North Korea: Land of Miracles

[Datepalm]

The possible/probable descent into civil war, chaos, failed-stateism, etc strikes me as more of an issue than the strict humanitarian/economic development issue. That would need to be dealt with somehow anyway, even in the nicest, most peaceful transfer of power.

[Free Northman]

Well, that, and a) China, b ) the fact that for sixty years this population has been totally cut off and indoctrinated into seeing the South (and the West) as EVIL ENEMIES, c) there couldn't possibly be any mid-ranking officers below the few that we're conveniently precision-bombing, who like their positions of authority very much thankseverso and don't plan on being deposed right now, and etc, and etc etc...

I accept that too.

But my (rather idle) argument would be to add up the likely loss of human life in that scenario and compare it to the certain loss of human life if nothing is done.

And once the cost of proposed action comes out as the lower estimate of the two, then bombs away, I say.

[Maithanet]

I accept that too.

But my (rather idle) argument would be to add up the likely loss of human life in that scenario and compare it to the certain loss of human life if nothing is done.

And once the cost of proposed action comes out as the lower estimate of the two, then bombs away, I say.

What if you're wrong?

[Free Northman]

What if you're wrong?

I guess that is the issue that stays one's hand, yes.

I guess the advantage of action over inaction should be clear in that scenario before action is taken.

I would add that the threat of loss of life that prompted action in the case of Ghaddafi's zenga zenga threat in Libya was a few hundred thousand at most and probably significantly fewer in reality.

In Korea, millions are facing starvation, prison camps and death. I am not convinced that the case for action in Libya was stronger than it is in North Korea.

[Hereward]

Perhaps not, but the case for inaction is far stronger re North Korea, as Libya was not a massively heavily armed, militarised country, possessing nuclear arms, one of the world's economic power centres in range of its artillery and a close friendship with an emerging superpower with the financial ability to sink the US economy.

[Rorshach]

Perhaps not, but the case for inaction is far stronger re North Korea, as Libya was not a massively heavily armed, militarised country, possessing nuclear arms, one of the world's economic power centres in range of its artillery and a close friendship with an emerging superpower with the financial ability to sink the US economy.

So, what you're really saying is... there IS a chance?

[TerraPrime]

North Korea is always a China problem, far as I can tell. At some point, when China is tired of having to babysit NK, they'll engineer a coup, or two, and slowly destabilize the country. But as long as NK has nuclear capacity, even if rudimentary, drastic events are not likely to happen.

Which, in all fairness, is a great achievement for the NK. If Iraq or Syria or Iran have nuclear capacity their autonomy would be more respected. It's like second amendment rights for the world.

[Shryke]

Well, I'm hardly a Korea expert. But my impression was that more or less 90% of the people of the two countries want to reunite their nations, with the only obstacle being the tiny inner circle of the dictatorship who oppose it. Lop the head off that snake, and the refugee issue would be resolved as the two countries merge again. A bit like East and West Germany joining up again.

Not at all accurate. The North are indoctrinated to hate the South (although how well that works is debatable and unknown) and in the South reunification is loosing support as the younger the person, the less they give a shit.

[Lightning Lord]

Not at all accurate. The North are indoctrinated to hate the South (although how well that works is debatable and unknown) and in the South reunification is loosing support as the younger the person, the less they give a shit.

Spot on. Most of my friends here don't have much interest in reunification. They feel bad about the humanitarian situation and think in a vague way that Korea should be whole, but when pressed on practicality admit that it's just not a very good option for South Korea.

[Ramsay Gimp]

You have all been subscribed to http://www.reddit.com/r/pyongyang

[Ramsay Gimp]

I guess that is the issue that stays one's hand, yes.

I guess the advantage of action over inaction should be clear in that scenario before action is taken.

I would add that the threat of loss of life that prompted action in the case of Ghaddafi's zenga zenga threat in Libya was a few hundred thousand at most and probably significantly fewer in reality.

In Korea, millions are facing starvation, prison camps and death. I am not convinced that the case for action in Libya was stronger than it is in North Korea.

You seem to think the problem could be solved by simply bombing Kim and his inner circle out of existence. But this raises some serious concerns:

1. What about the millions of starving, uneducated (or brainwashed) refugees who will flee to China or South Korea when the regime falls, due to our actions? We tell them to deal with it, it's their problem now?

2. What about the thousands in prison/labor camps? Do you think there's any conceivable scenario where the guards "let them go" if the U.S. attacks? They've been trained to view these people as vile scum - they'd likely execute them all before we got close to liberating them

3. You seem to think that it is appropriate for the U.S. to go around the world looking for monsters to slay (this does seem to be a habit we picked up since the end of the Cold War, but it is utter folly)

Reading about the Norks make me sick to my stomach. They are the most evil and warped regime currently in existence, in my view. But it's not a problem that could be solved by a cruise missile or drone strike, let alone a large war

[Horza]

Oh, it's even more problematic than that.

FN is a loyal proponent of the CBTOD, and so he assumes that it's enough to bump off Jong-un and a few other top leaders to collapse the KWP, as if there couldn't possibly be people who support the regime for reasons other than blind loyalty to the charismatic, swaggering Kim Dynasty. The possibility that a significant portion of the KWP and the Army wouldn't just start purging everyone they thought was part of this American perfidy and put the country on war footing doesn't seem to enter this scenario.

[Ramsay Gimp]

Oh, it's even more problematic than that.

FN is a loyal proponent of the CBTOD, and so he assumes that it's enough to bump off Jong-un and a few other top leaders to collapse the KWP, as if there couldn't possibly be people who support the regime for reasons other than blind loyalty to the charismatic, swaggering Kim Dynasty. The possibility that a significant portion of the KWP and the Army wouldn't just start purging everyone they thought was part of this American perfidy and put the country on war footing doesn't seem to enter this scenario.

The State's control over media and education has been so complete for so long that any reliance on an uprising or local support for American intervention is a pipe dream. People from North Korea stationed in other countries still cried when the Dear Leader died. 2+2=5 in North Korea. They love Big Brother.

Plus, I also doubt the South Koreans would appreciate us starting a war that resulted in Seoul getting barraged by artillery

[The Marquis de Leech]

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Attacking North Korea without authorisation or legitimate self-defence validation would be a breach of international law.

[Free Northman]

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Attacking North Korea without authorisation or legitimate self-defence validation would be a breach of international law.

Haha.

Sorry. Attacking North Korea is a bad idea for all the other reasons people gave above, but not this one.

Because quite simply I don't give a crap about "international law". In my mind there is no such thing.

International law is like some rules that were made in a small village of 200 people. But each of these 200 acts only in his own best interest, and these rules only apply if one of the strongest 5 guys in this village does not veto it. And these 5 almost never agree on anything.

So if one of these 5 choose to do something, then it cannot be against the rules.

And to make it even more absurd, one of these 5 is stronger than the other 199 guys in the village combined.

So in a nutshell if any of the 5 say something isn't against "international law", then it isn't. And then it comes down to each guy for himself. And when you're stronger than the other 199 combined, well, the reality is international law is what you say it is.

As we saw with operation Iraqi Freedom.

[The Marquis de Leech]

Because quite simply I don't give a crap about "international law". In my mind there is no such thing.

Courts (both civilian and military) disagree.

[Free Northman]

Because quite simply I don't give a crap about "international law". In my mind there is no such thing.

Courts (both civilian and military) disagree.

Please explain the enforcibility of international law on a permanent member of the security council.

[Werthead]

This week Channel 4 in the UK showed an interesting different type of documentary on North Korea: it was mostly made by North Koreans themselves, both exiles (in China and South Korea) and people inside the country sneaking video footage out. It showed a very different type of NK to the one we're used to.

Basically, North Korea's internal society has started to unravel and the government's control is slipping. There's been hints of this since the 1990s famine when the government essentially let a million people starve to death, but this documentary showed it was fundamentally more intrinsic than that. Very few people in North Korea believe the government's lies about the outside world and North Korea's place in the world. Every week hundreds of DVDs and USB sticks containing movies, TV shows and documentaries from the outside world are smuggled into NK (the China-NK border guards are apparently so corruptible the traffic is almost completely unimpeded, not to mention that it's relatively easy to cross the river between the two countries for long stretches of the border), and others from inside the country go the other way. Conservative estimates suggest that more than 50% of the population has now illegally watched a movie from outside the country. Spy cameras have become quite common in NK, and videos of what's happening away from the eyes of the few outside broadcasters are now getting out.

They are quite startling. They show people no longer obeying police when they try to detain them for reasons of freedom of speech and in some cases mobs form and drive the police off. One video showed police trying to detain a woman for wearing trousers. She told them to fuck off and a bunch of other people gathered. The police got unnerved and let her go. A few weeks later the regime changed the law so women can now wear trousers. Another video showed a woman running a private bus service between isolated villages. Again, a police officer tried to stop her (private enterprise in NK is effectively banned, though the regime has no choice but to tolerate it due to the impracticality of shutting it down whenever it appears) and again had to leave with his tail between his legs once other people got off the bus and stood up to him. Other videos show young children starving on the streets of Pyongyang, and other people running the private (and technically illegal) markets, without which North Korea's economy would collapse.

The videos also show people in the military, local party officials and government-sanctioned businessmen all publicly criticising Kim Jong-Un. The reasons are varied, but many cite his youth and inexperience as problems, as well as the influence of the hardline generals and the refusal to open up the country to more trade with South Korea and China. Another showed people going into the Pyongyang Department Store Number One, a showcase for North Korea's economy, and asking for goods only to be told that they are all for display only, and there is no real stock.

There were also interviews with NK ex-pats living in the south, running a radio station that beams directly into North Korea. Hand-cranked radios have been smuggled into the country en masse and it is now estimated that several million North Koreans listen to radio shows from the South every day.

The documentary shattered the notion of a brainwashed population living in total ignorance of the outside world and being mindlessly subservient to the government. Civil disobedience is a growing issue, and the government backing down several times (like over the trouser thing) has only emboldened the opposition. There are two possibilities to take from the documentary: on the one hand, North Korea may experience a 'quite revolution' which ousts the government and opens up the country to the outside world relatively peacefully. One Asian political analyst suggested this could happen within 5-10 years. The other is more devastating: the government responds to the growing civil disobedience and loss of control with massive crackdowns. Kim Jong-un's government is divided between hardliners who believe in total control and moderates who believe in more freedom, and the result could be open civil war (in a country with nukes).

North Korea is not going to be ruled by this dynasty for too much longer, but the question is whether the downfall is peaceful (or relatively so) or violent, and to what degree that impacts on the surrounding countries. Bombing the place is definitely not going to help.

[The Marquis de Leech]

Please explain the enforcibility of international law on a permanent member of the security council.

If you're a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (which most of the world, including the UK and France are), the ICC has jurisdiction to deal with acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

Punishment for war crimes or other violations of the Geneva Conventions are generally enforced by either the same side (in the case of the US, see the court martials over My Lai) or by the opposition.

It is now commonly accepted that no treaty permitting certain crimes (e,g, genocide) is legitimate: there exist certain peremptory norms that trump other forms of international law. Similarly, the torture convention places an obligation on states to "try or extradite", and since the Pinochet case in the 1990s, immunity for former heads of state no longer covers torture,

Customary international law (e.g. access to enclaves) has the status of federal common law in the US, and the US Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to punish offences against the Laws of Nations (i.e. offences against international law). Yes, if a permanent member digs its heels in and refuses to budge on the enforcement of a particular aspect of law (famously, the US after losing Nicaragua vs US in the 1980s), there is nothing that can be done, but it is generally a PR disaster for the country in question. The vast majority of the time, international law is respected by states because no-one wants the law of the jungle.

[Horza]

This week Channel 4 in the UK showed an interesting different type of documentary on North Korea: it was mostly made by North Koreans themselves, both exiles (in China and South Korea) and people inside the country sneaking video footage out. It showed a very different type of NK to the one we're used to.

A similar portrait can be found in Nothing To Envy which is based on accounts from North Korean ex-pats.

The famine of the 1990s drastically undermined state control. In its wake border-crossing and private economic activity have turned into facts of everyday life, in which elements of the North Korean state are even complicit. The deepening reliance on the military and the rise of private financial empires don't bode well for continued Kim rule, even if Jong-un was a more astute leader than appears the case.