Jump to content

Does Consciousness Exist?


Ser Scot A Ellison

Recommended Posts

Consciousness and its Place in Nature by David J. Chalmers

Still reading it bit by bit but here's a nice, semi-long argument in which David Chalmers explains why he isn't a materialist regarding consciousness. I don't know if it would convince anyone, but I enjoy his writing style and think his arguments are, at minimum, interesting.

eta: Raidne, thanks for your response, it gave me something to mull over.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

IMO, the gap between physical and phenomenal truths, as described by Chalmers, is categorization. In the Mary example, Mary has full color vision but has always lived in a black and white world. One she sees something red. Red is a new physical truth. Whatever Mary experiences of it will be her phenomological truth. But she won't really have a normal human phenomological truth of "red" until she sees it often enough or has enough context to say what the hell red is - to form a category or abstract idea.

These categories are why my phenomological truth is that I'm sitting at a desk typing on a computer on a message board right now, and not making finger motions that create strange symbols on a rectangular shaped object pointed at my face god knows where (as a zombie would be doing, to use Chalmers' example). In other words, categories allow us to create the narrative that forms our phenomological reality.

Our ability to categorize arises from the "physical" properties of the brain, so, strictly speaking, I'm still a materialist.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yeah, I'm not 100% convinced by Chalmers but he presents the most coherent reasoning I've seen on why someone could rationally think of consciousness as being more [than physical].

The quantum consciousness stuff is fun in a comic book sense but I don't see it leading anywhere. [Well maybe David Bohm's whole implicate order thing may provide some kind of answer as part of Karl Pribram's Holonomic Brain idea.]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yeah, I'm not 100% convinced by Chalmers but he presents the most coherent reasoning I've seen on why someone could rationally think of consciousness as being more [than physical].

Only insofar as there is a gap that remains unexplained between physical truth and phenomenal truth, no?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

And I think the research on consciousness, discussed in the Atlantic article, combined with the research into the neural network and categorization into the brain, closes the gap. The brain creates categories (general nouns) of perceptions experienced (by statistical relatedness to other category members). Our brain integrates these categories with our other general ideas across the neural network. The integration of these categories creates our coherent narrative of our subjective experience. Scientific research has established that we are not conscious where that ability is not present.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Isn't that more about comprehension than consciousness? We could probably get a computer to categorize, but I don't think it would be conscious.

I know it seems crazy to deny materialism b/c if you're [not a] materialist you're either a dualist, idealist (formal term for mental monism apparently), or some kind of panpyschicist....

....but I can't help but think there's something to the anti-materialist argument.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Isn't that more about comprehension than consciousness? We could probably get a computer to categorize, but I don't think it would be conscious.

For a certainty, but that's only one of the three criteria listed.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Are you thinking of consciousness more like "reflexive consciousness," i.e. being conscious of the fact that you are conscious? That's a more specific thing, IMO, but just as explainable. After all, you have to be able to understand who "you" are in your narrative, and, in fact, many mental disorders show disturbance to the formation of the idea of the self (i.e. narcissism).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think some of the ideas of qualia have weight. [seems like where people fall on the materialist-dualist-idealist spectrum depends on how seriously they take the idea of qualia.]

I don't think the Color Room is convincing, but there does seem to be something to what Chalmers refers to as the phenomenal.

It's hard for me to see how a neural network, which are all "switches" in various states AFAIK, gives rise to subjective awareness. I do think the idea of consciousness being connected to narrative is correct though.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Aren't you talking more about free will than consciousness? i.e. determinism vs. non-determinism.

Consciousness can exist in both a deterministic and non-deterministic universe, but free will can only exist in a non-deterministic universe.

If consciousness is just the binary firing, or not firing, of neurons then it's deterministic and thus no free will. But if there are phenomena at play other than the firing of neurons then non-determinism becomes possible and therefore free will becomes possible.

The issue of investigating metaphysics in consciousness is problematic, because even assuming a metaphysical consciousness there must be some physical mechanism for such consciousness to become manifest in the phycisl realm, thus the physical mechanism would veil any alleged metaphysical foundation.

Also assuming a metaphysical reality exists, and assuming it is essential and physicality is contingent, it is conceivable that all life (even all existance) has a metaphysical aspect. Thus consciousness (however that may be defined) in things other than humans doesn't preclude the existence of a metaphysical reality.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 1 month later...

Given Christopher Hitchens very firm views on atheism, and that he sees humans as the latest itteration of Gene's efforts to create vessels that allow them to continue self replication, if he would have believed Concsiousness was simply a side effect of or those vessles deluding themselves into believeing they have some sort of ability to touch a higher plane of existence through self referential thought.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I don't think you need to go any further than Descartes to answer this question. "I think, therefore I am"

I'm aware of myself. I'm aware of the world around me. I'm able to react to events, to plan and to learn. I can communicate my thoughts with other entities. What is all this if not consciousness? What is consciousness if it's not this?

Yes, my concsiousness is made up of various chemical and neurological processes, but that doesn't change the nature of what it is. Likewise my hands are made up of cells, which are made up of molecules, atoms, quarks etc. but they're still hands. Everything you encounter in your daily life is made up of smaller parts, that doesn't prevent them from existing as seperate ontological objects distinct from the sum of their parts. I don't see why concsiousness should be perceived any differently.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Consciousness isn't an all or nothing proposition. There are different states of concsiousness. Most animals are concsious to some extent. They display vaying degrees of self awareness, awareness of their own surroundings, communication skils, tool use, planning and adaptability. These are all signs of concsious thought.

On the other hand, plants, fungi and unicellular lifeforms almost certainly aren't concsious in any way we can recognise. They lack any sort of nervous system, are incapable of self awareness, planning, innovation or really any kind of thought at all. They are aware of and react to their environment but only in the most automatic of ways. If a tree does have a concsiousness it must exist in a form currently unknown to science.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.

Guest
This topic is now closed to further replies.
×
×
  • Create New...