Ukraine Part 2: Playing chicken with Kiev

[karaddin]

27 minutes ago, Toth said:

But nobody in this entire conversation has ever argued for NATO military intervention against Russia, so why bringing it up in response to purely economic suggestions? It's a perfectly fine position to have to say pre-emptive sanctions might bring us into a disadvantageous situation, but I feel like it clamps down the conversation when you instantly go from that to "So you want WW3, do you?". The moral imperative should be to make a statement that we won't accept a war of aggression out of economic concerns. If it still happens, tough luck, but we at least show that we keep our word and make good on our threats.

The point of my statement was to say that if they really think it's a red line they should be avocating for that. You're coming into this at about 5th remove from the exchange which actually started this, which was Kal getting the impression that someone was expecting Ukrainians to fight and die to avoid Putin getting a victory and pushing back on that. My point in joining that conversation was to say that if you truly think Ukraine should be fighting to prevent Putin then you should be arguing for the West to join them. If Ukraine chooses to fight that's obviously their right, but I don't think we should be cheerleading that without being willing to help. If they choose to try get Putin to back down, that's also their right and we should take whatever measures help that happen if they need a public stand against them joining NATO or something to that effect. And if Putin invades anyway we should do what we can to make that as painful as possible without escalating the situation, ie severe sanctions, whatever aid can be sent without making the situation worse etc.

My only other point in this thread has been disagreeing with Tywin about the way sanctions should be put in place (ie preemptive or reactive)

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

1 hour ago, karaddin said:

Well this is where you've gone wrong because that's not what I'm saying at all and I'm pretty sure its not what Kal is saying either. I 100% think we should impose sanctions if Russia actually invades, and they should be real, actually crippling ones rather than the half assed ones from the leak a day or two ago. I'm completely against preemptively imposing them because then they lose whatever value they have as a deterrence, but at not point have I argued against imposing them in response.

They've already lost that value though. The threat of sanctions as a deterrence appears to have failed. 

[Toth]

7 minutes ago, karaddin said:

The point of my statement was to say that if they really think it's a red line they should be avocating for that. You're coming into this at about 5th remove from the exchange which actually started this, which was Kal getting the impression that someone was expecting Ukrainians to fight and die to avoid Putin getting a victory and pushing back on that. My point in joining that conversation was to say that if you truly think Ukraine should be fighting to prevent Putin then you should be arguing for the West to join them. If Ukraine chooses to fight that's obviously their right, but I don't think we should be cheerleading that without being willing to help. If they choose to try get Putin to back down, that's also their right and we should take whatever measures help that happen if they need a public stand against them joining NATO or something to that effect. And if Putin invades anyway we should do what we can to make that as painful as possible without escalating the situation, ie severe sanctions, whatever aid can be sent without making the situation worse etc.

Fair enough!

Though I must admit I am cynical enough that I'm expecting Ukraine will have to fight no matter what they wish to. Neutrality won't solve the Crimea issue for Putin and cutting off eastern Ukraine with only Putin's word that he won't be back in 8 years to demand more will not be in any way acceptable for Ukraine.

[karaddin]

31 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

They've already lost that value though. The threat of sanctions as a deterrence appears to have failed. 

You do know he hasn't actually invaded yet right? The war isn't in progress. You can't punish someone for doing something before they've done it, and it completely undermines trust in why you were doing it if you try. Its still entirely possible this is a bluff even if our indicators suggest otherwise.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

12 minutes ago, karaddin said:

You do know he hasn't actually invaded yet right? The war isn't in progress. You can't punish someone for doing something before they've done it, and it completely undermines trust in why you were doing it if you try. Its still entirely possible this is a bluff even if our indicators suggest otherwise.

First, not everyone would agree that a war isn't in progress. Some believe it has been since the initial invasion, which cannot be forgotten.

Second, if someone says they're considering to punch you in the face, and then they cock their arm back like they're going to punch you in the face, are you seriously going to wait until after they punch you in the face to react? Because that's more or less the situation on the ground right now. 

[Varysblackfyre321]

8 minutes ago, karaddin said:

You can't punish someone for doing something before they've done it

Sure you can.
If you plan to commit to murder buy a gun and then stake out your potential victim’s house you can still be charged and convicted of conspiracy to commit murder.

I think anyone who’d side with Russia at this juncture would be predisposed to side with them regardless what the West does. Many people will always see the west as the bad guy in any conflict it gets in.

 

[DMC]

49 minutes ago, karaddin said:

You can't punish someone for doing something before they've done it,

No, but Tom Cruise can!

[Larry of the Lawn]

38 minutes ago, Varysblackfyre321 said:

Sure you can.
If you plan to commit to murder buy a gun and then stake out your potential victim’s house you can still be charged and convicted of conspiracy to commit murder.

I think anyone who’d side with Russia at this juncture would be predisposed to side with them regardless what the West does. Many people will always see the west as the bad guy in any conflict it gets in.

 

Someone describing if / then scenarios to make predictions of what will happen is not "taking Russia's side".  You seem to have a complete inability to separate people stating what they believe to be likely consequences of sanctions, from supporting Russia invading Ukraine.  I'm not sure if you're just not reading what people write at this point, or simply trolling.  

[Varysblackfyre321]

5 minutes ago, Larry of the Lake said:

Someone describing if / then scenarios to make predictions of what will happen is not "taking Russia's side".  You seem to have a complete inability to separate people stating what they believe to be likely consequences of sanctions, from supporting Russia invading Ukraine.  I'm not sure if you're just not reading what people write at this point, or simply trolling.  

I wasn’t accusing Karadin of taking Russia’s side. I simply made note many others will condemn nato and the US regardless of how appropriately they act to Russian aggression. Because they hate the west in general and have been grilled into seeing the west, more particularly the US, as the bad guy in any military conflict. There’s no good reason to see Russia as anything but the aggressor at this point

The risk in implementing new sanctions before Putin starts killing people I feel is overblown.

[Larry of the Lawn]

27 minutes ago, Varysblackfyre321 said:

I wasn’t accusing Karadin of taking Russia’s side. I simply made note many others will condemn nato and the US regardless of how appropriately they act to Russian aggression. Because they hate the west in general and have been grilled into seeing the west, more particularly the US, as the bad guy in any military conflict. There’s no good reason to see Russia as anything but the aggressor at this point

The risk in implementing new sanctions before Putin starts killing people I feel is overblown.

Oh, gotcha, so it was just a non sequitur.  

[karaddin]

46 minutes ago, DMC said:

No, but Tom Cruise can!

You'd have a point if Tywin was advocating sending him in, but I've seen no suggestion of PreCruise missiles. Glad someone got the precrime vibe I was intending to imply!

 

1 hour ago, Tywin et al. said:

First, not everyone would agree that a war isn't in progress. Some believe it has been since the initial invasion, which cannot be forgotten.

Second, if someone says they're considering to punch you in the face, and then they cock their arm back like they're going to punch you in the face, are you seriously going to wait until after they punch you in the face to react? Because that's more or less the situation on the ground right now. 

I don't have any beef with those arguing the first point, but I'd refer you back to my earlier post about punishments needing to be clearly connected to what they're punishing - enforcing sanctions now for an invasion that happened in 2014 would be an odd approach. 

To your latter point - this feels more like giving someone a fine but in no way stopping them from connecting the punch while having no legal authority to enforce the fine. It's obviously a flawed analogy because you can dodge a punch but Ukraine can't exactly dodge an invasion.

[karaddin]

3 minutes ago, Larry of the Lake said:

Oh, gotcha, so it was just a non sequitur.  

I think I get the point, part of my point is that imposing sanctions preemptively is bad from an international relations perspective. Varys thinks this is irrelevant because those inclined to think that way will do so anyway. It wasn't very clearly worded and I think it did come across directed at me but I'm happy to accept that this was what was actually meant.

I disagree, I think being locked into the US perspective blinds you to the range of international opinion and there's plenty of room between "in the tank for Russia/China" and "backing the US no matter what". To be specific about what i consider to be one of the big dangers of that approach - it's what Kal has already mentioned multiple times. Bush hurt the international view of the US, but Trump tore it to shreds. Any agreement or treaty with the US is only good for the time until the next Presidential election and then your stance could be turned on its head, and even as a nation that's not only a staunch ally but dependent to the point you could argue we function as a vassal state I don't feel that even Aus could trust future behaviour. And I think this would further that damage when Biden is meant to be repairing it.

[DMC]

15 minutes ago, karaddin said:

PreCruise missiles.

Well done.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

54 minutes ago, karaddin said:

I don't have any beef with those arguing the first point, but I'd refer you back to my earlier post about punishments needing to be clearly connected to what they're punishing - enforcing sanctions now for an invasion that happened in 2014 would be an odd approach. 

Not really, these events are not happening in a vacuum, and addressing them as such is missing the mark. A huge part of this conversation is how a positive result for Putin will embolden him to make further provocations. That needs to be at forefront of our thinking when deciding what to do.

Quote

To your latter point - this feels more like giving someone a fine but in no way stopping them from connecting the punch while having no legal authority to enforce the fine. It's obviously a flawed analogy because you can dodge a punch but Ukraine can't exactly dodge an invasion.

So what would you do to stop them then? 

[Iskaral Pust]

Putin wants a buffer zone of Kremlin-controlled autocracies.  The gradual seeping expectation of democracy and individual liberty percolating eastward from the EU is anathema to his regime.  The various color revolutions, expanding NATO membership and moves into the EU sphere (culturally, politically and economically) are an existential threat to him because they bring an unflattering contrast into closer proximity.  Putin’s biggest risk is that the Russian people become more aware of what life could be like without him and the oligarchs.  It’s no coincidence that the USSR’s collapse was triggered from East Germany where the contrast between life in the east and west was most obvious. (Just as Xi Jinping and the CCP maintain a rigid information buffer zone against expectations of individual liberty).

The catalyst for Putin to act now is the weakness and fragmentation of the west: America is tired of foreign wars, Germany is dependent on Russia for energy, Britain (relatively hawkish amongst Europeans) has no vote or influence in the EU.  Ukraine has been drifting more consistently toward Europe over the past few years. If Putin wants to reassert his buffer, his opponents are weak now and the longer he waits the more westernized Ukraine becomes.

A full-on military invasion of Ukraine is a disaster for Putin if the Ukrainians resist.  Ever since the Vietnam War, the recurring lesson is that a powerful military can successfully invade but a determined resistance makes it too bloody and expensive to actually hold a resistant territory.  NATO doesn’t need to enter into an open war with Russia, they just need to be willing to send armaments and other material support to the Ukrainian resistance.  It all hinges on whether Ukraine is determined to resist.

Putin needs to cow the Ukrainians into submission and embolden the pro-Russian faction within Ukraine, hence the attempts to sow fear.  An invasion by Russia will only succeed if it is not resisted strongly, which Russia achieved with Crimea similar to an Anschluss.  A protracted bloody war in Ukraine will not be popular in Russia and cannot be sustained indefinitely.  Russia has enough financial reserves and demand for energy exports to survive any economic sanctions for long enough to outlast the international furore, but they cannot forcibly suppress a dogged Ukrainian resistance.

Putin expected that his aggressive stance would dismay the war-weary west and they would acquiesce to his demands: which effectively are to grant Russia an explicit sphere of influence across the former USSR, blocking any further integration (politically, culturally, economically) with the west.  Putin never needed to invade Ukraine, he just wanted guarantees that NATO and EU will disavow Ukraine and allow him to install a pro-Kremlin puppet autocracy.  That what he wants, and he doesn’t want to have to fight a war to get it.

But it is unthinkable for the west to just consign Ukrainians to Putin’s control against their will — literally unthinkable because their mindset does not stretch to political enslavement of tens of millions of people just to satisfy Putin’s desire for apartness.  Self-determination is a fundamental value of the west, but not the east.  It’s one thing to accept an Anschluss of the Crimea that was supposedly supported by a majority of that local population, but we are no longer in the age of great powers diving up maps to suit themselves (a lesson ever since the aftermath of WWII).  The same applies to Taiwan and China.  The west does not want to participate in an open war against Russia (or China), but they will refuse to just acquiesce to Putin’s unwelcome hegemony and instead support the Ukrainians (or Taiwanese) with enough weapons to make an invasion prohibitively expensive.  Most military defense is only about making invasion prohibitively expensive, which is why most military violence in recent decades has been raids rather than invasion (e.g. 9/11), proxy wars where the cost is lower (e.g. Iran arming militias, Hezbollah, Yemen, etc), and/or by desperate people with little to lose against opponents who cannot impose a high cost on their actions (e.g. Somalia, Ethiopia, ISIS, Maghreb).

Putin has a problem now: he absolutely cannot appear weak or be seen to back down.  His hold over Russia relies on the perception of his strength, cunning and ruthlessness.  He wants the west to make some concessions that he can trumpet as a victory, and then quietly subvert the Ukrainian government without interference.  Putin expected to be appeased for the very same reasons that North Korea is firing missiles again and expects to be granted more economic aid in response.  Instead, his demands have largely been ignored and not taken seriously at all.  His bluff is being called.  He may follow through with the bluff because appearing weak may be worse than entering an expensive war with no certain exit strategy.  Even a big bilateral summit with America is a victory of sorts for Putin — at least then he looks like a superpower rather than just another tinpot autocrat.  But Biden has been sparing in how much attention he’s giving this, which has been the smart play.

The realpolitik play for US/NATO is to sneer at Russia’s demands, send arms and support to Ukraine, prepare sanctions on all the Russian oligarch personal assets outside of Russia (especially in London, Geneva and Stockholm), and wait to see if Russia wants to embroil itself in a protracted war.

[Werthead]

5 minutes ago, Iskaral Pust said:

The catalyst for Putin to act now is the weakness and fragmentation of the west: America is tired of foreign wars, Germany is dependent on Russia for energy, Britain (relatively hawkish amongst Europeans) has no vote or influence in the EU.  Ukraine has been drifting more consistently toward Europe over the past few years. If Putin wants to reassert his buffer, his opponents are weak now and the longer he waits the more westernized Ukraine becomes.

I think the current American situation is as good a reason for the timing as anything else. Biden proved extremely weak over Afghanistan and the USA's allies are now extremely wary of American commitments, fearing they mean nothing. How Biden handles this crisis is something that will be carefully watched. If his response is too weak, then Russia might feel emboldened the test the waters with a confrontation over the Baltic States later on (and China is definitely closely watching this as well).

[Iskaral Pust]

4 minutes ago, Werthead said:

I think the current American situation is as good a reason for the timing as anything else. Biden proved extremely weak over Afghanistan and the USA's allies are now extremely wary of American commitments, fearing they mean nothing. How Biden handles this crisis is something that will be carefully watched. If his response is too weak, then Russia might feel emboldened the test the waters with a confrontation over the Baltic States later on (and China is definitely closely watching this as well).

Yes, and Putin has always relied on indirect attacks.  He subverts elections, fosters discord and divides his opponents.  He looks for inexpensive indirect attacks rather than expensive conventional war.  Right now is the culmination of his indirect campaign: his opponents are divided and lack resolve to oppose him directly.  Afghanistan showed that America will no longer fight a war on behalf of a people who won’t fight it for themselves.

So the real question is whether the Ukrainians will resist.  If they do, the West will support their resistance because it’s a less demanding involvement.  That is very cost-efficient for US/NATO, the very opposite of holding a hostile and/or failed state.

Putin has successfully divided and weakened the resolve of his opponents — Fox News now openly supports the Russians, Germany has been conspicuously silent — but the Ukrainians have grown in their resolve to move away from Putin and the USSR.  The Ukrainian resolve to resist Putin is now the crucial point on which this pivots, and he may have underestimated them.  It’s hard for me to tell from where I sit.

[karaddin]

38 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

 So what would you do to stop them then? 

I don't think there is anything that can be done by the West to stop it other than direct military conflict.

Absent the willingness to do that, crippling sanctions should come into play as soon as he actually starts any further invasions, and in particular I think going after the wealth of the oligarchs may be an effective tool - try and wedge them away from Putin by making it costly for them personally. As much arms and other aid as Ukraine wants/can use as well.

[DMC]

31 minutes ago, Tywin et al. said:

Not really, these events are not happening in a vacuum, and addressing them as such is missing the mark. A huge part of this conversation is how a positive result for Putin will embolden him to make further provocations. That needs to be at forefront of our thinking when deciding what to do.

I think you really need to stop claiming imposing sanctions now wouldn't be preemptive because "the war started in 2014."  I suppose this seems like a righteous rhetorical point, but it is entirely disingenuous when we're talking about the west threatening sanctions on Russia.  The west did threaten sanctions in 2014, then imposed some while Obama decided against more aggressive options -- and then seven years passed.  Hell, even Ted Cruz isn't shameless enough to deny that the sanctions he's pushing for are preemptive.  And if that's what you advocate, fine.  I think it'd be terribly unwise reflecting typical hawkish thoughtlessness, but hey whatever.  But you really gotta ask yourself how far you've strayed if Ted Cruz is being more forthright and sincere than you.

46 minutes ago, Werthead said:

How Biden handles this crisis is something that will be carefully watched. If his response is too weak, then Russia might feel emboldened the test the waters with a confrontation over the Baltic States later on (and China is definitely closely watching this as well).

I think Biden has clearly done what he was supposed to do, for the most part.  He's maintained the line on the "nonstarters" and projected a united front while still preserving a diplomatic offramp for Putin.  Perhaps more importantly, he's resisted the bravado and saber-rattling of GOP hawks and even garnered faint praise from McConnell earlier this week.  (The increasing divide on the right between the decidedly hawkish GOP in Congress and the Trumpist Russia boosters in the media should be very interesting to watch, but that belongs in another thread.)  I agree with Iskaral that the realpolitik approach for the US/NATO is, essentially, exactly what Biden has done and is doing.

That being said, I am quite disappointed in the details leaked yesterday about his sanctions plan.  They appear quite weak and not much of a deterrent at all (no matter when they're imposed).  Still, it's hard for me to put that on Biden as it seems fairly apparent the plan's toothlessness is almost solely due to Europe fearing an energy crisis.  Not much he can do about that.

[Mr. Chatywin et al.]

55 minutes ago, karaddin said:

I don't think there is anything that can be done by the West to stop it other than direct military conflict.

Absent the willingness to do that, crippling sanctions should come into play as soon as he actually starts any further invasions, and in particular I think going after the wealth of the oligarchs may be an effective tool - try and wedge them away from Putin by making it costly for them personally. As much arms and other aid as Ukraine wants/can use as well.

So your position is to continue to defer, is that fair to say, with maybe something happening on the backend?

30 minutes ago, DMC said:

I think you really need to stop claiming imposing sanctions now wouldn't be preemptive because "the war started in 2014."  I suppose this seems like a righteous rhetorical point, but it is entirely disingenuous when we're talking about the west threatening sanctions on Russia.  The west did threaten sanctions in 2014, then imposed some while Obama decided against more aggressive options -- and then seven years passed.  Hell, even Ted Cruz isn't shameless enough to deny that the sanctions he's pushing for are preemptive.  And if that's what you advocate, fine.  I think it'd be terribly unwise reflecting typical hawkish thoughtlessness, but hey whatever.  But you really gotta ask yourself how far you've strayed if Ted Cruz is being more forthright and sincere than you.

It's not a righteous rhetorical point, it's a statement of fact. Russia already invaded Ukraine and is sending the message that it will do it again. Waiting with empty threats is not a response anyone should accept, yet here we are, with the "crippling sanctions" already off of the table. Great maneuvering!