Jump to content

Arab guilty of rape after consensual sex with Jew


Eurytus

Recommended Posts

ljkeane,

Because I want to?

Yes, but why do you want to? Clearly, you wouldn't want to if you thought it was the worst possible decision you could make, and the truth of it is it doesn't make any sense you would do it unless you thought it was the best possible decision you could make, even if "the best" were still radically awful.

Basically your argument is that every decision everyone makes must be moral because they made that decision? That seems somewhat circular.

I think we're talking past each other, because that doesn't sound to me like anything I've ever said.

sometimes people act in an immoral fashion.

I don't believe that's correct -- except in cases where they think that not to act so is or would have been even more immoral.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well I haven't murdered anyone so far which was the example I used. Why does there have to be a point? It's what I consider to be moral, sometimes people act in an immoral fashion.

Thats an exteme example. How do you vote? For what you believe to be moral or for what benefits you? And if you cosistently do the latter, well, how you explain that to yourself in none of my business - call it weakness or human nature or hypocricy or amorality or utalitarianism - but from my perspective theres absoloutely no difference whether your action were or weren't consistent with what you think is right. What I will use to decide whether I think you're a moral or an immoral person (per my own set of morals, ofcourse) is how you actually acted.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For what you believe to be moral or for what benefits you? And if you cosistently do the latter, well, how you explain that to yourself in none of my business - call it weakness or human nature or hypocricy or amorality or utalitarianism - but from my perspective theres absoloutely no difference whether your action were or weren't consistent with what you think is right. What I will use to decide whether I think you're a moral or an immoral person (per my own set of morals, ofcourse) is how you actually acted.

That's fine. What does it have to do with other people's moral codes?

Yes, but why do you want to? Clearly, you wouldn't want to if you thought it was the worst possible decision you could make, and the truth of it is it doesn't make any sense you would do it unless you thought it was the best possible decision you could make, even if "the best" were still radically awful.

Unless you think that the calculation of 'best' must be the same as the caluculation of 'moral' then so what? As I've been saying unless you consider some sort of calculation of net utility to be the sole determinant of 'moral' then there's no reason you can't choose to prioritize utility over morality.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

ljkeane,

Unless you think that the calculation of 'best' must be the same as the caluculation of 'moral' then so what?

As I've been saying unless you consider some sort of calculation of net utility to be the sole determinant of 'moral' then there's no reason you can't choose to prioritize utility over morality.

It sounds like you're just repeating a mantra over and over again, and I'm not seeing the logic in the statement itself.

You see, I don't really understand utilitarianism, either, only because utility is necessarily tautological to every philosophy. Why would you deliberately put obstacles in your own way to achieving your own values? The truth is, you wouldn't, unless some other value were taking precedence.

Earlier, you referenced deontology, but I didn't actually understand the progression of your argument. If you could point out to me where I've misunderstood deontology, that will be useful, but it seems to me that it's simply the a priori selction of a handful of Absolute Principles, and then you build the rest of your morality on that foundation. There's nothing in that, as far as I can see, that would benefit in any way from getting in its own way. To the extent that an adherent does not contradict himself or otherwise get in his own way, he is necessarily being utilitarian.

How is that not the case?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It sounds like you're just repeating a mantra over and over again, and I'm not seeing the logic in the statement itself.

I don't see what is difficult to follow, I'm saying utility maximisation is not inherantly moral.

Earlier, you referenced deontology, but I didn't actually understand the progression of your argument. If you could point out to me where I've misunderstood deontology, that will be useful, but it seems to me that it's simply the a priori selction of a handful of Absolute Principles, and then you build the rest of your morality on that foundation. There's nothing in that, as far as I can see, that would benefit in any way from getting in its own way. To the extent that an adherent does not contradict himself or otherwise get in his own way, he is necessarily being utilitarian.

As I said I don't particularly like philosophy but if someone who holds deontological principles were to choose to make a decison to maximise their utlity in violation their 'rules' then by their moral code they would be making an immoral decision. So unless it's not possible for them to get utility from an act in violation of their code I don't see the issue.

Seems like ljkeane is stating that human beings are for the most part immoral creatures and so the laws they create are also immoral, naturally. Seems strange to be so smug about that though.

No that's not what I'm stating but thanks for your input.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

ljkeane,

I'm don't believe you are making any definite statements about what is moral or not.

But it seems that you want to posit that a person can act in contradiction of her own values, which I don't understand.

I believe that a person necessarily employs a handful of major criteria to every decision she makes, though some of these assessments may take place sub rosa. Among the considerations: basic survival (will this kill me?), happiness (will this satisfy my lusts?), and love and belonging (will this hurt me by hurting people I love? will this hurt my place in society?).

A decision runs this gauntlet in basically zero time, and the condition in which it emerges, the action that results, depends in large part on the order in which these criteria are valued. If you value belonging above survival, then when faced with a decision like murder, which threatens your belonging, or not-murdering where the would-be victim threatens your own life, you're going to choose to die. If you value happiness above belonging, then when killing someone is going to make you rich, you're more likely to choose to kill. How could that not be the case? The only way for it to be else is to deny the initial assumptions -- that you do not, in fact, value belonging above survival, or happiness over belonging.

This process, which we all undergo, is morality. The hierarchy of these values in a given moment is our moral code of that interval.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well, please say what it is you say :) (though I won't be able to read your reply until tommorow)

That utility maximisation is not the sole determinant of what is moral and that as a consequence of that decisions based on utility maximisation are not necessarily moral or moral statements. :bang:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm don't believe you are making any definite statements about what is moral or not.

No I'm not. I'm making a statement on what I don't believe determines morality.

But it seems that you want to posit that a person can act in contradiction of her own values, which I don't understand.

Then since every decision anyone will ever make will be from at least a personal perspective 'moral' the concept is somewhat redundant. I don't think this reflects reality.

Look we obviously fundamentally disagree so I don't think this discusssion is going to go anywhere.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

That utility maximisation is not the sole determinant of what is moral and that as a consequence of that decisions based on utility maximisation are not necessarily moral or moral statements. :bang:

Well I popped back for a little while. So to respond:

Bring it down to commonsense language pealse. rolleyes.gif This utility maximization you speak of is a pretty murky thing. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize happyness for the group. Is this the maximization you speak of? Are you saying that morality is that but also other things? (I have no problem with that) And than you say that Utilitarian-based morality is not in fact moral?

But that's neither here nor there. We weren't speaking of what you don't believe in, we were discussing what you DO believe in (morally that is)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

ljkeane,

As I said I don't particularly like philosophy but if someone who holds deontological principles were to choose to make a decison to maximise their utlity in violation their 'rules' then by their moral code they would be making an immoral decision. So unless it's not possible for them to get utility from an act in violation of their code I don't see the issue.

I've missed it again. Sorry. The language is too obscure for me, and it's my wording :(

What I'm getting at is this: all morality, whatever your philosophy, be it deontology, utiliatrianism, or hedonism, or whatever, is simply the precise order of our values -- (x) > (y) > (z). When faced with (y) and (z), you're going to choose (y). If you didn't, then (y) > (z) would have to be false. Every decision we make reflects these values, though some decisions more explicitly and directly than others -- therefore, every decision is necessarily a moralistic one. In every choice, even if we don't like it or wish there was some other way, we are essentially doing what we think we must -- we are being as moral as we can.

ETA: I feel I should add a clarification here that I am referring in the above to what we have internalized as, and what we feel is our most moral choice -- not what we are able to intellectually point to and rationalize as the most moral choice.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

ljkeane,

Then since every decision anyone will ever make will be from at least a personal perspective 'moral' the concept is somewhat redundant. I don't think this reflects reality.

I understand what you're saying, about not wanting to continue the discussion, and I'm sorry about that, because I'd really like to know where the disconnect is between that understanding and reality. What are the problems with such a description?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

But any decision where you are making a value-judgement (IE: judging one thing as better/worse than another) you're making a moral decision.

wouldn't some of those value-judgments be more appropriately described as aesthetic judgments? for instance, the scientist reads the experimental data that her computer shat out and decides that the data are good enough to conclude that her hypothesis is both falsifiable and not falsified by the data. sure, it's got a lot of the routine indicia of scientific descriptive discourse about it, but the ultimate judgment was aesthetic (rather, i.e., than moral).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Stego,

Ridiculous statement. You lack understanding of morality. (Which is great for a prospective lawyer. :D )

Why would you do anything except because you should? If you do it because you want to, then you've decided that you should do what you want to do; indeed, this particular value is a cornerstone of hedonism. Not all moral philosophies are necessarily antithetical to our basic desires as we find them.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

But any decision where you are making a value-judgement (IE: judging one thing as better/worse than another) you're making a moral decision.

wouldn't some of those value-judgments be more appropriately described as aesthetic judgments? for instance, the scientist reads the experimental data that her computer shat out and decides that the data are good enough to conclude that her hypothesis is both falsifiable and not falsified by the data. sure, it's got a lot of the routine indicia of scientific descriptive discourse about it, but the ultimate judgment was aesthetic (rather, i.e., than moral).

that would be a decision that does not affect other people, so its morally akin to choosing between chocolate and vanilla - a personal question of taste or judgment that dosen't have a moral component. (of course, depending on the data, it might affect other people, but here we trust our scientist that shes not using that criteria but simply her understanding of the data.)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Lugez,

I know this is just a parenthetical, a sort of throwaway point, but you've excited my curiosity: what kind of deception would qualify as sufficiently "gross" to warrant a charge of rape, where there is no other basis for that charge?

Hard to say. I understand drawing the line between "simple deception" and "rape" could be very difficult. I'm even open to the idea perhaps any type of deception shouldn't be rape. But whatever, I've gone this far.

But I would say rape can be argued when a person goes to extreme lengths to preserve his/her charade for the purpose of manipulating someone into having sex. A case in which the manipulated individual could be REASONABLY duped.

I don't believe this case falls into that situation. The guy told the girl he was a Jew, and she immediately bought it without looking into the matter further. If she wanted to, she could have easily seen through the lie. But nope, they decided to have sex later.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.

Guest
This topic is now closed to further replies.
×
×
  • Create New...