Ukraine: Ongoing…

[Kalbear]

Update - looks like a suspect has been arrested.

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/04/report-discord-admin-who-leaked-military-docs-idd-as-national-guard-airman/

I'm still in shock that someone who is not even active duty - he's national guard! - has the kind of access and lack of operational oversight to get some of this info. 

[ThinkerX]

1 hour ago, Kalnestk Oblast said:

Update - looks like a suspect has been arrested.

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/04/report-discord-admin-who-leaked-military-docs-idd-as-national-guard-airman/

I'm still in shock that someone who is not even active duty - he's national guard! - has the kind of access and lack of operational oversight to get some of this info. 

'let the clerks deal with it'

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

So… is Lula openly backing Putin now?

 

[Winterfell is Burning]

2 hours ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

So… is Lula openly backing Putin now?

 

No, not now: he always has been. 

 

[Rippounet]

On 4/12/2023 at 3:36 PM, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Please present the signed ratified agreement between NATO and the Russian Federation (not the Soviet Union Gorbachev never held any position within the Russian Federation… did he) wherein NATO agreed it wouldn’t expand Eastward.  

We’ll wait.  

… or… 

Is it really your contention that a casual comment by James Baker really has the power to formally legally bind the NATO alliance as though a treaty existed between it and a Nation-State that no longer exists?

*sigh*

I was replying to Wert saying that the existence of "backroom promises" was heavily disputed. It is absolutely not, these "backroom promises" are a matter of historical record.
You and others have immediately shifted the goalposts and moved to "legally binding agreement."
Honestly, I genuinely wonder if you realize you do that (or strawman) almost every single time I post in this thread. Because this time it's really really obvious.

I will establish two things that can seem highly paradoxical.

First, this was certainly not a "casual" comment by Baker, but a genuine proposal that was part of an entire negotiating strategy between the US/the West and the Soviet Union. To deny that would be a form of historical revisionism. You can click on the link I provided for further info.
Second, and quite paradoxically, the content of these negotiations was indeed not binding. They reflected a situation at a given moment in time and all parties understood that things might quickly evolve to make them moot. In fact, many people already assumed the Soviet Union would collapse in the 1980s ; everyone wanted Gorbachev to succeed, but no one could be certain he would, not even Gorbachev himself. All parties involved knew they needed both to work for the best and prepare contingency plans.
And we know this not just thanks to the historical record, but also because the man pretty much stated this himself about a decade ago (IIRC, too lazy to check the actual date), seemingly rejecting the "myth" of the NATO promise and very clearly rebuking Putin's perspective (obviously, Gorbachev and Putin were never close).

This is the kind of subtlety I tend to deal with, professionally speaking. The point isn't that Putin is "right" (if I adopt a truly professional perspective, the very notion of "moral rightneousness" quickly becomes irrelevant), but that he is using a kernel of truth to build a false narrative. If one wants to have some sort of... operational perspective on events, you cannot deny the truth, but must try to see how it is being used to mislead. That way you can understand how both sides' propaganda works (because yes, there is always propaganda on "both sides," even on yours/ours, however uncomfortable it may be to acknowledge), by conceptualizing/modelizing the construction of perceptions, "images," representations, themes...

On 4/13/2023 at 2:07 PM, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

@Rippounet

obviously you are under no obligation to reply but I, for one, would be very interested in hearing your response to what seem, to me, to be entirely factual observations about existing Russian foreign policy.

Any "response" I would have would be purely academic, borderline philosophical even, and useless on almost every level (though not worthless, I would hope).

Russia became a thug of a nation. But my old school of thought (historical constructivism) was never overly concerned with moral judgments. It's more about understanding how such a thing could happen, the identification of historical turning points, the construction and use of perceptions (or in international relations, cultural representations... )... etc, that kind of thing. The main point is, all in all, to be closer to determinism than essentialism.
If anyone here's ever heard of Edward Said you should know what I'm about.
I believe essentialism (essentialising other peoples, that is) is one of the root causes of conflict, but there's no way I can properly explain why or convince anyone on an internet forum. It's one of those things that you need to understand for yourself. Also, historical constructivism is almost completely useless while a war is under way: it is best used to prevent or end conflicts by providing reports/briefings to decision-makers at key moments. But during a conflict, a constructivist should yield the floor to one of their colleagues of a another school.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

1 hour ago, Rippounet said:

*sigh*

I was replying to Wert saying that the existence of "backroom promises" was heavily disputed. It is absolutely not, these "backroom promises" are a matter of historical record.
You and others have immediately shifted the goalposts and moved to "legally binding agreement."
Honestly, I genuinely wonder if you realize you do that (or strawman) almost every single time I post in this thread. Because this time it's really really obvious.

I will establish two things that can seem highly paradoxical.

First, this was certainly not a "casual" comment by Baker, but a genuine proposal that was part of an entire negotiating strategy between the US/the West and the Soviet Union. To deny that would be a form of historical revisionism. You can click on the link I provided for further info.
Second, and quite paradoxically, the content of these negotiations was indeed not binding. They reflected a situation at a given moment in time and all parties understood that things might quickly evolve to make them moot. In fact, many people already assumed the Soviet Union would collapse in the 1980s ; everyone wanted Gorbachev to succeed, but no one could be certain he would, not even Gorbachev himself. All parties involved knew they needed both to work for the best and prepare contingency plans.
And we know this not just thanks to the historical record, but also because the man pretty much stated this himself about a decade ago (IIRC, too lazy to check the actual date), seemingly rejecting the "myth" of the NATO promise and very clearly rebuking Putin's perspective (obviously, Gorbachev and Putin were never close).

This is the kind of subtlety I tend to deal with, professionally speaking. The point isn't that Putin is "right" (if I adopt a truly professional perspective, the very notion of "moral rightneousness" quickly becomes irrelevant), but that he is using a kernel of truth to build a false narrative. If one wants to have some sort of... operational perspective on events, you cannot deny the truth, but must try to see how it is being used to mislead. That way you can understand how both sides' propaganda works (because yes, there is always propaganda on "both sides," even on yours/ours, however uncomfortable it may be to acknowledge), by conceptualizing/modelizing the construction of perceptions, "images," representations, themes...

Any "response" I would have would be purely academic, borderline philosophical even, and useless on almost every level (though not worthless, I would hope).

Russia became a thug of a nation. But my old school of thought (historical constructivism) was never overly concerned with moral judgments. It's more about understanding how such a thing could happen, the identification of historical turning points, the construction and use of perceptions (or in international relations, cultural representations... )... etc, that kind of thing. The main point is, all in all, to be closer to determinism than essentialism.
If anyone here's ever heard of Edward Said you should know what I'm about.
I believe essentialism (essentialising other peoples, that is) is one of the root causes of conflict, but there's no way I can properly explain why or convince anyone on an internet forum. It's one of those things that you need to understand for yourself. Also, historical constructivism is almost completely useless while a war is under way: it is best used to prevent or end conflicts by providing reports/briefings to decision-makers at key moments. But during a conflict, a constructivist should yield the floor to one of their colleagues of a another school.

So, if I understand correctly you are looking at international relations through a completely diffraction lens and framework than the rest of us are coming at it.  

Interesting, as broadly read as I am I haven’t heard of “historical constructivism” before now.  I’ll have to read up on it.  

It is still frustrating to see Baker’s comment trotted out as though it has any sort of power to bind NATO or any NATO member state.  And the Russians using that “non-binding statement” like it is a binding agreement is really incredibly frustrating.  

But… if you are talking about anticipating or predicting Russian actions based upon their use of that lie… that is also interesting.

[Toth]

1 hour ago, Rippounet said:

First, this was certainly not a "casual" comment by Baker, but a genuine proposal that was part of an entire negotiating strategy between the US/the West and the Soviet Union. To deny that would be a form of historical revisionism. You can click on the link I provided for further info.
Second, and quite paradoxically, the content of these negotiations was indeed not binding. They reflected a situation at a given moment in time and all parties understood that things might quickly evolve to make them moot. In fact, many people already assumed the Soviet Union would collapse in the 1980s ; everyone wanted Gorbachev to succeed, but no one could be certain he would, not even Gorbachev himself. All parties involved knew they needed both to work for the best and prepare contingency plans.
And we know this not just thanks to the historical record, but also because the man pretty much stated this himself about a decade ago (IIRC, too lazy to check the actual date), seemingly rejecting the "myth" of the NATO promise and very clearly rebuking Putin's perspective (obviously, Gorbachev and Putin were never close).

So what's the point?
Baker's "proposal" (reading the actual document here: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16116-document-05-memorandum-conversation-between ) reads like Baker on February 9th trying to gauge where Gorbachev stands... with the final agreement having been signed  in September 12th, seven months later, with none of that being a part of it (mostly because NATO as an organization was not a party to it): https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm

So yes, it was a proposal made by a single diplomat as part of an ongoing process that then... was not put in the actual agreement. Gorbachev himself stated that he wasn't expecting Warsaw Pact to dissolve at that point, so from my perspective it makes sense that he only demanded no nuclear weapons to be put into former GDR territory, which ultimately was what was decided upon. An ongoing process, as you say. May have also been somewhat influenced by Gorbachev having other things to worry about at that time, what with that whole attempt to overthrow him.

Meanwhile Yeltzin signed off on the first NATO expansion during a visit by the Polish president in 1994 who at the time was practically trying to blackmail Clinton to get allowed in: https://declassifieduk.org/revealed-boris-yeltsin-privately-supported-nato-expansion-in-1990s/

As you say, ongoing process. Clinton tried his best to keep the Visegrad states in the much looser PfP project to appease Russia, but faltered after 4 years of relentless pursuit of it by these states, only greenlighting it in 1996, with it happening in 1999. At that point Russia had a seat at every NATO table and later allowed Bush to wage his Afghanistan invasion from former USSR territory and putting ships under NATO anti-piracy command in 2004, so everything seemed peachy.

Was Bush then "humiliating" Putin by telling Ukraine and Georgia "Sure, why not?" when they asked for NATO membership in 2008? Maybe. But I personally don't find it very civilized to see that as a main reason to invade a neighbor a few months later for fear of not being able to bully them into compliance anymore. I know very well that these wars happened because Putin envisioned the countries within Russia's "sphere" to stay there forever and join his Eurasian Economic Union pet project as a counter alternative to EU... but... alright, maybe... he should... come up with offering a better deal? Military action to prevent someone slipping away is so 19th century after all... shall we not regard the sovereignty of states as... well... a universal good that needs to be respected in order to not fall back into imperialistic bickering? As the UK proved... we aren't stopping anyone from changing their mind later after all...

[Darzin]

2 hours ago, Rippounet said:

I believe essentialism (essentialising other peoples, that is) is one of the root causes of conflict, but there's no way I can properly explain why or convince anyone on an internet forum. It's one of those things that you need to understand for yourself. Also, historical constructivism is almost completely useless while a war is under way: it is best used to prevent or end conflicts by providing reports/briefings to decision-makers at key moments. But during a conflict, a constructivist should yield the floor to one of their colleagues of a another school.

I don't buy this at all. I agree that there is a lot of essentializing of Russia now. It's not hard to dig up posts on reddit or Twitter (and even more respectable outlets) posted by Good Liberals^tm talking about the essential despotic characteristics  of the Russian people and state even tracing it back to Muscovite Despotism. This kind of talk would never be allowed about Muslims or Africans and such people would never be caught dead posting that anyway but yeah there's a lot of essentially orientalist rhetoric about "the Russian people" not to mention the LGBT narrative that is a lot more complex then it first seems as Russia serves as something of a haven for LBGT individuals among the post-soviet states and also conveniently ignoring the US alliance with Saudi Arabia.

But but... all of that happened post 2014. Before that and before the Georgia war in the 90s and 00s Russia was regarded as on the path to the liberal order stumbling per haps but on it. Bush looked into Putin's eyes and said he had a good soul as late as 2012 Mitt Romney was laughed at for saying Russia was a threat and the Germans maintained their Ostpolitik until well after bombs had started falling on Ukraine. The idea that the west drove Russia to this through hostile action is simply false. The seizing of Crimea was shocking that  another country would unilaterally annex territory moved Russia into the real enemy camp but Russia largely got away with it. And then now started this war, if they couldn't see how both Crimea and the current war mirror the actions of a  mustachioed man and would through all Europe into a panic well they should have. 

On NATO expansion, first you should really consider that the narrative of NATO expansion is somewhat of a narrative for external consumption. The narrative inside Russia is far more about protecting native Russians from Nazis. That being said Russia got what they wanted in 2014, with the Crimea and Donbass conflicts Ukraine was not eligible to join NATO. As long as Russia held the Crimea Ukraine was never going to join NATO so it makes little sense to start a war to prevent something that was already prevented. Additionally the last time NATO expanded towards Russia's borders was in 2004 almost 20 years ago. The idea that Russia was under threat by a constantly expanding NATO is just false. No country on Russia's borders was going to conceivably join NATO when the war was started.

 

Edited April 16 by Darzin

[Padraig]

3 hours ago, Rippounet said:

The point isn't that Putin is "right" (if I adopt a truly professional perspective, the very notion of "moral rightneousness" quickly becomes irrelevant), but that he is using a kernel of truth to build a false narrative

Well sure.  Most politicians know to place a kerrnel of truth in their arguments.  So yes, there were discussions about NATO in the early 90s.  And sure, the Russian government argues that Ukrainians are essentially Russian, whether Ukrainians like it or not.

Its good to know these arguments but I believe most people in the West think they don't particularly matter.  And I can only agree.

[Rippounet]

1 hour ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

But… if you are talking about anticipating or predicting Russian actions based upon their use of that lie… that is also interesting.

Ideally, that's the point, yes.

1 hour ago, Toth said:

So yes, it was a proposal made by a single diplomat as part of an ongoing process

It was a bit more than that. The reunification of Germany was hotly debated at the time, and even European officials could have their doubts - for instance, it's well-known here that France wasn't too eager to revive a potential neighboring rival that might be fully aligned with the US - and not Europe. The US at the time wasn't just dealing with the Soviet Union, but also had to take into account the positions of its European allies. Therefore, Baker's conversation(s) with Gorbachev reflected the US looking for an "ideal" position that could suit all involved parties.

56 minutes ago, Darzin said:

But but... all of that happened post 2014. Before that and before the Georgia war in the 90s and 00s Russia was regarded as on the path to the liberal order stumbling per haps but on it. Bush looked into Putin's eyes and said he had a good soul as late as 2012 Mitt Romney was laughed at for saying Russia was a threat and the Germans maintained their Ostpolitik until well after bombs had started falling on Ukraine. The idea that the west drove Russia to this through hostile action is simply false.

Well yes, but... the idea is that i) actions can lead to errors of interpretation and ii) the other party may be genuinely paranoid (or be expecting too much). In other words, what one party views as a neutral or defensive action can be interpreted as unfriendly or hostile. To put it differently, the point is to try to identify when or if the other party is actually being honest. That might seem academic, but this type of analysis does have a lot of merit when you're dealing with nuclear powers.
Now all this being said, all this academic stuff is useless here and now . Putin and/or the Russian high command's actions have been so laughingly stupid that nothing can truly explain them. I mean, for real, even if I do try to base an analysis on what I used to call the "ultra-hard image" of Russia, it still doesn't account for the events of the past year. The old "initiatory vs responsive" debate has no meaning if most of the decisions taken are objectively stupid.
It kinda drives me crazy tbh .

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

@Rippounet,

Have you read Karl Popper’s criticisms of what he calls “Historicism”.  The attempts to use past actions to make predictions about future events?

[kiko]

17 minutes ago, Rippounet said:

The reunification of Germany was hotly debated at the time, and even European officials could have their doubts - for instance, it's well-known here that France wasn't too eager to revive a potential neighboring rival that might be fully aligned with the US - and not Europe.

Even though this is a tangent, all those wonderful promises and non binding stuff at that time were just words anyway. The German reunification would have happened in any case. Who could have stopped it? I'm not even sure Russia was the biggest opponent in those discussion. The others, especially the UK could just conveniently hide behind them. Btw, one of those promises was that Germany would have a very close economic and political relationships with Russia. That turned out great, didn't it?

 

 

 

[Toth]

19 hours ago, Rippounet said:

It was a bit more than that. The reunification of Germany was hotly debated at the time, and even European officials could have their doubts - for instance, it's well-known here that France wasn't too eager to revive a potential neighboring rival that might be fully aligned with the US - and not Europe. The US at the time wasn't just dealing with the Soviet Union, but also had to take into account the positions of its European allies. Therefore, Baker's conversation(s) with Gorbachev reflected the US looking for an "ideal" position that could suit all involved parties.

Yes. And? I'm a bit confused. All of what you are saying here is correct, but what does that have to do with your initial statement? Your statement that started this tangent was this one:

On 4/12/2023 at 2:52 PM, Rippounet said:

Cold War historians can tell you there are many documents that show that NATO not expanding eastward was a pretty explicit condition for the Soviet Union facilitating the reunification of Germany.

But all the sources say that western diplomats, especially from Germany and the US, were concerned about upsetting the Soviet Union through expansions and Gorbachev taking it for granted that the US wouldn't do so... but then not making it explicitly a condition on any paper anywhere. And what I was getting at with my writing out the events that followed is that Gorbachev's grumpiness about the "spirit of the document" having been overstepped didn't really matter because at point different actors were responsible for the events. Clinton did try to prevent eastwards expansion even at a time when Yeltzin said he wouldn't consider it a threat. It is Putin who then turned around and used it as justification for aggressive retaliation after he was already for years in office. Though even in his behavior I got the feeling he doesn't really care about the Visegrad states because they turned to the West the instant they had the option to and there was no going back, but is particularly sore about Ukraine and Georgia seeking NATO protection as he thinks all the countries who remained closely tied to Russia now owe it unconditional allegiance and can't be allowed to break away no matter the cost. An assumption that means to me (and I think also most people here on the board) that past NATO expansions or feelings of actual threat didn't truly factor into Putin's reasoning (except maybe some soreness seeing how much better they do in the EU and that with the exception of Hungary they have no desire for ties to Russia) and that any attempt to seek any kind of western alliance would have resulted in a response from the Brezhnev playbook either way.

[Rippounet]

On 4/17/2023 at 3:33 PM, Toth said:

It is Putin who then turned around and used it as justification for aggressive retaliation after he was already for years in office. Though even in his behavior I got the feeling he doesn't really care about the Visegrad states because they turned to the West the instant they had the option to and there was no going back, but is particularly sore about Ukraine and Georgia seeking NATO protection as he thinks all the countries who remained closely tied to Russia now owe it unconditional allegiance and can't be allowed to break away no matter the cost.

Yes, that was precisely the conclusion I reached last year. Emphasis on the bolded BTW.

On 4/17/2023 at 3:33 PM, Toth said:

An assumption that means to me (and I think also most people here on the board) that past NATO expansions or feelings of actual threat didn't truly factor into Putin's reasoning

Well yes, except, as you said, when it comes to Ukraine and Georgia. IIRC, Putin always presented himself as a realist (i.e. the old "spheres of influence" theory), which is pretty conventional for Russian autocrats.
Now I'm not a realist myself, and obviously realist theory has been pretty convenient for Russia, to the point where you can see it as a recurrent propaganda device. Still, one question that has haunted decision-makers for decades is whether the Russian leadership actually believes in realism, and if it does, how far will it go to defend its perceived sphere of influence.
If we're applying this to current events, the question becomes what the annexation of Eastern Ukraine actually means for Putin. Is it a bluff or not? Now, again, I don't adhere to realist thinking myself, and I don't think we should respect Putin's demands, but it would be irresponsible not to consider the possibility that Putin is actually honest (as in: buying his own cool-aid, if you want), with everything that entails.

Edited April 18 by Rippounet

[A Horse Named Stranger]

13 minutes ago, Rippounet said:

If we're applying this to current events, the question becomes what the annexation of Eastern Ukraine actually means for Putin. Is it a bluff or not? Now, again, I don't adhere to realist thinking myself, and I don't think we should respect Putin's demands, but it would be irresponsible not to consider the possibility that Putin is actually honest (as in: buying his own cool-aid, if you want), with everything that entails.

No. The question should always be what it means for Ukraine and the people living there. Not what it means for Putin.

This is again this very colonial mindset about Ukraine just being some sorta plaything/negotiating mass. 

Anyway, from a realpolitik perspective the only way to really end this war is by a Ukrainian victory. If Putin gets to redraw borders as sees fit with his military he will do it again. 

[James Arryn]

41 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

No. The question should always be what it means for Ukraine and the people living there. Not what it means for Putin.

This is again this very colonial mindset about Ukraine just being some sorta plaything/negotiating mass. 

Anyway, from a realpolitik perspective the only way to really end this war is by a Ukrainian victory. If Putin gets to redraw borders as sees fit with his military he will do it again. 

The last is not really accurate. Any realpolitik perspective depends on so many factors unknown or only partially understood. Whose perspective are you talking about, first? Either way, there aren’t many realpolitik perspectives that only accept absolute victory for one side in something this fluid. From a nationalist Ukrainian’s perspective it might mean that, but that’s not the same thing. It would be what much of the North Western world wants, myself included, but that’s just ideals. In that one side has nukes, a realpolitik global perspective might be happy with any end that keeps all nukes on the shelf, and at the same time serves to discourage future adventurism. In that we are ~ lucky in that the past 3 major foreign adventures of major powers vs. minor powers (Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine) the minor power has been able to use home field advantage to prevent their absorption. Russia’s success up until this invasion was setting the opposite example, so thankfully that’s been arrested.
 

That should give major powers pause, but tbh revanchists will be quick to do the whole ‘we cannot be beaten except from within’ crap in Russia as in every other aggressive nation, but that’s as inevitable as winter, so we’ll just hope they never gain serious momentum. That’s never good. That’s just one example of a foreseeable consequence of an absolute victory for Ukraine…but if that’s the only price I’d happily pay it. Unless the revanchists get control of nukes. 

Edited April 18 by James Arryn

[Kalbear]

50 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

No. The question should always be what it means for Ukraine and the people living there. Not what it means for Putin.

This is again this very colonial mindset about Ukraine just being some sorta plaything/negotiating mass. 

Anyway, from a realpolitik perspective the only way to really end this war is by a Ukrainian victory. If Putin gets to redraw borders as sees fit with his military he will do it again. 

I massively disagree. It is absolutely crucial to understand how people will act and what their theory of mind is. Again this does not mean you agree with it! It does mean, however, that if Ukraine goes against Russia and stops becoming a puppet state (like it did in 2014) that means Russia will react. 

And if you don't want Ukraine to lose, you need to be prepared to stop Russia. Putin won't be dissuaded or threatened to stop. He will only be stopped. And it is vital that this is understood, because it frames what comes next. There will not be negotiated settlements here that a free Ukraine can accept. Putins goal is not part of Ukraine, though he might accept that so he can try and retake things later. Putin views Ukraine as part of Russia, views NATO as an aggressor that is bent on containing and weakening Russia, and views this war as a war for the literal existence of Russia. That is fundamentally wrong and results in some very stupid decisions but it is a sincerely held belief. 

And if you don't understand that, you won't make the right choices to help Ukraine. 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

28 minutes ago, Kalnestk Oblast said:

And if you don't want Ukraine to lose, you need to be prepared to stop Russia. Putin won't be dissuaded or threatened to stop. He will only be stopped. And it is vital that this is understood, because it frames what comes next. There will not be negotiated settlements here that a free Ukraine can accept. Putins goal is not part of Ukraine, though he might accept that so he can try and retake things later. Putin views Ukraine as part of Russia, views NATO as an aggressor that is bent on containing and weakening Russia, and views this war as a war for the literal existence of Russia. That is fundamentally wrong and results in some very stupid decisions but it is a sincerely held belief. 

And if you don't understand that, you won't make the right choices to help Ukraine. 

Partially true. 

There are a few things here that needs addressing.

Putin won't be dissuaded or threatened to stop, is probably true. We don't know whether he will back down or double down if NATO actually threatened to really enter the conflict. Fortunately we will never find out, as that could easily spiral out of control.

Negotiated settlement that is acceptable for one side are achievable. And negotiated settlement acceptable to Ukraine complete withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory, acceptable settlement for Russia international recognition of the occupied territories as Russia. Ofc those are mutually exclusive. 

Putin viewing Ukraine as part of Russia... I would say he views it as a part of Russia's sphere of influence. So a puppet state status like Belarusk (basically a Russian colony) is a version of events he'd be fine with. Viewing NATO as aggressor, I don't think so. But here we can can actually talk about, whether that is a propaganda lie for the Russian public or whether he bought his own press. I take the position he knows it's bullshit. From that position your other assumptions don't hold up either. If he doesn't truely believe that NATO is the aggressor, then  it's not a war for Russia's existence. That's part of the domestic PR (or propaganda) campaign to get the Russian people in line. If he talks about Nazis every turn, then this is to invoke the image of the great Patriotic War. That's also Russia's best/most revered generation. Go fight in Ukraine, you can/will become the next Vasili Saitsev, Sergey Gritsevets. It's basically the Russian equivalent to the 72 virgins waiting for you. 

Question is whether he can climb down, and that looks unlikely. So whether he actually believes his own propaganda or not, might be a distinction with little meaning. The thing it might matter is the use nukes. If he truely believed those things, than he might resort to their use. If not, that scenario looks more unlikely. 

 

[Kalbear]

31 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Partially true. 

There are a few things here that needs addressing.

Putin won't be dissuaded or threatened to stop, is probably true. We don't know whether he will back down or double down if NATO actually threatened to really enter the conflict. Fortunately we will never find out, as that could easily spiral out of control.

That's a different concern; the point I was trying to make is that Putin will not take threats of sanctions or even potentially military losses as the reason to stop. 

31 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Negotiated settlement that is acceptable for one side are achievable. And negotiated settlement acceptable to Ukraine complete withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory, acceptable settlement for Russia international recognition of the occupied territories as Russia. Ofc those are mutually exclusive. 

Negotiated settlements that are acceptable to one side are not negotiated settlements; those are only negotiations in the most technical use of the term. 

31 minutes ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Putin viewing Ukraine as part of Russia... I would say he views it as a part of Russia's sphere of influence. So a puppet state status like Belarusk (basically a Russian colony) is a version of events he'd be fine with. Viewing NATO as aggressor, I don't think so. But here we can can actually talk about, whether that is a propaganda lie for the Russian public or whether he bought his own press. I take the position he knows it's bullshit. From that position your other assumptions don't hold up either. If he doesn't truely believe that NATO is the aggressor, then  it's not a war for Russia's existence. That's part of the domestic PR (or propaganda) campaign to get the Russian people in line. If he talks about Nazis every turn, then this is to invoke the image of the great Patriotic War. That's also Russia's best/most revered generation. Go fight in Ukraine, you can/will become the next Vasili Saitsev, Sergey Gritsevets. It's basically the Russian equivalent to the 72 virgins waiting for you. 

Question is whether he can climb down, and that looks unlikely. So whether he actually believes his own propaganda or not, might be a distinction with little meaning. The thing it might matter is the use nukes. If he truely believed those things, than he might resort to their use. If not, that scenario looks more unlikely. 

 

I should have been clearer; Putin views Ukraine as part of the Russian Empire - though even that is not clear given the rhetoric that Russia has used fairly recently. 

But yeah, I absolutely disagree. Putin clearly views NATO as an aggressive threat that is being used to stop the Russian Empire. He has thought this for a long time. He has thought that allowing the Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO was a massive mistake, especially the Baltics. And heck, even if you think that he's totally lying he cannot back down from this position. 

Furthermore, while Russia won't be wiped off the map the Russian identity that Putin wants - that of an autocratic empire that is a major power - is threatened by NATO expansion, EU expansion and those satellite states going their own way. And that's good for us! It's good for Ukraine! But it doesn't mean that they're going to take it, and you have to understand that to Putin it is absolutely real and a real threat. Possibly one of the only threats he truly cares about. Now you could argue that this isn't going to be case for all leadership at Russia in theory, but betting on a non-Putin leader coming to power is not a good call regardless.

[Werthead]

Thinking that Putin is obsessed with NATO is probably a mistake, but to be fair one he wants people to make. Putin's discussion and statements on NATO over the years from the 1990s onwards shows an evolving situation where he did not regard NATO as even vaguely problematic until some time after 9/11, likely after Poland and the Baltics joined, and he was not hugely concerned about them. The smart money is that Putin believed that Russia within its post-1990 borders already had the resources to become a massively powerful country that would, eventually, be able to reassert influence (if not direct control) over Eastern Europe, and it didn't really matter because Belarus was an effective vassal and so was Ukraine, at least prior to the 2004 and 2013 revolutions, and for part of the period between.

At some point he changed his thinking, from realising that in order for Russia to become that economic superpower it might have to make sweeping changes to a more democratic form of rule with more accountability and ending corruption, likely after seeing the same in the EU, where he probably assumed countries like Poland and Romania would remain poor and corruption-ridden forever. Seeing them actually make great strides forward likely took him by surprise. There was also China taking the same steps, but retaining its autocratic, centralised authority thanks to the monolithic power of the Party (before Xi stepped up and started redirecting that authority to himself personally). At that point he likely realised that he'd made a mistake in helping Russia move in a faux-democratic direction and demolish any strong ideological belief in a political system, because it was hard(ish) to go against that, at least not without either embracing democracy and effectively limiting his own period in power (ha) or trying to assert a new political ideology to fire people up, which could backfire on him massively (his own reputation as a massive cynic didn't really help there).

The only way out of that situation, to reverse Russia's demographic crisis and increase the country's economic power and size, is direct military conquest and colonisation, which is the direction he's chosen to go in. Badly, it would seem. He now seems to be pivoting, if with some reluctance, towards Option B, which is to turn Russia into a vassal of China and benefit from the latter's increase in power and influence.

The NATO thing does play well in Russia, though. I saw one guy arguing that France and Russia were very close allies in the 18th Century and at times during the Napoleonic Wars, to the point of French fashion being all the rage in Russian cities and Russian nobility speaking French over Russian, before Napoleon reversed that overnight. And Germany/Prussia and Russia were very close allies on and off through the Napoleonic Wars, most of the 19th Century and right up to the start of WWI, as well as during the interwar period and obviously with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. But Germany turned on Russia again, almost overnight. The argument in Russia plays that sure, modern-day France/Germany/NATO/the EU is somewhat reliable and friendly, but that could spin on a dime (and, ironically, things like Brexit and the rise of neo-fascism in the US and far right success in Europe - often funded by Russia! - is used to back that up), and that's why you can't have Ukraine, with its nearest border being just ~400 miles from Moscow, falling into that camp, and certainly not Belarus either. It might be bollocks (the EU/NATO turning into the Fourth Reich doesn't make Russia's 6,000 WMDs mysteriously vanish), but it plays well.