Ukraine 18: Pump up the S-300’s… Dance Dance…

[Werthead]

Balakliya and Shevhekove have been retaken in full. Ukrainian flags flying over both towns. Ukrainian sources reporting the their military has reached the Oskil and secured the Sen'kivka Bridge, one of three they need to establish control over the river. The next is in Kupyansk and the third is east of Izyum. The Ukrainians must be thinking of the advantages of crossing the Oskil and invading Luhansk Oblast (ha!) but will likely hold on the Oskil for reinforcements. There's some fighting on the road west of Kupyansk but it seems to be limited.

8 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Think they could actually roll up the Russians to February 2022 lines in Northern sector?  Are the Russians that screwed?

General Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian C-in-C, published a paper yesterday saying that Ukraine is now moving to reclaim its full 2014 borders and will eject Russian forces from within those borders and will also neutralise Russian long-range military capabilities to impact Ukraine from within its borders. It appears that means establishing long-range artillery defences which can hit Russian artillery on Russian territory at well.

Some indications that the only peace deal Ukraine will accept now will be the removal of Russian forces and the demilitarisation of both the Russian and Ukrainian sides of the border, and if the Russians put forces back on the border, Ukraine will militarise it immediately.

[Maithanet]

1 minute ago, KalVsWade said:

Russia has continued to show an incredible disregard for alienation of allies and customers in favor of doing whatever the hell they want to and keeping their narrative. 

Not sure about that.  Russia has shown some interest in keeping relations going with India and China in particular.  Russia waited until the winter olympics were over to invade at China's request, which is a pretty big favor. 

Russia knows that it will face blowback from India and China if they use nukes.  Exactly what that blowback will be is not totally clear, but it could be significant.  If China and India were to join the oil sanctions, even briefly, it could be a disaster for Russia. 

The western reaction would be significant, and it would probably end any reluctance on the part of the NATO to provide things like tanks, F-15s and warthogs, which definitely wouldn't help the military situation. 

In contrast, the military value of using a nuke is questionable.  Ukraine's forces are already spread out to avoid getting destroyed by Russian artillery and thermobaric weapons.  It is quite possible that nukes could be used to slow/stall the Ukrainian advance, but it is unlikely to be a decisive in and of themselves.  Ukraine will definitely keep fighting. 

It's hard to argue nukes make sense.  It is an option the way that invading Poland from Kaliningrad is an option.  It would almost assuredly turn a bad situation worse for Russia. 

[Kalbear]

Just now, Maithanet said:

Not sure about that.  Russia has shown some interest in keeping relations going with India and China in particular.  Russia waited until the winter olympics were over to invade at China's request, which is a pretty big favor. 

Russia knows that it will face blowback from India and China if they use nukes.  Exactly what that blowback will be is not totally clear, but it could be significant.  If China and India were to join the oil sanctions, even briefly, it could be a disaster for Russia. 

Maybe. Alternately, China may choose to not care that much. 

I guess that's the real issue - is China willing to risk US sanctions? Is the US willing to actually fuck over the rest of the world economy to mess with China even more? 

Just now, Maithanet said:

The western reaction would be significant, and it would probably end any reluctance on the part of the NATO to provide things like tanks, F-15s and warthogs, which definitely wouldn't help the military situation. 

Alternately, it might make Ukraine sue for peace very quickly and be unwilling to let the rest of their country get irradiated further. Or, to be accurate, that might be what Putin is thinking. 

Just now, Maithanet said:

It's hard to argue nukes make sense.  It is an option the way that invading Poland from Kaliningrad is an option.  It would almost assuredly turn a bad situation worse for Russia. 

Again, y'all are taking this as a rational fact-based decision based on military goals. I agree that militarily it would be extremely stupid. But so is invading Ukraine, or assuming Ukrainian people were calling out for Russian intervention. 

Try, instead, to put yourself in Putin's place. He wants to show the world Russia is not to be trifled with. He is absolutely pissed off that the US has been arming Ukraine and keeping them in the war. He is trying to make Europe starve from energy and put pressure on the world to actually starve, and that's not working. His choices are continuing a war that is looking increasingly bad for Russia and (per this week) may end up gaining absolutely nothing relative to 2014, or trying something to stop the war from continuing that is not conventional weapons. He already believed that Ukraine and Europe are weak, unable to deal with harsh realities and loss of luxuries; could he believe that use of nuclear weapons would make them even more scared? I mean, we already have boarders who are terrified of this situation anyway - is it that weird to think that he thinks that too? 

[Fez]

3 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

Try, instead, to put yourself in Putin's place. He wants to show the world Russia is not to be trifled with. He is absolutely pissed off that the US has been arming Ukraine and keeping them in the war. He is trying to make Europe starve from energy and put pressure on the world to actually starve, and that's not working. His choices are continuing a war that is looking increasingly bad for Russia and (per this week) may end up gaining absolutely nothing relative to 2014, or trying something to stop the war from continuing that is not conventional weapons. He already believed that Ukraine and Europe are weak, unable to deal with harsh realities and loss of luxuries; could he believe that use of nuclear weapons would make them even more scared? I mean, we already have boarders who are terrified of this situation anyway - is it that weird to think that he thinks that too? 

On the other hand, Putin is likely also concerned that a nuclear strike order from him is ignored and leads to his immediate removal from power. Whereas if the war simply fails he might be able to scapegoat others and stay in place.

[Kalbear]

Just now, Fez said:

On the other hand, Putin is likely also concerned that a nuclear strike order from him is ignored and leads to his immediate removal from power. Whereas if the war simply fails he might be able to scapegoat others and stay in place.

Who the hell is going to remove him from power? The notion that he's going to be somehow removed or that anyone in Russia has the power to do so is not based on reality. 

[Fez]

2 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

Who the hell is going to remove him from power? The notion that he's going to be somehow removed or that anyone in Russia has the power to do so is not based on reality. 

His entire inner circle. Not for anything else, but nukes are a hell of a line to cross.

[Werthead]

I feel this is similar to the feeling that Russia might use nuclear weapons earlier in the war, or would start bombing the Polish airport where supplies are pouring in from across Europe and the United States at prodigious rates. It is within the outer boundaries of being possible and Russians sometimes float the idea to terrify people, but ultimately it is implausible because it removes control from Putin and from Russia. It takes them over the event horizon into a series of events they cannot predict and cannot control. They can control everything else, including probably even how to sell a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine as a reasonable decision for Russian interests, but not what happens once they break the nuclear taboo.

Putin's position in Russia is robustly secure as long as the supporting mechanisms for his rule remain in place. If they start faltering - and there is a lot more open criticism of Putin right now than there has been for years - he can go from being untouchable to being expendable very quickly, as many a dictator has found to their cost.

[Kalbear]

2 minutes ago, Fez said:

His entire inner circle. Not for anything else, but nukes are a hell of a line to cross.

His entire inner circle is powerless. Putin has almost total control in Russia. There was some thought that the oligarchs could wield some power against Putin but the relationship is entirely the reverse; the oligarchs rely entirely on Putin for anything. 

 

1 minute ago, Werthead said:

I feel this is similar to the feeling that Russia might use nuclear weapons earlier in the war, or would start bombing the Polish airport where supplies are pouring in from across Europe and the United States at prodigious rates. It is within the outer boundaries of being possible and Russians sometimes float the idea to terrify people, but ultimately it is implausible because it removes control from Putin and from Russia. It takes them over the event horizon into a series of events they cannot predict and cannot control. They can control everything else, including probably even how to sell a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine as a reasonable decision for Russian interests, but not what happens once they break the nuclear taboo. 

I think that's reasonable. At the same time it is almost precisely the rationale given for why Putin would never break the 70 year taboo of war in Europe. 

1 minute ago, Werthead said:

Putin's position in Russia is robustly secure as long as the supporting mechanisms for his rule remain in place. If they start faltering - and there is a lot more open criticism of Putin right now than there has been for years - he can go from being untouchable to being expendable very quickly, as many a dictator has found to their cost.

I guess I don't see how those would falter per se after a nuclear weapon attack, because I don't see how short of actual boots on the ground European powers can escalate particularly further. I guess the best thing they can do is give Ukraine even more weapons but I think from a Russian perspective that's almost certainly the case they're dealing with now, and the notion that Ukraine can get and use F35s any time soon is unlikely. 

[Fez]

1 minute ago, KalVsWade said:

His entire inner circle is powerless. Putin has almost total control in Russia. There was some thought that the oligarchs could wield some power against Putin but the relationship is entirely the reverse; the oligarchs rely entirely on Putin for anything. 

It's not about power in Russia; it's about power in the Kremlin building/his personal residence itself. If Putin issues the order for nukes, does that order get relayed? Or does a group of colonels/generals/intelligence officers order the personal guards to stand aside and put a bullet in his head?

He has to at least consider the possibility that it could happen.

[Kalbear]

2 minutes ago, Fez said:

It's not about power in Russia; it's about power in the Kremlin building/his personal residence itself. If Putin issues the order for nukes, does that order get relayed? Or does a group of colonels/generals/intelligence officers order the personal guards to stand aside and put a bullet in his head?

He has to at least consider the possibility that it could happen.

There is absolutely no indication that his orders would be ignored, superceded or lost. This implies a officer corps that has any kind of backbone or any kind of competence, which is not particularly on display. The same logic that would indicate this would happen is the same logic that would indicate people would tell Putin that the idea to invade Ukraine was hugely stupid.

 

[Werthead]

7 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

I think that's reasonable. At the same time it is almost precisely the rationale given for why Putin would never break the 70 year taboo of war in Europe. 

I think from the Russian realpolitik perspective, their actions since 2008 have been rational (if amoral), and each success - in Georgia, in Syria, in Donbas and Crimea - and each successive weaksauce response from the west has emboldened them to go further.

I think this general direction of travel, combined with the apparently strong intelligence consensus of the entire Russian intelligence operation that Ukraine would fold like a park of cards on being invaded, combined to create the idea that fast-moving military operation to decapitate the Ukrainian government would be successful, and we should note it very nearly was. If the Ukrainians had not retaken Hostomel Airport immediately and if 3,000 Ukrainian troops had not defeated 30,000 Russians north-east of Kyiv (possibly the most unlikely military victory in modern history, if not all of military history), then the Russian plan may well have succeeded and they'd be sitting pretty with a big shit-eating grin on Putin's face right now.

As it turned out he was wrong and fired half of his intelligence service for getting it so wrong.

[Darzin]

Surely Putin would try mobilization before nukes? Right now Russia is not fully mobilized a fully comitted Russia would be able to bring more to bear then they are now. 

3 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

There is absolutely no indication that his orders would be ignored, superceded or lost. This implies a officer corps that has any kind of backbone or any kind of competence, which is not particularly on display. The same logic that would indicate this would happen is the same logic that would indicate people would tell Putin that the idea to invade Ukraine was hugely stupid.

 

Even the toadiest of toadies will start murmuring when they orders they are given are likely to end in them dying in nuclear fire. And at that point they have the scapegoat right there get rid of Putin put the blame on him and countinue enjoying their dachas.

[Kalbear]

2 minutes ago, Werthead said:

I think from the Russian realpolitik perspective, their actions since 2008 have been rational (if amoral), and each success - in Georgia, in Syria, in Donbas and Crimea - and each successive weaksauce response from the west has emboldened them to go further.

I think that's true (and what I mentioned way back in the day when I said it was going to happen), but a common argument against it was that Putin would never DREAM of breaking the peace in Europe and the taboo of that. I just don't think that's a reasonable argument. 

2 minutes ago, Werthead said:

I think this general direction of travel, combined with the apparently strong intelligence consensus of the entire Russian intelligence operation that Ukraine would fold like a park of cards on being invaded, combined to create the idea that fast-moving military operation to decapitate the Ukrainian government would be successful, and we should note it very nearly was. If the Ukrainians had not retaken Hostomel Airport immediately and if 3,000 Ukrainian troops had not defeated 30,000 Russians north-east of Kyiv (possibly the most unlikely military victory in modern history, if not all of military history), then the Russian plan may well have succeeded and they'd be sitting pretty with a big shit-eating grin on Putin's face right now.

As it turned out he was wrong and fired half of his intelligence service for getting it so wrong.

So on that note - are his intelligence officers telling him that using a nuke would cause Ukraine to fold and that Europe would fold? 

[Kalbear]

2 minutes ago, Darzin said:

Surely Putin would try mobilization before nukes? Right now Russia is not fully mobilized a fully comitted Russia would be able to bring more to bear then they are now. 

Not by a lot, and that risks a lot of anger at home. It's also not clear if mobilization will matter given that the real issue Russia has is not troops, it's armaments and replacements of those. Mobilization won't solve the issue of having to buy drones from Iran and artillery from North Korea. 

2 minutes ago, Darzin said:

Even the toadiest of toadies will start murmuring when they orders they are given are likely to end in them dying in nuclear fire. And at that point they have the scapegoat right there get rid of Putin put the blame on him and countinue enjoying their dachas.

I don't see why they'd think they'd be dying in nuclear fire, and Russian doctrine has ALWAYS been to use nukes with the idea that you can use some and not end the world. 

And again, the idea that they can enjoy their dachas implies that those things are independent of Putin. They aren't. The oligarchs aren't propping up Putin. They have virtually no real power. No military or intelligence reports to them. There is no loyalty to them. 

[Gorn]

Right now, there are 55k Russian troops playing war in Vladivostok, on the other side of the planet from the collapsing fronts in Ukraine.

I think you are seriously underestimating how desperate Putin is to maintain the illusion for domestic audience that everything is fine, there is no war, merely a limited special operation. There would need to be many, many escalatory steps before the use of nukes becomes even a plausible option.

[Maithanet]

Like any dictator, Putin's rule is secure and unchallenged right up until it's not.  Putin has built the gigantic machine of the Russian state with himself as the indispensable center.  The fact that no one else understands (let alone controls) the many elements of this machine is a big part of why he's still alive, but it's not foolproof. 

If Putin chooses to double down in the face of every challenge, regardless of the suffering of his troops, his citizens, and his elites, then at some point the situation will blow up in his face.  Hitler only lived long enough to die in his bunker because of astonishing luck in avoiding assassination attempts.  Putin isn't at that point yet because Russia is nowhere near rock bottom.  Using nukes would be extremely destabilizing to the world order and potentially to the Russian order.  Putin prefers (indeed, requires) the current Russian order to remain as it is. 

[Which Tyler]

59 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

If the scenario mentioned above is true, the Ukrainians are strategic masters.  I am seeing the same thing from other sources, who are saying:

1. Ukraine baited the Russians to shifting their top troops into the south; the Russians took the bait and shifted their best troops into the south.
2. The Ukrainians compartmentalized the good Russian troops into boxes separated by rivers by knocking out the bridges.
3. The Ukrainians systematically starved the Russians on all fronts of material and ammo (Hello, Himars).  North, south, and east, everybody got visited by the Ammo Dump Explosion Fairy.
4. With the quality Russian troops boxed into geographic traps in the south and starved logistically, Ukraine probed into the north and east.
5. Ukrainian probes in the north and east discovered poor or nonexistent resistance, and Ukraine began driving into these voids of resistance.

There is still a kind of radio silence in the region south and east of Zaporizhzhia, so it will be interesting to hear what is going on there.

I'm far from an expert here - but points 1, 2 & 4, sounds more deliberate than it played out.

I'd agree that those things happened, but I'd be surprised if it was Ukraine's intent beforehand. IMO they planned an assault / seige on Kherson, so Russia flooded troops into the area - where Ukraine then managed to tie them in. Not because of a bait and switch, but because Russia played a hand badly, and suddenly the opportunity was there.

I doubt Ukraine particularly expected an assault around Kharkiv to be quite so successfully - but again, the opportunity presented itself because Russia cocked up.

Constant probing, and enabling on-the-ground commanders to make tactical decisions is showing its rewards against a larger army, hamstrung by incompetence and centralised command.

 

I absolutely reserve the right to be wrong - as a married man, it's by far my most frequently utilised right!

[Fez]

14 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

There is absolutely no indication that his orders would be ignored, superceded or lost. This implies a officer corps that has any kind of backbone or any kind of competence, which is not particularly on display. The same logic that would indicate this would happen is the same logic that would indicate people would tell Putin that the idea to invade Ukraine was hugely stupid.

There's never been nuclear launch orders though. That's the whole point.

Any dictator worth their salt is concerned about the possibility of a palace coup, and takes the steps to avoid one. Putin certainly has, and under ordinary circumstances there's no chance of one occurring. But ordering nukes when not faced by an existential threat, is not an ordinary circumstance. It changes the ground in unknown unpredictable ways. It's taboo in a way that basically nothing else is. So Putin faces the dilemma that issuing such an order takes him from a 0% chance of violent death to an unknown % chance of violent death. 

Is that a risk he's willing to take? Perhaps, if he thinks that % is low enough and that the reward for doing so is high enough. But it will be part of his calculus; that there is a personal risk as well as national risk.

[Kalbear]

3 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

 Putin prefers (indeed, requires) the current Russian order to remain as it is. 

If that were the case he would never have invaded Ukraine. 

[Werthead]

33 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

If that were the case he would never have invaded Ukraine. 

I think he invaded Ukraine because he wanted to increase Russia's power and prestige, the first step in restoring the old Russian empire. The idea that Russia would be defeated was probably unfathomable to him. He was probably thinking the worst-case scenario in February was failing to take Kyiv and maybe Odesa, but still overrunning the Donbas, forming a land corridor and being able to declare a convincing victory with ~10% of Ukrainian territory under Russian control.

The worst-case scenario right now is losing all of the territory gained since February and losing the Donbas and losing Crimea. Although I do wonder if the threats towards Crimea might be Ukraine hinting that cutting his losses, pulling out of Ukraine and negotiating over Crimea so he can sell securing the consolidation of Crimea (recognised as Russian by Ukraine and the west, with the water supply restored) as a face-saving exercise, is an option.

36 minutes ago, Which Tyler said:

I'm far from an expert here - but points 1, 2 & 4, sounds more deliberate than it played out.

I'd agree that those things happened, but I'd be surprised if it was Ukraine's intent beforehand. IMO they planned an assault / seige on Kherson, so Russia flooded troops into the area - where Ukraine then managed to tie them in. Not because of a bait and switch, but because Russia played a hand badly, and suddenly the opportunity was there.

I doubt Ukraine particularly expected an assault around Kharkiv to be quite so successfully - but again, the opportunity presented itself because Russia cocked up.

Constant probing, and enabling on-the-ground commanders to make tactical decisions is showing its rewards against a larger army, hamstrung by incompetence and centralised command.

I absolutely reserve the right to be wrong - as a married man, it's by far my most frequently utilised right!

It's worth noting that the Americans said that the Ukrainians had been wargaming the Kharkiv offensive for weeks. I get the impression that the Ukrainians had wargamed the Kherson, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia offensives with the Americans and with NATO personnel but had been told not to pursue three offensives at once, as that was too ambitious, so they didn't bother with Kharkiv. But when a recon in force pushed through the lines and found nothing there, they hurriedly pivoted and took advantage of the success to reinforce it, and were even slow to fully exploit it (the southern arm of the offensive stayed still for two days whilst the northern went wild).

So, they had planned this operation as a contingency but weren't necessarily expecting to implement it, but improvised.