Ukraine: Slava Ukraini!!!

[Maithanet]

Scot,

By several accounts I've read, General Surovikin was at the very least a good, possibly very good, commander.  His work in the first few months of the war stand out compared to other theater commanders.  While he was in command the Russian army didn't do anything particularly stupid, and executed a successful retreat under fire over a river at Kherson (an extremely challenging feat).  He was doing all he could to retain and rebuild the strength of the Russian military, while gradually incorporating the newly mobilized troops.  Then what happened?

He was sacked for insufficient loyalty* to Shoigu and replaced with Gerasimov.  His successes meant nothing, and in many cases weren't even recognized as successes.

* According to some, he was actively plotting to oust Shoigu, although it is pretty obvious that Shoigu is standing in the way of any real improvements in the Russian military, and thus it's not surprising someone like Surovikin would want him gone. 

 

[Maithanet]

14 minutes ago, Werthead said:

The British defence secretary suggested today that 97% of the entire current Russian military is currently committed to the Ukrainian theatre, leaving only a mind-boggling 3% in Syria and defending the borders with other countries. Over 50% of all Russian tanks in existence have been destroyed or crippled in the conflict to date.

That 97% figure really doesn't seem possible.  Several people have assumed that he means 97% of potentially deployable military, thus excepting troops doing things like guarding Vladivostok, manning the airbase in Kaliningrad, etc.  If you assume that there's something like 300k troops deployed in and around Ukraine, 3% of that is less than 10k troops.  There's simply no way that could be right. 

[Werthead]

40 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

That 97% figure really doesn't seem possible.  Several people have assumed that he means 97% of potentially deployable military, thus excepting troops doing things like guarding Vladivostok, manning the airbase in Kaliningrad, etc.  If you assume that there's something like 300k troops deployed in and around Ukraine, 3% of that is less than 10k troops.  There's simply no way that could be right. 

It'd be interesting to see a clarification on that. Is Russia really dumb enough to leave less than 10K troops on its (not inconsiderable!) borders whilst focusing on Ukraine? Yes. Has it done that? Unclear.

I have seen the assumption that he is including Wagner and the new recruits, which push the total number of the Russian army and the total number deployed to Ukraine much higher, but it'd be a stretch to see that get to 97%.

For the power grab, Shoigu is personally loyal to Putin over a very long period of time (they go on holidays together) and Putin does not regard him as a political threat, since Shoigu does not have much of a powerbase of his own, and his ethnic origin precludes him from being a likely candidate to succeed Putin in fairly-racist Moscow (although Shoigu also seems to have fancied himself as an Admiral Doenitz-style compromise candidate between other, more extreme candidates who'd probably trigger a civil war and collapse of the Russian state). I suspect Putin personally trusts Shoigu (at least as far as he trusts anyone) more than anyone else in the Kremlin, maybe more than anyone else full stop.

If Shoigu - who has no military background himself - keeps fucking up, that might lead to a sideways promotion into another area, or even a minor demotion, but I don't see Putin kicking him to the curb. The problem is who'd replace him: Gerasimov is more competent and has more military experience, but he's cut from the same kind of cloth and they are allies together.

It does look like Putin is now favouring the less-radical, more conservative military wing having given the "hawks" things their way for the last few months, to limited apparent success (although, as said, Surovikin's tactics were at least somewhat productive, if highly manpower-wasteful).

[mcbigski]

It annoys me somewhat when people refer to me as "McBigski".  That handle is all lowercase.

It doesn't annoy me as much as when I get accused for rooting for child rape because I point out that war is far better for industrial interests than for soldiers, but that's part of the burden of being correct instead of being compliant. 

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

12 minutes ago, mcbigski said:

It annoys me somewhat when people refer to me as "McBigski".  That handle is all lowercase.

It doesn't annoy me as much as when I get accused for rooting for child rape because I point out that war is far better for industrial interests than for soldiers, but that's part of the burden of being correct instead of being compliant. 

My apologies.  I have corrected your handle.

[mcbigski]

It's a tiny thing Ser Scot.  But a little grace can go far.

[Kalnak the Magnificent]

My favorite part of this is that it is apparently all about the good of the Ukrainian soldiers, who would certainly be doing super great if Ukraine didn't fight back very well and have no interest in defending their homes.

I guess it would be nicer to the Russian soldiers?

[Gorn]

I feel this is a good time to remind people of Russia's purge lists for the occupation, which included everyone who served in Ukraine's military from 2014.

Edited February 16 by Gorn

[Derfel Cadarn]

3 hours ago, mcbigski said:

It's a tiny thing Ser Scot.  But a little grace can go far.

Ser Scot A Ellison

[Varysblackfyre321]

5 hours ago, mcbigski said:

It annoys me somewhat when people refer to me as "McBigski

You shouldn’t have said that as now people will do it deliberately.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

5 hours ago, Derfel Cadarn said:

Ser Scot A Ellison

Ser Scot or Scot or Scott are all fine, thank you.

(“Hey you” also works provided I can tell it is referring to me… )

Edited February 16 by Ser Scot A Ellison

[Alarich II]

Link to an excellent paper on lessons learned how to beat Russia.

It is very long but the two page summary at the beginning gives a very good overview.

[Werthead]

Multiple "Marine Infantry" troops of the 155th Brigade were taken prisoner after the almighty fuck-up at Vuhledar. Many of these "marines" turned out to be crewmembers of the Russian Pacific Fleet. They'd been yanked off their ships, freighted to Ukraine and told to go fight on the front line. They seemed pretty pissed off about it.

Norway and Finland are reporting that around 80% of the Russian troops normally based on the Kola Peninsula have been shipped off to the frontlines. The border and main facilities are manned by negligible forces.

So maybe that 97% figure really is accurate.

[ThinkerX]

15 minutes ago, Werthead said:

Multiple "Marine Infantry" troops of the 155th Brigade were taken prisoner after the almighty fuck-up at Vuhledar. Many of these "marines" turned out to be crewmembers of the Russian Pacific Fleet. They'd been yanked off their ships, freighted to Ukraine and told to go fight on the front line. They seemed pretty pissed off about it.

Norway and Finland are reporting that around 80% of the Russian troops normally based on the Kola Peninsula have been shipped off to the frontlines. The border and main facilities are manned by negligible forces.

So maybe that 97% figure really is accurate.

Maybe the Russian high command really was stupid enough to send 90%+ of their military to Ukraine? 

[karaddin]

Well one doctrine that is holding so far is that nukes are the ultimate guarantee of their homeland. The previously remaining regular border garrison in Siberia isn't stopping an invasion from China or the US when there's no reinforcements or resupply coming, the real deterrent is the surety of nuclear weapons being used in response.

The troops would certainly play a part in preventing special forces operations, or theft or anything of that nature but doesn't actually do much in stopping someone taking bites out of Siberia. So if that's their primary concern at the moment and they think those troops will make a deciding difference in achieving objectives in Ukraine then... They're probably wrong on that last part, but it's not really any worse a decision then the average choice during this war has been.

[Tywin et al.]

 

[Kalnak the Magnificent]

7 hours ago, Alarich II said:

Link to an excellent paper on lessons learned how to beat Russia.

It is very long but the two page summary at the beginning gives a very good overview.

That was great! There is definitely a feel of this fighting the last war, and how applicable it is to other wars is debatable, but it was a great breakdown. 

[Alarich II]

6 hours ago, Kalnestk Oblast said:

That was great! There is definitely a feel of this fighting the last war, and how applicable it is to other wars is debatable, but it was a great breakdown. 

I agree; we mustn't forget that this is a NATO specific paper, so there is a clear focus on defending NATO territory - especially in Europe, so there are some general points wrt to drone use, strategic communication, data-based combat, artillery etc. but also very defense-specific, eurocentric points like the decentralized defense and jagdkampf-strategies, robust rail logistics etc. and a notable absence of any points about air combat, probably because this is one area, where NATO is far ahead of Russia or Ukraine.

But I hope that the points mentioned in this paper will enter the broader political discussion here in Germany.

[Maithanet]

So it is becoming more and more obvious that for all the breathless talk about the huge Russian counteroffensive that...this is it.  We are seeing it.  The only advances we're seeing are around Bakhmut, and even there Russian sources admitted that the city will not fall by the desired Feb 23 deadline, and instead will hold until March or April.  Across the rest of the front line, we are seeing wasteful attacks for no results at all.  We'll see if they start being more aggressive with their air forces.  We'll know if that is happening because we'll see a spike in aircraft and helicopter losses.  That might make some difference, but it is unlikely to be decisive unless the Ukrainians run out of anti-air ammunition (their reserves are a closely guarded secret).

There are increasing signs that the Russian military machine is falling apart.  Putin's "I don't care about the costs" strategy cannot hide the losses in men, machines and economic might.   I hope that the upcoming Ukrainian offensive (whenever they feel ready to launch it) is sufficiently powerful that the Russian forces collapse.  If they do, the war could be over this year.  If not, the suffering on both sides will only drag on. 

[Derfel Cadarn]

Another fall from a window