China and the West…

[Zorral]

I suppose you all heard that China has been running a secret Chinese police station in NYC, for quite some years?  How whacky can things get?  Every time one thinks we've hit peak whackadoodle, here comes one even more cray-cray.

Quote

China ran a secret NYC police station to harass dissidents, prosecutors say

https://gothamist.com/news/two-new-yorkers-charged-with-running-secret-police-station-for-chinese-government-in-manhattans-chinatown

 

[Wilbur]

On 4/17/2023 at 2:01 PM, Zorral said:

I suppose you all heard that China has been running a secret Chinese police station in NYC, for quite some years?  How whacky can things get?  Every time one thinks we've hit peak whackadoodle, here comes one even more cray-cray.

https://gothamist.com/news/two-new-yorkers-charged-with-running-secret-police-station-for-chinese-government-in-manhattans-chinatown

 

They were caught doing the same thing down and LA and up in The City four or five years ago.  The San Francisco Chronicle had a good series on it at the time, but I can't find it now.  And of course, they were also doing it in Canada, in Toronto and Vancouver, according to the Grauniad.

Police investigate claim of secret Chinese police stations in Canada | China | The Guardian

[Zorral]

More on the China-based operations.

Chinese police stations in NYC are part of a vast influence operation

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/19/chinese-police-new-york-city-foreign-influence/

Quote

 

.... Local associations such as Changle routinely work with Chinese authorities to establish police outposts, suppress criticism of the CCP and repress critics abroad, according to a report by Safeguard Defenders, an investigative group that tracks China’s transnational repression. This is part of the larger CCP influence network known as the “United Front.”

“The United Front system (United Front Work) is the work of Chinese Communist Party agencies seeking to co-opt and influence ‘representative figures’ and groups inside and outside China, with a particular focus on religious, ethnic minority and diaspora communities,” Australian researcher Alex Joske said in the report.

The United Front dates back to the era of Mao Zedong. Xi Jinping called its influence operations one of the party’s “magic weapons.” The operations often run through local proxy organizations that offer services to overseas Chinese (as in this case) or support Beijing’s preferred policies, such as reunification with Taiwan.

For example, last month, when the “China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification” staged a protest in front of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s New York City hotel, the United Front was behind the operation. Leaders of groups like the China Council give lavishly to U.S. politicians in both parties. The Florida branch of this particular group was once headed by Cindy Yang, a former spa mogul who peddled access to Mar-a-Lago during Donald Trump’s presidency.

Tracking foreign-influence operations — especially those working within ethnic communities that experience discrimination — requires sensitivity. Rep. Lance Gooden (R-Tex.) failed to demonstrate this when he questioned the loyalty of his Democratic colleague Judy Chu (N.Y.) in February, after one Chinese influence organization claimed her as its “honorary chairwoman.” (Chu denied the affiliation.) ....

 

And of course there is all the Russian funded and backed messing with US elections and other matters too.

[Wilbur]

Jon has a good video out this weekend on the EV market in China and their position as an exporter.

It will be interesting to see Western governments assume various postures in response to the Chinese EV market.

[ants]

On 4/14/2023 at 5:37 AM, Werthead said:

it's interesting that he held long talks with Macron over the issue and invited a previous, more pro-China Taiwanese leader to tour the country, perhaps with a view to the 2024 election in Taiwan and the possibility that Taiwan might simply decide that the cost of resisting the invasion would not be worth it.

It would be interesting to see what would happen if Taiwan did choose to begin joining China. Would that completely nullify US/China military tensions? Would it actually impact world GDP one iota? Certainly from an Australian perspective it would actually be a fantastic outcome if it reduced tensions significantly. 

Which then raises the question, is there an incentive for the US to abandon Taiwan? 

[Kalbear]

Given how needy China is right now for semiconductors the most immediate effect would almost certainly be a massive loss in worldwide production of anything containing electronics with special focus on business and IT companies. It would have a pretty big effect on the gdp of Japan, Korea and the US right away.

[Werthead]

12 hours ago, ants said:

It would be interesting to see what would happen if Taiwan did choose to begin joining China. Would that completely nullify US/China military tensions? Would it actually impact world GDP one iota? Certainly from an Australian perspective it would actually be a fantastic outcome if it reduced tensions significantly. 

Which then raises the question, is there an incentive for the US to abandon Taiwan? 

It might remove Taiwan as a problematic flashpoint, but the underlying tensions over US influence in the Asia-Pacific region - American military bases too close to Chinese territory for their liking, plus control over the South China Sea (which control over Taiwan would amplify) - would remain. It would make any Chinese moves towards Japan, South Korea or the Philippines more difficult to justify, since the Chinese claim of not invading any outside power for generations (amidst various explanations over how Tibet and the brief Vietnam and Indian forays were legit territorial disputes) is something they repeat often, whereas such forays could cloaked under the broader umbrella of a US-China conflict sparked by Taiwan.

Ultimately it depends on what the Chinese believe the geopolitical ceiling on their ambitions is: securing the last unresolved major territorial issue from 1949 and then building up their economy whilst maintaining a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent (China has a goal of tripling its nuclear warheads over the next fifteen years or so), but beyond that business as usual (the perceived Chinese ambition fifteen years ago or so) or actually going much further than that, bringing all of Asia into China's sphere of influence (by fair means or force) and ejecting American influence from the region altogether. In the latter case, then China taking Taiwan peacefully might actually be a bad idea, as it puts off a conflict until a time when China is much stronger and the US possibly much weaker (and maybe dramatically increases the likelihood of a conflict turning nuclear).

Of course, the Chinese might simply not be able to square the circle of achieving geopolitical ambitions in the region without risking a nuclear war, but will walk right up to that line and prod the line a fair bit. There's some speculation that China regards a new Cold War against the US and its allies as perhaps inevitable, and will go that far but no further, and hope for no miscalculations along the way.

It's very hard to tell, though. China's economy is overwhelmingly dependent on trade with the EU, Japan, South Korea, the United States, Australia and other allies of the US, against which its trade with Russia is fairly small fry.  And there's probably too many wild cards (like the status of India, which is doing a Turkey-like great job of playing both ends whilst strengthening its own position) for China's liking as well.

A key and vital issue might be the attitudes of the next generation of Chinese leaders, many of whom have come up through the business and economic boom years, and whilst they may be ambitious and share the older generation's nationalistic outlook, they are also considerably better-travelled, more aware of the global situation and may be more reluctant to completely overthrow the applecart to uncertain outcomes (especially in light of Ukraine). It might be a question of when we start seeing those voices coming to prominence as the current generation ages out.

Edited May 2, 2023 by Werthead

[ants]

Is there really much evidence that China has territorial (versus influence) ambitions beyond Taiwan and its immediate borders? I would have thought the trade issues you raise would mean China's main goal after Taiwan would be to gain control via influence, not force. 

[Kalbear]

6 minutes ago, ants said:

Is there really much evidence that China has territorial (versus influence) ambitions beyond Taiwan and its immediate borders? I would have thought the trade issues you raise would mean China's main goal after Taiwan would be to gain control via influence, not force. 

Certainly not in rhetoric. They do want some of their weirder conflicted territories but there is very little sign that they want to expand control militaristically. It's not entirely clear they want that with Taiwan, but they'll do it if they have no other options.

I think it also changes if they see the US projecting more force in the China sea. If the US becomes a lot more influential with Phillipines I can see China pushing back.

[Werthead]

18 hours ago, Kalnestk Oblast said:

Certainly not in rhetoric. They do want some of their weirder conflicted territories but there is very little sign that they want to expand control militaristically. It's not entirely clear they want that with Taiwan, but they'll do it if they have no other options.

I think it also changes if they see the US projecting more force in the China sea. If the US becomes a lot more influential with Phillipines I can see China pushing back.

Taiwan I think is a very powerful point of pride with China because of the historical significance (it's unfinished business from the civil war that ended in 1949 and gave the Communist Party near-complete control of China). If Taiwan declares independence, or if the US did something to massively change the balance of power (putting large numbers of troops on Taiwan, or maybe delivering highly powerful weapons systems), then I have zero doubt that China would invade immediately.

China may still choose to invade anyway, on the basis that - if successful - it would be an immense demonstration of its power and confirmation that the American Century was finally over and China was now the dominant world power. OTOH, it would still be chancy and China could be defeated, which could have exactly the opposite impact, so I think their preference will be to avoid a military invasion unless they felt they had no other choice. Other, less chancy options are available (again, though, Xi "getting it done" on his watch for legacy purposes might be a factor here).

[Wilbur]

China begins to access Vladivostok:

Russia opening Vladivostok port to China after 163 years, Economy News - ThinkChina

[Werthead]

9 hours ago, Wilbur said:

China begins to access Vladivostok:

Russia opening Vladivostok port to China after 163 years, Economy News - ThinkChina

We should probably get used to calling it Haishenwai, as should the residents

[dog-days]

This article from Fortune.com about the huge loans China has issued to developing countries (Zambia and Sri Lanka among many others) on secretive terms sounds blood-curdling, and my grasp of economics/economic history isn't solid enough to do a dispassionate assessment. 

I assume that for the poor countries it's more or less business as usual. They're broke and in debt and corrupt politicians have spent the loans on white elephant projects. Hopefully at least some of the infrastructure created will be of us. But for them it probably doesn't matter that much if you owe a tranche of your GPD to China or the West; if China wants you to pay its engineers to build you a high-speed railway or if the USA wants you to accept huge imports of food aid from its own farmers.

For China, I guess it knows it can use the debt as leverage to acquire more power. If Chinese companies build a port with Chinese money in Sri Lanka, at that point de facto national sovereignty in the port must get rather fuzzy. 

[Darzin]

I'm actually not sure how much those loans were a nefarious scheme and how much they were miscalculations. For Sri Lanka my understanding is the Chinese may have been very content to get that port but for a lot of the others it seems more like overestimating the host countries ability to pay, and the host countries getting used to welching on debts and taking out unsustainable loans. 

I know in Central Asia China has been burned a few times on big belt and road initiatives by overestimating recipient countries competence and underestimating their corruption. A  lot of this debt was loaned for the purpose of keeping China's infrastructure sector from shrinking as there is less and less new need for such projects in China proper, but using these loans that way means they are expected to be repaid.  

Edited May 26, 2023 by Darzin

[The Anti-Targ]

Was on. Webinar with economics Prof. Jane Golley from Australia National University. The topic was China Fact, Fiction and Faith. Lots of interesting stuff, but 2 ammusing words she's coined on China are: sinophrenia - the belief that China is about to collapse at the same time as believing it's taking over the world; and sinophria - the belief that everything is absolutely fine with China and it's going to do good things for the world.

She dismisses both of those beliefs as ridiculous. The facts, she asserts, is that China is not collapsing any time soon, but there are clouds on the horizon that China can either address or fail to address vut there is time to sort things out economically. The great powers struggle between the US and China also has several rounds to go before it reaches a conclusion.

[Darzin]

So America and China are friends again or at least frenemies. Not really sure how steady these new improved relations will be but it seems an encouraging sign for the future, and makes my interactions with Taxi drivers much less annoying. Biden's dictator comment got essentially zero time on state media when last time there was a fit about it.

I do think calling Xi a dictator is somewhat misleading in an ”America is a Republic not a democracy“ sort of way, while it's technically true, I think it undersells the vast institutional power of the CCP and that however much power Xi has he's not the lynchpin holding the system together. 

Edited November 26, 2023 by Darzin

[Werthead]

7 hours ago, Darzin said:

So America and China are friends again or at least frenemies. Not really sure how steady these new improved relations will be but it seems an encouraging sign for the future, and makes my interactions with Taxi drivers much less annoying. Biden's dictator comment got essentially zero time on state media when last time there was a fit about it.

I do think calling Xi a dictator is somewhat misleading in an ”America is a Republic not a democracy“ sort of way it's technically true, I think it undersells the vast institutional power of the CCP and that however much power Xi has he's not the lynchpin holding the system together. 

My take on this is that China and the US saw the relationship unravelling and the rhetoric rising at a rate that was inimical to both nations' interests: China is not well-prepared for a conflict now but could be in 3-4 years time, so putting the brakes on the deterioration is a good move. It also restores (some) business confidence in China, the US and on the global stage at a moment when China's economy is the shakiest it has been in decades. China has also undertaken (modest) reproachment efforts with Australia to try to simmer things down on that front.

I strongly suspect that China has seen how badly Russia is doing in Ukraine and this has led to some reconsiderations of its next moves at a moment of uncertainty. Seeing how the Taiwan and US elections go in 2024 could also be a key consideration. 

How long-term these moves are remains to be seen. I think it's a pause and a brief reversal of the decline rather than a long-term improvement. It could perhaps morph into that if Xi has a major rethink on how to increase Chinese power without risking a major conflict.