Ukraine 15 - Minsk II and other disappointing sequels

[The Fallen]

You don't think like the Ukrainian leadership. This conflict has been marked by several questionable strategic decisions on high command's part that have seen hundreds and thousands of Ukrainian soldiers lost to encircling manoeuvres. Poroshenko is full of it:

I'm afraid you have the right of it. Reading some of the updates it looks like the rebels have been able to keep reinforcements out of Debaltseve. What's crazy is that Poroshenko wasn't able to get these troops either safe passage out - not the total surrender the rebels are demanding - or the lines pushed back far enough so that the rebels wouldn't be able to pin these troops in; I'm not sure where exactly Debaltseve is located in relation to the front, so I'm not sure if that was a possibility.

Either way, it seems that the reports of Ukraine getting the short end of the stick with regards to the ceasefire negotiations are being proven right.

[Solmyr]

I'm not sure where exactly Debaltseve is located in relation to the front, so I'm not sure if that was a possibility.

A useful map of the conflict to aid for better visualisation.

[Horza]

Additionally, as well as being underequipped the Ukrainian army received a mauling in August and needs a sustained ceasefire to start rebuilding. If there really are 6-8 thousand troops in Debaltseve their loss would be an epic disaster for an already demoralised and overstretched force.

[snake]

Remind me when Ukraine joined NATO again?

They haven't. Keep up with the news man.

And then remind me why NATO expansion is the problem here?

Cause I can cite that girl at my work wearing a short skirt as an area of concern for me, but that in no way means she or anyone should think that puts any obligation on her.

Because it threatens Russia. Thus they lash out. That is what happened.

In an interview with Der Spiegel Leon Panetta addresses this. When asked:

"Part of the current conflict goes back to NATO's eastern expansion. Putin always made clear that he felt threatened by that. Do you understand his perspective?"

He replied:

"Yes I do. I understood their concerns, and we should have kind of leaned more towards bringing them into the family of nations as opposed to keeping them isolated and feeling like we were ganging up on them because that's the Russian mentality, that everybody is ganging up on them."

To be sure, he suggest the only way to handle this crisis now is to arm Ukraine and get tough with Russia. Still, he acknowledges that NATO expansion is a precursor to the events unfolding today.

[The Iceman of the North]

Yes, we get it Snake. Girls should not wear miniskirts and other provocative clothing when out on the town.

[snake]

Yes, we get it Snake. Girls should not wear miniskirts and other provocative clothing when out on the town.

Don't be an asshole.

It was stupid to ignore Russian concerns. Should countries be allowed to do what they want? Sure. Can they? No. That's the reality of it. If you want to ignore the larger, more powerful, paranoid state on your border go right ahead but don't be surprised if they react in a predictable and hostile way. Especially when they do what they have been saying they would do for the last decade.

[The Iceman of the North]

Don't be an asshole.

It was stupid to ignore Russian concerns. Should countries be allowed to do what they want? Sure. Can they? No. That's the reality of it. If you want to ignore the larger, more powerful, paranoid state on your border go right ahead but don't be surprised if they react in a predictable and hostile way. Especially when they do what they have been saying they would do for the last decade.

Don't be an asshole? This is exactly what your stance is.

[ElizabethB.]

Yes, we get it Snake. Girls should not wear miniskirts and other provocative clothing when out on the town.

Let me try.

All is well because the department of Russian Humanitarian Aid has plenty of clothing to give to any girl threatened by Western fascism and oppression.

[snake]

Don't be an asshole? This is exactly what your stance is.

That because I think NATO expansion has been part of the reason for this conflict you suggest that I think that women shouldn't wear short skirts because they'll get assaulted? What a fucking cunt you are.

[The Iceman of the North]

That because I think NATO expansion has been part of the reason for this conflict you suggest that I think that women shouldn't wear short skirts because they'll get assaulted? What a fucking cunt you are.

It's exactly the same reasoning.

[ElizabethB.]

Or is someone really claiming that Russia should get to decide about the defence of Baltic countries, the Nordics, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia and god knows how many more?

Hi Elizabeth

Well I think they should get to decide for themselves.

[NestorMakhnosLovechild]

Don't be an asshole? This is exactly what your stance is.

There's a pretty fundamental divide here between the theories of international relations that you and snake and others in the thread are using to view the ongoing situation with Russia and the Ukraine. It's massively unfair to suggest that someone believe in a certain moral outcome on an individual level because of their description of a particular State actor, because there's an ongoing, unresolved and massive disjunction between how State actors are viewed and judged vs. individual moral actors.

Snake's view of the Ukraine situation is fairly uncontroversial realpolitik, as recognized by Leon Panetta (former US Defense Secretary) and many others (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, who favors sending "lethal arms" to the Ukraine, also believes Washington should make clear that it would not accept Ukrainain membership in NATO because "it would be a dagger pointed at the heart" of Moscow.

It's one thing to take a prescriptive view of international relations and to make the argument that individual countries SHOULD be judged by the moral standards of individuals (although I shudder to think how those of us in the United States would react if the US were seriously and meaningfully judged on the moral standards of an individual person) but that doesn't necessarily resolve the descriptive problem of this not, in fact, being how countries act on the international stage.

[ElizabethB.]

Don't be an asshole.

It was stupid to ignore Russian concerns. Should countries be allowed to do what they want? Sure. Can they? No. That's the reality of it. If you want to ignore the larger, more powerful, paranoid state on your border go right ahead but don't be surprised if they react in a predictable and hostile way. Especially when they do what they have been saying they would do for the last decade.

Hi snake!

Just what exactly do you think Ukraine or Georgia did that can be described as "ignoring the larger, more powerful paranoid state on their border"?

Because in all fairness your post comes off as "they had it coming."

[Shryke]

There's a pretty fundamental divide here between the theories of international relations that you and snake and others in the thread are using to view the ongoing situation with Russia and the Ukraine. It's massively unfair to suggest that someone believe in a certain moral outcome on an individual level because of their description of a particular State actor, because there's an ongoing, unresolved and massive disjunction between how State actors are viewed and judged vs. individual moral actors.

Snake's view of the Ukraine situation is fairly uncontroversial realpolitik, as recognized by Leon Panetta (former US Defense Secretary) and many others (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, who favors sending "lethal arms" to the Ukraine, also believes Washington should make clear that it would not accept Ukrainain membership in NATO because "it would be a dagger pointed at the heart" of Moscow.

It's one thing to take a prescriptive view of international relations and to make the argument that individual countries SHOULD be judged by the moral standards of individuals (although I shudder to think how those of us in the United States would react if the US were seriously and meaningfully judged on the moral standards of an individual person) but that doesn't necessarily resolve the descriptive problem of this not, in fact, being how countries act on the international stage.

There is a fundamental divide here Nestor, but it's not the one you are showing here.

See, I don't think anyone in this thread does not agree with the idea that NATO expansion or, if we are talking about what's going on in Ukraine, the breaking away of states Russia sees as part of it's sphere of influence makes Russia angry and/or nervous. Everyone agrees that Ukraine's short skirt made Russia feel it's pride stir in it's loins.

The difference lies in whether or not one thinks this obligates us to view anyone else as bad in some sense for provoking them. What everyone else is arguing is yeah, NATO expansion makes Russia all nervous but that doesn't make NATO expansion bad because the problem is Russia's reaction, not NATO expansion. It's the moral judgement we disagree with. Because Snake is also making one here. Or if he's not, he always sounds like he is and that's what everyone is reacting to.

And beyond that of course there is the fact that Russia's reaction here is what justifies NATO expansion in the first place.

Like, fundamentally everyone here understands sphere of influence politics, it's just most of us don't much care about Russia being butthurt over this shit. Anymore then we would care about the US being cranky that one of it's client states got all uppity.

[Celestial]

There's a pretty fundamental divide here between the theories of international relations that you and snake and others in the thread are using to view the ongoing situation with Russia and the Ukraine. It's massively unfair to suggest that someone believe in a certain moral outcome on an individual level because of their description of a particular State actor, because there's an ongoing, unresolved and massive disjunction between how State actors are viewed and judged vs. individual moral actors.

Snake's view of the Ukraine situation is fairly uncontroversial realpolitik, as recognized by Leon Panetta (former US Defense Secretary) and many others (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, who favors sending "lethal arms" to the Ukraine, also believes Washington should make clear that it would not accept Ukrainain membership in NATO because "it would be a dagger pointed at the heart" of Moscow.

It's one thing to take a prescriptive view of international relations and to make the argument that individual countries SHOULD be judged by the moral standards of individuals (although I shudder to think how those of us in the United States would react if the US were seriously and meaningfully judged on the moral standards of an individual person) but that doesn't necessarily resolve the descriptive problem of this not, in fact, being how countries act on the international stage.

The fundamental problem here is that Snake and Arakan's arguments portray Russia as some kind of victim, when it is not.

Let's delve into this matter more deeply. It was reiterated by those two (and others) that Russia fears NATO expansion, that Ukraine in NATO is a dagger pointed at Russia, etc. Question: why? More specifically, what concrete actions could NATO take against Russia through Ukraine? Nobody who constantly repeated the argument that NATO expansion is a threat against Russia did provide an answer.

This would suggest their argument is disingenuous, because answering that question would show immediately the falsity of the Russian position.

Because, if NATO wants to fuck Russia, it does not need Ukraine at all.

There are two ways NATO could mess with Russia: economically or militarily.

If NATO countries want to screw Russia's economy, they do not need Ukraine (or any of the eastern European countries, for that matter). US and its allies are squeezing Russia's economy now.

Maybe Russia fears an armed invasion through Ukraine? Again, absolutely not. Using Ukraine as a launching pad for an invasion of Russia made sense in a pre-Cold War context. But the advent of nuclear weapons made that kind of scenario completely outdated. First and foremost, for NATO to attack Russia, it would require radical changes in their internal political structure - something like the rise to power of some far-right groups willing to make such an attempt and with the capacity to impose it on their own population. That would take at least a decade, so Russia would have plenty of warning time. Second, if NATO was recklessly enough to attack Russia, there is only one viable scenario for such a war: an all-out nuclear attack with 2,000 and 3,000 warheads delivered from ICBM, strategic bombers and submarines. There is no other alternative, because any invasion of Russia would trigger a massive Russian nuclear retaliation. And again, Ukraine is irrelevant. NATO would need Ukraine only for a re-enactment of the Operation Barbarossa, and that is a war scenario against Russia which is impossible even theoretically.

If Russia seriously fears that a NATO army from eastern Ukraine would march on Moscow, then we have bigger problems than the NATO expansion, because this means the Russian leadership is not capable of rational thought.

There is though an aspect which is indeed very problematic for Russia regarding the NATO expansion. The issue here is that a lot of people from the Russian leadership are still nostalgic after the old Soviet/Russian empire and view the former soviet republics as part of Russia's domain. NATO's expansion is a threat not for Russia per se, but for Russia's ability to bully those former Soviet republics as it likes.

In this context, the old Russian complaints about the American missile shield suddenly make a ton of sense. Because, when Russia does this bullying, it relies on its nuclear forces to intimidate NATO and make them look the other way.

As such, the opinions of Kennan and Panetta do have a lot of realpolitik logic. But the problem is that they basically urge to acquiesce Russia's desire to be able to keep its neighbouring countries under its boot - a position which many people find utterly immoral.

[NestorMakhnosLovechild]

There is a fundamental divide here Nestor, but it's not the one you are showing here.

See, I don't think anyone in this thread does not agree with the idea that NATO expansion or, if we are talking about what's going on in Ukraine, the breaking away of states Russia sees as part of it's sphere of influence makes Russia angry and/or nervous. Everyone agrees that Ukraine's short skirt made Russia feel it's pride stir in it's loins.

The difference lies in whether or not one thinks this obligates us to view anyone else as bad in some sense for provoking them. What everyone else is arguing is yeah, NATO expansion makes Russia all nervous but that doesn't make NATO expansion bad because the problem is Russia's reaction, not NATO expansion. It's the moral judgement we disagree with. Because Snake is also making one here. Or if he's not, he always sounds like he is and that's what everyone is reacting to.

And beyond that of course there is the fact that Russia's reaction here is what justifies NATO expansion in the first place.

Like, fundamentally everyone here understands sphere of influence politics, it's just most of us don't much care about Russia being butthurt over this shit. Anymore then we would care about the US being cranky that one of it's client states got all uppity.

It's funny - because while you're trying to deny that divergent understanding of theories of international relations are not the issue here, what you're actually saying proves the opposite. The real issue seems, pretty clearly to me, that snake is viewing the situation from a normative, realpolitik perspective, and you are looking at it from a fairly standard prescriptive view which, honestly, strikes me as pretty close to Wilsonianism. Both are perfectly valid lenses to view the situation from, depending on the context, because they both have something valid to offer how we view the situation.

You can't even pin the moral argument you're trying to attribute to Snake on him - you have to resort to the vague and bullshitty "well it kind of sounds like's making this argument he's not" - in order to justify your reaction. The problem is that he's making an argument outside of your frame of reference, and you're either unwilling or unable to deal with it on its own terms.

There isn't, in fact, even necessarily a conflict between the two views, as long as you accept one as descriptive and one as prescriptive. You can say, for example, that Ukraine should have the right to orient itself in any way it chooses. In fact, snake said just that in this thread, on this page. However, that doesn't prevent you from also recognizing that this is not how powerful states, including the United States, react to interference in their spheres of influence. And notwithstanding how States should be able to behave, good foreign policy must also be designed to deal with the world as it is, and not just how you want it to be. And from this perspective, the foreign policy of the West in pushing its sphere of influence right up against Russia has been incredibly clumsy. And they've taken actions that they should have known were going to prompt a backlash, and they took them anyway. Russia may be wrong, but the West has been foolish. And since we can always count on Russia being in the wrong, the onus is on our leadership to be better than foolish.

[NestorMakhnosLovechild]

The fundamental problem here is that Snake and Arakan's arguments portray Russia as some kind of victim, when it is not.

I'm going to save us both a lot of time.

First, I haven't seen anything from Snake that portrays Putin's Russia as any kind of a "victim." In fact, as with Shryke, I think your perception that this is the case has more to do with your failure to take his arguments on its own merits. As for Arakan, I'm not defending or supporting anything he's said.

Second, I'm not Defending Russia's pretext for its current actions nor the propriety of its actual reasons for its current actions. I'm not defending Russia at all.

So, I'm not sure what you're actually disagreeing with me about.

[Suttree]

As for Arakan, I'm not defending or supporting anything he's said.

It would actually be fairly entertaining to read a pseudo defense of Arakan and fixit's position that Nuland and her magic cookies deposed Yanukovich.

[Horza]

There's a pretty fundamental divide here between the theories of international relations that you and snake and others in the thread are using to view the ongoing situation with Russia and the Ukraine. It's massively unfair to suggest that someone believe in a certain moral outcome on an individual level because of their description of a particular State actor, because there's an ongoing, unresolved and massive disjunction between how State actors are viewed and judged vs. individual moral actors.

On this point, I'd argue that the personalisation and individualisation of nation-state actors is something of a byproduct of the language of international relations, and particularly realism, which has a tendency to ascribe definite, enduring personalities, worldviews and objectives to nation-state actors. I agree that they aren't particularly useful or revealing but for as long as people speak about unitary 'Russia', and what it 'wants' or 'feels' such comparisons are basically inevitable.

Snake's view of the Ukraine situation is fairly uncontroversial realpolitik, as recognized by Leon Panetta (former US Defense Secretary) and many others (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, who favors sending "lethal arms" to the Ukraine, also believes Washington should make clear that it would not accept Ukrainain membership in NATO because "it would be a dagger pointed at the heart" of Moscow.

'Uncontroversial' is an interesting word choice. What is uncontroversial about realpolitik as espoused by snake and those old geezers? Is it a consensus viewpoint in international relations theory? Does it make strong empirical findings? Offer reliable predictions? I'd suggest the answers to all of these questions is a resounding 'no'. Realpolitik is a contested term for a set of contestable viewpoints. We can get around to how sensible various realpolitik policy options for the current crisis are (my take: not very), but I think it's enough here to say that invoking international relations realism and all the serious old geezers with laminated NSC clearance badges gathering dust in back cabinets of their Georgetown edifices who subscribe to it does not resolve any controversy.

[Shryke]

It's funny - because while you're trying to deny that divergent understanding of theories of international relations are not the issue here, what you're actually saying proves the opposite. The real issue seems, pretty clearly to me, that snake is viewing the situation from a normative, realpolitik perspective, and you are looking at it from a fairly standard prescriptive view which, honestly, strikes me as pretty close to Wilsonianism. Both are perfectly valid lenses to view the situation from, depending on the context, because they both have something valid to offer how we view the situation.

You can't even pin the moral argument you're trying to attribute to Snake on him - you have to resort to the vague and bullshitty "well it kind of sounds like's making this argument he's not" - in order to justify your reaction. The problem is that he's making an argument outside of your frame of reference, and you're either unwilling or unable to deal with it on its own terms.

No Nestor, it's not. The issue is that many are very much framing the issue prescriptively. I think you are again trying to ascribe motives to others based on your own innate sense that you are obviously the only one here being logical and unemotional and above the fray, as you do in basically all these arguments.

Celestial is dead on in that the fundamental issue is that many are arguing that Russia is right to be offended or scared or what have you by NATO expansion and Nuland's magic cookies. That said feelings are legitimate. Whereas the rest of us are agreeing that Russia may see it as a threat but we don't think that actually places any sort of prescription on others. NATO has no obligation to entertain Russia's delusions of hegemony at the expense of it's neighbours.

The issue here with you is that you refuse to believe that this extends beyond a neutral realpolitik-style rational assessment to actual judgement. And yet it very much appears that no one else really agrees with you on this. But no, it must be US who are unwilling or unable to deal with arguments outside our frame of reference. Just like it is every time you pull this shtick.