Ukraine War: David And Goliath

[ThinkerX]

I would point out that the US has massive stockpiles of decaying munitions that really are worth a tiny fraction of their former value - and will become a hazardous waste issue in the not so distant future. So, why not ship them off to Ukraine?

 

 

[Kalbear]

12 hours ago, ThinkerX said:

I would point out that the US has massive stockpiles of decaying munitions that really are worth a tiny fraction of their former value - and will become a hazardous waste issue in the not so distant future. So, why not ship them off to Ukraine?

Because the US cannot legally do so without approval from congress and going through the various acts above. Because, weirdly enough, there are a lot of policies and laws around the US giving away its weaponry to other countries.

Also it's not entirely clear what stockpiles of decaying munitions you're referring to. A lot of the weapons that the US no longer uses (like cluster munitions) have been shipped over. There aren't a ton more, unless you want the US to start arming Ukraine with the stockpiles of chemical weapons they have.

[Wilbur]

Kalbear, you are correct in your framing of the situation.  My question is why the Biden administration seems to be doing so little to get the Big Administrivia Train rolling through the countryside of Rules & Regulations that need to be satisfied and completed to get more gear to Ukraine.

There are many good and reasonable regulatory steps and approvals that need to be cleared to send munitions to another country.  We know this, and we are blessed that they exist.  But they are gates that can and should be passed, and it doesn't seem like the administration shows much of a sense of urgency to start the work necessary to pass those gates.

The regulatory runway to successful launch of munitions to Ukraine is a long one.  Why not start the run-up early and often, so that we can actually Do The Thing and send them what they need?

[Kalbear]

35 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

Kalbear, you are correct in your framing of the situation.  My question is why the Biden administration seems to be doing so little to get the Big Administrivia Train rolling through the countryside of Rules & Regulations that need to be satisfied and completed to get more gear to Ukraine.

There are many good and reasonable regulatory steps and approvals that need to be cleared to send munitions to another country.  We know this, and we are blessed that they exist.  But they are gates that can and should be passed, and it doesn't seem like the administration shows much of a sense of urgency to start the work necessary to pass those gates.

The regulatory runway to successful launch of munitions to Ukraine is a long one.  Why not start the run-up early and often, so that we can actually Do The Thing and send them what they need?

Basically all the regulations and things have been done. We have identified the things that can be sent, have dotted our Is and whatnot. The problem is simply the money. 

I guess we could also argue the issue about what specific higher-tech weapons should be sent over, but the issues there aren't administrative either; the problem is a will to give them to Ukraine. 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

42 minutes ago, Wilbur said:

The regulatory runway to successful launch of munitions to Ukraine is a long one.  Why not start the run-up early and often, so that we can actually Do The Thing and send them what they need?

The US should have done that, before Democrats lost the House. But back then they still believed in that boiling the frog approach.

[Bironic]

1 hour ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

The US should have done that, before Democrats lost the House. But back then they still believed in that boiling the frog approach.

Totally agree

[Padraig]

There seems to be a new boiling the frog situation too.  Over the last 6 months, things seem to have gotten a little worse for Ukraine each month.  Now Orban is getting more vocal in the EU, on top of the US money issue.  I fear where it ends up.

[House Balstroko]

2 hours ago, Padraig said:

There seems to be a new boiling the frog situation too.  Over the last 6 months, things seem to have gotten a little worse for Ukraine each month.  Now Orban is getting more vocal in the EU, on top of the US money issue.  I fear where it ends up.

How so? 

[Padraig]

7 hours ago, House Balstroko said:

How so? 

I’m assuming you read what Kal posted.  I mentioned the EU.  And on the battlefield, nearly all fronts see Russia grinding forward by meters. Ukraine isn’t even doing that.

[ThinkerX]

1 hour ago, Padraig said:

I’m assuming you read what Kal posted.  I mentioned the EU.  And on the battlefield, nearly all fronts see Russia grinding forward by meters. Ukraine isn’t even doing that.

Those meters are coming at a staggering cost in lives and material, causing massive stress, social and economic back in Russia. 

[Bironic]

10 hours ago, House Balstroko said:

How so? 

There are also statistics out there (haven’t got the link right now) that foreign aid to Ukraine peaked around January to March 2023 and has since fallen even below the 2022 average and without foreign aid Ukraine is screwed.

[Padraig]

7 hours ago, ThinkerX said:

Those meters are coming at a staggering cost in lives and material, causing massive stress, social and economic back in Russia. 

And I’m sure in 20 years those costs will force them to stop fighting in Ukraine.

[Werthead]

11 hours ago, Padraig said:

I’m assuming you read what Kal posted.  I mentioned the EU.  And on the battlefield, nearly all fronts see Russia grinding forward by meters. Ukraine isn’t even doing that.

Ukraine has made small but extant territorial grounds south of the Dnipro in occupied Kherson Oblast, and it recently retook some of the territory lost in the aborted Russian Kreminna offensive in the north-east. It has apparently ceased regaining ground around Bakhmut and its advances out of the Robotyne salient and firming up new defences in those areas. At one point they also drove back the Russian advance north of Avdiivka.

These are modest advances, but they have nevertheless been taking place.

Russian casualties have been approaching 1,000 per day across all fronts for the last two weeks, which is unsustainable. They have to loosen up on that in the not too distant future or render themselves vulnerable to a counter.

[Maithanet]

2 hours ago, Padraig said:

And I’m sure in 20 years those costs will force them to stop fighting in Ukraine.

If Ukraine does not get sustained (perhaps even increased) assistance from the US/EU, then it cannot win a long war with Russia.  But you are basically embracing Russian propaganda if you think that Russia can fight anywhere near the current level of intensity for decades.  It doesn't have the economy or the infrastructure. 

Perhaps Russia could freeze the conflict and things settle down to something more akin to a (slightly larger) redux of the 2015-2021 period.  Russia could manage that, and Ukraine would absolutely struggle with continuing to fight such a medium intensity conflict while rebuilding from the devastation of the past two years. 

It all comes down to the level of support Ukraine receives, and that has indeed been shaky these past 6 months.  We can only hope that the NATO countries can get their act together. 

[Padraig]

1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

But you are basically embracing Russian propaganda if you think that Russia can fight anywhere near the current level of intensity for decades. 

I will admit I was exaggerating somewhat (I hope).  People have been saying that Russia will collapse soon after its initial invasion failed.  I suppose if you keep repeating it, it could eventually be true.  But in the meantime, I will continue to roll my eyes when I read it.

I'm sure Russia is suffering a lot.  But Ukraine certainly is too.  And as you said, continuing external support is a serious concern. 

It might all work out.  I'm not as clued in as some of you all.  But I don't see much reason to be optimistic.  I hope i'm wrong.

[Werthead]

Russia is currently experiencing a major economic contraction which it is turning every single trick in the book to avoid or even delay. They are running out of options. When you sell off 10% of your foreign currency reserves in one go, you are very much standing on quicksand and without systemic addressing of the economic problems (i.e. cutting off almost all of your overseas markets and spending what money you have left on guns), you merely increase the chances of having to do tricks like that again in the future, probably on a larger scale. Russia is instead doubling down on its mistakes and they are compounding one another. Their plan to pivot to tying themselves to China's economy is also foundering on the rocky shores of China's own economic woes.

These problems are serious but it is perhaps possible for Russia to pull itself onto a more even course before it starts going into a tailspin, which could be both beneficial (Russia literally runs out of the ability to fund the war and pay its soldiers, and Tsar Nicholas II could tell you a thing or two about the importance of paying its soldiers) and also incredibly dangerous (Putin needs to pull off a quick victory at absolutely any risk at all). Russia's technical issues with, for example, its internal air fleet are also continuing to mount. 

There is also the interesting situation of Putin's increased vulnerability: Putin believes that his dealing with Prigozhin has ended internal threats from within Russia. That is over-optimistic. It's instead made his opponents warier and also more resolute: if you move against Putin you cannot equivocate halfway through like Prigozhin did, you have to make your move, commit and not stop until you win or die. Putin's other opponents are also much quieter than Prigozhin and perhaps more dangerous for that. However, he also still has Kadyrov as a wild card and some of Kadyrov's recent moves have the whiff of Prigozhin's early defiance to them; whether that's Kadyrov preparing to make a move whilst Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, or Kadyrov merely lining up ducks to execute the second Putin falls (to another challenger, to ill health or whatever) is a key question.

Russia has become a very brittle state, possibly faster and even more weaker than was expected at the onset of the war. However, it has shown itself adept at dodging major blows. It has also transitioned to a defensive footing on the war front, which means it needs less troops (perhaps risking internal dissent over further conscription waves) and Ukraine breaking those defences requires massive reinforcement and reinvestment from its overseas partners, who have a series of issues affecting them. There are ways around those issues - the UK, Spain, France, the Baltics, the Nordics and Germany seem extremely resolute in continued support and they can pick up some slack from issues in the US, but clearly not all of it - but not all of them. Poland's political issues with Ukraine I think are fixable whilst the government sorts its shit out, but they need to sort that out ASAP: the current border problems due to Polish farmers and apparently adding a 2-week turnaround to military equipment getting into Ukraine and that needs to go yesterday.

There is also a fierce internal debate going on within South Korea at the moment about what support to offer Ukraine: North Korea sending tons of equipment to Russia is making South Korea consider doing the same to Ukraine, both as a geopolitical counter and also to test some of its equipment in the field. South Korea's artillery ammunition production capacity is incredible, and could offset some, if not most, of the loss of American support whilst its politics fuck around for all of 2024. South Korea and Japan have been wary of increased support to Ukraine whilst the possibility of a China-Taiwan conflict remains on the table, but China's internal economic woes are adding new complexities to those calculations (would a full-blown Chinese crash make a war with Taiwan less likely, as China needs all hands and improved foreign relations on deck to fix the crisis, or more, as it needs a good patriotic distraction?).

There is also a cynical view that some countries may see a frozen conflict as more beneficial: it would be hard for Russia to continue prosecuting even a low-key war against Ukraine whilst also trying to mount an invasion somewhere else.

[Werthead]

Putin recently flew to the UAE to try to shore up relations there, and intriguingly took Kadyrov with him.

Having failed to expel migrants passing through Russia into Finland and the Baltic States, Russia has started arresting them and pressing them into service in Ukraine. Efficient, I guess.

A 58-year-old Ukrainian sniper has reportedly broken the world record for the longest kill shot by hitting a Russian soldier at a distance of 3.8 kilometres. The Ukrainian sniper unit was engaging Russian targets clean on the other side of the Dnipro.

A Russian Su-24M over the Black Sea was shot down by a Patriot missile. Some Russian aircraft are having problems working out the maximum "safe range" they can operate from without being hit by Patriots (against which Russian flares and ECM seem mostly ineffective).

Saudi Arabia and several other members of OPEC+ have expressed annoyance at Russia's lack of transparency about is energy production sector. OPEC+ members are supposed to share data on production with one another so they can coordinate prices. It stops members cutting side-deals with other countries. There seems to be suspicion that Russia is producing more oil than it is saying and then selling the excess on the down-low to China and other countries, undercutting other members of the consortium.

Russian civilian aircraft failures this week.

1. A Boeing 777 suddenly developed an electrical fire that caused an immediate evacuation before takeoff from Moscow.
2. A Tu-204 cargo plane's engine burst into flames during takeoff from Ulan-Ude. The pilot managed to dump the fuel, extinguish the fire and land, but the engine was a write-off.
3. A passenger plane flying from Kazan to Moscow made an emergency landing at Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. The stabilization system experienced a malfunction and the pilots had to manually fly the plane to an emergency touchdown.
4. An Aeroflot Airbus A321 made an emergency landing at Pulkovo Airport (St. Petersburg) after the cockpit air conditioning system failed.
5. A Boing 737 made an emergency landing at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk after wheel pressure failures.
6. A plane taking off from Novosibrisk saw its autopilot and flaps fail simultaneously.
7. An Aeroflot Airbus A321 flying from St. Petersburg to Moscow made an emergency landing at Sheremetyevo due to an engine failure.
8. A Yamal airline Superjet 100 landed at Tyumen Roschchino Airport due to an unspecified technical malfunction.

A Russian military cargo plane also just straight-up exploded.

The head of the Polish National Security Bureau has issued a warning that Russia may be looking to launch an invasion of NATO's eastern flank in three years. Germany recently said it would take Russia between five and nine years to prepare an attack on eastern Europe, perhaps more if the war in Ukraine was dragged out. However, Poland and the Baltic States believe this is too optimistic. Putin may be looking to launch an invasion of the Baltic States and maybe Poland on his watch, and having just turned 71 he may be feeling time is not on his side for a longer timetable.

[Bironic]

44 minutes ago, Werthead said:

Putin recently flew to the UAE to try to shore up relations there, and intriguingly took Kadyrov with him.

He generally uses the fact that Kadyrov is a muslim to gain favor in the muslim world. I think this is one of the reasons why he took him on this trip...

[Derfel Cadarn]

While the idea of the Russian army, whose three day war is approaching two years, attacking NATO is laughable, I think people are taking notice thet Putin will just keep feeding the meat grinder , banking on an enemy running out of expensive munitions before he runs out of cannon fodder

[Hmmm]

22 hours ago, Werthead said:

There is also a fierce internal debate going on within South Korea at the moment about what support to offer Ukraine: North Korea sending tons of equipment to Russia is making South Korea consider doing the same to Ukraine, both as a geopolitical counter and also to test some of its equipment in the field. South Korea's artillery ammunition production capacity is incredible, and could offset some, if not most, of the loss of American support whilst its politics fuck around for all of 2024. South Korea and Japan have been wary of increased support to Ukraine whilst the possibility of a China-Taiwan conflict remains on the table, but China's internal economic woes are adding new complexities to those calculations (would a full-blown Chinese crash make a war with Taiwan less likely, as China needs all hands and improved foreign relations on deck to fix the crisis, or more, as it needs a good patriotic distraction?).

There is also a cynical view that some countries may see a frozen conflict as more beneficial: it would be hard for Russia to continue prosecuting even a low-key war against Ukraine whilst also trying to mount an invasion somewhere else.

Yeah, it is both amazing and sad that South Korea at this point has apparently supplied more 155mm artillery ammunition to Ukraine than all the European nations combined. Sure South Korea is an economic and military powerhouse despite its small size. Its total GDP is incidentially about the same as Russia's. But this really shows the shameful state of the European arms industry and munition stocks before the full scale invasion began. We are lucky that the Russian military turned out to be so incompetent. 

Edited December 7, 2023 by Hmmm