Ukraine Part 2: Playing chicken with Kiev

[Kalbear]

Continue!

Another good source on Euro politics and warfare stuff is this guy:

 

 

[Varysblackfyre321]

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When people talk about "appeasement" being a bad thing relating to a strong man like Putin, we all know what you're alluding to - Hitler and the 3rd Reich being allowed to become what it did. So when we're talking about appeasement being a bad thing with a modern actor, the unspoken part is always that there is a line that exists where stopping that actor becomes the moral imperative for the rest of the world if we wish to live up to being a civil society. The only way to stop them past a certain point will be through military intervention. This was true in the case of Hitler and it wasn't taken initially, but their hands were ultimately forced* and it happened anyway so we talk about appeasement instead of stopping him as a cautionary tale that we must never repeat yet we never actually admit that this is saying we need to go to war.

So let me be blunt - if you genuinely think Putin is crossing that line with these actions, don't shy away from the implications of that and don't pretend you're just talking about sanctions. You're calling for NATO/the US to send troops into Ukraine to defend it against the aggression of Putin and defend their right to self determination**. I'm not going to disagree with you that going to war is actually the right thing to do when that line has been crossed but I'm not necessarily going to share your view on where the line is. Unfortunately the risk of a nuclear exchange has a dramatic impact on moving that line.

*The inevitability of a war being in the near to mid term future is actually what I'd say is one of the important properties of The Line™, so talking about appeasement of Putin in this language makes a lot more sense if you think a war with Russia is ultimately unavoidable and we should face now because it will be even worse later and allow people to suffer in the interim

**I actually think defending Ukraine is morally justified, the problem is the horrendous risks associated with it. Ukraine should absolutely be able to join NATO and be protected from a belligerent neighbor but the reality isn't lining up with how I think the world should function

And finally just to make it clear where I stand - I do not think the line has been crossed with Putin due to the huge risks and I don't think conflict is inevitable. All else aside he's running on limited lifespan at this point.

@karaddin

First I feel this was more directed towards me. I wasn't alluding to anything. I explicitly used nazi Germany as an example of how an appeasement can either embolden bad actors and get them in a position it’d be a lot harder to keep them in line.

No one wants ww3. A direct war between nuclear states can easily end with the end of world. 

But not every military conflict with Russia is the Cuban missile crisis.

 

Sanctions, weapons and money to Ukraine are viable ways to help resist an invasion and potentially make him wary of continuing.

It's not either we let him conquer whatever he desires outside nato or we do WW3.

It's a false narrative. The Soviets blatantly gave weapons and aid to states were hostile to US interests and that did help determine if America could establish control over it or allies of America could. North Vietnam for example probably would have been a lot less successful in fighting off the American military with soviet gear and money.

Also the American public (wrongly or rightly), began to have a disfavorble view of the war in total.

Sanctions could make living and doing business in Russia even more unappealing—even for the oligarchs that control it.

Side note I really wish that detail was included a bit more. Too often I think the success of the north Vietnamese are just presented as some “noble savages” who were able to beat back the bad Imperialists by their noble motivations(defending their homeland.)

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

Kyiv.  We really should stop using the Russian spelling and pronunciation.

[Gorn]

29 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Kyiv.  We really should stop using the Russian spelling and pronunciation.

While I use "Kyiv" spelling as well, let's not go into chauvinism here. Especially considering that it's "Kiev" for a large percentage of people actually living there.

[Luzifer's right hand]

Is it even WW3 if no Austrians are to blame? Well I guess we are involved in Nord Stream 2.

I do expect most EU countries to become much more pro Russia soon with energy prices threatening our industries.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

32 minutes ago, Gorn said:

While I use "Kyiv" spelling as well, let's not go into chauvinism here. Especially considering that it's "Kiev" for a large percentage of people actually living there.

It isn’t chauvinism to use the Russian pronunciation in a Nation-State that isn’t Russia?

[Gorn]

28 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

It isn’t chauvinism to use the Russian pronunciation in a Nation-State that isn’t Russia?

Chauvinism is denying others the right to use their preferred spelling.

ETA: Look, I come from a country that was involved in almost 4 years of bloody war over shit like that. It just rubs me the wrong way.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

5 minutes ago, Gorn said:

Chauvinism is denying others the right to use their preferred spelling.

ETA: Look, I come from a country that was involved in almost 4 years of bloody war over shit like that. It just rubs me the wrong way.

Fair enough.

[Kalbear]

10 hours ago, Varysblackfyre321 said:

@karaddin

First I feel this was more directed towards me. I wasn't alluding to anything. I explicitly used nazi Germany as an example of how an appeasement can either embolden bad actors and get them in a position it’d be a lot harder to keep them in line.

No one wants ww3. A direct war between nuclear states can easily end with the end of world. 

But not every military conflict with Russia is the Cuban missile crisis.

Not every military conflict with an autocrat is Hitler either. 

10 hours ago, Varysblackfyre321 said:

 

Sanctions, weapons and money to Ukraine are viable ways to help resist an invasion and potentially make him wary of continuing.

It's not either we let him conquer whatever he desires outside nato or we do WW3.

I don't understand this point. No one is saying don't do sanctions or don't ship weapons. Who are you making this point to?

My point, echoed by others, is that if you think this is a red line say so, and advocate for war with the US and NATO. if you aren't willing to do that you don't think it's a red line.

 

[Werthead]

The Munich comparisons are somewhat dubious because Germany was the richest and most militarily powerful state in Europe at the time, whilst Russia is definitely not the richest and, whilst it may be the most militarily powerful or at least most numerous by itself, it is hugely outranged by NATO's full military potential. It is also not entirely clear what Putin's endgame is here.

If his position is as advertised, namely he just wants to keep Ukraine out of NATO, then there is perhaps scope for some kind of deal, perhaps ensuring Ukrainian neutrality/sovereignty outside of NATO but on friendly terms with it, or basically a continuation of the current status quo. This would be the realpolitik solution which accepts the simple facts on the ground but would be a repudiation of both NATO and the West's morality, namely their feeling that sovereign nations should be able to do what they want regardless of what their neighbours think.

If we think that Ukraine is simply the first domino to fall and Putin's future targets include the Baltic States and potentially threatening Poland and Finland (and if Putin wants to effectively rebuild the Soviet Union, that may be the case), then the analogue to Munich becomes more appropriate. The question is if Putin gets away with getting what he wants with Ukraine, then he may feel emboldened to try to get what he wants in the Baltic States, calculating that the United States would not risk WW3 over the sovereignty of Latvia or Estonia, which a lot of people in the USA have never even heard of.

A greater danger, perhaps, is Putin having a degree of sense and knowing when to withdraw his winning hand, then his successor (who might come to power in the not too distant future) might now, and feel emboldened by the success in Ukraine to make a play directly against NATO elsewhere.

[DMC]

13 minutes ago, Werthead said:

This would be the realpolitik solution which accepts the simple facts on the ground but would be a repudiation of both NATO and the West's morality, namely their feeling that sovereign nations should be able to do what they want regardless of what their neighbours think.

Well, I don't think the Ukrainians offering a neutrality pact would undermine the west's morality/ideals.  If they allowed Putin to dictate terms on NATO membership, yes, but those are two different things.  Of course, I don't think Putin will be satisfied simply by Ukraine committing to a neutrality pact.

17 minutes ago, Werthead said:

The question is if Putin gets away with getting what he wants with Ukraine, then he may feel emboldened to try to get what he wants in the Baltic States, calculating that the United States would not risk WW3 over the sovereignty of Latvia or Estonia, which a lot of people in the USA have never even heard of.

Yeah I think if Putin is "successful" he will very likely turn his attention to the Baltic states.  Poland and Finland, not so much, but his instinct would almost certainly be right that the US/west is not going to care as much.

[Maithanet]

26 minutes ago, Werthead said:

If we think that Ukraine is simply the first domino to fall and Putin's future targets include the Baltic States and potentially threatening Poland and Finland (and if Putin wants to effectively rebuild the Soviet Union, that may be the case), then the analogue to Munich becomes more appropriate. The question is if Putin gets away with getting what he wants with Ukraine, then he may feel emboldened to try to get what he wants in the Baltic States, calculating that the United States would not risk WW3 over the sovereignty of Latvia or Estonia, which a lot of people in the USA have never even heard of.

That mostly hinges on HOW that happens though.  If Putin goes for a full on invasion of Ukraine, the US/EU will certainly hit back with sanctions, and Ukraine will certainly fight back militarily.  How effectively Ukraine can resist the Russian military is uncertain, but at the very least occupying Ukraine and propping up a Russian friendly govt would require a huge military investment and a pretty constant stream of casualties.  Perhaps Russia is willing to pay those costs, but even if they are, the combination of sanctions + the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign will sap Russia's military strength.

Thus it is very difficult for me to imagine a circumstance where Russia could credibly threaten an invasion of Latvia or Estonia in 2030 in such a scenario, barring unforseen events elsewhere in the world. 

Which I why I do think that if Ukraine made a permanent neutrality offer in the hopes of avoiding war that Putin would probably take it.  Swallowing up Ukraine would be extremely difficult and costly for Russia, which will severely limit Russian options going forward. 

[Ran]

Latvia and Estonia are in the EU and NATO. Ukraine is in neither.

I think that's going to make a real difference in regards to the calculus on all sides. I don't think Putin's intentions run to seizing the Baltics. 

[Toth]

Never forget that the most pressing issue for Putin is also securing fresh water supply for Crimea. That's why I severely doubt Putin is doing this for any grand conquests or even outright challenge NATO. Also keep asking yourselves why he's giving us such advance notice. That is almost certainly to gauge how harsh the sanctions are that we end up threatening him with. If he truly wanted to conquer Ukraine/topple its government, he probably would have attacked much more quickly and decisively two weeks ago and then forced the world to accept it.

[DMC]

13 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

Thus it is very difficult for me to imagine a circumstance where Russia could credibly threaten an invasion of Latvia or Estonia in 2030 in such a scenario, barring unforseen events elsewhere in the world. 

Well, I suppose this depends on what "successful" entails regarding Ukraine.  However, based on past behavior it's hard to see Putin not trying to continue to test the west and change the status quo with the Baltic states.  That doesn't mean necessarily mean invasion, no, but very likely rehashing his playbook of posturing, destabilizing and threat gestures.

[Kalbear]

11 minutes ago, Ran said:

Latvia and Estonia are in the EU and NATO. Ukraine is in neither.

I think that's going to make a real difference in regards to the calculus on all sides. I don't think Putin's intentions run to seizing the Baltics. 

It is tough for me to imagine the rest of Europe turning their backs on the Baltics, even if the US chooses to do so because they're run by, say, Trump or Tucker Carlson. Poland...might be trickier due to their current government and viewpoint of democratic ideals. 

 

6 minutes ago, Toth said:

Never forget that the most pressing issue for Putin is also securing fresh water supply for Crimea. That's why I severely doubt Putin is doing this for any grand conquests or even outright challenge NATO. Also keep asking yourselves why he's giving us such advance notice. That is almost certainly to gauge how harsh the sanctions are that we end up threatening him with. If he truly wanted to conquer Ukraine/topple its government, he probably would have attacked much more quickly and decisively two weeks ago and then forced the world to accept it.

Giving us advanced notice does a lot of things, but one of the big things it does is that it makes sure that everyone actually understands what the intentions are. What's being deployed is a lot of things required to take the Ukraine - but it's not enough to take much more than that. It is a sizeable force, but it's miniscule compared to the full Russian army. This makes it more likely that they are going for what they're saying they're going for. A surprise attack has advantages logistically and militarily but makes it significantly more likely to make mistakes and intentions not known or misunderstood, and makes it more likely to escalate. 

It also isn't awesome to do war in winter in Asia. 

[Werthead]

1 hour ago, Ran said:

Latvia and Estonia are in the EU and NATO. Ukraine is in neither.

I think that's going to make a real difference in regards to the calculus on all sides. I don't think Putin's intentions run to seizing the Baltics. 

Russia has made a lot of noise in the past about "retaking" the Baltics, although it's not been as voluble as it has been about Ukraine recently.

It depends if the calculation is that they simply want to stop NATO getting bigger or, as Putin has indicated in his written list of demands, he wants it rolled back to around 1997, effectively omitting the Baltic States as well as most of Eastern Europe. If so then at some stage he needs to directly challenge NATO and doing it through Estonia or Latvia is where you'd start. You could certainly test it, start a military buildup on the border and see if large numbers of American troops land to reinforce the NATO mission already there. If they don't, and there's a ferocious battle in Congress about it, then Putin can roll the dice, because the second a NATO member country is attacked and is not defended by its most powerful member, the alliance basically collapses.

Of course, the general feeling is that Putin made that list of demands knowing it was a non-starter but giving NATO a counter-option of agreeing that Ukraine will not join NATO, even if only for a given time period (say 5-10 years), which he could accept as a climbdown (and potentially punting the problem off to his successor).

Then again, three or four months ago the general feeling in the West is that this buildup was simple scaremongering to get Biden on the phone again, and it's clearly now more than that.

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What's being deployed is a lot of things required to take the Ukraine - but it's not enough to take much more than that. It is a sizeable force, but it's miniscule compared to the full Russian army. This makes it more likely that they are going for what they're saying they're going for. A surprise attack has advantages logistically and militarily but makes it significantly more likely to make mistakes and intentions not known or misunderstood, and makes it more likely to escalate. 

The capability and size of the Russian army is always theoretical than actual. A substantial amount of the Russian military budget has had a tendency to vanish into various people's pockets, and corruption is endemic in its supply chain, its logistics and everything else. There was a massive upgrade after Georgia in 2008, but there still seems to be a big capability gap between Russia's military strength on paper and what it can put in the field, though it is a lot smaller than it was back then.

One of Russia's biggest problems with its military is its underperforming economy, which makes it questionable how long it can sustain a high-intensity or even a low-intensity ongoing military campaign, how quickly it can replace destroyed material and make up for expended munitions. Russian military doctrine for the past decade and a half or so has favoured reinforcing local forces (whether Ossetian, Syrian or Ukrainian separatists) to do the legwork of the fighting for them and deploy air and special forces for surgical, quick strikes to minimise Russian losses of both material and manpower. In Ukraine that option is not available, so they're going to have to take on the type of war they've really not fought since Chechnya, albeit with a more capable military than they had back then.

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It also isn't awesome to do war in winter in Asia. 

Pedantic point, but all of Ukraine is in Europe. For forces used to fighting in those weather conditions, it's actually better to fight now or in February when the ground is frozen then 2-3 months down the line when the thaw comes and vast chunks of the terrain turns into mud, which completely blighted the Germans in WWII in all three years they stayed on the offensive, and may have cost them the war (they delayed Barbarossa by a month because weather conditions were slow in reaching their optimum, and they missed the window to capture Moscow before winter made it impossible by maybe a week).

[Clueless Northman]

2 hours ago, Werthead said:

A greater danger, perhaps, is Putin having a degree of sense and knowing when to withdraw his winning hand, then his successor (who might come to power in the not too distant future) might now, and feel emboldened by the success in Ukraine to make a play directly against NATO elsewhere.

That's the real risk without any doubt. Though Putin's direct follower, whenever it'll be, will still have the likes of Lavrov, Shoigu, Medvedev around - assuming he won't actually be one of them. We're probably good for 15 years before the real unknown.

3 hours ago, Werthead said:

If we think that Ukraine is simply the first domino to fall and Putin's future targets include the Baltic States and potentially threatening Poland and Finland (and if Putin wants to effectively rebuild the Soviet Union, that may be the case)

He's stated he definitely doesn't want to, too big and too messy. Well, he might think USSR was borderline manageable but he's clearly said he consider post-WW2 Soviet bloc to have been a terrible blunder, USSR didn't have the resources to control it and to go adventuring supporting groups all across the world. The Union overreached very quickly and wasted its limited resources doing it.

Since Russia and China are banking on US and Europe declining on their own, I wouldn't be surprised if Putin played that kind of waiting game and was fully satisfied to neutralize Ukraine (as in turning it into a buffer for both sides, and a politically and militarily neutral country) and any dream of NATO further expansion for the next 20 years. In which case, our current experiment, I mean, discussion has gone from "Sanctions and war" to "maybe we can live with no expansion and neutral Ukraine as long as it stays independent and isn't actually controlled by Russia". Typical "Ask big first" negotiation trick. Of course, he also has other goals and concerns outside Ukraine and will keep on trying to negotiate or ask for them.

 

I've also seen a few rumors that the bulk of the entire Russian navy was to go out next week to have various exercices in various oceans. If true, then Putin is not just messing with Western generals' nerves with ground troops near Ukraine, he's opting for confusion and uncertainty on a greater scale.

[DMC]

WSJ has the scoop on Biden's leaked sanctions plan.  Since that's paywalled, here's politico's writeup on it:

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“[T]the potential targets include several of Russia’s largest government-owned banks, such as VTB Bank, the banning of all trade in new issues of Russian sovereign debt and the application of export controls across key sectors such as advanced microelectronics,” they reported, noting that no final decision has yet been made. “Off the table, for now, are sanctions on oil and natural gas exports or disconnecting Russia from SWIFT, the basic infrastructure that facilitates financial transactions between banks across the world, said one of the officials.”

GREGORY BREW, an oil expert at Yale University, told NatSec Daily in a tweet that the administration “probably realized that sanctions blocking Europe from buying Russian oil/natgas would have a destabilizing impact on markets and contribute to high prices. There is not enough spare capacity to fill a Russian gap in the near-term.”

Doesn't sound too encouraging.

[Varysblackfyre321]

3 hours ago, Kalibuster said:

Not every military conflict with an autocrat is Hitler either. 

Eh, I think generally the rule applies. It’s important to set up boundaries, if you don’t autocrats will take what’s yours if they want it.

3 hours ago, Kalibuster said:

don't understand this point. No one is saying don't do sanctions or don't ship weapons. Who are you making this point to?

You who said shipping weapons and utilizing sanctions would be the equivalent of thoughts and prayers.

3 hours ago, Werthead said:

The Munich comparisons are somewhat dubious because Germany was the richest and most militarily powerful state in Europe at the time, whilst Russia is definitely not the richest and, whilst it may be the most militarily powerful or at least most numerous by itself, it is hugely outranged by NATO's full military potential. It is also not entirely clear what Putin's endgame is here.

Also Nazi Germany didn’t have nukes.

I do however think in the initial stages of German expansion if there was a more forceful reaction he wouldn’t have been able to make Germany as rich or militarily powerful as he had at Munich.