Religion IV: Deus vult!

[Sci-2]

Sci,

Why acknowledge subtlety and nuance when you can present a false dichotomy?

:P

I think people unacquainted with theist philosophers assume it's all about grasping for anything that can even slightly suggest God. Feser's varied complaints about IDers shows that's not the case.

(I agree with Feser on this - ID and FTU are at best probability arguments for something or someone to intervene in natural processes. I don't believe even taking them together proves there's a God as conceived by religions worshiping Yaweh, Isvara, Allah, etc.)

What other options do you see?

A vision due to exhaustion or drug use during which they confront a representation of their psyche.

Or, if there's no reason to doubt their mental processing at the time time, perhaps it is a representation of a possibly extant Collective Unconscious.

Or maybe it was a representation of the Divine manifesting in such a way as to best communicate with that person.

Or perhaps it's a real spirit masquerading as a god.

Or perhaps the god they saw is a real being, whether it's Zeus or whoever.

Now if you're asking if I'll do whatever this supposed deity told me to do, just because the deity said so, the answer is No. But that would be my answer even if I saw Jesus's corpse get up, or Krsna kill a giant demon while still a baby, etc.

[Queen Ayras Lord Commander]

Alien Jesus:

http://s1376.photobucket.com/user/Dekoms/media/P1080014_zps09595347.jpg.html

[Larry of the Lawn]

madness is the Outside leaking in.

[TrueMetis]

Magic versus Metaphysics

Guy in your first link is a moron. It an entirely irrelevant point since we don't actually know the universe had a beginning, indeed most evidence suggests the big bang was a change in state not a coming into existence. With that in mind that people are confusing "everything with a beginning has a cause" and "everything in existence has a cause" still doesn't matter because "a cause" doesn't in a way need to be a deity. The author can call this "intellectually unserious" all he wants but that doesn't make it true.

[OnionAhaiReborn]

Best part of that article:

To be sure, many theists do in fact believe in paranormal phenomena. Alleged paranormal practices of the sort often labeled “occult” or “magical” are condemned by the Catholic Church, not merely because they are often phony (though of course they often are phony), but because even if authentic they involve an appeal to demonic powers or lost souls. Now angels, demons, and souls are of course associated in the popular mind with all sorts of superstitions and crude images. But rightly understood there is nothing superstitious about them, and certainly nothing “magical” in the objectionable sense of being intrinsically unintelligible. The traditional philosophical arguments for the immateriality of the intellect provide independent grounds for holding that it is possible in principle for there to be a disembodied intelligence. And in traditional theology, that is exactly what an angel, a demon, or a postmortem soul is supposed to be. Here too, while one could of course disagree with the arguments in question, they are not “magical” in the sense of appealing to powers regarded as intrinsically unintelligible. (It is worth emphasizing that Aristotle himself, who had no Christian theological ax to grind, thought that there were such things as disembodied intelligences.)

So he hints, at the very least, that he believes in demons and lost souls, but you'd better not dare to accuse him of believing in magic. The whole thing was a bizarre exercise in defining away a word- magic- that he doesn't want applied to his beliefs, by saying, in determined ignorance of common usage, that the word only means things which are intrinsically unintelligible. And then he says that he can explain the supernatural things he believes in and therefore they aren't magical.

If we instead pursue common sense and colloquial usage, it's obvious that anyone accusing theists of belief in magic are making a comparison to largely defunct folk-belief in spells, curses, mythical creatures, and evil spirits. Magic refers to a category of purported supernatural abilities or beings, a definition with actual historical and linguistic purchase. Feser walks right into the comparison, because it appears does believe in these things, as must anyone who believes all of the teachings of the Catholic Church. If he doesn't like having it called magic, he shouldn't believe in such things, instead of talking in circles to demand that a word which now connotes- for good reason!- silliness and unseriousness be given special definition so it won't apply to his beliefs.

[Sci-2]

Guy in your first link is a moron. It an entirely irrelevant point since we don't actually know the universe had a beginning, indeed most evidence suggests the big bang was a change in state not a coming into existence. With that in mind that people are confusing "everything with a beginning has a cause" and "everything in existence has a cause" still doesn't matter because "a cause" doesn't in a way need to be a deity. The author can call this "intellectually unserious" all he wants but that doesn't make it true.

How does this disprove the Cosmological Argument? Whether a Prime Mover requires an intellect - that's an interesting question & I've wondered about that myself. I have Feser's book on Aquinas's philosophy but I've not gotten to that part. I'm still trying to grasp the basic metaphysics, as the book is not as introductory as I'd hoped.

Given the existence of Platonic Atheism it seems like it's possible to have the (possibly) necessary metaphysical lynchpins without recourse to theism.

If we instead pursue common sense and colloquial usage, it's obvious that anyone accusing theists of belief in magic are making a comparison to largely defunct folk-belief in spells, curses, mythical creatures, and evil spirits. Magic refers to a category of purported supernatural abilities or beings, a definition with actual historical and linguistic purchase. Feser walks right into the comparison, because it appears does believe in these things, as must anyone who believes all of the teachings of the Catholic Church. If he doesn't like having it called magic, he shouldn't believe in such things, instead of talking in circles to demand that a word which now connotes- for good reason!- silliness and unseriousness be given special definition so it won't apply to his beliefs.

But that just seems like begging the question to me - you're saying certain things acceptable within a particular metaphysics are proof that metaphysical paradigm is wrong. Doesn't that strike you as an unfair philosophical conclusion?

If - and no doubt it's a BIG IF - there is a metaphysics that can be shown to accommodate souls/God/angels/etc, and if this metaphysics better explains the accepted consensus reality than others, isn't he right to deny the charge that it's magic[?] He's using the term to describe something taken on as a brute fact, as he notes here in that same Magic vs Metaphysics post:

Indeed, if any view is plausibly accused of being “magical” in the sense in question, it is atheism itself. The reason is that it is very likely that an atheist has to hold that the operation of at least the fundamental laws that govern the universe is an “unintelligible brute fact”; as I have noted before, that was precisely the view taken by J. L. Mackie and Bertrand Russell. The reason an atheist (arguably) has to hold this is that to allow that the world is not ultimately a brute fact -- that it is intelligible through and through -- seems to entail that there is some level of reality which is radically non-contingent or necessary in an absolute sense. And that would in turn be to allow (so the traditional metaphysician will argue) that there is something which, as the Thomist would put it, is pure actuality and ipsum esse subsistens or “subsistent being itself” -- and thus something which has the divine attributes which inexorably flow from being pure actuality and ipsum esse subsistens. Hence it would be to give up atheism.

Now I think he's wrong that rejection of brute fact requires theism - Matthews lays out an alternative Taoist-leaning case in Panpsychism as Paradigm and the aforementioned Why Has the West Failed to Embrace Panpsychism?.

But I think he's right that brute facts are, under a paradigm-neutral definition of magic, in some sense "magical".

[Liffguard]

There are two main problems with the cosmological argument as I see it, both problems being with its premises. Firstly it is not true that every action has a cause. The entire field of quantum physics is built on the observation of uncaused effects. The very early universe would have been small enough to operate on the quantum scale. Secondly, it assumes the universe had to have had a beginning, which is an unwarranted assumption. We don't know whether the universe had a beginning in time and it might even be a logically meaningless question. What's before the universe? What's north of the north pole?

[OnionAhaiReborn]

But that just seems like begging the question to me - you're saying certain things acceptable within a particular metaphysics are proof that metaphysical paradigm is wrong. Doesn't that strike you as an unfair philosophical conclusion?

If there is a metaphysics that can be shown to accommodate souls/God/angels/etc, and if this metaphysics better explains the accepted consensus reality than others, isn't he right to deny the charge that it's magic. He's using the term to describe something taken on as a brute fact, as he notes here:

No, the comparison doesn't prove that it's wrong. What it does is ask people to question why, if they do, they disbelieve in the magic of folk-lore, and then to draw the comparison to what are similar claims made by some theists- in this case a staunchly Catholic theist- with a mind toward getting them to apply the reasons for their disbelief in the folk-magic to the claims of theists. Without the disbelief in folk-magic the comparison won't persuade anyone, but with the disbelief it invites the listener to apply consistent reasoning.

Feser's pursuit here is frivolous- it amounts to "it's not magic if it can be explained." All he's done is to redefine the word magic away from its actual accepted common use and meaning because he doesn't like having it applied to his beliefs, even though under its actual accepted common use and meaning the comparison is perfectly fair. It amounts to Feser believing in magic but not wanting it to be called magic because he recognizes its silly connotation. What he should be arguing is that magic is real, and he thinks he can prove it, which apparently he does. Instead he makes up a definition that no one follows, uses it to declare his belief in magic not a belief in magic, and then childishly turn around and accuse atheists, using his made up definition, of belief in magic.

[Liffguard]

Going back to the idea of an incomprehensible god; a god so vast, complex and powerful that it is in principle impossible for us to understand. I have many more objections to this idea. Firstly and most obviously, it's completely unfalsifiable. Because this god is ineffable, anything and everything can be attributed to it. Child dies? God's plan is mysterious. Child lives? Praise god! By definition, any and all events become evidence for this god's existence, or at least can't be evidence against.

Related to the above point, what is such a god for? If your god is incomprehensible then how does anyone know what such a god is like? Why assume it is good rather than evil? Why assign it a moral dimension at all? Maybe it prefers that all humans paint themselves purple and walk on their hands on the summer solstice of every leap year? How could you tell? Certainly no one is any position to tell other people about what such a god wants. You don't get to tell me that god is incomprehensible on the one hand and then turn around and try to pass laws based on this god's supposed desires. If you want to posit the existence of such a deity as a purely intellectual exercise then that's fine I guess. But such a god, by definition, can have no observable, measurable effect upon the world. Whilst such a god might, in theory, technically exist, its existence would be irrelevent. As soon as a god acts in such a way that it affects the physical world in even the slightest degree then at least one aspect of it has become partially observable and comprehensible.

[Queen Ayras Lord Commander]

Going back to the idea of an incomprehensible god; a god so vast, complex and powerful that it is in principle impossible for us to understand.

I always just met this line of thought with, "Why talk about it or think about it then? If we cannot comprehend then we're just wasting time."

[TerraPrime]

I always just met this line of thought with, "Why talk about it or think about it then? If we cannot comprehend then we're just wasting time."

There's a value to that kind of god as a human Rorschach test. You know, a nomadic tribe of sheep herders persecuted and marginalized saw one thing and a Vedic prince besieged by class guilt saw something different, maybe?

[Gears of the Beast]

There are two main problems with the cosmological argument as I see it, both problems being with its premises. Firstly it is not true that every action has a cause. The entire field of quantum physics is built on the observation of uncaused effects. The very early universe would have been small enough to operate on the quantum scale. Secondly, it assumes the universe had to have had a beginning, which is an unwarranted assumption. We don't know whether the universe had a beginning in time and it might even be a logically meaningless question. What's before the universe? What's north of the north pole?

I think another main problem with it is that it's often just a case of 'special pleading'. It states that everything that exists needs a cause but then to get around the infinite regress problem with "what causes god" they just say "well, he doesn't need one, he's the uncaused cause, he's outside of time". Most instances of the cosmological argument I encounter are special pleading.

I'm not sure why so many apologists love the cosmological argument, I think it's pretty shit and there are even better ones out there. Like Matt Slick's version of the Transcendental Argument (although there are still plenty of fallacies in it).

[Liffguard]

I think another main problem with it is that it's often just a case of 'special pleading'. It states that everything that exists needs a cause but then to get around the infinite regress problem with "what causes god" they just say "well, he doesn't need one, he's the uncaused cause, he's outside of time". Most instances of the cosmological argument I encounter are special pleading.

And on top of all that, even if you can reasonably conclude that the Universe had an uncaused cause that is exempt from regress, the theist's work is still cut out for him. He still has yet to prove that:

- The prime mover is an entity or agency rather than a blind physical process.

- The prime mover still exists in any capacity.

- The prime mover has capacity to act in any way beyond setting the initial boundary conditions.

- The prime mover is in some way sentient or conscious.

- The prime mover is in some way sentient or conscious in a manner conducive to giving even a single fuck about one primate species on one planet in one insignificant corner of the universe.

- The prime mover wants to be worshipped.

- The prime mover isn't too fond of gay people.

- etc.

A lot of theists take the cosmological argument as true (which I don't think it is but whatever). Even if they're right, all they've done is proved that at one point there was some entity or process capable of starting the universe. That's it. They still have to demonstrate further reasons as to why we should assign all of these very specific religious characteristics to this entity or process.

[Gears of the Beast]

snip

And on top of all of that we have the problem of proof by logic which Hume addressed:

David Hume argues against a-priori proofs of matters of fact in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:

1.Premise: Nothing can be proved to exist a priori unless its non-existence would imply a contradiction.

2.Premise: Nothing that is demonstrable or distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction.

3.Premise: For everything that conceivably existing, we can also conceive its non-existence.

4.From (2) and (3), there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction.

5.From (1) and (4), there is no being who's existence is demonstrable a priori.

"I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it."

[TrueMetis]

How does this disprove the Cosmological Argument? Whether a Prime Mover requires an intellect - that's an interesting question & I've wondered about that myself. I have Feser's book on Aquinas's philosophy but I've not gotten to that part. I'm still trying to grasp the basic metaphysics, as the book is not as introductory as I'd hoped.

Oh fuck off Sci, let's not pretend that the Prime Mover people who use the Cosmological Argument for is anything other than a god.

I think another main problem with it is that it's often just a case of 'special pleading'. It states that everything that exists needs a cause but then to get around the infinite regress problem with "what causes god" they just say "well, he doesn't need one, he's the uncaused cause, he's outside of time". Most instances of the cosmological argument I encounter are special pleading.

I'm not sure why so many apologists love the cosmological argument, I think it's pretty shit and there are even better ones out there. Like Matt Slick's version of the Transcendental Argument (although there are still plenty of fallacies in it).

Well to be fair (cause the guy in Sci's link whined about exactly this) it's "things that began to exist" that need a cause. Even though indeed many people making the cosmological argument do reduce it to everything needs a cause. So it's still special pleading in that it assumes that the universe began to exist but god didn't. Ultimately despite that guys bitching that difference between "everything has a cause" and "everything that has a beginning has a cause" is unimportant.

[Gears of the Beast]

Oh fuck off Sci, let's not pretend that the Prime Mover people who use the Cosmological Argument for is anything other than a god.

Well to be fair (cause the guy in Sci's link whined about exactly this) it's "things that began to exist" that need a cause. Even though indeed many people making the cosmological argument do reduce it to everything needs a cause. So it's still special pleading in that it assumes that the universe began to exist but god didn't. Ultimately despite that guys bitching that difference between "everything has a cause" and "everything that has a beginning has a cause" is unimportant.

Well no, that's the kalam cosmological argument which appears to be created in an attempt to get around those problems with the cosmological argument. I'd argue it's still special pleading but it's definitely begging the question. I'll quote Dan Barker:

The curious clause “everything that begins to exist” implies that reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE), and those that do not (NBE). In order for this cosmological argument to work, NBE (if such a set is meaningful) cannot be empty[2], but more important, it must accommodate more than one item to avoid being simply a synonym for God. If God is the only object allowed in NBE, then BE is merely a mask for the Creator, and the premise “everything that begins to exist has a cause” is equivalent to “everything except God has a cause.” As with the earlier failures, this puts God into the definition of the premise of the argument that is supposed to prove God’s existence, and we are back to begging the question.

[TrueMetis]

Well no, that's the kalam cosmological argument which appears to be created in an attempt to get around those problems with the cosmological argument. I'd argue it's still special pleading but it's definitely begging the question. I'll quote Dan Barker:

Forgot to distinguish the two, my mistake. The guy in sci link was using the Kalam version though he just said cosmological argument and I did the same.

[Gears of the Beast]

Sorry for beating the dead horse (because the cosmological argument is very much a dead horse) but Iron Chariots also has a great bit on equivocation in the kalam cosmological argument.

Kalam also equivocates on the first premise when it refers to everything that "begins to exist". Presumably this premise is referring to everything around us on this planet--everything in your house, everything on the streets, everything we see in the cosmos. However all of these things did not "begin to exist" in the same sense theists are claiming the universe "began to exist" (creation ex nihilo). According to the laws of thermodynamics, matter can neither be created nor destroyed, and everything we are familiar with is a actually reconfiguration of preexisting matter than has been around for billions of years. The atoms that comprise people, places, and planets do not "come into existence" in the same sense Kalam is claiming the universe came into existence (matter appearing from a previous state of non-being/non-existence). Rather they have always existed in some form, and the objects we see around us are merely the latest rearrangements of those atoms. So in speaking of the universe requiring a "cause" for it's existence, Kalam is not referring to it as you would an automobile, which is being "caused" by a group of laborers rearranging physical matter into the form of a car, or mountains being "caused" by the shifting of tectonic plates (also made of atoms which have been around since the big bang), but of something being caused by creation ex nihilo, which is not at all the type of creation we are familiar with in every other circumstance. Kalam therefore is using a word game and the fallacy of equivocation on the phrase "begins to exist" to try and draw a parallel between wildly different things.

In summary: Kalam proponents believe God made the universe exist ex nihilo. But everything around us only "begins to exist" in a trivial sense, as rearrangements of preexisting, uncreated stuff. Since the universe is literally the only example of something truly "beginning to exist" from a previous state of nothingness, this means there is a sample set of one in this category, leaving no inductive support for the premise that "whatever begins to exist (ex nihilo) has a cause".

Once the argument is reformulated to take into account the hidden premises, it looks like this:

1. Every rearrangement of pre-existing matter has a cause. (supported by every observation, ever.)
2. The universe began to exist from absolute nonexistence, NOT from a rearrangement of pre-existing matter.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

In other words:

1. Every X has a cause.
2. The universe Y.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

As you can see, once the equivocation is made plain, the argument is invalid.

Additionally, while the term "universe" is commonly understood to mean "the sum of everything that exists," Kalam represents an attempt to establish the existence of something outside the universe. This is conceivable only in the case of a non-standard definition (which presumably involves some kind of distinction between a physical universe and some other realm external to it). In this case, the first premise becomes even more tenuous; how can one assert that everything that begins to exist has a cause when one believes in the existence of a realm outside of our universe with properties unlike anything we can discover through mere observation? A commonsense version of causality is not applicable here...meaning we now have a problem defining "cause" in this context!

[Sci-2]

Oh fuck off Sci, let's not pretend that the Prime Mover people who use the Cosmological Argument for is anything other than a god.

Huh? My point was that even establishing a metaphysical lynchpin like the Prime Mover may not establish an actual intelligence. If it's just a lynchpin then it can't be a God.

I thought that was the point you were making, and I thought I was agreeing with you. [At least I wasn't trying to refute that point. Once I finish Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide I'll be able to say more.]

[Sci-2]

Archbishop Sues Satanists for Return of Consecrated Host

Coakley claims Daniels possesses a consecrated host without authorization and that it "must have been procured from the Catholic Church by theft, fraud, wrongful taking" by Daniels or a third party.
The archbishop says the defendants have scheduled a black mass at the Cityspace Theatre in Oklahoma City on Sept. 21, where they intend to "desecrate and destroy" the consecrated host.
"Defendants describe what they plan to do with the consecrated host at the black mass: 'The consecrated host is corrupted by sexual fluids, then it becomes the sacrifice of the mass,'" the complaint states. "Defendants also plan to stomp on the consecrated host during the black mass. According to the defendants' website, black masses can include 'nudity, public urination, and other sex acts' and have included '[f]orms of bestiality along with animal sacrifice.'"
The Archdiocese did not respond to a request for comment Wednesday evening.
Two weeks ago, Coakley denounced the black mass for desecrating the consecrated host "in the vilest ways imaginable."
"This terrible sacrilege is a deliberate attack on the Catholic Mass as well as the foundational beliefs of all Christians," Coakley wrote in an Aug. 4 statement on the Archdiocese website. "It mocks Our Lord Jesus Christ, whom we Catholics believe is truly present under the form of bread and wine in the Holy Eucharist when it has been consecrated by a validly ordained priest."
Coakley expressed concern that city officials have refused to cancel the black mass from taking place at a public facility.
"I have raised my concerns with city officials and pointed out how deeply offensive this proposed sacrilegious act is to Christians and especially to the more than 250,000 Catholics who live in Oklahoma," Coakley wrote. "I am certainly concerned about the misuse of a publicly supported facility for an event which has no other purpose than mocking the Catholic faith. I am especially concerned about the dark powers that this Satanic worship invites into our community and the spiritual danger that this poses to all who are involved in it, directly or indirectly."
Coakley asked his congregation to include the Prayer to St. Michael the Archangel at the end of each mass until Sept. 29.
The Satanist group did not respond to a request for comment Wednesday evening.
It will make "slight changes" to the black mass "so that a public viewing can occur without breaking Oklahoma's laws based on nudity, public urination, and other sex acts," the group said on its website.
Coakley seeks an order directing the return of the consecrated host and reimbursement for costs and attorneys' fees.