k troops in uniform.  I don't know if that 3 million figure is accurate, as I'm sure a lot of people have fled.

At the very least, this video explicitly said that LPR and DPR combined should be able to field over a hundred thousand troops.  Obviously not all (or even most) of those troops will be infantry, but if Russia is calling the shots and demanding the LPR/DPR send most of their new conscripts into infantry support, that is going to be a large number.  And yes, those troops are very poorly trained, poorly equipped and will suffer immense casualties. 

[Werthead]

12 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

The video definitely said 40k combined troops at the beginning of the conflict from the two statelets. (Obviously different sources can differ, but that's what it said).  But I don't agree that they'd be scraping the bottom of the barrel to get to 40k.  With a population of 3 million, 40k is ~1.5% of the population in arms.  That's a huge number for peacetime, but hardly the upper ceiling for a country at war.  In WW2 the rule of thumb was much closer to 10% mobilization.  Now I can definitely see reasons why DPR/LPR wouldn't be able to get to 10%.  The population is disproportionately older, lots of people have fled the area and casualties in the past 8 years would all reduce that number.  But getting to 4-5% sounds doable, which would be 120-150k troops in uniform.  I don't know if that 3 million figure is accurate, as I'm sure a lot of people have fled.

At the very least, this video explicitly said that LPR and DPR combined should be able to field over a hundred thousand troops.  Obviously not all (or even most) of those troops will be infantry, but if Russia is calling the shots and demanding the LPR/DPR send most of their new conscripts into infantry support, that is going to be a large number.  And yes, those troops are very poorly trained, poorly equipped and will suffer immense casualties. 

I don't believe the DPR and LPR allow women to serve in combat (Russia allows women to serve in the military, but not in combat roles, unlike WWII) which will halve their military potential right there, not to mention they'll be relying on women workers to keep what passes for their economy going.

But Galeev and others have written at length about the DPR and LPR and they are really barely-functioning gangster states at the best of times. There isn't a huge amount of love for them on the streets, perhaps deliberately, as Russian annexation is possibly preferable to living under their continued rule (in practice I doubt much would change). That makes it difficult to recruit troops to fight with any gusto, and we know the DPR and LPR troops are suffering massive morale problems.

[Maithanet]

6 minutes ago, Werthead said:

But Galeev and others have written at length about the DPR and LPR and they are really barely-functioning gangster states at the best of times. There isn't a huge amount of love for them on the streets, perhaps deliberately, as Russian annexation is possibly preferable to living under their continued rule (in practice I doubt much would change). That makes it difficult to recruit troops to fight with any gusto, and we know the DPR and LPR troops are suffering massive morale problems.

Yes, the DPR and LPR troops have terrible morale, to go along with terrible training and terrible equipment.  One LPR leader in the video said that LPR conscripts (the barely trained ones) were only deployed on quiet fronts to allow their better experienced troops to fight elsewhere.  But then they were routed in the Ukrainian counterattack north of Kharkiv.  Surprising nobody, the Ukrainians can figure out if they are facing a bunch of untrained troops without comms or anti-tank weapons, and plan offensives accordingly.  I don't know many details of how that battle went, but my guess would be that the Ukrainians would take a LOT of prisoners, because why the hell would some conscripts from Luhansk care if Russia controls Kharkiv? 

[Maithanet]

Another War on the Rocks podcast with Michael Kofman.

The title is "the most dangerous time for Ukraine?" and it is overall not an optimistic picture.  The Russians are grinding forward and the Ukrainians are getting worn down.  The promised NATO support has been either late or in too few numbers.  One thing that NATO advisors are seeing is that much of the equipment donated to Ukraine is already wearing out due to hard use and poor maintenance practices.  Ukrainians troops are given a crash course in how to use this equipment and they rush to deploy it (understandably) but best practices to keep those machines operating are not being followed, and may not have even been taught to them at all.  The US in particular is learning that lesson and insisting on longer training periods for expensive equipment like the rocket artillery.  But that just further delays the lag between when equipment is promised and when it actually gets deployed on the battlefield.

The Ukrainians have suffered high losses of their best troops and are filling in with less trained and lower morale troops.  These troops are not performing as well, which is no surprise.  Russia has thus far been able to get enough infantry for its offensive, but that could run out more or less anytime.

After the Russian offensive runs out of steam, expect an operational pause as both sides reequip, train up new reserve units and prepare for the next phase.  It is unlikely that the Ukrainians will be able to move quickly to the offensive once the pressure eases in the Donbas (or if they do, such offensives will be small).  Many people had held up hope that the Ukrainians could go on the counteroffensive this summer and the exhausted Russians would struggle to hold ground.  That scenario remains possible, but looks much less likely given the level of attrition in Ukraine's best troops. 

[Werthead]

1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

Another War on the Rocks podcast with Michael Kofman.

The title is "the most dangerous time for Ukraine?" and it is overall not an optimistic picture.  The Russians are grinding forward and the Ukrainians are getting worn down.  The promised NATO support has been either late or in too few numbers.  One thing that NATO advisors are seeing is that much of the equipment donated to Ukraine is already wearing out due to hard use and poor maintenance practices.  Ukrainians troops are given a crash course in how to use this equipment and they rush to deploy it (understandably) but best practices to keep those machines operating are not being followed, and may not have even been taught to them at all.  The US in particular is learning that lesson and insisting on longer training periods for expensive equipment like the rocket artillery.  But that just further delays the lag between when equipment is promised and when it actually gets deployed on the battlefield.

The Ukrainians have suffered high losses of their best troops and are filling in with less trained and lower morale troops.  These troops are not performing as well, which is no surprise.  Russia has thus far been able to get enough infantry for its offensive, but that could run out more or less anytime.

After the Russian offensive runs out of steam, expect an operational pause as both sides reequip, train up new reserve units and prepare for the next phase.  It is unlikely that the Ukrainians will be able to move quickly to the offensive once the pressure eases in the Donbas (or if they do, such offensives will be small).  Many people had held up hope that the Ukrainians could go on the counteroffensive this summer and the exhausted Russians would struggle to hold ground.  That scenario remains possible, but looks much less likely given the level of attrition in Ukraine's best troops. 

The Ukrainians have been warning of another problem as well. Western Donbas is relatively flat and open between the Donets and the Dnieper, and there's a death of large urban areas between the two rivers. Where there are, the rivers are much, much smaller and narrower, and the Russians can go around or over them more easily. If they lose Severodonetsk - and they lost the last bridge over the river in the city today - and then Lysychansk, they may have to face the choice between trying to hold the Russians back on much less favourable ground or falling back all the way to the city of Dnipro and form a new defensive line along the Dnieper. That will cede most of the eastern third of the country to the Russians and put Kharkiv in danger.

However, there's some suggestion that if the Ukrainians give ground quickly, that may encourage the Russians to race ahead of their supply lines and that might allow a Ukrainian counter attack using the tactics that were so successful around Kyiv and Kharkiv. It'd be a hell of a gamble to take though.

The biggest issue is the degree to which Russia can continue to expend large numbers of lives. They clearly can't keep it up forever, and if the break point in terms of casualties forcing them to change tactics is just weeks away, the Ukrainians continuing to fight tooth and nail for every inch of territory makes sense. If the Russians have managed to get enough reinforcements so the break point is months away instead, then that completely changes the argument and Ukraine may be expending lives to just slow the inevitable.

It also remains unclear what the Russians now define operational success as. If they just want Donetsk and Luhansk and will call that a victory, that's one thing and Ukraine might be wise to pour everything in to stop them, but if they are planning to try to take the whole country, then Ukraine might be advised to trade space for lives and time until more of their mobilisation takes effect and heavier weapons arrive.

[Toth]

In another forum where I'm following the Ukraine war discussion, the voices of the doomsayers are getting louder and louder because of Ukraine's massive artillery disadvantage with dwindling ammunition stocks and only pitifully small numbers of western artillery to replace the much larger number of Soviet pieces. All the while Russia keeps grinding on.

There is also quite a bit of arguing going on about Germany's role in the support. Especially with the SPD really making itself suspicious with the chancellor warning of nuclear war to explain his hesitancy and the defense minister aggressively dodging the question of whether Ukraine should win. Some users insist Germany already did plenty in terms of giving money (that Ukraine isn't allowed to spend on heavy weopons) and small arms ammunition and helmets and mouldy GDR stuff in the first weeks and months of the war and as such we did our part and can't bring more and those who criticize the government for its dragging feet are attacked as mindless haters. Meanwhile others (myself included) are very frustrated because Ukraine needs all the heavy equipment it can get and our only donation will soon be 7 howitzers and 50 complicated and horribly outdated AA tanks without ammunition. Yay, go Germany!

How the fuck are we the fourth biggest weapons exporter in the world again and now that it's needed we are dragging our feet? And what the fuck is wrong with the SPD?

[Darzin]

4 hours ago, Toth said:

In another forum where I'm following the Ukraine war discussion, the voices of the doomsayers are getting louder and louder because of Ukraine's massive artillery disadvantage with dwindling ammunition stocks and only pitifully small numbers of western artillery to replace the much larger number of Soviet pieces. All the while Russia keeps grinding on.

There is also quite a bit of arguing going on about Germany's role in the support. Especially with the SPD really making itself suspicious with the chancellor warning of nuclear war to explain his hesitancy and the defense minister aggressively dodging the question of whether Ukraine should win. Some users insist Germany already did plenty in terms of giving money (that Ukraine isn't allowed to spend on heavy weopons) and small arms ammunition and helmets and mouldy GDR stuff in the first weeks and months of the war and as such we did our part and can't bring more and those who criticize the government for its dragging feet are attacked as mindless haters. Meanwhile others (myself included) are very frustrated because Ukraine needs all the heavy equipment it can get and our only donation will soon be 7 howitzers and 50 complicated and horribly outdated AA tanks without ammunition. Yay, go Germany!

How the fuck are we the fourth biggest weapons exporter in the world again and now that it's needed we are dragging our feet? And what the fuck is wrong with the SPD?

Alternatehistory.com? 

[Werthead]

The amounts Ukraine are asking for are pretty steep. Even assuming they are exaggerating by 200-300% for effect, it's still effectively asking NATO to donate a vast chunk of their standing artillery, tank and vehicle fleets.

I think it's also starting to cause arguments in countries like Poland, the Baltics, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, who are overwhelmingly pro-Ukraine, but some are now thinking of what happens if Russia takes all of Ukraine and is on their borders with them having sent vast chunks of their military to be captured or destroyed in Ukraine. If they think sending that stuff will stop that, they'll do it, but if any bet-hedging starts, that's going to be a problem.

[Darzin]

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

The amounts Ukraine are asking for are pretty steep. Even assuming they are exaggerating by 200-300% for effect, it's still effectively asking NATO to donate a vast chunk of their standing artillery, tank and vehicle fleets.

I think it's also starting to cause arguments in countries like Poland, the Baltics, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, who are overwhelmingly pro-Ukraine, but some are now thinking of what happens if Russia takes all of Ukraine and is on their borders with them having sent vast chunks of their military to be captured or destroyed in Ukraine. If they think sending that stuff will stop that, they'll do it, but if any bet-hedging starts, that's going to be a problem.

A big problem seems to be the limitation of Soviet Stock and the lack of trained Ukrainians to operate NATO weapons. That said I think the US should go for broke and open it's stocks along with training Ukrainians. The US has more than 8000 Abrams tanks in operation, donating 500 shouldn't meaningfully impact US defense but would help Ukraine a lot. The US doesn't seem to have as much artillery but with the war rapidly devolving into an artillery heavy one it would seem well within NATOS ability to collectively get 1000 pieces of artillery to Ukraine. That would be an extreme level of aid but this is an extreme situation.

[Werthead]

7 minutes ago, Darzin said:

A big problem seems to be the limitation of Soviet Stock and the lack of trained Ukrianians to operate NATO weapons. That said I think the US should go for broke and open it's stocks along with training Ukrianians. The US has more than 8000 Abrams tanks in operation, donating 500 shouldn't meaningfully impact US defense but would help Ukriane a lot. The US doesn't seem to have as much artillery but with the war rapidly devolving into an artillery heavy one it would seem well within NATOS ability to collectively get 1000 pieces of artillery to Ukraine. That would be an extreme level of aid but this is an extreme situation.

There was an analysis today saying that a single "big push" of aid to Ukraine could have a huge impact because the degree to which Russia is relying on artillery is fairly dangerous - in a war it's a bad idea to rely on just one tactic - and their manpower situation is more tenuous than they are presenting it as. A big push could swing things in Ukraine's favour again, but it has to be big and the aid has to be sustained. There's a risk that the war is entering a "boring" stage (or has been in one for several weeks) where there are no major movements on a daily basis so people lose interest. Obviously that won't happen in Eastern Europe, but there is a bigger danger of France and Germany's foot-dragging spreading, and the UK and US getting distracted by internal events.

[broken one]

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

I think it's also starting to cause arguments in countries like Poland, the Baltics, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, who are overwhelmingly pro-Ukraine, but some are now thinking of what happens if Russia takes all of Ukraine and is on their borders with them having sent vast chunks of their military to be captured or destroyed in Ukraine.

In Poland? I guess not. I mean almost all mainstream politicians seem to understand well that it is safest moment to pass the stuff (strong NATO presence in Poland will last for some time) and that Ukrianian success is absolutely in Polands interest. The bigger, the better. If we had not given them the ~250 tanks, ammo and other stuff, their loss would have been more probable. And if they fall we are in bad situation, and 300 new Leopards would not help. Moreover, too much has been already invested to stop. Problem is Poland gave a lot of equipment and has not much more to give for some time.