Ukraine 21: On the Attack with a Giant Phallic Spear

[Werthead]

Hoo boy. Sounds like infighting has broken out in Putin's upper circles. Patrushev, the very hawkish and somewhat bizarre conspiracy theorist who has Putin's ear in the inner circle, has apparently started campaigning for Prigozhin (the head of Wagner) to be fired or possibly even eliminated, as he has apparently broken their long-standing agreement not to talk about Wagner as an unofficial tool of the Russian military.

Prigozhin has also been publicly disgruntled about how things are going, and his PR guy Slobodenyuk has been calling for Shoigu to be fired. A Rosgvardia unit loyal to Putin has arrested Slobodenyuk, one of whom's Telegram channels has publicly called for the execution of Lavrov and Peskov as traitors. Interestingly this did not go through the FSB, which Putin continues to blame for intelligence failures prior to the war (the FSB insiders maintain they gave accurate intelligence and Putin ignored them).

Kadyrov has joined Prigozhin in calling for a change in direction, and will likely not be impressed by these later power moves (Putin has given him a field promotion, possibly to alleviate that issue). Prigozhin's own men, loyal to him personally, are currently fighting hard in Bukhat, one of the few areas where Russia has had recent (if modest success). Kadyrov commands a very large and personally loyal military, and has kept that military on-side with rewards, keeping them out of the worst of the fighting, and ensuring they know he has their backs and is only working with Putin out of personal loyalty from the end of the civil war. If Prigozhin and Kadyrov feel they've been betrayed, they have significant power and resources to stop fighting, pull their troops out of Ukraine and start a civil war.

It's also worth noting that Prigozhin has garnered some popular support amongst the wider Russian military in Ukraine, condemning poor equipment, conditions and far too late reinforcements. If Wagner were to go off-reservation or withdraw, it's possible other Russian units would follow.

This argument on how the war might end with Russian forces simply turning on one another, even if Putin could somehow ride it out, is interesting, although I'm not sure 100% convincing.

 

[Corvinus85]

Russia really is a modern day feudal state. Some of these higher ups should be careful if the Late Lord Kadyrov decides to invite them to a wedding.

[Werthead]

16 minutes ago, Corvinus85 said:

Russia really is a modern day feudal state. Some of these higher ups should be careful if the Late Lord Kadyrov decides to invite them to a wedding.

Apparently the psychic also alerted him to a plot by the United States to destroy Russia after he "listened in" to Madeleine Albright's dreams, which sounds legit.

Patrushev is apparently "favourite" to take over from Putin, not that'll probably count for much. That would be far more worrying if he wasn't older than Putin, so all things being equal, hopefully won't outlast him by much.
 

[Darzin]

7 minutes ago, Corvinus85 said:

Russia really is a modern day feudal state. Some of these higher ups should be careful if the Late Lord Kadyrov decides to invite them to a wedding.

I was just going to say this, it really is interesting how purely feudal it is with Kadyrov's father being a former rebel and warlord who bent the knee in exchange for his title, which was passed to his son. And Prigozhin being a sellsword. Crazy that Russia has multiple personal armies running around a modern battlefield.

And great analysis as always @Werthead 

[Maithanet]

8 minutes ago, Darzin said:

I was just going to say this, it really is interesting how purely feudal it is with Kadyrov's father being a former rebel and warlord who bent the knee in exchange for his title, which was passed to his son. And Prigozhin being a sellsword. Crazy that Russia has multiple personal armies running around a modern battlefield.

Crazy, but also a big part of why they are so inept.  Combined arms is already hard to do.  Add in a bunch of seperate armies that don't listen to each other, and it is just impossible. 

A lot of the Ukrainian advances in Kharkiv oblast have been because different units weren't talking to each other.  One unit gets attacked and retreats, but that fact doesn't get relayed to nearby units.  So those units get flanked.  Then everybody starts to panic and it's a headlong rush to the rear, because none of these units individually are strong enough to reform the line further back.  It happened several times in the Kupyiansk-Izyum offensive, and it only stopped when some LPR units held firm around Lyman. 

[Kalbear]

Adding on to what @Werthead wrote I really liked this long essay on what the end of the Ukraine war looks like. This is relevant to other conversations:

Quote

 

To be sure, there is a certain temptation to concede mentally to nuclear blackmail.  Once the subject of nuclear war is raised, it seems overwhelmingly important, and we become depressed and obsessed.  That is just where Putin is trying to lead us with his vague allusions to nuclear weapons.  Once we take his cue, we imagine threats that Russia is not actually making.  We start talking about a Ukrainian surrender, just to relieve the psychological pressure we feel. 

This, though, is doing Putin's work for him, bailing him out of a disaster of his own creation.  He is losing the conventional war that he started.  His hope is that references to nuclear weapons will deter the democracies from delivering weapons to Ukraine, and buy him enough time to get Russian reserves to the battlefield to slow the Ukrainian offensive.  He's probably wrong that this would work; but the rhetorical escalation is one of the few plays that he has left. 

But this is the meat: that we're witnessing in various ways a major power struggle that Putin is appearing to fall for:

Quote

 

Prigozhin and Kadyrov are calling for is an intensification of the war, and mocking the Russian high command in the most aggressive possible tone, but meanwhile they seem to be protecting their own men.  That too seems like a trap.  By criticizing the way the war is fought, they weaken Putin's informational control; by forcing him to take responsibility even as they will not do so, they expose his position further.  They are telling him to win a war that they do not, themselves, seem to be trying to win.

In the overall logic that I am describing, rivals would seek to conserve whatever fighting forces they have, either to protect their own personal interests during an unpredictable time, or to make a play for Moscow.  If this is indeed the present situation, it will soon seem foolish for everyone involved to have armed forces located in distant Ukraine, or, for that matter, to get them killed there day after day.  Then comes a tipping point. Once some people realize that other people are holding back their men, it will seem senseless to expend (or alienate) one's own. 

 

In this scenario what you'll see is Putin necessarily pulling troops back into Russia because he needs them just in case. It might not have an armed conflict in Russia, but it requires planning around said conflict to avoid, well, not having troops loyal to you nearby. Ukraine becomes the worst place possible to have your troops. And that means, by design, they'll be withdrawn; not because Ukraine is beating them or threatening Russia, but because Russia is threatening Russia.

Quote

If this is what is coming, Putin will need no excuse to pull out from Ukraine, since he will be doing so for his own political survival.  For all of his personal attachment to his odd ideas about Ukraine, I take it that he is more attached to power.  If the scenario I describe here unfolds, we don't have to worry about the kinds of things we tend to worry about, like how Putin is feeling about the war, and whether Russians will be upset about losing.  During an internal struggle for power in Russia, Putin and other Russians will have other things on their minds, and the war will give way to those more pressing concerns.  Sometimes you change the subject, and sometimes the subject changes you.

I'm not sure how much I buy this. It's an interesting analysis to see how Putin's partial, shitty mobilization implies that Putin is not leading by himself and does coordinate with others and what that implies. It's nice to want to think that there are major fractures within Russia that are spilling out, and that Putin is weak. And this is a better take than the very ephemeral idea of Russians rising up and revolting en masse against the government, which always felt wishful and ignored a lot of history - including the Russian revolution, which was largely troops rising up and changing sides. But it still feels very preliminary, and I think it also ignores Putin's ability to act against internal power in his own country in decisive ways. 

[horangi]

14 minutes ago, KalVsWade said:

I'm not sure how much I buy this. It's an interesting analysis to see how Putin's partial, shitty mobilization implies that Putin is not leading by himself and does coordinate with others and what that implies. It's nice to want to think that there are major fractures within Russia that are spilling out, and that Putin is weak. And this is a better take than the very ephemeral idea of Russians rising up and revolting en masse against the government, which always felt wishful and ignored a lot of history - including the Russian revolution, which was largely troops rising up and changing sides. But it still feels very preliminary, and I think it also ignores Putin's ability to act against internal power in his own country in decisive ways. 

While I generally agree, giving Putin some "Franco in Morocco" vibes may force further mistakes in the field to Ukraine's advantage.  One could even have hope that it switches his thinking from the false existential threat of Greater Russia to a more personal existential threat.  I imagine its harder to find windows for Prigozhin or Kadyrov to fall out of, especially as he's tossed the FSB under the proverbial T-72.

[Which Tyler]

 

Please, please, please can that mean he NEEDS thoughts and prayers

[Matrim Fox Cauthon]

I suspect that Shoigu will be the fall guy for the failed invasion, with his sacrifice to the Russian propagandists made easier by his minority status. 

[Kalbear]

10 minutes ago, Matrim Fox Cauthon said:

I suspect that Shoigu will be the fall guy for the failed invasion, with his sacrifice to the Russian propagandists made easier by his minority status. 

I don't think there will be a 'failed' invasion. Shoigu may go out of favor with Putin, but I don't think he'll blame him because that would imply that all the things that Putin said happened didn't happen or something bad happened in some way. I don't think that's likely. Authoritarian governments can never admit failure from internal sources; they must always blame outside forces AND also say how they triumphed in some way anyways. This is what Trump does too, mind you - he gets pissed off at those who betrayed him, but he never ever admits that anything he ever did went badly. 

Either Putin chooses to withdraw after saying that they met all of their goals (which will miraculously be changed from the last 3 times he did it) or Putin will no longer be in power and Putin himself will be the fall guy. 

[Maithanet]

I don't know that Shoigu will be the fall guy for the invasion, but it's looking more and more like his days are numbered.  I would be very surprised if he's still in the same position in 6 months.  If he's lucky he'll be able to retire quietly to his $50 million mansion which he miraculously saved up for with his 100k salary.  He must be very thrifty.  If he's not lucky, then it's either prison for corruption or a fall from a window. 

As for the rest, I thought Snyder's discussion of Wagner was interesting.  I've seen a lot of people point out that the constant attacks around Bakhmut make no sense, as they are making minimal (if any) progress, and they are gradually being outflanked by the troops further north.  Snyder implies that Wagner wants to be on this "quiet" part of the line rather than facing an aggressive Ukrainian push on both flanks, because this allows them to save their strength.  Then Prigozhin rounds up criminals at jails, gives them a gun and points them at the enemy, which strengthens his position politically because he can say "see, I'm still attacking!  Wagner is doing more than anybody!" even though actually they're accomplishing nothing.  That makes more sense than any other explanation I've seen for why those attacks have continued the past 2 months. 

[Makk]

I think he has missed his chance of selling a sham victory even at home. A month ago he could have possibly spun a story about how he had killed the nazis, smashed the Azov battalion, and left the Donbass and Luhansk in the hands of their allies, but now it was vitally important to defend against the growing aggression of the evil American puppets Estonia and Latvia. Going through with the annexation ceremony has made it harder for him to actually withdraw as he is obligated to defend "Russia". He has, thankfully, screwed up so many times recently, this will probably go down as one of the most incompetently led military campaigns in all of history.

I do think his only offramp at this stage is to get the Napolean treatment. Imprison him offshore somewhere where he can live out his remaining days in relative comfort. He deserves much worse, he is a war criminal responsible for hundreds and thousands of needless deaths, but if it can quicken the end of the conflict and save lives then it should be done. I have no idea if he would go for that, he is a massive egotist and wouldn't like it, but his legacy is unsalvageable at this stage and if he values his life he might. 

 

[Werthead]

1 hour ago, Matrim Fox Cauthon said:

I suspect that Shoigu will be the fall guy for the failed invasion, with his sacrifice to the Russian propagandists made easier by his minority status. 

Potentially, but Putin values personal loyalty very highly and Shoigu has been with him through thick and thin and seems to have his back. That's not to say that Putin wouldn't turn on him without a second's hesitation if there was an overwhelming need to do so, but Putin and Shoigu are very aware that Shoigu would not be in any position of authority without Putin and owes his entire career to him, which is not the case for a lot of these other guys (maybe Kadyrov, although Kadyrov also likely tells himself that he and Putin's alliance is based on the idea that Putin was afraid of Chechnya beating Russia again).

[Werthead]

Oh, it's Putin's birthday tomorrow, that's why there's the prayers thing, not necessarily because he's ill. He's turning 70 and that's seen as a bit of a hallmark age in Russia, where you're officially "old". Apparently they see it like Americans or Europeans would see someone turning 80 or even 85: good going, but you're starting to push it.

[Jace, Extat]

1 minute ago, Werthead said:

Oh, it's Putin's birthday tomorrow, that's why there's the prayers thing, not necessarily because he's ill. He's turning 70 and that's seen as a bit of a hallmark age in Russia, where you're officially "old". Apparently they see it like Americans or Europeans would see someone turning 80 or even 85: good going, but you're starting to push it.

I always assumed the only thing older than 27 in Russia was the church.

[The Anti-Targ]

I don't remember the exact words, but wasn't the sham referendum an independence vote and Russia merely recognised the independence of these regions? Or did Russia subsequently take the step of admitting these independent regions into the Russian Federation?

Russia could still bug out proclaiming that independence has been achieved and call on the UN to recognise this "reality", but that now it is important for the military to be re-deployed to it's other vulnerable points on its border to defend against possible future encroachments that the evil west and its puppets may seek to inflict on Russia as punishment for freeing the free peoples of the Donbas. They could even say, that the west mis-characterised Russia's relationship with the Donbas and it was never brought into the federation, though some time soon Russia will enter into confederation negotiations with those completely legitimate and democratically elected free republics, which the west is duty bound to defend the self-determination rights of those now free people.

It is hard to do make that sort of move with Ukraine actively de-annexing several square kilometres of these free regions on a daily basis, because what land can Russia exactly be claiming as free and independent when that land area is changing almost on an hourly basis.

[Darzin]

29 minutes ago, The Anti-Targ said:

I don't remember the exact words, but wasn't the sham referendum an independence vote and Russia merely recognised the independence of these regions? Or did Russia subsequently take the step of admitting these independent regions into the Russian Federation?

The vote was specifically for annexation.  Previously the LPR and DPR had declared independence in "referendums" and been recognized by Russia as independent states.  These most recent votes were for the LPR. DPR and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to join Russia, and both Putin and the Duma have already ratified the annexation.

The Russian state media I read has been trumpeting the annexation to the high heavens and covering every minute detail, with multiple breathless stories per day about it, so it seems it will be rather hard to walk back given that every part of the Russian Federation has accepted the annexation and had that acceptance Trumpeted from the rooftops. There are even stories about the economic benefits of the new territories being put out, with not at all imperialist titles like this; Ports, mines, agriculture: What can new regions give Russia’s economy? The article reads like something straight out of the great game.

[Werthead]

Interesting analysis of the sabre-rattling here.

[Wilbur]

The thing about the threat of a tactical nuclear strike by Russia is first, what are they going to target?  Ukraine doesn't have huge troop formations clumped up together, so will the targets be civilian instead?

And second, the response to a tactical nuclear strike doesn't have to be nuclear.  Consider that once Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the US response is likely to be that any Russian asset worldwide is a valid target.  Russian subs suddenly fail to report home, Russian contractors in Africa disappear, Arctic installations receive MOAB, etc. etc.  Add the rest of NATO to the repost, and a conventional response to Russian nuclear aggression would be devastating.

Third, once Russian actually uses a nuclear weapon, it can no longer hold the threat out as a political lever.  What is left as a threat after that, since Russia's conventional forces have been shown to be a hollow reed?

[Kalbear]

1 hour ago, Wilbur said:

The thing about the threat of a tactical nuclear strike by Russia is first, what are they going to target?  Ukraine doesn't have huge troop formations clumped up together, so will the targets be civilian instead?

It'll probably be a major supply site or infrastructure point. Not that it matters; the goal of using a tac nuke would be to demonstrate political will, not to aid military success.

1 hour ago, Wilbur said:

And second, the response to a tactical nuclear strike doesn't have to be nuclear.  Consider that once Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the US response is likely to be that any Russian asset worldwide is a valid target.  Russian subs suddenly fail to report home, Russian contractors in Africa disappear, Arctic installations receive MOAB, etc. etc.  Add the rest of NATO to the repost, and a conventional response to Russian nuclear aggression would be devastating.

Losing a sub or something else would not be particularly devastating to the current Ukrainian war effort. What has likely been drawn up is a major strike using cruise missiles on a single important target, such as an air base or major supply junction. It would almost certainly not be open season if one was used. The goal would be to ensure Russia understands that using nukes would be a net negative. 

1 hour ago, Wilbur said:

Third, once Russian actually uses a nuclear weapon, it can no longer hold the threat out as a political lever.  What is left as a threat after that, since Russia's conventional forces have been shown to be a hollow reed?

This I don't get. Using one small nuke does not reduce the threat of using larger ones.