Ukraine: Slava Ukraini!!!

[mormont]

13 minutes ago, Rippounet said:

Really? Well perhaps mimicking it is something we'd want to avoid, right?

I'm not sure what point you think this is making, but yes. We're not in any danger of mimicking it, though, so that's fine.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

15 minutes ago, Rippounet said:

Really? Well perhaps mimicking it is something we'd want to avoid, right?

You’re making some interesting points… but… how is retaking territory lost to an invader… mimicking… the invader?

[Padraig]

43 minutes ago, Rippounet said:

Truth is, without genuine victory, even a totalitarian government will eventually struggle to keep a people motivated for war. Without victory in the field, even a totalitarian government may have to consider negotiation out of self-preservation.

43 minutes ago, Rippounet said:

Realistically speaking, even if Russia were to get something out of this war, the cost of the conflict alone should guarantee that it stays put for at least a decade, unless China decides it wants to go to war over Taiwan and needs it to open another front.

I don't really get what you are saying.  Most people here are saying that Russia doesn't deserve to be rewarded with territory after invading Ukraine.  You seem to be saying that Russia is unlikely to get anything out of this war?

Either way, Russia ends up with next to nothing.  Right?

You just seem to be saying that people should be more open to negotiation in the meantime before the inevitable end result?

Sure?  I don't think Ukraine has said that it would never ever negotiate with Russia.  Just not given the current situation.  When Russia talks about negotiations it has been pretty clear that it means negotiating the terms of Ukraine's (effective) surrender.  And given you are saying that Ukraine has effectively won the war, i'm not sure how your argument ties together.

Its like you read somewhere that Putin is ready to negotiate Russia's withdrawal but nobody will listen to him (and he is forced to blow up cities instead, since that is the natural reaction).

Anyhow, I don't get it. 

My other interpretation of your argument is that it is mainly a theoretical/academic exercise about the futility of war than an actual debate about the reality in Ukraine.

[Gorn]

@Rippounet

Here's a hypothetical situation to consider.

Russia invades Ukraine based on an unrealistic expectation of its own strength and Ukraine's weakness. The rest of the world responds with condemnations and sanctions.

The war doesn't go as well as Russia expected and it comes significantly short of accomplishing its goals, but it still ends up with annexed parts of Ukraine that it can use to declare "victory" and to justify the war to its population. During that time, it uses its intelligence resources to internally subvert Western states, incite and finance the rise of fascism and far right globally.

Seven years later, it rearms and tries again, with a different strategy and different weapons than the last time.

Only guess what? This is not a hypothetical, this is exactly what happened last year.

[A True Kaniggit]

6 hours ago, Rippounet said:

It's hard not to spot the cognitive dissonance here. Or the naivety. Or the lack of historical perspective.  But of course the entire point of the war was precisely to bleed Russia dry. There were even statements to that effect before it had even started.

Wait. Things have gone on since this post but I can’t let the bolded slide. 

The whole point of Russia deciding on their own to invade Ukraine was to bleed Russia dry?

[Jace, Extat]

24 minutes ago, A True Kaniggit said:

Wait. Things have gone on since this post but I can’t let the bolded slide. 

The whole point of Russia deciding on their own to invade Ukraine was to bleed Russia dry?

Well, we've all seen Putin compared to Roose Bolton... From a certain angle I suppose it makes sense; if the country needs a leeching then it needs a leeching

[Clueless Northman]

5 hours ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

What good is accomplished from negotiation if you can be certain the person you are negotiating with will breach any agreement in short order?

We can ask the American native tribes how it worked out for them.

 

1 hour ago, Gorn said:

@Rippounet

During that time, it uses its intelligence resources to internally subvert Western states, incite and finance the rise of fascism and far right globally.

Only guess what? This is not a hypothetical, this is exactly what happened last year.

You're aware that it's not Putin's agents who decided to screw the French people with pension reforms and pushed them on the streets? Unless you believe Macron is actually Putin's stooge. Same with strikes in Germany and UK. Do you think it's Russian money who crashed SVB and Credit Suisse? Putin didn't need to move a finger for our own governments and economic elites to fuck us over and over. They're that bad and that crooked that they couldn't even stop being greedy incompetent assholes for a year to ensure Western people could fully stay onboard with the "war effort".

 

3 hours ago, Rippounet said:

the idea that "they" will always want more, that "they" will never change, that "they" are essentially expansionist and will never accept peace, therefore war is unavoidable and complete victory the only acceptable future.
It's an old line, often based on mistaken readings of history.

Anyway, such thinking is self-defeating. While it can be true at a given point in time, it is not an acceptable basis for any kind of rational thought: if seen as an absolute truth, it would lead to either perpetual war or extermination. There could never be peace, or even co-existence, only war and genocide. Such views on other humans (or on all humans) are a core tenet of fascist thought, the idea that "they" are irredeemable and need to be either crushed or exterminated.

Alas, that kind of mindset has been building up in Russia for the last 20 years, and we see the results right now. Sadly, such a mindset also seems to be quite trendy among too many Western politicians and media. It's already difficult to end a war when one side does it; when both do, I fear we might be in for a very long and very deadly war, if it doesn't end up in "total war" mode. I'm quite gloomy because I see some on both sides picking and escalatory rhetoric (though what amazes and surprises me the most is that some of the biggest Western hardliners are in Baltic States, which clearly will lose the most if the war escalates to full-blown NATO-Russia total war, when it's warmongers in America and Siberia who most probably would suffer the less).

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Oh man rips, this is just sad to read.

Your entire argument is just morally wrong and plain bad.

- Your negotiated peace means a Ukrainian surrender, with them accepting Russia's annexation of their territories.

- It means everybody should accept one state redrawing map and moving its borders as it sees fit.

- It presumes that a bad faith actor, who has thus far violated every agreement and actually started that war of aggression will be acting in good faith this time.

- you deny Ukraine agency, you dismiss their war for survival as independent state as some sort of Western plot to bleed Russia dry. I really do not need to tell you how messed up this position is, and how this is a very imperalistic take on it. You treat Ukraine (and its territory) as some sorta of buffer or negotiation mass, that can be cut and sliced as needed to (temporarily) pacify Russia.

You are smarter and way better than this.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

24 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

- It means everybody should accept one state redrawing map and moving its borders as it sees fit.

Wait, we can't just absorb through force Canada and Baja Mexico?

Well fuck.

Is that idea of "buying" Greenland* still on the table?

*ETA: Worth noting, one of @Mexal's favorite Gerry Buts movies of ALL TIME!!!

[Maithanet]

The new Perun video talks about casualties and how difficult it is to estimate them for the war in Ukraine.  Couple relevant takeaways:

 - Casualties are certainly high in this war, but it takes a LOT of casualties to genuinely get to the point where a nation cannot replace them.  Both Russia and Ukraine aren't even approaching 1/20th of the casualties they suffered in WW2 (and they won that war). 

 - Likewise the economies of both countries are shaky, and the ability to continue to pay the ever increasing war bills is a challenge.  But by mortgaging the future (and in the case of Ukraine, accepting a ton of aid/loans) neither is anywhere near collapse.  Likewise talk about "running out of shells" misses the point.  Nations run into ammunition shortages, but they basically never stop producing them altogether.  There are some indications that Russia is cutting back on shell consumption, but not to the extent that they cannot continue fighting.  Russia/Ukraine will never "run out" of shells. 

 - The limiting factor in the war is materiel and training capacity.  Turning a group of civilians into an effective military unit that is trained and equipped with modern (or at least workable) gear is hard.  And in modern war you have to do that A LOT to replace casualties.  Even a year into the war, Ukraine still has plenty of military age men that are not in the military because they don't have the capacity to train them or the war machines for them to operate.   

 - The T-55 showing up indicates that Russia has run out of operable T-62s and T-72s in storage, but it doesn't mean that Russia doesn't have plenty of T-72s in storage that could become operational with an overhaul.  There's just limited capacity to do those overhauls while also repairing existing tanks that are damaged, making additional spare parts, and increased orders for new T-90s (all of which is done at the same facilities). 

[Wilbur]

1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

The new Perun video talks about casualties and how difficult it is to estimate them for the war in Ukraine...

...There's just limited capacity to do those overhauls while also repairing existing tanks that are damaged, making additional spare parts, and increased orders for new T-90s (all of which is done at the same facilities). 

The other constraint that struck a chord for me was the idea that Russia may not have sufficient numbers of trained or skilled repair technicians to service broken equipment.  So as military stuff breaks, the backlog of "tanks and guns and stuff that needs to be rebuilt" begins to grow, while the output of repaired equipment continues to shrink.

Short of putting more women into the technical repair force, or connecting to an outside repair chain in NK or China, this seems like a medium-term (two to five years) issue that Russia won't be able to overcome.  Making the central Asian republics angry, such as by stealing stuff from the cosmodrome in Kazakhstan or failing to enforce CIS agreements in Armenia, has cut Russia off from a certain amount of more likely outside maintenance and rebuild services.

[Maithanet]

18 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

The other constraint that struck a chord for me was the idea that Russia may not have sufficient numbers of trained or skilled repair technicians to service broken equipment.  So as military stuff breaks, the backlog of "tanks and guns and stuff that needs to be rebuilt" begins to grow, while the output of repaired equipment continues to shrink.

Short of putting more women into the technical repair force, or connecting to an outside repair chain in NK or China, this seems like a medium-term (two to five years) issue that Russia won't be able to overcome.  Making the central Asian republics angry, such as by stealing stuff from the cosmodrome in Kazakhstan or failing to enforce CIS agreements in Armenia, has cut Russia off from a certain amount of more likely outside maintenance and rebuild services.

Yes, this is one of the big advantages that Ukraine has over Russia.  Ukraine can ship damaged equipment to allies for repair and refit.  There is a fair bit of that capacity in Europe.  In contrast, Russia has to rely on the same people/factories that are churning out more tanks, overhauling 40 year old T-72s, and increasing production of spare parts so frontline machines can be maintained without requiring overhaul. 

He also made the good point that the losses we don't see from just wear and tear of military equipment are very significant in this war.  No military equipment lasts forever, and if you're talking about Soviet era stuff, even if it were well maintained in storage (not guaranteed), it is going to break down pretty quickly under hard use.  If Ukraine is replacing its 2022 stuff with newer (~2000s era) NATO equipment, whereas Russia is bringing back equipment from the 70s and earlier, then Ukraine should have a meaningful advantage in how long its equipment will survive frontline duty. 

[Padraig]

16 hours ago, Clueless Northman said:

You're aware that it's not Putin's agents who decided to screw the French people with pension reforms and pushed them on the streets? Unless you believe Macron is actually Putin's stooge. Same with strikes in Germany and UK. Do you think it's Russian money who crashed SVB and Credit Suisse? Putin didn't need to move a finger for our own governments and economic elites to fuck us over and over. They're that bad and that crooked that they couldn't even stop being greedy incompetent assholes for a year to ensure Western people could fully stay onboard with the "war effort".

You unfortunately misunderstood what Gorn was saying.  He was talking about the post-2014 invasion period.  Not the post-2022 invasion period.

16 hours ago, Clueless Northman said:

I'm quite gloomy because I see some on both sides picking and escalatory rhetoric (though what amazes and surprises me the most is that some of the biggest Western hardliners are in Baltic States, which clearly will lose the most if the war escalates to full-blown NATO-Russia total war, when it's warmongers in America and Siberia who most probably would suffer the less).

It shouldn't really surprise.  People are very likely correct that Russia isn't going to invade the Baltic states in the near term, as it has used up its military resources.  They don't have to fear revenge in that way.

What the Baltics are rightfully worried about is that in the medium term, if Russia does succeed in Ukraine, then it will inevitably look at taking the Baltic states too.  (This is the lesson from the 1930s).  Now people dismiss this as unlikely but that's a privileged position to be in.  Your country isn't at risk of invasion and even a small risk of invasion is very disturbing.  (It is the same reason people focus a lot at nuclear risk.  A 1% risk of nuclear war is 1% too high).  And the Baltics are much harder to defend than Ukraine. 

Thus, the Baltics believe that the only solution is that Russia loses this war.  That they are put off invading countries for the long term.  That can only occur if the West gives Ukraine a lot of help.

Also, I don't think the rhetoric from the West has been that hardline actually.  Ignoring Poland and the Baltic states.  Most countries understand that negotiation must happen eventually but Russia is not leaving that door open.

[Kalbear]

Also, I think the Baltics from a strategic perspective are significantly more at risk. They're smaller, with much less overall population and military resources, have much less tactical leeway for resistance and have almost their whole countries in first strike capacity from Russian soil. 

The Baltics are also very aware of how NATO allies - particularly the US - are more than happy to sell them out depending on what fucking cowards are in office at the time. They're seeing what DeSantis is saying and what Trump has said, and rightfully recognize the support when it is convenient. They know that all Russia has to do is plan on invading when the US is a spineless appeaser and Russia will bulldoze them while Article 5 is ignored. The 'good' news is that Poland, Czechia and a few others are certain to mobilize, but they're still not enough. 

[Maithanet]

33 minutes ago, Kalnestk Oblast said:

The Baltics are also very aware of how NATO allies - particularly the US - are more than happy to sell them out depending on what fucking cowards are in office at the time. They're seeing what DeSantis is saying and what Trump has said, and rightfully recognize the support when it is convenient. They know that all Russia has to do is plan on invading when the US is a spineless appeaser and Russia will bulldoze them while Article 5 is ignored. The 'good' news is that Poland, Czechia and a few others are certain to mobilize, but they're still not enough. 

However, even if we imagine a scenario where Ukraine is forced to give away part of their territory (say Crimea and the Donbas), then Russia will need a long time to rearm.  A Ukraine/Poland/Czech/Slovak/Baltic/Finland/Sweden grouping already has a significantly larger economy and a comparable military industrial base as Russia.  By 2035 or later, there's a real chance it will be much further ahead (those countries are not under sanctions). 

In addition, the Soviet stockpiles Russia has needed to have any staying power at all in this war will be used up and a relative nonfactor in a future conflict. 

I'm not saying there isn't reason for concern in the Baltics, there certainly is.  But if the US and Western Europe cannot be relied upon for robust military support, then I think we'll see an anti-Russia block exclusively of the eastern and northern european countries that take Russia seriously.  They would probably need a catchy for their group, like the Warsaw Pact or something. 

[Kalbear]

I disagree; while Russia's stockpiles are definitely depleted that is due to a lot of them being actually deployed in theater. Take those out of Ukraine and reorganize and I think you'd find Russia has a LOT of strength. I don't see Russia waiting until 2035 either; I think if they attack it would be after Ukraine is done in some way + a US/UK far right resurgence and likely some other distraction, such as a Taiwan invasion. 

And as we've seen the Western economy and political structure is under heavy duress. Having more disruptive activities - major environmental collapse, another set of war, another major refugee crisis, another pandemic - will make a lot of these peacetime deals significantly less likely to be kept. 

[Maithanet]

OK, I don't see how any of that contradicts what I said.  This war has clearly demonstrated that there is a block of countries that are very firm in their anti-Russia stance and the sacrifices they are willing to make.  Those countries actually represent a pretty strong bloc (larger than Russia economically, and comparable militarily). 

As for how quickly Russia can launch another war such as this, there are a lot of question marks about such a future scenario, but I think it's pretty clear that the Russian military is getting weaker each month this war goes on.  Older equipment, crappier gear, more worn out barrels, less ammunition stockpiled.  That doesn't mean they aren't still dangerous - Russia is still a large country with a large military industrial base, but even if the war ended today, it would take a while before Russia was as strong as it was in Feb 2022.  And unfortunately, this war probably has a long way to go. 

[Kalbear]

1 minute ago, Maithanet said:

OK, I don't see how any of that contradicts what I said.  This war has clearly demonstrated that there is a block of countries that are very firm in their anti-Russia stance and the sacrifices they are willing to make.  Those countries actually represent a pretty strong bloc (larger than Russia economically, and comparable militarily). 

As for how quickly Russia can launch another war such as this, there are a lot of question marks about such a future scenario, but I think it's pretty clear that the Russian military is getting weaker each month this war goes on.  Older equipment, crappier gear, more worn out barrels, less ammunition stockpiled.  That doesn't mean they aren't still dangerous - Russia is still a large country with a large military industrial base, but even if the war ended today, it would take a while before Russia was as strong as it was in Feb 2022.  And unfortunately, this war probably has a long way to go. 

It contradicts what you said because I don't think that bloc of countries is ready right now, nor is it as pervasive. Sweden and Finland aren't likely even capable of joining the Baltics in mutual defense right now. Poland may or may not depending on their politics du jour. Hungary certainly isn't going to. 

As to how fast Russia can attack again my point is that they don't need to be as strong as they were in Feb 22 in order to crush the Baltics, especially if their goal is not the decapitation strike that they had with Ukraine. If they're simply wanting to pave Estonia, well, they are more than capable of doing that even with the limited amount of arms they have now. They currently have what, over 300k people mobilized and armed and actually war-capable? That's a massive army, and far more than what the Baltics have or even what Poland/Czech/Baltics have. 

All of this is to say that the Baltics and Poland and others wanting to end Russia's capabilities for the next 10 years makes a lot of sense, and they should rightly be opposed to any capitulation from Ukraine that gives Russia anything - especially giving Russia anything like the weaponry they currently have. 

[Maithanet]

IMO there is no realistic scenario where Ukraine is militarily defeated and agrees to give away a bunch of territory in 2023.  If we go on a hypothetical that Russia commits to another, larger mobilization and wins decisively in summer/autumn of 2024¹, followed by a Trump victory², then it is possible that Putin could seek additional victories, but I personally think he would be much more likely to wait a while to rebuild his military and economy.  Not to mention the continuing occupation of Ukrainian territory which will be a low/mid intensity guerrilla war for decades. 

Even with that string of very good luck for Putin, I'm personally doubtful that Russia could win a war with the Baltics and Poland in 2026.  This war has demonstrated that Russia's conventional military power was greatly overestimated.  While it is fair to call into question NATO's political will, particularly going forward with other threats like climate change, that doesn't change the fact that Russia's military power is fading.  

 

¹ I think this is extremely optimistic for Russia and quite unlikely.

² Possible, but by no means certain.  50/50 or so.

[Clueless Northman]

1 hour ago, Padraig said:

Thus, the Baltics believe that the only solution is that Russia loses this war.  That they are put off invading countries for the long term.  That can only occur if the West gives Ukraine a lot of help.

As Kal said, the Baltic will be wiped out and pretty much annihilated in case of a future war, and I fear that even if Russia attacked them right now they wouldn't be able to fully repel the assault, even if a Western/NATO/Polish counterattack could eventually liberate the area. On the other hand, I also agree with Maithanet that Russia attacking Poland, or Ukraine if it survives the war without much territorial losses, isn't very probable in the next years, they'll have to sort out their military and production mess.

Still, Russia won't disappear, Poland won't disappear, Ukraine won't disappear, they're too big and populous as countries; the Baltics are small and cannot be realistically defended like Ukraine is, they have no strategic depth. At the end of the day, they have to find some way of co-existing with the big bad bear next door, while ignoring each other as much as possible - well, I'd say all the countries in that area will have to go this way eventually, when the dust settles and hundreds of thousands more are dead, but it's even more important for Baltic States because war devastation would be out of proportion for them, and actually a genuine existential risk.

At some point, geography is a bitch, we're not in a world in which every country has a similar military and economic power, and you have to deal with the neighbours you get, you can't just fully ignore them. Canada can pretend to be independent, it would never survive joining a Moscow-Beijing genuine alliance, there would be a coup or an invasion before it would happen. And if the world were a military free for all, like it was a few times in the past, a country the size of France could hope to deter German aggression, but Luxembourg or even Denmark couldn't.

Life sucks, but until every country has hundreds of nukes, there's a genuine World Police (not a US-based one), or all countries, peoples and governments learn the lesson and get disgusted by war, major powers will try to exert spheres of influence here and there, causing pushback and local alliances, or some neighbours trying to find support farther away.

 

53 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

But if the US and Western Europe cannot be relied upon for robust military support, then I think we'll see an anti-Russia block exclusively of the eastern and northern european countries that take Russia seriously.  They would probably need a catchy for their group, like the Warsaw Pact or something. 

I wonder how things would've turned out if all former Warsaw Pact vassals (and some of the former Soviet Republics) had actually banded together and created their own military and economic bloc, separate from EU and specially NATO - but with the faint hope of NATO backing in case of open war with Russia; a bit like the old Polish Intermarium dream, but without a Polish hegemon. Russia might have become a bit less paranoid, less aggressive, and focused less on trying to rebuild a monstrous military. Though of course this option would look riskier than having actual NATO support, so it's no wonder they picked the more cautious option.