Ukraine: Are ya winning yet.

[Jace, Extat]

6 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

How much of a pause do you think the poor performance of Soviet/Russian tech has given the PLA… given how much of their older stuff is based on Soviet tech?

I can take this question, if I might presume:

 

Ser, 

Scot, 

Pal...

You have no fucking idea what the People's Liberation Army has at its disposal. And much less what the People's Liberation Army Navy has at its disposal. 

 

The difference between China and Russia is well drawn out by Wert right there, though it's more of a passive byproduct of what he was actually addressing. 

Russia is weak and wild. They have more ambition than capacity. And have really always been that way. That's just Russia baby. Now they can box! Yo, they can box. But they kinda suck. Sorry. They're really better off, like, self-image wise I think; as a fucking terrorist state. Like, that's their crowd. Hooking up with Iran? Yo, Russia's the Cool Kid at that table. 

Or at least that's their future with Putin and his policies. IMO. New Year new day eh? Who knows what another government might be like. 

Meanwhile, China. China is not weak. And they are not wild. China is strong. And China is focused. Do not underestimate them. 

 

That's all I got. 

 

[Wade1865]

18 minutes ago, Werthead said:

… the sooner Russia is defeated and left licking its wounds, the less likely they will have to fight a two-front conflict … 

Werthead -- that’s one of the prime considerations.

Some (good, but shortsighted) people in the USG consider option 1) where a decisively defeated RUS released from the requirements of a costly active war and both recovering and reconsolidating represents a better option than 2) a stalled RUS perpetually pinned and bleeding out gallons of blood and matériel while facing stalemate or worse against a UKR proven to be capable of holding the line.

And even if some ignored the (unlikely employed, but still available) risk of RUS nuclear capability under option 1), they can’t ignore the certainty that a PRC invasion of Chaiwan would result in their decisive conventional defeat against the US and Asian Allies. It would be outright annihilation, assuming they could even put adequate numbers of boots on the island, hahaha. The US wouldn’t have to actively fight a two-war front against RUS and the PRC.

Both opponents are contained, the USG just needs to ensure the nukes stay inactive.

[Jace, Extat]

24 minutes ago, Wade1865 said:

Werthead -- that’s one of the prime considerations.

Some (good, but shortsighted) people in the USG consider option 1) where a decisively defeated RUS released from the requirements of a costly active war and both recovering and reconsolidating represents a better option than 2) a stalled RUS perpetually pinned and bleeding out gallons of blood and matériel while facing stalemate or worse against a UKR proven to be capable of holding the line.

And even if some ignored the (unlikely employed, but still available) risk of RUS nuclear capability under option 1), they can’t ignore the certainty that a PRC invasion of Chaiwan would result in their decisive conventional defeat against the US and Asian Allies. It would be outright annihilation, assuming they could even put adequate numbers of boots on the island, hahaha. The US wouldn’t have to actively fight a two-war front against RUS and the PRC.

Both opponents are contained, the USG just needs to ensure the nukes stay inactive.

You cold blooded bastard... 

I love it! 

 

Bad! 

Bad! Bad ruthless strategist! 

Bad, bad, baaaad... So... um... so bad... 

 

 

[Werthead]

1 hour ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

How much of a pause do you think the poor performance of Soviet/Russian tech has given the PLA… given how much of their older stuff is based on Soviet tech?

Given the degree to which China is updating their arsenal with modern, superior equivalents, I don't think this is a major consideration. If they ever need to invade Mongolia for some reason, they might send in their older stuff, but for Taiwan they'll be using the best and most modern of what they've got.

The question for China is always the best moment to do that, and that is always in flux. A lot of American and other studies put the tipping point for China to militarily and economically surpass the US in the late 2020s to mid-2030s, but the problem is that even if China is 10% or 15% stronger than the US, the US can still inflict massive casualties and economic damage on it even in losing. And recent economic studies by the US and Japan have suggested the tipping point may not be achieved now until the 2040s, and if China's meteoric growth years are over and behind it, than it may never be achieved.

You also have the same issue for Xi that there is for Putin, that he's old enough that the question of legacy will come up and he may decide to roll the dice to cement his legacy even if the circumstances are not optimal.

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Yes, but Xi has more or less set up China for the long strategic grind (new silk road, investments in Africa and Europe). 

So the roll of the dice doesn't really fit into that. But yeah, Taiwan is sorta is an existential question for them. 

On the other hand Demographics would probably suggest action rather sooner than later. Will China have sufficient man of fighting age for open conflict with the US (conventional war).

[Kalbear]

Another consideration is that unlike Russia China has basically no actual military experience in the field. We don't know how their logistics will work, how their CnC works, how their intel or EW works, how their combined arms fights. They definitely have more advanced tech and abilities but how well they will do is something of a massive question mark. It's possible that their military is as decimated by corruption and decay as the Russian military is; it's also possible that they're significantly better than anyone else and are incredibly ready to strike, particularly in the Taiwan war. 

My bet would be that they have a lot of good planning and ideas but do not have sustained use of those things and there will be setbacks on their overall plans, but they will also have capabilities that the West is largely unprepared for and Taiwan is completely unprepared for. 

[Wilbur]

The thing about China's purported plans for an invasion of Taiwan is that they have to conquer and hold Taiwan without damaging the Taiwanese economic engines of TSMC et al.

That is physically difficult to do, (cross the strait, defeat an armed resistance, but don't damage any fabs, etc.) and even if they achieve the physical control of an enterprise in Taiwan, will the rest of the world continue to do business with a captured corporate entity?

Russia clearly failed to do this in Ukraine - just look at all the sarcastic "Russia Mir" photographs of utterly ruined Ukrainian towns in the memes online.  And Russia didn't have to cross a body of water prior to doing so, or face down and defeat a naval power en route.

China will need to have step-function values of superior performance to pull such a move off in Taiwan.  So while the PLA builds and struts, I see Xi's long-term hopes in the African and Oceanic investments as a more likely way to achieve global power status.  Russia's Ukrainian Misadventure will surely only add credence to this peaceful alternate strategy for China.

[Kalbear]

3 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

The thing about China's purported plans for an invasion of Taiwan is that they have to conquer and hold Taiwan without damaging the Taiwanese economic engines of TSMC et al.

I don't think that's their plan or primary goal. I'm sure they'd like to do that but capturing Taiwan has been an existential goal for China since the 50s, long before they became an economic power. The reason they're doing it has little to do with getting semiconductor manufacturing capabilities. 

Also note that one of the reasons that the US is diversifying and investing in semiconductor capacity is precisely to mitigate the pain of losing Taiwanese capacity in any war - whether Taiwan gets taken or fights for a while. 

There are some wargames out there that show what might happen in a conventional war, but that also presumes that the US would be using their full weight out there - and I think that's hopeful but not assured, especially if Trump or DeSantis get into power in 2024. 

https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html

[Padraig]

Whatever about Taiwan, i'm surprised that the optimism around Ukraine remains given Ukraine was talking today about another major Russian offensive before the end of the month, with up to 500k men!  They probably exaggerate but whatever the number, this is a concern.

Things have been on a downwards trajectory for Ukraine for the last couple of months (even if it was a moderate decline).  The announcement regarding tanks seems to be too little, too late (from what I read anyhow).  That the momentum Ukraine had has been lost because they didn't have the equipment earlier to capitalise on a faltering Russian presence.

I'm not saying panic but I was worried a month ago.  That has only worsened since.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

Did Russia really rename Volgograd… Stalingrad?

 

[Maithanet]

13 hours ago, Padraig said:

Things have been on a downwards trajectory for Ukraine for the last couple of months (even if it was a moderate decline).  The announcement regarding tanks seems to be too little, too late (from what I read anyhow).  That the momentum Ukraine had has been lost because they didn't have the equipment earlier to capitalise on a faltering Russian presence.

They have?  I'm not seeing that.  Russia has been throwing thousands of bodies at Bakhmut and Soledar, and to show for it they have taken a few square miles of charred wasteland.  If Ukraine made an offensive like that I would call it a dismal failure.  Instead, Ukraine is receiving more and better weapons, training more and more civilians to be soldiers, and building up reserves for the next offensive.

Last fall, Ukraine had plans for a huge counterattack into Zaporozhye Oblast, to cut the Russians in two.  It was an incredibly bold plan with huge potential benefits. They discussed it with NATO generals and those generals conducted multiple trial wargames and found that the offensive was unlikely to work and ran the risk of getting bogged down with no decisive result.  So Ukraine adjusted, and instead came back with two smaller offensives, in Kharkiv and around Kherson.  We saw those offensives go off, and both were very successful.  Those offensives did not "peter out", they achieved their objectives and then they stopped.  There was a brief moment where it looked like they could snatch up Kreminna as well, but they didn't quite have the reserves available.  

Obviously Ukraine isn't going to announce when and where their next offensive will be, but it's pretty obvious that it hasn't started yet.  The inching forward in Kreminna is definitely not it. 

[Maithanet]

Scot,

My understanding is that it is being temporarily renamed, really just for the ceremony.  Although Stalin is clearly coming back into vogue in Russia, which is not great. 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Lenin (who by all rights should be less toxic/controversial than Stalin) is kinda weird, how you would work him into Putin's Russia socially. 

Putin's domestic policy is somewhat closer to the Romanoffs (or Romanovs pick the transcription of your choice here), with the strong role of the Orthodox Church and this Patriotic Piety. The Russian Orthodox Church canonized them in 2000 (?), then there was a court ruling a couple of years later that rehabilated them. This big Russian empire with Kyiv as the actual cultural capitol of Russia etc. is way more Romanov than Lenin.

Now then, remind me how Lenin and the Romanoffs got along. And now try to square Vladimir Ilyich with that Romanoff cult. He also famously loved the Orthodox Church.

[Gorn]

14 hours ago, Padraig said:

Whatever about Taiwan, i'm surprised that the optimism around Ukraine remains given Ukraine was talking today about another major Russian offensive before the end of the month, with up to 500k men!  They probably exaggerate but whatever the number, this is a concern.

Things have been on a downwards trajectory for Ukraine for the last couple of months (even if it was a moderate decline).  The announcement regarding tanks seems to be too little, too late (from what I read anyhow).  That the momentum Ukraine had has been lost because they didn't have the equipment earlier to capitalise on a faltering Russian presence.

I'm not saying panic but I was worried a month ago.  That has only worsened since.

If it will cheer you up, here's a recap of how 6 Russian brigades (including what's left of their marines) got their asses kicked by 3 Ukrainian brigades last week in the Battle of Vuhledar (still ongoing):

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-2-february-2022-vuhledar-8e34b3cc3ae1

[Maltaran]

3 hours ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Did Russia really rename Volgograd… Stalingrad?

 

Only for one day to mark the anniversary of the end of the battle of Stalingrad

[mormont]

2 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Lenin (who by all rights should be less toxic/controversial than Stalin) is kinda weird, how you would work him into Putin's Russia socially. 

Putin's domestic policy is somewhat closer to the Romanoffs (or Romanovs pick the transcription of your choice here), with the strong role of the Orthodox Church and this Patriotic Piety. The Russian Orthodox Church canonized them in 2000 (?), then there was a court ruling a couple of years later that rehabilated them. This big Russian empire with Kyiv as the actual cultural capitol of Russia etc. is way more Romanov than Lenin.

Now then, remind me how Lenin and the Romanoffs got along. And now try to square Vladimir Ilyich with that Romanoff cult. He also famously loved the Orthodox Church.

Politically, Lenin doesn't fit into Putin's Russia. But socially? Sure.

Putin's clique consists of Russian nationalists. And it spans everyone from former KGB folks to unrepentant White Russians. The thing they have in common is Russia. Lenin, Stalin, the Romanovs? Communism and the Tsars? The Orthodox Church and the Party? All in the mix. All emblems of Russian greatness. All the reverse of the decadent West.

It doesn't all work logically, but it's not about logic. It's about the feelings.

[Padraig]

4 hours ago, Maithanet said:

They have?  I'm not seeing that.

As I said, it was a moderate decline.  In other words, if you are losing territory more than you are winning territory, its a decline, albeit moderate.

[Maithanet]

15 minutes ago, Padraig said:

As I said, it was a moderate decline.  In other words, if you are losing territory more than you are winning territory, its a decline, albeit moderate.

I don't think that tiny fluctuations in territory are the best way to judge who is winning this war.  The territory that Russia has captured has been blasted to oblivion and is not particularly meaningful. 

[Werthead]

We did see Russia gain a significant amount of territory at the start of the war, and then lost a large chunk of it around Kyiv. We then saw Russia gain a fairly big chunk of territory in the summer, moving towards the Donbas, only to lose a larger chunk around Kharkiv and extending south and east towards Lyman. Russia has since lost a fairly large amount of territory in and around Kherson, whilst making up for it only with very small gains around Soledar and Bakhmut.

The direction has been in Ukraine's favour, although of course that can reverse fairly quickly. The biggest changes not in Ukraine's favour has been the recent Russian success in optimising resupply routes from rail heads and ammo dumps out of range of HIMARS and then trucking that material to the front. It's still not getting Russia up to speed - their rate of artillery fire around Bakhmut has been cut by around 75% compared to the Donbas offensive just because getting the ammo and replacement barrels in is a major problem - but it is allowing them to grind forwards when combined with human wave attacks of disposable personnel. 

The new supply system is fragile, and can be disrupted by the newly enhanced-range HIMARS missiles. It's also only really possible because Russia holds railheads in eastern Ukraine directly integrated into their own supply network. We've seen elsewhere where not having such an integrated transport infrastructure has cost them.

Recent Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Russia will focus an enhanced push on capturing all of the Donbas by the end of spring, with the next offensive due to launch by the end of this month. There is some concern that the release of tanks may not be in time to help blunt this offensive, and indeed that Russia may have "shadow-conscripted" far more troops than previously believed and been able to arm them with small arms. Such a large-scale offensive will be very bloody for Russia, but could be successful.

[SeanF]

17 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Lenin (who by all rights should be less toxic/controversial than Stalin) is kinda weird, how you would work him into Putin's Russia socially. 

Putin's domestic policy is somewhat closer to the Romanoffs (or Romanovs pick the transcription of your choice here), with the strong role of the Orthodox Church and this Patriotic Piety. The Russian Orthodox Church canonized them in 2000 (?), then there was a court ruling a couple of years later that rehabilated them. This big Russian empire with Kyiv as the actual cultural capitol of Russia etc. is way more Romanov than Lenin.

Now then, remind me how Lenin and the Romanoffs got along. And now try to square Vladimir Ilyich with that Romanoff cult. He also famously loved the Orthodox Church.

Lenin was still a Russian nationalist, who suppressed the various independence movements.  That’s why many Tsarist officers fought for the Bolsheviks.