The Revolution will be Appropriated

[sologdin]

Genetic hard-wiring will ensure that this flattening-and-raising process always takes place - in the real world, and then in fiction as its mirror. We (humans) like leaders; we like having charismatic figures to tell us what to do;

richard--

you think there's a DNA basis for these practices and processes, or are you relying on a preponderance of historical evidence to make the point?

i frankly don't know enough to argue either way, though i'd be a bit more persuaded of the thesis were someone to locate the "fascist gene." were you perhaps thinking of adorno et al's work on the "authoritarian personality"?

[Richard]

@ Sologdin

you think there's a DNA basis for these practices and processes, or are you relying on a preponderance of historical evidence to make the point?

Well, to be completely honest, it is more of a gestalt argument than anything right now. But the evidence for - for example - a genetic basis for religiosity and conservative outlook (which to my mind it's a no brainer to link with deference to charismatic authority) is mounting seriously. Check out Steven Pinker's books The Blank Slate and How the Mind Works for pointers on this. Also have a look at this website for some insight into how liberal and conservative mindsets function:

www.yourmorals.org

NB - the problem is that things like the "fascist gene" are, as your quote marks correctly imply, a misnomer - I don't doubt that susceptibility to fascistic forms of authority has at least in part a genetic component (see above - after all, what's more fascistic than monotheism?), but it isn't going to be as simple as one expressed or supressed gene, or even a handful. And clearly environment is going to have a mutually modifying effect on whatever genetic palette you start with. But I do very much believe that there is only so much post-genetic modification you can do through upbringing, education etc..... We won't be a sprouting moral angel's wings anytime soon, either within the revolution or without.

@ Shadow Play

If you're going to use reductionism to a genetic basis for the reason why we humans hero-worship and vicarious live their lives, then by the same token consciously working against such can be just as much a genetic drive and a basis. Both influences are equally true,

Well, it's not really reductionism per se - the genetic origins of this kind of thing are likely to be every bit as complicated as any mainstream sociological explanations based on culture or political economy. And the flaw in your argument is that bit about equally true. Ultimately, there'll be some solid genetic reasons why people work against demagoguery, yes - we seem to be hard-wired for egalitarianism (though only to a point - it starts to break down once you get beyond kin/tribal bonds), and of course rebellion in itself is a good way for low status males to improve their standing. But the problem is that, IMHO, this is a complex of influences, built into a coherent whole by rational thought. Whereas the charismatic hero thing seems to come in pretty much whole and unadulterated from the (genetic) guts upward. Hero worship, by definition, isn't thought through or rationalised. So there's nothing equal about this battle. It's like comparing the urge to fuck with the urge to carry and use condoms - we have to employ massive public health campaigns to get people to do the latter; but no-one needs an advertising campaign to persuade them to fuck.

[Mathis Waters]

If you want to argue a genetic basis for political differences I'm not sure Haidt is the best route to go, since his entire theory is built around the fact that non-conservatism is historically novel and that many people don't ascribe moral value to deference to authority. (Beyond this, I feel like his model amounts to more of an uninteresting classification scheme than a positive theory, but that's getting really off-topic.)

[Richard]

If you want to argue a genetic basis for political differences

Don't want to argue anything (the emergent truths are unattractive, to say the least, for a left/liberal feminist egalitarian like me). I'm just looking at the evidence lying around and drawing conclusions from the shape of the landscape.

I'm not sure Haidt is the best route to go

What Haidt has to offer is a modular basis for morality which chimes well with Pinker's arguments in The Blank Slate. I think the immediate value of his work lies in its applicability to the Culture Wars currently being waged in the US (and increasingly cropping up in my home country as well) - perhaps not surprising because this seems to have been his initial inspiration - but that isn't why I cited it here. The pay-off for me is that the modules cited as influencing liberal opinion are the ones most admitting of objective analysis; harm is a verifiable objective reality; justice is a (flawed) attempt to view interpersonal conflict from an objective stand-point. The more you get into the other modules, the ones that influence conservatives, the more you see a departure/retreat from any kind of objective truth. In-group loyalty cannot possibly be right all the time - your group is bound to be in the wrong sometimes, so privileging in-group loyalty over things like justice and harm necessarily means legitimising gut reaction over attempts to address human affairs in an objective/realistic/just fashion. Respect for authority is even worse because, well, power corrupts - so trusting someone because they have power is tantamount to ignoring a basic truth of human nature. And by the time you get to Disgust/Spirituality, well, we've taken a hard right turn from the real world into barking mad I-hear-voices.

Taken together, and allowing, as you say, that liberal thought seems to be a lesser and maybe (though I have my doubts about that) more recent development, this spread pretty much condemns us to the guts-over-brains model, at best wrestled partially (and, I fear, only sporadically) to the ground by hard rational thought, education and legislation.

[red snow]

This has turned into an interesting thread.

I agree there is probably a genetic basis to the whole flock vs sheep thing, it makes sense if we used to live in social herds/packs as cavemen or even as early humans looking out for predators while foraging. Too many of them and it wouldn't work though. I guess by their nature the "leaders" often get selected out for causing too much of a stir or competing with each other while the flock get by on neutrality. By the same token we'll accept people who go against the norm as it can come in useful sometimes - that strange caveperson who used to play with flint, or that one who told stories to teach them to avoid dangerous scenarios was probably butchered by a few tribes before they realised the benefit.

While genes are definitely underpinning a lot of things I think the "newish" idea of Memes is more important when applied to society/pop culture etc. It's a bit like meta-genetics and is based on the power/evolution of ideas. The advantage of the meme is that it can evolve far faster than our genetics can. Science/medecine could be thought of as a type of meme in that we have made advances far quicker than our genes could have eg microscopy/telescopy over evolved eyes or telephone/internet over telepathy. Obviously we've required a few mutations to probably give a few brains an edge but by sharing our thoughts and adding to it over generations we've pretty much escaped the constraints of genetic evolution.

[Mathis Waters]

Don't want to argue anything (the emergent truths are unattractive, to say the least, for a left/liberal feminist egalitarian like me). I'm just looking at the evidence lying around and drawing conclusions from the shape of the landscape.

Let me be more formalistic, then: if you believe it is a reasonable conclusion that there are genetic bases of political difference, Haidt is not a reasonable source of such conclusions. He's just going about classifying the different moral rules encompassed by societies, but he certainly doesn't attempt to show that these moral differences are due to genetic differences between agricultural and industrial civilizations.

I think he would like to present the five categories as a meaningful fact about human nature, but for that to be true you'd have to be able to conceive of a hypothetical species with moral rules that couldn't fit into one of the categories. But "sanctity" can cover any hypothetical rule not sortable into the other four, like "don't wear clothes made out of two different fabrics." And the other categories are, as categories, tautologies - "respect for authority," "ingroup loyalty," "justice is good," "pain is bad," - until put into a more specific and substantial form. So it provides neither a meta-rule about which rules humans can't follow nor one about which ones they must follow. (I suppose one could claim that there must be some rules placed in the harm and fairness baskets, but there doesn't seem to be any particular reason to suppose this is the case - after all, the same claim could be made several centuries ago about all five.) It just sorts rules into categories and notes that for some people, some baskets are empty.

What Haidt has to offer is a modular basis for morality which chimes well with Pinker's arguments in The Blank Slate. I think the immediate value of his work lies in its applicability to the Culture Wars currently being waged in the US (and increasingly cropping up in my home country as well) - perhaps not surprising because this seems to have been his initial inspiration - but that isn't why I cited it here. The pay-off for me is that the modules cited as influencing liberal opinion are the ones most admitting of objective analysis; harm is a verifiable objective reality; justice is a (flawed) attempt to view interpersonal conflict from an objective stand-point. The more you get into the other modules, the ones that influence conservatives, the more you see a departure/retreat from any kind of objective truth. In-group loyalty cannot possibly be right all the time - your group is bound to be in the wrong sometimes, so privileging in-group loyalty over things like justice and harm necessarily means legitimising gut reaction over attempts to address human affairs in an objective/realistic/just fashion. Respect for authority is even worse because, well, power corrupts - so trusting someone because they have power is tantamount to ignoring a basic truth of human nature. And by the time you get to Disgust/Spirituality, well, we've taken a hard right turn from the real world into barking mad I-hear-voices.

You're arguing morality from morality here, though! Those who believe in authority and loyalty accept them as simple values, the same as you accept the avoidance of (for instance) physical suffering in others as a simple value. The proposition that "loyalty is a bad value because the ingroup isn't always right" is meaningless when "what's right" is precisely what values exist to explain. (Or "explain.")

Taken together, and allowing, as you say, that liberal thought seems to be a lesser and maybe (though I have my doubts about that) more recent development, this spread pretty much condemns us to the guts-over-brains model, at best wrestled partially (and, I fear, only sporadically) to the ground by hard rational thought, education and legislation.

I don't know what it means for it to be a "lesser" "development." It's possible that there were "harm and fairness only" moralities in some pre-agricultural societies (indeed, I'd rank it as probable, since H-G groups tend to be more diverse than agricultural ones,) but obviously moral language in agricultural societies has encompassed more concerns than just harm and fairness.

But it doesn't seem to me that agricultural civilization is any more or less natural than industrial civilization, or that the harm and fairness categories are any more or less emotional than the others; values are inherently affective social objects. It does seem to me that a civilization composed of peasants ruled by competing groups of warriors and priests would have more use for rules encompassing all five categories than one composed of wage-laboring citizens ruled by competing groups of businessmen and bureaucrats.

[Richard]

Yes, and that also makes you wonder about the so-called Great Leap Forward in the Paleolithic. Was the change that facilitated all that sudden cultural/technological advance fifty thousand years ago the arrival of - so to speak - the Liberal Gene?

Way too neat to seriously believe - sigh :)

Or at least in such simplistic terms. But certainly, an ability to relate closely to the objective reality around you combined with an enthusiasm for change/new stuff (or at least a lack of fear thereof) would be a handy genetic grab-bag tool for any species hoping to get a developmental leg up.

[Galactus]

Yes, and that also makes you wonder about the so-called Great Leap Forward in the Paleolithic. Was the change that facilitated all that sudden cultural/technological advance fifty thousand years ago the arrival of - so to speak - the Liberal Gene?

Seems decidedly unlikely, for starters (as has been pointed out) the development of agriculture was a slow, gradual process (in the purely technical sense, minor inventions leading to further minor inventions, each of them insignificant) I suspect Diamond's ecological thesis has better support for explaining the advancement of agriculture than some kind of genetic change (that, by the way, would have to have happened in several different locations, many of which were genetically isolated from each other)

[Richard]

@ Matthias

I think you're misinterpreting Haidt (and me) somewhat wilfully here. We're not talking philosophically about what rules humans must or must not follow - we're talking pragmatically about what behavioural norms they evidentially do follow. Haidt is citing the "thought" processes people go through when they decide what is morally right and wrong. ("Thought" in inverted commas here, because clearly this is not about the process we understand as rational thought, it's about gut (genetic) level reaction)

Likewise, you're missing a significant point here:

But "sanctity" can cover any hypothetical rule not sortable into the other four,

No, it can cover all the others as well, but so what? The issue of sanctity is not about what hypothetical rules there are, it's about the reasons for obeying them. A moral rule might well say "Thou shalt not kill" - but for a whole variety of modular reasons. The issue lies not in the commandment itself, but in the "rationale" behind it. The harm module says "thou shalt not kill because that could be your helpless child". The justice module says "thou shalt not kill because, well, how would you like it if someone killed you". But the sanctity module says "thou shalt not kill because this imaginary Big Chief in the Sky says it's Bad and that's All There is To It, so shut the fuck up, there's nothing more to say on the matter." Sanctity defeats any attempt to relate to the world realistically, not because it is always wrong in what it demands, but because it can't distinguish between what is right or wrong from a non-partisan point of view. Execute a mass murderer, pardon him and let him go, wipe out six million Jews - it's all the same as long as "God says so".

And you're also missing my (rather than Haidt's) point here:

You're arguing morality from morality here, though! Those who believe in authority and loyalty accept them as simple values, the same as you accept the avoidance of (for instance) physical suffering in others as a simple value.

Each module starts simple and gut level, sure. I may "accept as a simple value" that harm is wrong (my liberal genetic hard-wiring coming into play), but harm is unavoidable in the real world, and that forces me to evaluate which harm is permissible. As a liberal I will (apparently) endeavour to use the fairness module to determine this - I will aim to ascertain objective blame and responsibility - I will apply cold mechanisms of law and justice. My child bullies another child and bloodies his nose - he's got a smack coming. My child defends himself against a bully and bloodies the bully's nose - I celebrate his bravery. So I am (attempting) to mediate my morality with objectivity.

But if I allow the in-group dynamic to dominate, then it's impossible for me to do anything other than support my child against the other. There is no appeal to objective reality. And, turning up the seriousness of the example, I permit my Jewish neighbour to be beaten in the street by local thugs because my leaders tell me it's right. I see the guy with a broken leg and a bleeding face and all, set on by a dozen bullies younger and stronger than he is, but that (objective) reality is irrelevant to me because according to Authority, Jews are not human like me, and their suffering doesn't count.

In short, the harm and fairness modules allow (albeit imperfectly) for objective reality and a rational assessment thereof. The in-group loyalty, respect for authority and sanctity modules mitigate exactly against such objective measures.

As to the issue of genetics itself:

He's just going about classifying the different moral rules encompassed by societies, but he certainly doesn't attempt to show that these moral differences are due to genetic differences between agricultural and industrial civilizations.

Fair enough, I don't think Haidt at any point actually claims this is a genetic issue, but it seems to me that his modular approach pretty much implies that certain brains are (hard)wired in certain varying fashions. How that happens exactly is up for grabs - but to me it chimes very closely with Pinker's argument about the evolved modular function of the brain.

[Mathis Waters]

I think you're misinterpreting Haidt (and me) somewhat wilfully here. We're not talking philosophically about what rules humans must or must not follow - we're talking pragmatically about what behavioural norms they evidentially do follow.

It took me a second to parse this, but unless I am wrong, you are referring to this sentence of mine: "So it provides neither a meta-rule about which rules humans can't follow nor one about which ones they must follow."

This was not a normative statement, although I certainly wouldn't accuse you of willful misinterpretation. Rather, it refers to Haidt's theory's explanatory value: it makes no novel statements about human nature, no predictions about what moral rules we might or might not expect to see in some hypothetical society. It is an exercise in categorization rather than explanation; like personality typologies.

In short, the harm and fairness modules allow (albeit imperfectly) for objective reality and a rational assessment thereof. The in-group loyalty, respect for authority and sanctity modules mitigate exactly against such objective measures.

I'm not seeing the difference. If, for example, your sole moral concern is "carry out the Führer's wishes," you want to know what, objectively, the Führer's wishes are. (The objective reality might be that the Führer-analogue doesn't exist, of course, but I don't see that as a fundamental problem for the value itself; imagine someone seeking to prevent the clear-cutting of a forest because it would cause the faeries who reside there to suffer.)

Fair enough, I don't think Haidt at any point actually claims this is a genetic issue, but it seems to me that his modular approach pretty much implies that certain brains are (hard)wired in certain varying fashions. How that happens exactly is up for grabs - but to me it chimes very closely with Pinker's argument about the evolved modular function of the brain.

The word "module" conjures up evolutionary explanations. But what about the evidence itself suggests that this-and-that or such-and-such is hardwired? What phenomena do we observe that would be much more likely if these categories are modules than if they are not? What about them cannot be explained by reduction to more basic psychological and social phenomena?

Pinker's framework of massive modularity allows, most unfortunately, for a lot of non-explanations to masquerade as explanations. To say that you've found an explanation for x - tada, it's because there's an x module! - is like saying you've discovered the identity of the serial killer of 1888 Whitechapel - why, he's Jack the Ripper! (Likewise for "drives" in psychoanalysis, &c.)

[Richard]

@ Galactus

Yeah, Diamond is Da Man as far as I'm concerned too - but I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing here. The Great Leap Forward, as I understand it (and, hey, I'm in no way an expert) pre-dates the whole agricultural thing by quite a few tens of thousands of years - it's more about a sudden surge in tool use, cooking of food, the evolution of language, symbolic concepts, artistic endeavour, trade etc....... Prior to this, it seems hominids had been sitting around scratching their arses and using a basic couple of flint tools for-fucking-ever with no impulse to change. Then - abruptly - Progress!

A long time later you get the shift of already pretty sophisticated hunter gatherer moderns into agricultural communities.

It'd be nice to think that liberal genetic inclination is what triggered that first inventive shift - but no, I don't really believe it. Too neat, too nice, and too affirming of the principles I hold dear against a universe that could give a fuck about them. (As a character in my next novel will say) If what you believe chimes closely with what you want to believe - then you're almost certainly wrong.

[Happy Ent]

Yeah, Diamond is Da Man as far as I'm concerned too - but I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing here. The Great Leap Forward, as I understand it (and, hey, I'm in no way an expert) pre-dates the whole agricultural thing by quite a few tens of thousands of years -

Yes, you’ve got the timing right. (It’s when dust arrives in Pullman’s mythology.) Diamond has nothing to say about this period.

[Richard]

@ Matthias

The objective reality might be that the Führer-analogue doesn't exist, of course, but I don't see that as a fundamental problem for the value itself; imagine someone seeking to prevent the clear-cutting of a forest because it would cause the faeries who reside there to suffer.

But you should see that as a fundamental problem - or at least, you should if you want to live in a sane modern society. To extend your analogy, if the only reason for seeking to save the forest is resident faeries (who don't exist), then what's to stop someone coming along and saying "No, no - it's okay, I talked to the faeries and they're moving out. In fact, they want us to clear this whole area because the Evil Trolls who are their sworn enemies have started using it as a refuge!" Sound environmental concerns go out the window and it's just a question of who's invisible friend has the last word. Basically, you end up counting angels dancing on the head of a pin - and that's no way to run a civilisation.

This was not a normative statement, although I certainly wouldn't accuse you of willful misinterpretation. Rather, it refers to Haidt's theory's explanatory value: it makes no novel statements about human nature, no predictions about what moral rules we might or might not expect to see in some hypothetical society

.

Okay, so apologies for the misunderstanding. But I don't see that a theory has to offer the extent of novelty or full hypothetical extrapolation you seem to want before it becomes worthwhile. Haidt's model offers a lot of convincing explanations for behaviour that are certainly fresh from my perspective, and that give me a fuller insight into the right wing mindset which I didn't have before. That, to my mind, makes it very useful at the explanatory level, because hard right wingers generally strike me as completely bat-shit crazy, and anything that helps us understand them better has to be helpful in general civilisational terms. Plus it doesn't hurt to understand my own basic drives a bit better either. It may be that you are a specialist in this field and seen from within said field, Haidt is not much of a trail-blazer - but for me, looking in from an educated layman's perspective, he seems to be breaking some very interesting fresh ground.

Pinker's framework of massive modularity allows, most unfortunately, for a lot of non-explanations to masquerade as explanations

Well, I won't argue Pinker with you, not least because you seem pretty solidly pre-disposed against him, and also because it would take more time than either of us have. Suffice it to say that I find his arguments make a great deal of very unpleasant but completely solid sense in areas where previous make-it-so sociological explanations have been found desperately wanting.

[Galactus]

But you should see that as a fundamental problem - or at least, you should if you want to live in a sane modern society.

Look over that argument a bit and then come back. You should see what's wrong with it.

[unJon]

Well, maybe - but in most of these cases, you generally get the impression that the author thinks this is just as cool as the participants do, which is where that falls down. Rooms full of self-important middle-class pretend-revolutionaries are, frankly, not that damn cool, no matter how crooked the berets or how pungent the Gauloise smoke.

That's certainly not true of Harkaway, which is the book that started this rant. For him it's a college thing that the narrator thinks of as

related to just having lots of sex at the end of the day, which I took to be a pretty sardonic, if accurate, view of such college communes. Add that to the damage caused by the narrators joining the beret wearing club: near death electric chair experiences and semi-forced army joining--and I think it pretty clear that Harkaway does not think the college group is "damn cool"

:unsure:

That said, I haven't read Banks or some of the other mentioned books, so cannot comment if authors find it more cool than it is....

[Mathis Waters]

But you should see that as a fundamental problem - or at least, you should if you want to live in a sane modern society. To extend your analogy, if the only reason for seeking to save the forest is resident faeries (who don't exist), then what's to stop someone coming along and saying "No, no - it's okay, I talked to the faeries and they're moving out. In fact, they want us to clear this whole area because the Evil Trolls who are their sworn enemies have started using it as a refuge!" Sound environmental concerns go out the window and it's just a question of who's invisible friend has the last word. Basically, you end up counting angels dancing on the head of a pin - and that's no way to run a civilisation.

I didn't say that inaccurate beliefs were not a problem, but that they weren't a problem for the value itself. The fact that there is no God is as irrelevant to the validity of authoritarianism as the nonexistence of faeries is irrelevant to the validity of compassion.

This was in anticipation of an argument that I expected you to make, but if you weren't going to, you can ignore it.

I don't see that a theory has to offer the extent of novelty or full hypothetical extrapolation you seem to want before it becomes worthwhile. Haidt's model offers a lot of convincing explanations for behaviour that are certainly fresh from my perspective, and that give me a fuller insight into the right wing mindset which I didn't have before. That, to my mind, makes it very useful at the explanatory level, because hard right wingers generally strike me as completely bat-shit crazy, and anything that helps us understand them better has to be helpful in general civilisational terms. Plus it doesn't hurt to understand my own basic drives a bit better either. It may be that you are a specialist in this field and seen from within said field, Haidt is not much of a trail-blazer - but for me, looking in from an educated layman's perspective, he seems to be breaking some very interesting fresh ground.

I'm not an expert, just an educated layperson like yourself; perhaps a little differently educated than yourself, as the lay usually are.

If all you mean is that Haidt's theory seems to be an enlightening description of the right-wing mindset, then I have no problem. (Although we should be careful: Lakoff offers a very plausible description of the right-wing mindset, but as far as I've investigated it's all nonsense.) But Haidt was raised in the context of questions of human nature, and you seem to believe that the five categories are distinct modules in the brain. (Or perhaps a module in the brain.) And I'm curious about what features of the model lead you to that conclusion. As best I can tell - and I'm trying not to be uncharitable here; it's quite possible I've misread you - the only reasons you have are that (i) there's nothing to prove that it isn't a module in some sense (it's hard to think of a psychological phenomenon for which this isn't true) and (ii) you, personally, would find it uncomfortable for these differing moral frameworks to be a module or modules. That's why I'm putting an emphasis on predictions: in order for us to have any reason to conclude that a hypothesis p is true or false, we would have to expect different data if p than if ~p.

Anyway, I apologize for leading us so off-topic.

[Happy Ent]

Anyway, I apologize for leading us so off-topic.

Oh, it’s all good! Spectacular thread…

[Stalker]

This is wrong, dammit. Socialism is a MASS MOVEMENT. Filled with MASSES. Who are all EQUALS. Boring, ordinary, normal people with their boring, ordinary normal lives WHOM YOU ARE EXACTLY LIKE.

This is realism. Socialism is not a mass movement. It is filled with people who want to be special. Boring, ordinary, normal people with their boring, ordinary normal lives are passionately uninterested in socialism, and just wants to get on with their lives. And in that, they are just like these activists

I want to believe that this is a sort of commentary on the attempt by people to use activism as a sort of self fulfillment at best and fashion at worst, but it never goes there.

I would like that too, but I wouldn't expect it; i wouldn't be surprised if these authors come from such circles themselves.

[sologdin]

filled with people who want to be special

reminds me of an article from details magazine about 15 years ago regarding leftwing politics in the US as the equivalent of the alpha chimp's dominance display (the article mixed college activists in with garage bands and performance artists).

the charismatic/aesthetic consideration strikes me as somewhat overemphasized, but it'd be contrary to basic marxist insights if one were to argue that the human consciousness that are in fact the products of capitalism somehow magically can become uninterested in the cultural products that capitalism irrationally valorizes (fame, celebrity, unsubstantiatable individualism, &c) simply because they assert an interest in left politics. that said, perhaps non-marxist socialists will adopt this kind of ahistoricist reasoning and argue that they have emancipated themselves, like nietzsche's overman, from historical necessity. such non-marxist lefties apparently need to read malcolm bull's article "reading nietzsche like a loser," from a few year's back in the new left review, which lays out the more or less compelling thesis that most readers of nietzsche assume that they, personally, adhere to the dictates of zarathustra and conceivably could be the ubermensch, and, accordingly, everyone else in the reader's life is a member of the herd. this reading is a secret desire, even though all such readers are likely to be the ultimate man, at best, but are more likely to be base herd members. a proper lefty reading of nietzsche, instead, should assume that the reader is a herd member and salvage what may remain.

i suspect that it may be similarly unrealistic, as above, to assume that the average reader of nietzsche is capable of reading the zarathustra like a loser precisely because the average reader of nietzsche is a dehistoricized bourgeois with little understanding of anything outside the narrow confines of cappy culture industry. (i do not of course except myself from this criticism.)

all that said, i accordingly find it to be an uncharitable criticism that seeks to deligitimate the concept of a socialist movement. (i.e., strictly speaking, "socialism" is not and has never been a movement, but is merely a broad term for a set of economics policies bearing various of many family resemblances, sufficiently wide in scope as to reasonably encompass the state capitalism of the US, the reformed welfare states of scandinavia, the third reich, the noveau christian socialism of neo-ortega, the ancient christian socialism of the Acts, the soviet experience in its totality, bismarck, and so on. it's an imprecise term, of little value when not properly delimited.) such a movement must necessarily be composed of avant garde members (gramsci's organic intellectuals, say) of the old order, and are necessarily conversant with that order. how could it possibly be otherwise?

[Lyanna Stark]

What an interesting thread! I will have to come back and read it later and read it properly.

For now though:

Happy Ent,

But why are no other recognisable political subgroups visible in SFF? Where are vegan Earth-worshipping tree-huggers? (Not that I mind…) The white-shirted, neat young conservative proto-fascists? (They make a very brief appearance in Iron Council, if I remember correctly—breaking up some theatre performance?) Where is the identity-politics, victimised, Dark Elf Power movement? Or am I just reading the wrong books?

Mieville does have some sort of conservative proto-fascists in "The City & The City", which I saw was also recommended by Lupigis and is an overall fabulous read.

Do let me know what you think about "Kraken" though as it reminded me of what Neil Gaiman might have written if he had accidentally inhaled too much commie crack. :)