The Legacy of Generals Grant and Lee

[DanteGabriel]

Gramsci,

I've heard it argued that much of Lee's genuis was really Jackson's ablity to execut tactically. I've frequently heard it argued that had Jackson had command of Ewell's Corp on the First day the AoP could have been rolled up piece by piece as it came up the Baltimore pike by corps because Jackson would never have stopped with the town of Gettysburg. He would have moved to take Cemetary Hill and Culp's Hill giving them tactical dominance of the surrounding area.

I wonder how much of that is more "Lost Cause" romanticism. "Oh, we coulda won if only Jackson had survived to help Lee win Gettysburg."

[maarsen]

Grant was clearly the superior strategist (to be fair, a lot of credit also goes to Winfield Scott) He knew what his objectives were and pursued them until he succeeded in getting them. Lee being fairly good tactically but had no really consistent idea of how to win the war other than "keep beating the yankees".

I think it's very interesting how strategically superior the North was, very early on they were doing all sorts of multi-pronged naval and land cooperation, etc, while the confederacy largely seems to have had a bunch of uncoordinated field armies each trying to do as best as it could.

The Union was fighting a single war with a coherent strategy, the confederacy at least four, only vaguely connected in strategy.

Funny thing though, everybody who counted knew how to beat the south, as you pointed out, but until Grant nobody actually tried. Grant won in the west prompting Lincoln to bring him east. After complaints about his generalship, Lincoln said "Nevertheless, he fights!"

[Arakan]

Grant was clearly the superior strategist (to be fair, a lot of credit also goes to Winfield Scott) He knew what his objectives were and pursued them until he succeeded in getting them. Lee being fairly good tactically but had no really consistent idea of how to win the war other than "keep beating the yankees".

I think it's very interesting how strategically superior the North was, very early on they were doing all sorts of multi-pronged naval and land cooperation, etc, while the confederacy largely seems to have had a bunch of uncoordinated field armies each trying to do as best as it could.

The Union was fighting a single war with a coherent strategy, the confederacy at least four, only vaguely connected in strategy.

That's like complaining about Stoke not playing nice tikitaka Barca style ;).

In other words: you can only play the cards you'be been dealt and with the exception of the madness which was Picket's Charge, Lee did a great job. The superiority of the North in almost evth was so overwhelming.

Grant is the father of modern US military doctrine but his performance in Petersburg is telling. Sherman is another story.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

DG,

I wonder how much of that is more "Lost Cause" romanticism. "Oh, we coulda won if only Jackson had survived to help Lee win Gettysburg."

I'm sure that's some of it. But, Jackson tended to be more aggressive than Ewell. Had the trust of his men while Ewell was new to command. It lends itself to counterfactuals even without the "lost cause" romanticism.

[Maithanet]

Grant was clearly the superior strategist (to be fair, a lot of credit also goes to Winfield Scott) He knew what his objectives were and pursued them until he succeeded in getting them. Lee being fairly good tactically but had no really consistent idea of how to win the war other than "keep beating the yankees".

I think it's very interesting how strategically superior the North was, very early on they were doing all sorts of multi-pronged naval and land cooperation, etc, while the confederacy largely seems to have had a bunch of uncoordinated field armies each trying to do as best as it could.

The Union was fighting a single war with a coherent strategy, the confederacy at least four, only vaguely connected in strategy.

But could the Confederacy have really done much better? Communication across the country was terrible with Union controlling large portions of confederate waterways by 1862. How could a grand strategy be put together, much less carried out?

Lee and Davis's strategy was to try and draw out the war, because they did not believe that the North would fight a war for "Union" to the bitter end. The more times Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac, the easier it was to believe that such a strategy would bear fruit. The problem was that they started the war right after Lincoln took office, and thus they had to survive 3 and a half full years of war before another Presidential election. Given the industrial and demographic superiority of the North, that was a losing proposition.

Gramsci,

I've heard it argued that much of Lee's genuis was really Jackson's ablity to execut tactically. I've frequently heard it argued that had Jackson had command of Ewell's Corp on the First day the AoP could have been rolled up piece by piece as it came up the Baltimore pike by corps because Jackson would never have stopped with the town of Gettysburg. He would have moved to take Cemetary Hill and Culp's Hill giving them tactical dominance of the surrounding area.

Ehh, it's easy to secondguess. Jackson was a superior commander to Ewell, so anything is possible, but to say the entire position at Gettysburg would have been lost had he been in command is a bridge too far for me.

[Manhole Eunuchsbane]

I think it's very interesting how strategically superior the North was, very early on they were doing all sorts of multi-pronged naval and land cooperation, etc, while the confederacy largely seems to have had a bunch of uncoordinated field armies each trying to do as best as it could.

Well to be fair, when you have about 14 seaworthy ships, there's only so much coordination you can muster.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

Maithanet,

I've also seen it argued that Jackson would have backed Longstreet and argued against continuing the attack at Gettysburg at all. That he would have supported retiring from the field to look for better ground to force the AoP to attack them.

[Arakan]

But could the Confederacy have really done much better? Communication across the country was terrible with Union controlling large portions of confederate waterways by 1862. How could a grand strategy be put together, much less carried out?

Lee and Davis's strategy was to try and draw out the war, because they did not believe that the North would fight a war for "Union" to the bitter end. The more times Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac, the easier it was to believe that such a strategy would bear fruit. The problem was that they started the war right after Lincoln took office, and thus they had to survive 3 and a half full years of war before another Presidential election. Given the industrial and demographic superiority of the North, that was a losing proposition.

Ehh, it's easy to secondguess. Jackson was a superior commander to Ewell, so anything is possible, but to say the entire position at Gettysburg would have been lost had he been in command is a bridge too far for me.

Completely agree.

People forget that Union vs CSA was much closer to USA vs Iraq in 2003 than anything else. Until Grant took command, the Union badly underperformed. Grant did his job as you should expect.

A Union army with the Prussian officer corps in charge would have crushed the CSA latest in 1863. of course IMO.

[Maithanet]

Maithanet,

I've also seen it argued that Jackson would have backed Longstreet and argued against continuing the attack at Gettysburg at all. That he would have supported retiring from the field to look for better ground to force the AoP to attack them.

Given that Jackson was a very good general, you could reasonably argue that he would have opposed every single mistake Lee made for the rest of the war. But again, I think that's sort of ridiculous.

[Gramsci]

Gramsci,

I've heard it argued that much of Lee's genuis was really Jackson's ablity to execut tactically. I've frequently heard it argued that had Jackson had command of Ewell's Corp on the First day the AoP could have been rolled up piece by piece as it came up the Baltimore pike by corps because Jackson would never have stopped with the town of Gettysburg. He would have moved to take Cemetary Hill and Culp's Hill giving them tactical dominance of the surrounding area.

I have heard the same, and buy it somewhat. Only somewhat because Ewell's actions that day were uncharacteristic. He was typically an aggressive commander and a betting man of the day probably would have assumed he would press the tactical advantage. The question then becomes, why the sudden change? Some attribute it to Lee: lacking the executive brilliance of Jackson that you mentioned, he developed a bad habit of equivocation and doublespeak that may have confused Ewell. Could be, hard to know given the limits of primary resources.

Grant was clearly the superior strategist (to be fair, a lot of credit also goes to Winfield Scott) He knew what his objectives were and pursued them until he succeeded in getting them. Lee being fairly good tactically but had no really consistent idea of how to win the war other than "keep beating the yankees".

I think it's very interesting how strategically superior the North was, very early on they were doing all sorts of multi-pronged naval and land cooperation, etc, while the confederacy largely seems to have had a bunch of uncoordinated field armies each trying to do as best as it could.

The Union was fighting a single war with a coherent strategy, the confederacy at least four, only vaguely connected in strategy.

I know it goes off as my singing Sherman's praises a bit too much, but upon reading Campaigning with Grant by Porter, you have a few revelations:

1. General Grant was a genuinely good person. His alcoholism made him an easy target for polemics, but he was as moral and modest as Robert E. Lee

2. Grant was certainly every bit Lee's equal, if not decidedly superior. He was reflective, knowledgeable, and decisive. Like Lee he was mindful of contextual politics and had a talent for the logistical side of war.

3. That said, many of his more modernist revelations on war were adapted from his close friend, William T. Sherman. It was Sherman who recognized that the Union's industrial might was its greatest strength, and, as has been born out in countless letters and correspondence, it was Sherman who really convinced Grant that the best strategy for defeating Lee was one that maximized the North's strengths while marginalizing its weaknesses.

Far more analysis should be given to Sheridan, Sherman, and even George Meade than to Grant, just as more analysis should be given to Stuart, Jackson, and Forrest than to Lee.

That's like complaining about Stoke not playing nice tikitaka Barca style ;).

In other words: you can only play the cards you'be been dealt and with the exception of the madness which was Picket's Charge, Lee did a great job. The superiority of the North in almost evth was so overwhelming.

Grant is the father of modern US military doctrine but his performance in Petersburg is telling. Sherman is another story.

That is a bold statement, for reasons I have already mentioned.

[White Walker Texas Ranger]

That's like complaining about Stoke not playing nice tikitaka Barca style ;).

In other words: you can only play the cards you'be been dealt and with the exception of the madness which was Picket's Charge, Lee did a great job. The superiority of the North in almost evth was so overwhelming.

Grant is the father of modern US military doctrine but his performance in Petersburg is telling. Sherman is another story.

It'd be like Stoke committing to playing long ball if Barca had Atletico Madrid's back line. Not only would they never get the ball, but they'd also never beat those guys for headers.

Also slightly off topic, Phil Sheridan was an observer during the Franco Prussian War and wrote a account of the Battle of Gravelotte. He wasn't too impressed at Prussian tactics. Those early Franco Prussian War battles were just as, if not more bloody than any battle in the Civil War. Small arms and artillery had advanced considerably and the Prussians had mastered the science of concentrating and supplying armies through rail. Tactics were, if anything, behind though.

The war, I think, ended earlier because Prussian commanders were willing to grind through horrific losses in order to complete the encirclement. Also because Napoleon III was an idiot.

[Galactus]

But could the Confederacy have really done much better?

Yes, I definitely think they could. Largely it's a matter of leadership and coordination on the highest level. They did about as well as they could tactically and operationally, but they didn't have much of any strategic coordination. Just a bunch of colourful personages more or less pursuing their own private wars.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

Maithent,

I enjoy miltary history counter factuals. "For want of a nail" eh?

[Arakan]

It'd be like Stoke committing to playing long ball if Barca had Atletico Madrid's back line. Not only would they never get the ball, but they'd also never beat those guys for headers.

Also slightly off topic, Phil Sheridan was an observer during the Franco Prussian War and wrote a account of the Battle of Gravelotte. He wasn't too impressed at Prussian tactics. Those early Franco Prussian War battles were just as, if not more bloody than any battle in the Civil War. Small arms and artillery had advanced considerably and the Prussians had mastered the science of concentrating and supplying armies through rail. Tactics were, if anything, behind though.

The war, I think, ended earlier because Prussian commanders were willing to grind through horrific losses in order to complete the encirclement. Also because Napoleon III was an idiot.

But that is the point! Ruthlessness. Isnt this exactly what Lincoln demanded and Grant/Sherman delivered.

And sorry but the victory over France is not only a completely different ball park, it's not even the same game. Whether Sherridan was impressed or not is not really relevant.

[Astromech]

Maithanet,

I've also seen it argued that Jackson would have backed Longstreet and argued against continuing the attack at Gettysburg at all. That he would have supported retiring from the field to look for better ground to force the AoP to attack them.

Lee probably would have never engaged at Gettysburg had Jeb Stuart and the cavalry followed orders and scouted the Union's positions instead of engaging in skirmishes and raids.

But could the Confederacy have really done much better? Communication across the country was terrible with Union controlling large portions of confederate waterways by 1862. How could a grand strategy be put together, much less carried out?

Lee and Davis's strategy was to try and draw out the war, because they did not believe that the North would fight a war for "Union" to the bitter end. The more times Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac, the easier it was to believe that such a strategy would bear fruit. The problem was that they started the war right after Lincoln took office, and thus they had to survive 3 and a half full years of war before another Presidential election. Given the industrial and demographic superiority of the North, that was a losing proposition.

Ehh, it's easy to secondguess. Jackson was a superior commander to Ewell, so anything is possible, but to say the entire position at Gettysburg would have been lost had he been in command is a bridge too far for me.

The Confederacy's only real hope of victory was demoralizing the Union to the point of Lincoln losing the election.

[Arakan]

Yes, I definitely think they could. Largely it's a matter of leadership and coordination on the highest level. They did about as well as they could tactically and operationally, but they didn't have much of any strategic coordination. Just a bunch of colourful personages more or less pursuing their own private wars.

That's true to an extent but a little bit of nitpicking because in the end it wouldnt affect the strategic premises.

[Maithanet]

Maithent,

I enjoy miltary history counter factuals. "For want of a nail" eh?

I do as well, but only when well fleshed out and without an agenda. The scenario you are painting strikes me as neither, although it's possible there is more to it.

[White Walker Texas Ranger]

But that is the point! Ruthlessness. Isnt this exactly what Lincoln demanded and Grant/Sherman delivered.

And sorry but the victory over France is not only a completely different ball park, it's not even the same game. Whether Sherridan was impressed or not is not really relevant.

The Prussian strategy was good, but tactically they were conducting cavalry charges against entrenched troops with repeating bolt action rifles.

[Gramsci]

But that is the point! Ruthlessness. Isnt this exactly what Lincoln demanded and Grant/Sherman delivered.

And sorry but the victory over France is not only a completely different ball park, it's not even the same game. Whether Sherridan was impressed or not is not really relevant.

The political genius of Bismarck coupled with the strategic genius of von Moltke far outshines that of the Lincoln/Grant pairing. Definitely agree there, if that is what you mean to imply. More importantly, the French loss can hardly be boiled down to "Napoleon III was an idiot."

[Jaxom 1974]

Lee probably would have never engaged at Gettysburg had Jeb Stuart and the cavalry followed orders and scouted the Union's positions instead of engaging in skirmishes and raids.

The Confederacy's only real hope of victory was demoralizing the Union to the point of Lincoln losing the election.

Didn't a courier drop some orders that tipped the Union? That can't be discounted.

And the Confederacy didn't have to have Lincoln lose, they needed to stymie the union forces long enough to get recognition from the European powers.