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America dropping the A-bomb


Centrist Simon Steele

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[quote name='mcbigski' post='1617525' date='Dec 12 2008, 11.25']C'mon. Did the war make electromagnetism stop working in Japan? They had radios. They weren't relying on the Pony Express. I suspect you're only saying a week is enough time because they weren't given that long.[/quote]

I chose that interval because it is long enough for the leadership to SEE images of the devastation, and talk a day or two.

Three might not be, especially in the chaos. And I am sincere when I say that if they hadn't surrendered unconditionally in a week, it would be reasonable to assume they weren't going to.

I say that number because when they WERE given that time, they surrendered. There is no way to know for sure that two cities destroyed tipped the balance when one would not have, but I sure wish they'd have been given the chance. And I think that the failure to give them that chance constitutes a crime. And the crimes committed by the Japanese military in other parts of Asia do not sufficiently justify committing this crime against their civilians.
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[quote name='sologdin' post='1617279' date='Dec 12 2008, 09.45'](these data [url="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-final-months-of-the-war-with-japan-signals-intelligence-u-s-invasion-planning-and-the-a-bomb-decision/csi9810001.html"]explained[/url] by a less hostile source.)

for me, the estimates of the JWPC in 1945 and the war department in 1946 are dispositive; eisenhower, nimitz, and macarthur are just icing on the cake.[/quote]

Kind of cherry picking aren't ya? My reading of the source suggests the leaders were a bit baffled by Truman's request for a casualty estimate for an operation whose directives were already approved. Their estimates were based on defensive numbers that were later found to be very inaccurate. They admitted that the estimates could vary DRASTICALLY. They were presented by planners who were trying to avoid scaring Truman out of pursuing the objectives due to a high death count. They were edited to obfuscate the totals in the final version. And they were heavily disputed by various other commanders who suggested much higher numbers based off casualty rates in other island conflicts.

Guess the message is...don't ask people to read your sources...cause they might actually do so. :)
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EHK--

i included the CIA document as indication that the zezima attribution was not just some crazy lefty's imagination.

my reading of the CIA guy's text leads me to understand that the JWPC regarded itself as making a professional estimate, rather than a prophecy, and so of course allowed for variation in the result. that the CIA guy exposes the data on which the JWPC based its estimates to be erroneous does not necessarily make the estimate erroneous: if japan has increased its defenses of kyushu from 350K to 600K, i assume that these soldiers are moved from elsewhere, and not conjured from the astral plane by some 9th-level shinto spell. if that's the case, then we move the estimated casualties from honshu to kyushu, and the overall estimate can stay where zezima asserts it to be. (all of this assumes that CIA guy is not wrong in his analysis.)

all that said, my point with the zezima/CIA document was not the fantasy that no casualties were predicted, but simply that the numbers were not understood at the time to be what truman claimed them to be, both before and after the cities were nuked. (even doubling the JWPC estimate to account for the doubling of the kyushu defenders doesn't get us to truman's "over a million lives" or even to his less ridiculous estimate of 200K US lives.)

the war department's 1946 study is actually more important to the case that the atomic bombings were unnecessary, IMO, to a japanese surrender. it furthermore seems likely that everyone knew that japan's defeat was imminent--how else could the allies be confident in demanding an [i]unconditional[/i] surrender?

all of this was merely in support of my first post in the thread: the bombs were dropped because of industrial & geostrategic necessity, and not the tactical necessity of forcing a surrender or the moral/economic necessity of sparing lives. (given the massive investment in the manhatttan project, we can be certain that those things were getting dropped soon enough--if not in japan, then on the soviets in eastern europe or the north koreans or whoever.)

it also seems to be an underestimation to suggest that winning the war was the only goal--of course the US wanted to win, and wanted to win quickly, cheaply, and so on. but it is able to conceive of the post-war world at the same time (plenty of this went on at bretton woods and dumbarton oaks, say). part of that post-war world was dealing with stalin--the suggestion that the bombs weren't used and timed in their use to impress uncle joe strikes me as inconsistent with the post-war planning. it doesn't really matter whether intimidation of stalin was the main goal of the bombs or just one of several important considerations--it's not like one or the other makes the atomic & firebombs suddenly non-criminal.



as an aside: how impressed are we by the thesis that the WTC in 2001 is a military target under the rationale of the US strategic bombing command during WWII?
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[quote name='litechick' post='1617029' date='Dec 12 2008, 01.19']Simon, it's OK to be conflicted. We should be conflicted. We just can't let that conflict lead to bitter cynicism. We can't give up on trying to do the right thing even if we can't be sure what that is. We can't let that conflict sap us of our resolve to make the best decision we can and execute a plan accordingly.[/quote]

I guess that's the problem with being conflicted, we often become cynical. I am hopeful though, after that display in Japan no one has used a nuke since. I believe our country will never use a nuke, not even in retaliation.

It's definitely a tough one. Tzanth--great perspectives I hadn't seen before.
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[quote name='Ser Scot A Ellison' post='1617126' date='Dec 12 2008, 05.33']All that said I no longer favor the use of the Bombs at the end of WWII. It was deliberately targeting civilians and I believe that is a war crime.[/quote]

That's the biggest thing for me too. Civilians.
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[quote name='sologdin' post='1617833' date='Dec 12 2008, 19.09']EHK--
my reading of the CIA guy's text leads me to understand that the JWPC regarded itself as making a professional estimate, rather than a prophecy, and so of course allowed for variation in the result.[/quote]

They were also an organization with a vested interest in underestimating the totals and took actions that may suggest such motivations were in fact acted upon.

[quote]that the CIA guy exposes the data on which the JWPC based its estimates to be erroneous does not necessarily make the estimate erroneous: if japan has increased its defenses of kyushu from 350K to 600K, i assume that these soldiers are moved from elsewhere, and not conjured from the astral plane by some 9th-level shinto spell. if that's the case, then we move the estimated casualties from honshu to kyushu, and the overall estimate can stay where zezima asserts it to be. (all of this assumes that CIA guy is not wrong in his analysis.)[/quote]

They were moved from elsewhere. From naval ground troops. From mainland asia. AKA, places we weren't planning on invading at that point. So more troops concentrated there doesn't necessarily mean an easier job for us anyplace else. Cause most of them were coming from places where we weren't planning jobs. Also, we clearly didn't have ideal intelligence on the situation as many of those divisions were already in place long before we made the 250,000 soldier short estimate. Even with the intercepted communications, its quite likely that we underestimated their total strength significantly.

[quote]all that said, my point with the zezima/CIA document was not the fantasy that no casualties were predicted, but simply that the numbers were not understood at the time to be what truman claimed them to be, both before and after the cities were nuked. (even doubling the JWPC estimate to account for the doubling of the kyushu defenders doesn't get us to truman's "over a million lives" or even to his less ridiculous estimate of 200K US lives.)

the war department's 1946 study is actually more important to the case that the atomic bombings were unnecessary, IMO, to a japanese surrender. it furthermore seems likely that everyone knew that japan's defeat was imminent--how else could the allies be confident in demanding an [i]unconditional[/i] surrender?[/quote]

Again, this group's estimate seemed to be dedicated to the primary purpose of not scaring the President away from invasion. They removed the sum totals of troops and casualties from the final version. Subtly cautioned MacArthur on his numbers. Suggested that casualty rates shouldn't exceed much earlier island ventures rather than the much more devastating recent ones like Okinawa.

However given the numbers and extensive preparations, its quite likely things would be worse. 350,000 to 600,000+ doesn't tell the whole story. The commanders likely anticipated suicide tactics, but not to the extent that later intelligence showed. Every obsolete plain in site was being prepped for suicide runs. Pilots trained for night kamikaze attacks. A whole flotilla of small suicide boats prepped to meet the navy and landing forces. Massive incendiary devices. Not only did this not look like a force ready to surrender, it looked like one prepping to fight on til the bitter end and willing...and even perhaps able to inflict a hell of alot more causalities than even the most gruesome estimates of allied command.

As for the imminence of defeat...naval and air commanders thought it wouldn't take an invasion. Army ground commanders thought it would....go figure.

[quote]all of this was merely in support of my first post in the thread: the bombs were dropped because of industrial & geostrategic necessity, and not the tactical necessity of forcing a surrender or the moral/economic necessity of sparing lives. (given the massive investment in the manhatttan project, we can be certain that those things were getting dropped soon enough--if not in japan, then on the soviets in eastern europe or the north koreans or whoever.)[/quote]

Except it doesn't support that assertion. Somehow I don't think that 'well, we spent alot of money on it' is gonna be a remotely significant motivation for killing 200,000+ people. Intimidating the Soviets likely played a factor, but there's very little reason to believe it was a dominant one. As I've said many times it was a tool in the arsenal, one amongst many used to force the enemy towards the inevitable conclusion. It worked.
[quote]it also seems to be an underestimation to suggest that winning the war was the only goal[/quote]

I'd agree. Perhaps you can find the SoB who suggested that. Dominant purpose? Primary purpose? Yes. Only purpose? I never said that.
[quote]part of that post-war world was dealing with stalin--the suggestion that the bombs weren't used and timed in their use to impress uncle joe strikes me as inconsistent with the post-war planning.[/quote]

Again, find me the dirty son of a bitch who said that. Cause I didn't. I never disputed that intimidating Joe factored into the equation. I simply disputed how significantly.

[quote]it doesn't really matter whether intimidation of stalin was the main goal of the bombs or just one of several important considerations--it's not like one or the other makes the atomic & firebombs suddenly non-criminal.[/quote]

If it doesn't matter, than why bring it up? If the primary goal was to end the war quickly and save lives...and it did both (for sake of argument), what makes it so inherently criminal?

[quote]as an aside: how impressed are we by the thesis that the WTC in 2001 is a military target under the rationale of the US strategic bombing command during WWII?[/quote]

Slightly more impressed if they actually had any legitimate grievances that would rise to the level of justifying an attack against the US.
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[quote name='sologdin' post='1617833' date='Dec 13 2008, 02.09']the war department's 1946 study is actually more important to the case that the atomic bombings were unnecessary, IMO, to a japanese surrender.[/quote]
It would have been quite useful to have those studies in August 1945, but alas, they weren't there. It is quite likely that the bombings were unnecessary, but how were the Allies to know that?
[quote]it furthermore seems likely that everyone knew that japan's defeat was imminent--how else could the allies be confident in demanding an [i]unconditional[/i] surrender?[/quote]
It was obvious that Japan had lost. As the Potsdam Declaration points out, they didn't have the men or the resources to challenge the powers assembled against them and they had no way of getting more. In the long term, Japan was screwed and everybody knew it. But in the short term, they had some rather well defended positions and soldiers with a willingness to commit what amounts to suicide if it furthered their cause. If we had actually had to invade them, it would cost many American lives.
[quote]all of this was merely in support of my first post in the thread: the bombs were dropped because of industrial & geostrategic necessity, and not the tactical necessity of forcing a surrender or the moral/economic necessity of sparing lives. (given the massive investment in the manhatttan project, we can be certain that those things were getting dropped soon enough--if not in japan, then on the soviets in eastern europe or the north koreans or whoever.)[/quote]
We can live without live tests of new weapons -- we've pretty much have ever since. However, given that they didn't appear to be surrendering as we had ordered them and given that we invested a great deal in a means of persuading them, it appears to be illogical not to use this means. And yes, impressing Stalin was probably a part of it as well (we certainly didn't want a shared occupation of Japan). But I think the more important part was simply making sure the Japanese accept our terms.
[quote]as an aside: how impressed are we by the thesis that the WTC in 2001 is a military target under the rationale of the US strategic bombing command during WWII?[/quote]
There's a time and a place for everything and 2001 is not 1945. Norms change over time and what was acceptable then is not acceptable now -- if we were to apply the 1945 norms fully, the war on terror would be a lot more bloody than it currently is though we may have lost fewer soldiers to it.
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[quote name='Bronn Stone' post='1617486' date='Dec 12 2008, 11.50']Had the US waited four more days and your prediction proved true, I'd be a LOT more comfortable with the decision. They gave them six days after Nagasaki, despite having a third functional device.

Four more days of defiance and I'd feel otherwise. But three days, with the speed of communication in August 1945 Japan, was too short a window.[/quote]


Um... they had telephones, right?
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[i]Slightly more impressed if they actually had any legitimate grievances that would rise to the level of justifying an attack against the US.

There's a time and a place for everything and 2001 is not 1945. Norms change over time and what was acceptable then is not acceptable now[/i]

EHK, althy--

ok. so it was not alright to target the WTC in 2001 as a military installation. as it happens, i agree.

was it alright in 1941 for the third reich to V2 london? the british were not surrendering, after all.
what about the rape of nanjing? the chinese did not surrender, as politely requested.


(why does legitimacy of grievance enter into the discussion? isn't that a matter of [i]jus ad bellum [/i]rather than [i]jus in bello[/i]?)



[i]what makes it so inherently criminal? [/i]

i know that i've cut this from the twists & turns of our debate's context, sure--but you don't mean to suggest that there's no prima facie criminal case to be made w/r/t the firebombings and nukings?
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Again: the Pacific/Great East Asian/Japanese War was up there with the Eastern Front for brutal, senseless carnage. Both sides behaved with greater brutality than they did in previous conflicts - the Japanese traduced their near-perfect record in the Russo-Japanese war and WW1 almost from the get-go, while the difference between US conduct in the Pacific theatre vs the European is palpable - this was total war, of a kind the US had never fought before.

ETA

solo: It was alright, legally. There were no conventions covering aerial bombardment - some of the Hague Treaty articles on naval bombardment were applicable but all they did was prevent the bombardment of _totally_ undefended cities. In terms of practice, both the Nazis and Japanese began terror-bombing and area bombing from the outset - see Warsaw, Rotterdam, Chungking (which the Japanese bombed almost daily from 1938-43, frequently targeting civilian districts, schools etc). The Condor Legion had demonstrated the principle in 1937 at Guernika.

The Rape of Nanking occured after the city had fallen into Japanese hands, and the 41 Blitz (the V-bombings were 44-45) was more or less par for the course by that time. Aerial bombing even when taking pains to be accurate was always indiscriminate to varying degrees, and the logic of total war gave justification to target civillians. Now it's a warcrime, back then it was one more tool in a protracted brutal conflict.

More ETA

You can call Bomber Harris, Curtis LeMay, Harry Truman and MacNamara (who had a significant role in the success of the March 15 Tokyo raid) war criminals if you like, only one of them is still with us and he'd give you a fierce trial defense even though he's in his 90s. By our laws, today, they are. But that doesn't get you any closer to understanding why they did what they did, or what they felt about it. History is not there for us to put it on trial, we don't serve it by calling it to defend our moral views or rubbish those of others. The way to prevent another Hiroshima is not to issue thundering denunciations of those involved but to explore and understand the contect in which it occured and the mindsets involved, and the circumstances that brought them to the decision. That's what history is for, and that's the hope it offers - to understand and avoid those situations.
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[quote name='sologdin' post='1617875' date='Dec 13 2008, 03.34']ok. so it was not alright to target the WTC in 2001 as a military installation. as it happens, i agree.

was it alright in 1941 for the third reich to V2 london? the british were not surrendering, after all.
what about the rape of nanjing? the chinese did not surrender, as politely requested.[/quote]
I am not entirely sure what point you are trying to make. That WWII was a nightmare that nobody in the world wants to see repeated? I agree. That's why we've adopted and mostly abided by rules intended to prevent it. In fact, our aversion towards the deaths of enemy civilians and most of these rules are direct consequences of WWII. However, I don't see what this has to do with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- yes, atrocious as they were, the bombings were fully consistent with the rest of the war; neither more nor less horrible.
[quote]i know that i've cut this from the twists & turns of our debate's context, sure--but you don't mean to suggest that there's no prima facie criminal case to be made w/r/t the firebombings and nukings?[/quote]
No, there is not. A criminal case requires an authority that would prosecute the accused and in this case, there wasn't any willing or able to do so. I guess you can try to construct a theoretical case against them now, but what's the point given that almost all of them are dead? It's about as effective as spitting on a grave.
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horza--

but isn't aerial bombardment plainly within the jurisdiction of article 6 of the CIMT?

[quote]ARTICLE 6

(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

© Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.[/quote]

bombing cities may be more a crime against humanity than a war crime under the nuremberg charter--but is that distinction really a big deal? and if we can hang the third reich on it (and i'm glad they were hanged), then why ignore allied practice?


[i]the bombardment of _totally_ undefended cities.[/i]

this strikes me as a potentially nonexistent distinction: would one soldier nix the "totally undefended" status?


incidentally, what do you make of the [url="http://64.233.169.132/search?q=cache:sP8Ne6SFh0EJ:www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPCL+greco-german+arbitration+tribunal&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us"]greco-german arbitration[/url] of 1927-30, where the tribunal:

[quote]condemned Germany for the aerial bombardment of the neutral cities of Salonica and Bucharest in 1916, invoking Hague Convention II of 1899 respecting the laws and customs of war on land. The tribunal considered that Article 25, prohibiting “bombardment of towns (...) which are not defended”, and Article 26, requiring “the commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment (...) to warn the authorities”, applied[/quote]?


or the league of nations declaration of 30 spetember 1938:

[quote]I. Recognizes the following principles as a necessary basis for any subsequent regulations:

1) The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal;

2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be identifiable;

3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in the neighbourhood are not bombed through negligence[/quote]

seems just as binding as kellogg-briand, which was enough for the CIMT to hang criminals against peace. flexible enough to allow combatants to bomb military installations, and even cause collateral damage, but plainly disallows indiscriminate bombings, like tokyo or hiroshima.


if there is no law against destroying an entire city from the air in WW2, then i suppose i'm wrong, and the US didn't commit any war crimes/crimes against humanity in its aerial bombardments. it boggles the mind, however, if it was illegal to indiscriminately bombard by land and sea, but not by air, given the law above--or that we could hang someone for shooting 100 POWs, but not for immolating 100K citizens.


althy--

[i]the bombings were fully consistent with the rest of the war; neither more nor less horrible.[/i]

i think i'm starting to get at the thesis that the US crossed a line with indiscriminate firebombing and nuking. these are actually more horrible than its other conduct. this stuff crosses into axis-land, and is demonstrably more horrible than the more responsible practices it otherwise deployed.


[i]criminal case requires an authority that would prosecute the accused and in this case, there wasn't any willing or able to do so.[/i]

this is fair enough--the CIMT was a victors' charter. but besides the political fiat that the court did not have jurisdiction (or prosecutorial discretion or will) to indict allied commanders & politicians, the elements of the offenses fit, aye?

does the US really wanna distinguish itself from the axis simply by pointing out a what is essentially a jurisdictional defect?
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brief response viz. the law at the time - you correctly point out that definition of 'undefended' was not pinned down. The League of Nations declaration was just that, and a call for an exploratory treaty.

as for the CIMT - in a lot of conventional and area-bombing cases you could argue military necessity, Harris and LeMay certainly did, and there's also grounds to charge the Imperial War Council for pursuing the war beyond possibility of victory. If we get hold of a time machine I'd happily go back and charge the shit out of nearly every political and military commander on both sides if only to rub in what a senseless brutalising waste war is.

Your point to althy about distinguishment by jurisdictional defect - what distinguishes Bomber Harris's de-housing campaign and LeMay and others over Japan is that they viewed what they were doing as a means to achieving a quicker end to the war than otherwise. In the case of much of what the Nazis and Japanese did, there was no similar military objective - the Final Solution, the Rape of Nanking etc were geared towards fufilling the genocidal aspirations of two totalitarian states (or authoritarian in the Japanese case).

ETA

Per Iocum: you watched [i]Fog of War[/i] too, I see ;) Go back to the sections on the firebombing - his exact words were: "we were acting [u]like [/u]war criminals" and earlier he takes pains to avoid the suggestion that his statistical report on the high-altitude bombing missions played any role LeMay's decision to opt for the low-altitude incendiary 15 March raid. I suspect if you asked him if he was a war criminal or if his acts were war crimes, he would tell you no in very strong terms.
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[quote name='Stego' post='1617703' date='Dec 12 2008, 16.15'][url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_war_crimes"]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_war_crimes[/url][/quote]
Thank you, Stego, for bringing that up. I've had the Burmese railway in mind the entire time I've been reading this thread. The Japanese certainly had no qualms about the forced labour and resulting deaths (one man for every sleeper laid) of POWs and civilians in that context.

[quote name='sologdin' post='1617875' date='Dec 12 2008, 20.34']was it alright in 1941 for the third reich to V2 london? the british were not surrendering, after all.[/quote]
When the Blitz was carried out, Britain still had allies in the field. Not heavy hitters like the US or the USSR (who signed up in June, 1941), and many of them occupied nations, but the then-dominions including India were on side. By August of 1945, Japan stood alone except for puppet states (and weren't they popular in those!).
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[quote name='sologdin' post='1617908' date='Dec 13 2008, 04.33']i think i'm starting to get at the thesis that the US crossed a line with indiscriminate firebombing and nuking. these are actually more horrible than its other conduct. this stuff crosses into axis-land, and is demonstrably more horrible than the more responsible practices it otherwise deployed.[/quote]
These actions were probably among the worst that the US did during the war, but they were by no means worse than the general tone. This was not an isolated incident or a strategy unique to the US -- Germany, Britain, Japan and everyone else with aerial superiority had been bombing civilians for the entire war as a means of lowering enemy morale and disrupting enemy industry. See here: [url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terror_bombing#World_War_II"]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terror_bombing#World_War_II[/url] .
[quote]this is fair enough--the CIMT was a victors' charter. but besides the political fiat that the court did not have jurisdiction (or prosecutorial discretion or will) to indict allied commanders & politicians, the elements of the offenses fit, aye?

does the US really wanna distinguish itself from the axis simply by pointing out a what is essentially a jurisdictional defect?[/quote]
I don't know what the laws were at the time, but it was certainly an evil thing to do. The distinguishing characteristic between the Allies from the Axis are not their military tactics which were pretty much the same, but ideology and the fact that the former did not slaughter minority groups on conquered territory while the latter had a program in place for doing so.
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[quote]his exact words were: "we were acting like war criminals"[/quote]

I just watched it- that section- again.

McNamara: "He [LeMay] and I'd say I were behaving as war criminals".

There's a difference... McNamara asserts that- had the U.S. lost- he'd have been tried as a war criminal. There's also a tacit admission that what he did was immoral...
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[quote name='Per Iocum' post='1617944' date='Dec 13 2008, 16.12']I just watched it- that section- again.

McNamara: "He [LeMay] and I'd say I were behaving as war criminals".

There's a difference... McNamara asserts that- had the U.S. lost- he'd have been tried as a war criminal. There's also a tacit admission that what he did was immoral...[/quote]

True, but I'd argue that both of them are putting some distinctions between themselves and the charge of war crimes. I don't know if there's a real difference between 'behaving like a war criminal' and 'committing war crimes' but MacNamara didn't cop to the latter, quite deliberately.
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[quote name='The Stranger' post='1616807' date='Dec 11 2008, 21.11']i don't agonize over the bombing either, but i do wonder about one thing: the purpose of using the bombs was clearly symbolic, otherwise we would have nuked Tokyo and Osaka. If the object was to prove a point, then, would it have been absolutely necessary to drop it on a city? Could we have dropped one bomb on a hill overlooking Tokyo, or hell, on the summit of Mount Fuji, and achieved the same effect? This is keeping in mind that public opinion, which would clearly be more swayed by having two cities vaporized, did [i]not[/i] have a significant role in the Japanese surrender; the military cabal around Hirohito acted unilaterally in declaring surrender. would they have been equally persuaded if we had used the weapon in a way which showed its destructive power without having to slaughter that many people? i dunno. my alternative still leads to deaths via fallout, but i've always wondered whether or not such a display would have done the job equally well as destroying two cities...[/quote]

We chose Hiroshima and Nagasaki because they were the two cities that were left.

Think about this - if we hadnt dropped the bomb, would the world have woken to the horror? If we didn't know about radiation sickness (and we didn't), what was there to stop the Cold War from going hot?
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