Libya, MENA thread 9

[Yoadm]

I think it's more accurate to say that they questioned whether your prognosis on that question might be influenced by certain biases.

As opposed to you, I suppose. Furthermore, more than one member insinuated that I'm a bigot by claiming that different cultures produce different historical outcomes, and that the revolutions in eastern Europe cannot be compared to those in the middle-east.

You were, and apparently still are, very quick to point out any evidence suggesting that Egypt is about to turn into a fundamentalist Islamist theocracy, and very quick to dismiss any evidence to the contrary.

I said that it is more likely to fit Iran's revolution model rather than Eastern Europe, but in no way did I say it was a sure thing. Nor am I so 'quick' to point out anything. The last time I produced an article about Egypt was more than a month ago. Untill now, I debated other issues in the MENA thread, although I apreciate the barbed reply to my post, a reply which avoided dealing with the article itself.

The article you quote above is not proof you were right, it's just more of the same trend.

I did not state that it is 'proof'. Rather, the trend it shows is neither very democratic (the military's rule) or secular, and that the street protests, conducted by young, relatively secular individuals, in no way means that the government that will come out of this mess will be anything like them. Iran's revolution started as a secular, mid-income revolution too, but in the end the most organized group got into power.

[mormont]

As opposed to you, I suppose.

Well... yeah. Unless you can explain why it is that I might be biased in such an assessment?

I'm not one of those who was suggesting this was the same as Eastern Europe, but I'm not a Cassandra, either. I think that democracy in Egypt is unlikely to look exactly like democracy in (say) Estonia: but then again, democracy in Estonia doesn't look quite the same as democracy in the US, either. And the transition in Eastern Europe was difficult, even with several more helpful factors in play (such as the carrot of EU membership and extensive aid from Western Europe). So I'd expect it to be difficult in Egypt, too. But difficult does not mean 'doomed to failure', nor does different mean 'a bad thing'.

Nor am I so 'quick' to point out anything. The last time I produced an article about Egypt was more than a month ago. Untill now, I debated other issues in the MENA thread, although I apreciate the barbed reply to my post, a reply which avoided dealing with the article itself.

My reply did deal with the article. It pointed out that the observations in it were really only to be expected and indeed were expected by most of those who'd criticised you. Your post, on the other hand, implied that they were not expected by them: this is either a straw man, or a misunderstanding of the position most of them hold. In fact, the differences lie elsewhere, in how these things will play out in the long run.

[Altherion]

There is something to be said for the power of True Names:

International banks, acting on government orders to freeze assets from Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, are scouring hundreds of millions of client files for individuals on the new watch lists. But in doing so, bank compliance officers are grappling with a peculiar challenge: the myriad ways of transliterating Arabic names.

...

Compounding things, for individuals with Arabic names, sanctions lists provide only a few alternate spellings. The U.S. Treasury Department offers 12 possible spellings for Moammar Gadhafi, though language experts say there are more than 100 for the family name alone.

In the case of Gaddafi, they could just look for the larger accounts and sort through them by hand, but I bet at least some of the sanctioned accounts will get away because of this.

[mormont]

At least Gaddafi has the comfort of knowing that someone feels for him.

El-Hadji Diouf has reportedly revealed his admiration for Colonel Gaddafi and sympathised with the Libyan leader's plight in the week when the dictator was accused of deliberately massacring his own people.

The Ibrox bad boy - fortunately, in the interests of decency, the Daily Record doesn't succumb to the temptation of listing Gaddafi as the bad boy of international politics - describes himself as a friend of the despot and is quoted as saying: "Gaddafi is a man I have always admired. I am telling the truth.

"I know him, and I know his son Saif well. They are my friends.

"I do not honestly know what is really happening in Libya at the moment but it must be very hard for Gaddafi and his family."

Bless his sensitive heart. :huh:

[Horza]

Who else?

[mormont]

The Syrians, on the other hand, appear to be breaking out the ammo...

Syrian security forces opened fire to disperse a mass anti-government protest in the country's third-largest city of Homs, witnesses have said.

Hours after the interior ministry warned it would not tolerate an "armed insurrection", security forces swarmed into a main square in Homs before dawn.

One protester told the BBC he had seen someone shot dead.

Meanwhile, the country's decades-old emergency law has been lifted - a key demand of protesters.

[Ckrisz]

Looks like shooting down the protesters did turn enough heads: Syria is lifting emergency law.

Somehow I doubt the two have much to do with each other. Assad is likely trying to split the opposition - look at what I am giving you, I am lifting the emergency law! If you remain in the streets, on the other hand, you are in armed insurrection and will be shot!

As if the main problem in Syria is that the security forces adhere strictly to an excessive law.

[Yoadm]

Well... yeah. Unless you can explain why it is that I might be biased in such an assessment?

No more or no less than I am. Annoying how a personal remark can be when it has little to do with reality, or the argument at hand.

I'm not one of those who was suggesting this was the same as Eastern Europe, but I'm not a Cassandra, either. I think that democracy in Egypt is unlikely to look exactly like democracy in (say) Estonia: but then again, democracy in Estonia doesn't look quite the same as democracy in the US, either. And the transition in Eastern Europe was difficult, even with several more helpful factors in play (such as the carrot of EU membership and extensive aid from Western Europe). So I'd expect it to be difficult in Egypt, too. But difficult does not mean 'doomed to failure', nor does different mean 'a bad thing'.

- I did not refer to you. There are other members in this discussion.

- I did not say eastern Europe developed into a democracy just like the US, but its still far more similar than, say, Iran.

- I did not say Egypt was doomed to failure, that is your own misrepresentation of my words.

My reply did deal with the article. It pointed out that the observations in it were really only to be expected and indeed were expected by most of those who'd criticised you. Your post, on the other hand, implied that they were not expected by them:

And who is them? I don't suppose you remember every single reply aimed at me in hundreds of posts? Probably not. I was refering to the posters who compared the Egyptian revolution to the fall of the Iron curtain, and others who were jubilant at the prospect of a young secular revolution. I simply pointed out that these things hardly play out in the end as they do at the beginning, the disorganization of the protestors and the organization of the MB. I did not say it would surely rule Egypt, but rather that there was a very good chance it would play either a significant or even leading role in Egyptian politics.

[mormont]

No more or no less than I am. Annoying how a personal remark can be when it has little to do with reality, or the argument at hand.

- I did not refer to you. There are other members in this discussion.

The only annoying thing here, honestly, is that the first sentence doesn't work, grammatically, as a response to the sentence of mine you're quoting. ;)

Seriously, you're doing just what you then go on to complain about me (allegedly) doing, addressing me rather than people who actually said this, and deploying an irrelevant argument to boot. Go back and read, because I can't be bothered to meta-analyse this.

- I did not say eastern Europe developed into a democracy just like the US, but its still far more similar than, say, Iran.

Yes, but the use of Iran as an example itself suggests a bias, doesn't it? You've clearly selected it because you're of the opinion that Egypt might turn out like Iran. Whereas if Egypt becomes a democracy, I'd suggest it's likely to bear as much resemblance to the US as Estonia does. Or Indonesia, or India, or Japan. Democracies are different. What matters for the purposes of this discussion is that they are democracies. That's the salient point of comparison.

- I did not say Egypt was doomed to failure, that is your own misrepresentation of my words.

It's my characterisation of your whole approach, yes. It seems to me to be a fair characterisation given that your posts on the subject are uniformly about obstacles to a successful Egyptian transition, and that your commentary on them is consistently pessimistic and sceptical to say the least.

ETA - I may be wrong. If so, I'd like to read your analysis of the up-side, the positives, the reasons why Egypt might succeed and hey, how Israel might be able to take a role in helping them to transition to democracy. Seems to me that Israel has nothing to lose by trying to help...

[Galactus]

The basque movement had quite a similar divide in it. There's always a spectrum to these 'terrorist' political movements that ranges from peaceniks to wheeler dealer politicians and finally to the extreme war mongering terrorist bastards.

Apparently, the Allies are running out of ammo. Literally.

That could be the most bizarre thing I've ever heard.

The same thing happened during the Kosovo bombing campaign IIRC; or at least so the news reported.

[Yoadm]

Seriously, you're doing just what you then go on to complain about me (allegedly) doing, addressing me rather than people who actually said this, and deploying an irrelevant argument to boot.

I adressed you since you replied to my post, yet the original post was not directed at you. You called me biased, and I simply replied that it can go both ways.

Yes, but the use of Iran as an example itself suggests a bias, doesn't it? You've clearly selected it because you're of the opinion that Egypt might turn out like Iran.

The Iran example suggests an opinion. Egypt is a more similar example to Iran's revolution than Eastern Europe. In Iran, the protests lacked a figurehead at first, were disorganized, conducted by mostly young middle-class individuals, where the most organized group eventually held sway. That group was not the one leading the original revolt. Furthermore, in both countries, there was alot of anger towards the west and a strong religious party.

It's my characterisation of your whole approach, yes. It seems to me to be a fair characterisation given that your posts on the subject are uniformly about obstacles to a successful Egyptian transition, and that your commentary on them is consistently pessimistic and sceptical to say the least.

Skepticism in the face of optimism is not nesseceraly bias, especially considering that this is the middle-east.

.

ETA - I may be wrong. If so, I'd like to read your analysis of the up-side, the positives, the reasons why Egypt might succeed and hey, how Israel might be able to take a role in helping them to transition to democracy. Seems to me that Israel has nothing to lose by trying to help...

If I was optimistic regarding the revolution in Egypt, then I imagine I would have an 'analysis of the upside'. Simply put, ending a dictators reign is the upside. The downside is the possibility of chaos and/or fundamentalism.

[All-for-Joffrey]

VERY interest article from Reuters analyzing the Al Jazeera news coverage of the Bahrain situation. Looks like there's reticence on their part when it comes to the al-Khalifas.

While AJ has had excellent coverage of the North African revolts, I had also noticed that their coverage of the Gulf states rebellions were light at best. We shouldn't forget who finances AJ.

Coco, I'm writing a series of context articles on Bahrain for my friend's blog and I agree with Reuters' assessment in general. However, just to verify, after reading this, I did a quick search of Bahrain on AJE and, in their defense, this did pop up :P:

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121882356449949.html

Yet this inspiration is already being put to the test all across the region as the protests spread like a "freedom virus," as one Cairene taxi driver put it to me the day before I left Cairo.

As I write this column the Bahraini government is in the process of brutally suppressing the protesters in its own version of Tahrir Square, Pearl Square.

If the US is Egypt's primary patron, in Bahrain it is among the ruling family's biggest tenants, as the country is home to the Fifth Fleet, one of the US military's most important naval armadas, crucial to protecting Persian Gulf shipping and projecting US power against Iran.

But while Bahrain has long been depicted as relatively moderate compared with its Salafi neighbor, Saudi Arabia, the reality is that the country is repressive and far from free, as citizens have almost no ability to transform their government, which according to the State Department "restricts civil liberties, freedoms of press, speech, assembly, association, and some religious practices."

In the wake of Egypt, where many people harbor resentment against the Administration for its lack of early support for the democracy movement what can Obama do now? Can he in good conscience acquiesce to the brutal suppression of pro-democracy protesters so soon after his eloquent words and late coming to supporting the Egyptian revolution?

The larger question is: What is more essential to American security today, convenient bases for its ships, planes and troops across the Middle East, or a full transition to democracy throughout the region?

So they're not COMPLETELY neglecting coverage of the issue, as the Reuters article sort of implies.

But you're right, between the government-owned local papers, the tepid coverage by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya (I don't know about The Nation as I don't read it, maybe you could fill me in about that, but I would assume that they're pretty much in the same boat), and the likewise lack of coverage about the protests in Western media outlets, it's exceedingly frustrating to find unbiased news about the situation unfolding there. The GCC protests are in for a very though time indeed.

[mormont]

I adressed you since you replied to my post, yet the original post was not directed at you. You called me biased, and I simply replied that it can go both ways.

Except that I didn't call you biased. I did suggest that you go back and read what was actually said: I repeat that. Meanwhile, yes, bias can go both ways - but 'can' is not 'does'.

The Iran example suggests an opinion. Egypt is a more similar example to Iran's revolution than Eastern Europe. In Iran, the protests lacked a figurehead at first, were disorganized, conducted by mostly young middle-class individuals, where the most organized group eventually held sway. That group was not the one leading the original revolt. Furthermore, in both countries, there was alot of anger towards the west and a strong religious party.

This is as stretchy as a hippo's swimming costume, IMO. Where is the Egyptian equivalent to Khomeini? The Iranian protests certainly did not 'lack a figurehead at first'. In Iran, there was already a powerful religious figurehead in exile, who had been actively opposing the Shah for sixteen years and had united the religious opposition behind him prior to the revolution. No such figure exists in the Egyptian situation. This is not a minor detail, it's a central point of difference. Furthermore, you are heavily overplaying the role of the secular revolutionaries in Iran: the demonstrations in 1979 were primarily calling for Khomeini's return, not democracy. If the Iranian demonstrations were not 'originally' led by the religious opposition (and even that is arguable), they were certainly leading them long before the end of the revolution. The demonstrations in Egypt were very much not about anger towards the West, while those in Iran were very much against Westernisation. And so on, and so on.

The parallels with the Iranian revolution are weak: at best, they are certainly no more valid than those with the Eastern European transition to democracy.

If I was optimistic regarding the revolution in Egypt, then I imagine I would have an 'analysis of the upside'.

Right. So I'm kind of puzzled that you would object to me characterising your position as being exactly this.

[Yoadm]

Except that I didn't call you biased. I did suggest that you go back and read what was actually said: I repeat that. Meanwhile, yes, bias can go both ways - but 'can' is not 'does'.

You not only suggested it, but rather justified it based on my assumption that the situation in Egypt might lead to an Iran-like scenario. It is unfair, to say the least.

This is as stretchy as a hippo's swimming costume, IMO. Where is the Egyptian equivalent to Khomeini? The Iranian protests certainly did not 'lack a figurehead at first'. In Iran, there was already a powerful religious figurehead in exile, who had been actively opposing the Shah for sixteen years and had united the religious opposition behind him prior to the revolution. No such figure exists in the Egyptian situation. This is not a minor detail, it's a central point of difference. Furthermore, you are heavily overplaying the role of the secular revolutionaries in Iran: the demonstrations in 1979 were primarily calling for Khomeini's return, not democracy. If the Iranian demonstrations were not 'originally' led by the religious opposition (and even that is arguable), they were certainly leading them long before the end of the revolution. The demonstrations in Egypt were very much not about anger towards the West, while those in Iran were very much against Westernisation. And so on, and so on.

A few corrections:

- The MB has posed an active long term opposition to Mubarak's and (Saddat's before him) rule for decades. Indeed, what we see since the revolution is that it has alot of power, and will most likely by pivotal in future elections.

- Khomeini was not the figurehead at the start of the revolution, which was conducted at first by people no more religious than those we saw at Tahrir.

- The original fight was for democracy, rights, food and employment.

- I have said that the Egyptian situation is more likely to fit the Iranian model, yet I have never said they are the same. They simply have far more in common than Eastern Europe, hence closer to the Iranian example.

The difference one might find is the strong hand of the Army in Egypt (which is trying to retain its power), but that can change as well.

Right. So I'm kind of puzzled that you would object to me characterising your position as being exactly this.

My objection is the assertion that pessimism regarding the Egyptian revolution implies bias.

[mormont]

You not only suggested it, but rather justified it based on my assumption that the situation in Egypt might lead to an Iran-like scenario. It is unfair, to say the least.

I'd suggest that anyone reading your posts can make up their own mind on that point.

A few corrections:

None of those are corrections. The first doesn't contradict anything I said, the second is flat out wrong, the third is a debatable point, the last is an opinion (an ill-founded one, I think). And taken all in all, I think they make the point about whether your pessimism stems from bias quite well.

[Yoadm]

I'd suggest that anyone reading your posts can make up their own mind on that point.

Since you adressed me, then naturally Im replying to your own claim regarding my so called 'bias', which you have failed to back up, apat from a weak statement regarding my 'pessimism'.

None of those are corrections. The first doesn't contradict anything I said, the second is flat out wrong, the third is a debatable point, the last is an opinion (an ill-founded one, I think). And taken all in all, I think they make the point about whether your pessimism stems from bias quite well.

The first means that Egypt has a decades old religious opposition to Mubarak, much like Iran did, something you wrote as if it was unique to Iran. The second is correct, sorry. Iran's revolution was originally secular and pro-democracy, untill they were gradually ousted by the most organized grouup, under Khomeini. Also, in your attempt to paint me as biased, you missed the last point:

Yoadm: I have said that the Egyptian situation is more likely to fit the Iranian model, yet I have never said they are the same. They simply have far more in common than Eastern Europe, hence closer to the Iranian example.

Or is misrepresenting ones posts your only debating tactic when faced with a point you cannot get across? I replied to some very optimistic posters regarding the Egyptian revolution. I never said it was 'doomed', nor that it will 100% end up like Iran. These are all your own misrepresentations. So, either read my posts and answer fairly without veiled insults, or don't debate at all.

[mormont]

Since you adressed me, then naturally Im replying to your own claim regarding my so called 'bias', which you have failed to back up, apat from a weak statement regarding my 'pessimism'.

Again, I'm happy to let others assess. Clearly, you're unlikely to say 'yes, you're right, I am biased': there's no mileage in that conversation.

The first means that Egypt has a decades old religious opposition to Mubarak, much like Iran did, something you wrote as if it was unique to Iran.

Not at all. I said that Iran's religious opposition had a longstanding and dominant figurehead, and Egypt's does not.

The second is correct, sorry. Iran's revolution was originally secular and pro-democracy, untill they were gradually ousted by the most organized grouup, under Khomeini.

Simply repeating that something that is wrong is correct will not do. Let's start with wikipedia, no authority of course, but we're not arguing an abstruse point here:

The first militant anti-Shah demonstrations were in October 1977, after the death of Khomeini's son Mostafa.[76] Khomeini's activists numbered "perhaps a few hundred in total", but over the coming months they grew to a mass of several thousand demonstrators in most cities of Iran.[77]

The first casualties suffered in major demonstrations against the Shah came in January 1978. Hundreds of Islamist students and religious leaders in the city of Qom were furious over a story in the government-controlled press they felt was libelous.

By summer 1978 the level of protest had been at a steady state for four months — about ten thousand participants in each major city (with the exception of Isfahan where protests were larger and Tehran where they were smaller). This amounted to an "almost fully mobilized `mosque network,`" of pious Iranian Muslims, but a small minority of the more than 15 million adults in Iran.

Khomeini and his followers were deeply involved in the overthrow of the Shah right from the start and at all times thereafter. They allied with secular and leftist groups who also wanted rid of the monarchy, but those groups were in the minority. The idea that such groups were the origin and main focus of the Iranian revolution and were only later supplanted by Khomeini's organisation is really not sustainable on even the most casual analysis. It's so weak, that frankly anyone trying to stand it up realistically has to expect people questioning exactly why they want so badly to sell this idea - or perhaps just why they want so much to believe that it's true.

Also, in your attempt to paint me as biased, you missed the last point:

I didn't miss it. I'd already addressed it;

It's my characterisation of your whole approach, yes. It seems to me to be a fair characterisation given that your posts on the subject are uniformly about obstacles to a successful Egyptian transition, and that your commentary on them is consistently pessimistic and sceptical to say the least.

So I've already said why I don't think it's a misrepresentation. I'll agree that I was quite mild about it, and could have made the case more strongly, but that was me being polite. ;)

I tend to agree that there's not much more point in continuing this, though.

[Yoadm]

Again, I'm happy to let others assess. Clearly, you're unlikely to say 'yes, you're right, I am biased': there's no mileage in that conversation.

And clearly you are unwilling or unable to back up that assertion with anything more than misrepresenting my posts.

Not at all. I said that Iran's religious opposition had a longstanding and dominant figurehead, and Egypt's does not.

Egypt has a long standing religious opposition in the form of a specific party, something you ommited. The only difference is that in one case we are speaking of an individual, and in the other, a whole organization.

Simply repeating that something that is wrong is correct will not do. Wikipedia

Indeed:

Other opposition groups[51] included constitutionalist liberals — the democratic, reformist Islamic Freedom Movement of Iran, headed by Mehdi Bazargan, and the more secular National Front. They were based in the urban middle class, and wanted the Shah to adhere to the Iranian Constitution of 1906 rather than to replace him with a theocracy,[52] but lacked the cohesion and organization of Khomeini's forces.

The opposition included many seculars and religious individuals, Khomeini's party, other religious and secular parties. The first attempt at a government was the creation of a semi-democratic relatively secular one. It failed. Eventually, the most organized group came out on top.

I didn't miss it. I'd already addressed it;

mormont, on 19 April 2011 - 01:37 PM, said:

It's my characterisation of your whole approach, yes. It seems to me to be a fair characterisation given that your posts on the subject are uniformly about obstacles to a successful Egyptian transition, and that your commentary on them is consistently pessimistic and sceptical to say the least.

This reply has nothing to do with my previous statement, which you ignored:

I have said that the Egyptian situation is more likely to fit the Iranian model, yet I have never said they are the same. They simply have far more in common than Eastern Europe, hence closer to the Iranian example.

At the same time, you misinterpeted my post as saying that I saw Egypt as doomed. I did not, nor did I state it will surely become another Iran. I did say that it is closer to the Iranian revolution than Eastern Europe (in direct response to those tho claimed the opposite) and assesed that, at the very least, the MB will have a pivotal role to play in Egyptian politics. Being pessimistic, again, does not equate with being biased. Even with the consistantly optimistic individuals in this thread, which compared Egypt to the fall of eastern Europe's communist block, though I deeply disagree with them, I do not try to shut them up by calling them biased. They are not. I simply disagree with them, and debate them respectfully, something you can try emulating.

[Ckrisz]

One key difference between the Iranian Revolution and the Egyptian one - no Saddam Hussein is going to invade Egypt and cement the hold of the religious authorities over the Army and security forces in Iran. Unless Bibi has something up his sleeve that we don't know of.

I think we severely underrate the impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iranian and Iraqi society. Both countries were thoroughly militarized and security forces became dominant. The first mass executions took place as the Iranian revolutionaries, panicked by chaos in the Army and "subversion" at home, began executing leftists en masse as possible fifth columnists.

[Former Lord of Winterfell]

I have said that the Egyptian situation is more likely to fit the Iranian model, yet I have never said they are the same. They simply have far more in common than Eastern Europe, hence closer to the Iranian example.

Is the discussion of religion/culture in general and Islam in particular taboo in looking at Egypt vis-a-vis Estonia and Iran? Until Iraq, there hadn't been a single real democracy anywhere in Arab world, and that one was imposed forcibly from the outside. It was a collection of secular dictators trying to appease/suppress religious extremists, and just plain old religious dictators. Egypt is, to some extent, trying to blaze a more unique path in turning itself into a democracy in that region. Those seeking to do so are having to contend with aggressive trans-national religious/cultural forces attempting to stop the transition to a western-style democracy. That is a lot to overcome.

And the point is not that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy. Muslims as individuals can support democracy as easily as anyone else. The point is that Islam currently is not a pro-democracy factor in that region of the world. Of course, that can change, but getting the ball rolling is the toughest part.

In contract, Estonia had the benefit of being in close proximity to a region of the world -- western/central Europe, with a solid democratic base from which democratic ideals more easily filtered. It also didn't have to contend with anti-democratic transnational forces.

I think it's entirely possible that Egypt can make that transition successfully, but I think it's wrong to overlook the impact of regional forces and extremist elements on the ease of that transition.

I think we severely underrate the impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iranian and Iraqi society. Both countries were thoroughly militarized and security forces became dominant. The first mass executions took place as the Iranian revolutionaries, panicked by chaos in the Army and "subversion" at home, began executing leftists en masse as possible fifth columnists.

That's a really good point. Nothing like a war to unit the people behind whomever happens to be the leader at that time.