Ukraine 22: Anyone else holding their breath?

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

Just now, 3CityApache said:

 

This is making me nervous with all the talk about “dirty bombs” and such.  Could the Russians successfully pull back from Kherson City without everyone knowing about it?

[Darzin]

2 hours ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

This is making me nervous with all the talk about “dirty bombs” and such.  Could the Russians successfully pull back from Kherson City without everyone knowing about it?

Russia exploding some kind of dirty bomb in Kherson would royally fuck their invasion, so you think they wouldn't do it. But pre-invasion I was arguing that they would never invade because it would royally fuck them even if they won, and it has but look how that went. 

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

6 minutes ago, Darzin said:

Russia exploding some kind of dirty bomb in Kherson would royally fuck their invasion, so you think they wouldn't do it. But pre-invasion I was arguing that they would never invade because it would royally fuck them even if they won, and it has but look how that went. 

Precisely.

[horangi]

1 hour ago, Darzin said:

Russia exploding some kind of dirty bomb in Kherson would royally fuck their invasion, so you think they wouldn't do it. But pre-invasion I was arguing that they would never invade because it would royally fuck them even if they won, and it has but look how that went. 

Actually, I wouldnt think it would be significantly meaningful from their standpoint.  We've already seen a fairly brazen disregard for their own troops radiological safety in the Chernobyl/Pripyat exclusion zone and at the Zaporizhzhia (which I did have to look up spelling on again) site.  As I believe @IFR pointed out in the past, dirty bombs are not really as devastating as they are made out to be from an actual casualty standpoint and of little to no use in battlefield warfare.  Moreover, even the terror aspect is only debilitating if one cares strongly about the long term health of ones soldiers/citizens.  I doubt a few percents increase in cancer rates among the populace 5 years out would be a deterrent.   Rather its the international response that would be staying their hand.

 

ETA: On the flip side- the above also indicates that using one on a Ukraine strong point for military gains is also of little use, since the Ukraine military would likely tough it out.  So its only real use is as a civilian terror weapon to try and force negotiation.  A tactical nuclear weapon would at least have some minor battlefield impact, but also are not a particular great option unless used en mass.

[Wilbur]

This week I have seen a new type of "front-line social media" reporting, videos of a kind that I have seen before now: Ukrainian military cooking videos.

Ukraine must be attempted to flood the zone with videos of the plentiful, delicious, hot food available to their frontline troops, in contrast to whatever the Russians are experiencing for chow now and as winter deepens.

[ThinkerX]

10 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

This week I have seen a new type of "front-line social media" reporting, videos of a kind that I have seen before now: Ukrainian military cooking videos.

Ukraine must be attempted to flood the zone with videos of the plentiful, delicious, hot food available to their frontline troops, in contrast to whatever the Russians are experiencing for chow now and as winter deepens.

Well, the initial wave of Russian troops was eating rations that were like a decade old.

Makes one wonder what the newly mobilized recruits will dining on - C rats from WWII?

[Werthead]

14 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

This week I have seen a new type of "front-line social media" reporting, videos of a kind that I have seen before now: Ukrainian military cooking videos.

Ukraine must be attempted to flood the zone with videos of the plentiful, delicious, hot food available to their frontline troops, in contrast to whatever the Russians are experiencing for chow now and as winter deepens.

The other one I've seen is Ukrainian troops taking time out to appreciate nature. There was one guy explaining something about the green open spaces of eastern Ukraine with gunfire (way off) in the background and someone asked him if this was safe and he was like, "Sure, they never fucking hit anything anyway."

Will try to find that one again because that was funny.

[Jace, Extat]

5 hours ago, ThinkerX said:

Well, the initial wave of Russian troops was eating rations that were like a decade old.

Makes one wonder what the newly mobilized recruits will dining on -  rats from WWII!

I have transformed your question? into answer!

And they called me a mad woman when I proposed The Culling! A ha! A hahaha! Ahhhh hahahahahahaha! 

Ahhh ha ha ha ha ha! 

[This would be when I fly off on my vacuum and credits roll, perhaps as the screen shrinks into a windowed pumpkin and I disappear into the stars]

[SeanF]

Is this retreat a “gesture of goodwill?”

[mormont]

9 hours ago, ThinkerX said:

Makes one wonder what the newly mobilized recruits will dining on - C rats from WWII?

Actual rats.

[broken one]

12 hours ago, Wilbur said:

in contrast to whatever the Russians are experiencing for chow now and as winter deepens.

I've watched an interview with Polish volunteer, a sergeant in rapid response squad, figthing in the South. He said that for last three weeks he had fed only on Russian rations and had nothing to complain about. Very tasty, especially apple jam from stock of special forces. So far, so good. 

[Padraig]

What is the general feeling around the progress of this war now?  Not much seems to have happened over the last few weeks but maybe that was to be expected given the arrival of winter?  And perhaps Ukraine will eventually start making significant ground again?  Or has Russia largely succeeded in freezing this war (and will press on again in the New Year when they have more troops fully mobilised)?  Or is it too difficult to call?  There certainly seems to be a lot of confusion around Kherson.

[Loge]

25 minutes ago, Padraig said:

What is the general feeling around the progress of this war now?  Not much seems to have happened over the last few weeks but maybe that was to be expected given the arrival of winter?  And perhaps Ukraine will eventually start making significant ground again?  Or has Russia largely succeeded in freezing this war (and will press on again in the New Year when they have more troops fully mobilised)?  Or is it too difficult to call?  There certainly seems to be a lot of confusion around Kherson.

The Russians have dig in and try to hold on to the territory they still occupy. The front line hasn't changed much over the last couple of weeks but the Russian losses have increased:

https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1588452710697046018?s=20&t=v4CMD-kg0fGlP8XQelHvdg

 

840 Russians killed in a single day is a lot. Wonder how much longer they can sustain that. Looks like they definitely prepare to leave Kherson, though not without a fight.

[broken one]

29 minutes ago, Padraig said:

What is the general feeling around the progress of this war now?  Not much seems to have happened over the last few weeks but maybe that was to be expected given the arrival of winter?  And perhaps Ukraine will eventually start making significant ground again?  Or has Russia largely succeeded in freezing this war (and will press on again in the New Year when they have more troops fully mobilised)?  Or is it too difficult to call?  There certainly seems to be a lot of confusion around Kherson.

Russians are pushing in the East again, it's said they have retaken some villages in Donetsk Oblast yesterday.

Ukrainians attempted to drive Russians out their positions in the hills West of Svatove, but were  pushed back. If they had succeeded the whole front could have collapsed.

As for Kherson - some anticipate Russians will evacuate troops from the territory West of Dnipro except for the Kherson city and Nova Kahovka and turn the two places into fortresses. I am afraid this makes sense, more than leaving the Western side completely, blowing up dams and dropping dirty bombs.

[Which Tyler]

1 hour ago, Padraig said:

What is the general feeling around the progress of this war now?  Not much seems to have happened over the last few weeks but maybe that was to be expected given the arrival of winter?  And perhaps Ukraine will eventually start making significant ground again?  Or has Russia largely succeeded in freezing this war (and will press on again in the New Year when they have more troops fully mobilised)?  Or is it too difficult to call?  There certainly seems to be a lot of confusion around Kherson.

A] Ukraine has made some rapid gains in September and early October - they then need to take some time to consolidate those gains, and make sure they're actually safe to count as Ukrainian territory now.
Plus, those best quality troops who were leading those offensives need some time off to recover, physically and mentally - which slows down any advance.

B] Russia has thrown a hell of a lot of bodies at the problem, and those sacrifices are keeping Ukraine pinned in place.

C] Russian acts of terrorism on population centres are fairly irrelevant to the progress of war, but their attacks on the electricity grid can be pretty significant.

D] Autumn and Winter will really slow down the ability of troops to move around. You need infantry to take and hold areas, and infantry need to be able to leave the roads to avoid being a turkey shoot.

 

Going forwards, Russia is really strengthening defensive lines at the Dnipro, Siverskyi-Donetsk rivers; and seem to be "just" taking as much time as possible in fighting a rearguard action to the West of the Dnipro and North of the S-D; and seem to have accepted that they're unlikely to hold them long-term (They'd REALLY like to hold the Northern 2/3 of Luhansk, but that's not where they're setting up they're main defensive line).

In the Zaporizhzhia <=> Donetsk region, there seems to be a lot of digging in, but no real movement (bar the odd village here and there as Russia will happily spend 2000 lives for the PR victory of a population centre holding 1000 people) but nowhere near the level as at the big rivers. At some point, Ukraine will launch an actual attack here; and it's anyone's guess as to how well the Russians have dug in, but they should at least be able to control the air from bases in Crimea.

In the Donetsk <=> Lyschansk region, Russia seems to REALLY want Bakhmut, but Ukraine seems to be really well dug in there, and it's just a meat grinder. Ukraine doesn't (currently) seem much interested in countering beyond the town limits here, and seem to have regarded the defence of the villages to the NE and SE as a rearguard action of their own.
Further North, Russia has started to make some actual ground around Bilohorivka, but not yet at Spirne. I expect these 2, and the 3 towns between them, to have a very unpleasant winter.

North of Severodonetsk, I think this is Russia fighting a slow retreat over the next year or so; and Ukraine being less bothered about the very North and East of this region (mop it up later).

 

I think Russia are looking to REALLY secure the pre-February ground they did have (with the natural border at the S-D), but pushed out up to Severodonetsk to the NW, and a frontline running from Lynschansk to Siversk, then down through Bakhmut, Niu York and Avdiivka to Donetsk (obviously, with those towns in Russian control, as far as the Russians are concerned.
If you then add the current frontline Donetsk <=> Zaporizhzhia, and have Russia holding the East bank of the Dnipro - I think Russia will consider that a huge success - hold out along that line for a few years and let the war grind down, with Russia having taken a swathe of coast, and the landbridge to Crimea and natural fortifications along most of the length.

 

Ukraine need to first get Russia off the West bank of the Dnipro, and the North bank of the S-D (including Severodonetsk, which will be one hell of a fight); then they really need to make inroads beyond those fortifications, or they most likely will be worn down to those borders. If Ukraine can't breach those borders, then in 5 years time, that land will be as lost to Ukraine as Crimea is.

 

 

ETA: I also wouldn't be surprised if Russia tries to hold Kherson city itself, even giving up on everything else to the West of the Dnipro - if they succeed with that, they'll try the same at Serverodonetsk and Stanychno-Luhansk. If they fail, they'll try to bleed Ukraine in those, but ultimately retreat.

[Werthead]

Russia seems to be trying to run out the clock for Ukraine and exhaust Ukraine's willingness and ability to fight. There are, however, myriad problems with this. The Russian economy is starting to take serious knocks from the sanctions. 15%+ of Russia's rolling stock is out of commission because of lack of spare parts. Their civil aviation is also suffering (advisories to use the full length of the runway and break less on landing to preserve both tyres and brakes). When the efficiency of both is highly reduced and rushing troops to trouble spots quickly becomes impossible, the regional discontent will likely grow further. The brain drain is also having a serious impact on the economy, although it is possible to reverse this: if Putin declares an end to conscription, some of the million or so people who've fled the country since the start of the war might be tempted to return.

We also know that Putin has big plans past Ukraine. He is clearly weighing up the options of taking Moldova, maybe Georgia and certainly the Baltic States within a short timeframe (the next decade or less), and bogging his military down in a long attritional war with Ukraine basically makes that impossible. At the moment he will be carefully watching what happens in the US midterms and what impact that has on international support for Ukraine, not to mention the situation in Iran and if his allies in Italy and Hungary can push the EU closer to breaking point. He will also likely encourage more trouble in Serbia to try to distract Europe. He may even risk deniable attacks on energy infrastructure (especially for Norway, Germany and the UK) to try to increase the pain on European civilians and stoke internal dissent in those countries and encourage them to break their support for Ukraine.

If everyone holds firm until the spring, I suspect the economic and international situation for Russia will become more serious and they may have to reconsider a withdrawal or a massive drawing-down of ambitions (in Putin's back pocket is always the option to retreat to just Donetsk and Luhansk and try to force a recognition of Crimea, which he could sell as something of a victory), or abandoning long-term military plans post-Ukraine since it will take them 5-10 years to just recover from the conflict.

Ukraine does seem to have paused to secure the territory it has retaken and ensure defensive lines against Belarus have been built and are holding firm. When it launches a new offensive, likely in the Spring, it will be a test as to whether everything it's learned can be put into place to break through heavily-defended Russian lines. Ukraine may also have developed a problem with the amount of high-tech weapons it has: enough to focus on one or two areas, but not all of them. Whilst using HIMARS to fuel its attacks in Kherson and north Donbas, it has effectively had to cede south Donbas, where Russian artillery has been able to operate relatively unimpeded once again, although fortunately not in remotely the same numbers it had during the summer.

[a free shadow]

4 hours ago, Werthead said:

He is clearly weighing up the options of taking Moldova, maybe Georgia and certainly the Baltic States within a short timeframe (the next decade or less)...

why? where is this from?

[Werthead]

27 minutes ago, a free shadow said:

why? where is this from?

There was a speech a couple of weeks ago where he said the coming decade would be the most unpredictable and dangerous since World War II, and Russia was going to make sure the West was weakened and would lose its dominant place in the world.

That does seem like a strong suggestion that Russia will eventually get itself into a position to directly confront NATO and risk a nuclear confrontation to restore its former Soviet states.

That's also in accordance with the Ukrainian intelligence report from more than a year ago where they said a timetable had been floating around the Kremlin which called for the essential reunification of most Soviet states, certainly the ones that joined NATO post-1997, by the early 2030s. In the run-up to the invasion, Russia also called upon NATO to return to its 1997 borders. This would effectively leave NATO with only a reunified Germany beyond its Cold War boundaries and effectively remove the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia from its membership (and leave them open to a Russian invasion later on).

Russia has also raised the prospect of retrospectively rescinding the recognition of independence of the Baltic States from the Soviet Union, citing failures of legal policy, and thus making their membership of NATO retrospectively null and void (which of course means jack shit to anyone outside Russia, but may win some supporters within Russia).

All of this, of course, shows a fantastic detachment from reality and a belief in a world that does not exist outside of Putin's head. However, as the past year has shown, that is enough for him to take actions that seem insane or futile to others.

[Maithanet]

2 minutes ago, Werthead said:

There was a speech a couple of weeks ago where he said the coming decade would be the most unpredictable and dangerous since World War II, and Russia was going to make sure the West was weakened and would lose its dominant place in the world.

That does seem like a strong suggestion that Russia will eventually get itself into a position to directly confront NATO and risk a nuclear confrontation to restore its former Soviet states.

All of this, of course, shows a fantastic detachment from reality and a belief in a world that does not exist outside of Putin's head. However, as the past year has shown, that is enough for him to take actions that seem insane or futile to others.

I go the other way with this.  Russia is attempting to make up for its military weakness with aggressive rhetoric, including nuclear threats.  But all Russia has is words.  The more the West is scared of Russian nukes and Russian armies, the better it is for Putin. 

Russia can talk about reclaiming the Baltic states, but what army will it use?  The one that is reduced to scrap in Ukraine?  Is this invasion going to happen after Russia is defeated in Ukraine, or while that defeat is still ongoing?

[Werthead]

5 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

I go the other way with this.  Russia is attempting to make up for its military weakness with aggressive rhetoric, including nuclear threats.  But all Russia has is words.  The more the West is scared of Russian nukes and Russian armies, the better it is for Putin. 

Russia can talk about reclaiming the Baltic states, but what army will it use?  The one that is reduced to scrap in Ukraine?  Is this invasion going to happen after Russia is defeated in Ukraine, or while that defeat is still ongoing?

Yes, I agree. Russia has no capability to follow through on the threat as long as NATO unity holds firm. That certainty goes completely out the window if Trump, or possibly other candidates, gets in in 2024.

The concerning bit is that Putin is effectively now, in Russian demographic terms, a dead man walking. If he thinks he is going to drop dead tomorrow, or in the next five years (which based on Russia's horribly low male lifespan is not unlikely, although of course he must have the best healthcare access in the whole country and might well live for another 20 years), he might well decide it's worthwhile going out trying to rebuild the Russian Empire and if he fails and dies in WWIII, so be it (what his subordinates think of that may be another matter). Of course, it's even more likely that that's what he wants other people to think to give in to him, whilst his giga-long COVID-repulsing tables shows that his personal survival is still of paramount importance to him.