Ukraine War: incompetence vs fecklessness

[Snowy89]

3 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Interesting one for those who missed it.

Going back to the Taurus (non-) debate from the previous pages.

Scholz clarified, there'd be no Taurus deliveries. Reasons as described, they could be used to hit targets inside Russia, making Germany party in this war. Our Smurf chancellor expressed his irritation over the way this decission was/is covered,

When you hear Justin Bronk explaining the worst case scenario for Ukraine, I can no longer even remotely understand the current hesitancy on EU leaders. What do these European leaders exactly expect the impact to be of a new refugee wave of very possibly more than 10 million additional Ukrainians running to EU countries if the Ukrainian army crumbles due to lack of ammunition like the Afghan army. Have they even remotely thought through the political and economical consequences just on Europe, never mind the world economy?

What do they expect the consequences of a Russia in full control of all Ukraine's borders all along EU nation states, with an experienced victorious army with backed by a military industry in full production. Like the guest says, what kind of deterrence do European leaders think they will have against Russia when they have just shown they cannot even bear when it is only money to stop the Russian army. Do they honestly expect Putin to believe them when they say they will now spend both money AND blood to defend Europe's borders. I'm honestly starting to think I may need to start preparing some emigration plans before this shitshow hits.

 

 

Edited February 26 by Job Snow

[Werthead]

One story doing the rounds internally in Russia is that Navalny was set to be released as part of a prisoner transfer but Putin had some sort of major rage-out the night before and ordered him to be iced instead.

Hungary has ratified Sweden's accession to NATO, removing the last obstacle to enlargement.

Russia launched a raid on Ukrainian positions outside Robotyne using several IFVs, but were swarmed by drones. Two of the drivers hell-rode into the middle of the town, surrounded on all sides by Ukrainian forces and the continuing-to-attack drones. It did not end well for them.

4 hours ago, Gorn said:

An important caveat is that Zelensky's figure doesn't include missing soldiers or POWs, only those who are officially KIA. In this war, MIA is a major percentage of total casualties.

True, but looking at the figures even assuming all those were KIA, that would "only" raise things into the 40,000s (maybe on a par with the 42,000 figure the BBC turned up from chronicling Ukrainian funerals and memorials), though obviously that's still horrendous. The MIA figure has come down a lot as well due to prisoner swaps with Russia, with several thousand Ukrainian troops returning to Ukraine (as well as several thousand Russian to Russia, of course).

[Stark Revenge]

I don't think people are really grasping the precarious nature of the situation. I know posters like Werthead would like to look on the bright side and point out Russia's vulnerabilities as well, but I really see little reason for optimism. European and Asian aid to Ukraine is great, but it really is just a band-aid. If the House does not authorize another major aid package to Ukraine, then I really do not see how this ends well for them.

This comes back to the idea that the West has not had a viable strategy to deal with the Russian invasion - even two years into the war. Biden slow dripping weapon systems to Ukraine has been disastrous. I know it's hard to say that if we had given them HIMARS, ATACAMS, F-16's early on that it would have changed the course of the war, but it certainly wouldn't have hurt. Now you have Macron coming out and making comments that all options are on the table to prevent Ukraine from falling, including the use of NATO troops in Ukraine. That would be insanity imo, but if Ukraine is really that important, why wait to send in troops till Ukraine's army has been degraded to the point of imminent collapse? Send in NATO troops now if Ukraine is so important. The West continues to act without cohesion or direction. I'm very worried about Ukraine's future. Apparently the median age of Ukrainian troops in 42 year old. That the Ukrainian Parliament cannot overcome domestic pressures to expand the conscription window below 27 years of age is baffling to me. The main argument against widening the conscription age appears to be that this demographic cohort is Ukraine's future and is small in size compared to the rest of their age brackets. Yet, without greater mobilization efforts, there will be no future for Ukraine. This seems like an obvious no-brainer to me, I cannot understand how Ukraine can continue to fight with an aged and outnumbered army against Russia's meat grinder and hope to hold the front as it is, much less take back territory in the long run. I really am having a hard time seeing how this ends well for Ukraine.

[Celestial]

30 minutes ago, Stark Revenge said:

I don't think people are really grasping the precarious nature of the situation. I know posters like Werthead would like to look on the bright side and point out Russia's vulnerabilities as well, but I really see little reason for optimism. European and Asian aid to Ukraine is great, but it really is just a band-aid. If the House does not authorize another major aid package to Ukraine, then I really do not see how this ends well for them.

This comes back to the idea that the West has not had a viable strategy to deal with the Russian invasion - even two years into the war. Biden slow dripping weapon systems to Ukraine has been disastrous. I know it's hard to say that if we had given them HIMARS, ATACAMS, F-16's early on that it would have changed the course of the war, but it certainly wouldn't have hurt. Now you have Macron coming out and making comments that all options are on the table to prevent Ukraine from falling, including the use of NATO troops in Ukraine. That would be insanity imo, but if Ukraine is really that important, why wait to send in troops till Ukraine's army has been degraded to the point of imminent collapse? Send in NATO troops now if Ukraine is so important. The West continues to act without cohesion or direction. I'm very worried about Ukraine's future. Apparently the median age of Ukrainian troops in 42 year old. That the Ukrainian Parliament cannot overcome domestic pressures to expand the conscription window below 27 years of age is baffling to me. The main argument against widening the conscription age appears to be that this demographic cohort is Ukraine's future and is small in size compared to the rest of their age brackets. Yet, without greater mobilization efforts, there will be no future for Ukraine. This seems like an obvious no-brainer to me, I cannot understand how Ukraine can continue to fight with an aged and outnumbered army against Russia's meat grinder and hope to hold the front as it is, much less take back territory in the long run. I really am having a hard time seeing how this ends well for Ukraine.

 

Because humans are world champions at deluding themselves when inconvenient decisions have to be made. And the kind of politicians which Europe and America have at the moment are even better at this then your average human.

Biden and Europe slow dripped the military aid not as part of some clever strategy, but because, at every step, they clung to the hope that maybe will be enough and Ukraine will manage with what they got, so US/Europe won't need to commit more.

If you have trouble understanding this mindset, think of the gambling addicts, who always make one more bet despite losses piling up, in the deluded belief that "maybe next time I'll win" - until they squander all their fortune away. This a similar mindset at play: "maybe Javelins will be enough" , "maybe several Himars will be enough", "maybe 100 tanks will be enough", etc. US and Europe has been (and still is) playing this game at Ukraine's expense, until they will squander all Ukraine's defensive capabilities away.

Truth be told, it is not just the fault of the politicians. If Scholz were to come tomorrow and announce that Germany must institute a 5% war tax to rebuild its weapon industry and draft 300,000 troops to rebuild its army, what do you think the German public would say?

European/American public opinion is indeed supporting Ukraine (although Russia is chipping away at that)... as long as the support remains cheap.

As for not having a "a viable strategy to deal with the Russian invasion", of course they don't. They cannot have one, because they have a very limited understanding of how power works in Russia. The whole idea that a ruler (Putin) will accept casualties in the range of 500,000 in WW1-style trench warfare (or that his population won't rise up and lynch him for that) is unfathomable for any Western leader. The fact that the West seriously thought that 100 MBTs and 300 IFVs would be enough for a major offensive also tells its own story.

 

Quote

What do they expect the consequences of a Russia in full control of all Ukraine's borders all along EU nation states, with an experienced victorious army with backed by a military industry in full production. Like the guest says, what kind of deterrence do European leaders think they will have against Russia when they have just shown they cannot even bear when it is only money to stop the Russian army. Do they honestly expect Putin to believe them when they say they will now spend both money AND blood to defend Europe's borders.

This is a question which needs to be addressed to the European public, first and foremost. The politicians have vacillated, indeed, but if Macron were to announce tomorrow that France must mobilize in support of Ukraine, the French would just vote for Le Pen.

[Werthead]

I think it is important not to panic and immediately declare the sky is falling. Russia continues to make incremental gains only at incredibly high costs. Where the danger is is somewhere on the line where Russia can penetrate through several lines of defence quickly and then "erupt" in the Ukrainian rear. However, that is more difficult than it first appears: the apparent success of Russian IFVs in crossing Ukrainian lines near Robotyne is worrying, but Ukraine immediately deploying heavy reserves to obliterate them shows they can adapt to that kind of situation.

Ukraine does need further western support, particularly artillery ammunition; the Ukrainians have effectively said that getting enough artillery ammo by itself would basically allow them to hold their current positions. The 800,000 shells the Czech Republic found recently will, by itself, provide Ukraine with enough ammo to continue fighting defensive and possibly even offensive actions for at least several months to come, depending where it is concentrated on the line.

Whilst individual weapons cannot necessary win the war, they can make life a lot harder for the Russians. The Black Sea has effectively been half-cleared of Russian vessels, operating near Ukrainian territory even for high-tech AWACS-ish aircraft has become difficult and the deployment of F-16s may make it too hazardous to fly bombers and cruise missile-carriers as close to the borders as possible.

It is correct to say that this is primarily a ground war and Ukraine needs to either retake ground from the Russians in a cost-lite manner (incredibly difficult) or it needs a stratagem to effectively outlast Russian offensives until something in Russia snaps (which may sound optimistic, but that's what we said before Prigozhin's death march, and the signs of strain within Russia continue to grow more pronounced). These are both difficult outcomes to achieve with Kyiv seemingly reluctant to put more, younger troops on the ground.

This is still the most precarious moment of the war for Ukraine since probably the summer 2022 offensive which took the twin cities, there should be no doubt of that, and this moment will last until the end of the year when we see what impact the US Presidential elections have on the situation.

Edited February 27 by Werthead

[Stark Revenge]

17 hours ago, Celestial said:

 

Because humans are world champions at deluding themselves when inconvenient decisions have to be made. And the kind of politicians which Europe and America have at the moment are even better at this then your average human.

Biden and Europe slow dripped the military aid not as part of some clever strategy, but because, at every step, they clung to the hope that maybe will be enough and Ukraine will manage with what they got, so US/Europe won't need to commit more.

If you have trouble understanding this mindset, think of the gambling addicts, who always make one more bet despite losses piling up, in the deluded belief that "maybe next time I'll win" - until they squander all their fortune away. This a similar mindset at play: "maybe Javelins will be enough" , "maybe several Himars will be enough", "maybe 100 tanks will be enough", etc. US and Europe has been (and still is) playing this game at Ukraine's expense, until they will squander all Ukraine's defensive capabilities away.

Truth be told, it is not just the fault of the politicians. If Scholz were to come tomorrow and announce that Germany must institute a 5% war tax to rebuild its weapon industry and draft 300,000 troops to rebuild its army, what do you think the German public would say?

European/American public opinion is indeed supporting Ukraine (although Russia is chipping away at that)... as long as the support remains cheap.

As for not having a "a viable strategy to deal with the Russian invasion", of course they don't. They cannot have one, because they have a very limited understanding of how power works in Russia. The whole idea that a ruler (Putin) will accept casualties in the range of 500,000 in WW1-style trench warfare (or that his population won't rise up and lynch him for that) is unfathomable for any Western leader. The fact that the West seriously thought that 100 MBTs and 300 IFVs would be enough for a major offensive also tells its own story.

I generally agree with this - especially how the West has continued to misread Putin and how far he is willing to go to win the war. Meat grinder assaults can win the day as we've seen, especially when you care little for your population and are taking efforts to protect ethnic Russians above all else.

A more generous explanation I've heard for the slow drip aid to Ukraine is that Biden and Co were worried about escalation management and the conflict spiraling out of control. Not that that makes the slow drip a good strategy, but it is a bit more understandable. 

However, that view is being challenged in a somewhat laughable manner. If Macron (and presumably the Baltic states and Poland) is so intent on sending troops to Ukraine to fight against Russia, then why wait?  The best chance for victory is to combine armies now, rather than wait till the Ukrainian army is near the brink of collapse. 

That this idea is even being discussed should send alarm bells ringing in anyone's head who is remotely sane. Direct conflict between NATO and Russia over Ukraine must be avoided at all costs (I'm open to the idea that NATO should escalate if Russia were to nuke Kiev or something, but not thrilled about it). If France or Poland want to send an expeditionary force to fight in Ukraine on a unilateral basis, then let them have at it, but under no circumstances should this become a NATO mission. It's begging for WWIII. This proposal is made worse by the fact that sending troops is wholly unnecessary if the West can get its act together, ramp up production and send Ukraine the weapons it needs to hold the front, if not take back all its pre-22 territory.  

17 hours ago, Werthead said:

I think it is important not to panic and immediately declare the sky is falling. Russia continues to make incremental gains only at incredibly high costs. Where the danger is is somewhere on the line where Russia can penetrate through several lines of defence quickly and then "erupt" in the Ukrainian rear. However, that is more difficult than it first appears: the apparent success of Russian IFVs in crossing Ukrainian lines near Robotyne is worrying, but Ukraine immediately deploying heavy reserves to obliterate them shows they can adapt to that kind of situation.

Ukraine does need further western support, particularly artillery ammunition; the Ukrainians have effectively said that getting enough artillery ammo by itself would basically allow them to hold their current positions. The 800,000 shells the Czech Republic found recently will, by itself, provide Ukraine with enough ammo to continue fighting defensive and possibly even offensive actions for at least several months to come, depending where it is concentrated on the line.

Whilst individual weapons cannot necessary win the war, they can make life a lot harder for the Russians. The Black Sea has effectively been half-cleared of Russian vessels, operating near Ukrainian territory even for high-tech AWACS-ish aircraft has become difficult and the deployment of F-16s may make it too hazardous to fly bombers and cruise missile-carriers as close to the borders as possible.

It is correct to say that this is primarily a ground war and Ukraine needs to either retake ground from the Russians in a cost-lite manner (incredibly difficult) or it needs a stratagem to effectively outlast Russian offensives until something in Russia snaps (which may sound optimistic, but that's what we said before Prigozhin's death march, and the signs of strain within Russia continue to grow more pronounced). These are both difficult outcomes to achieve with Kyiv seemingly reluctant to put more, younger troops on the ground.

This is still the most precarious moment of the war for Ukraine since probably the summer 2022 offensive which took the twin cities, there should be no doubt of that, and this moment will last until the end of the year when we see what impact the US Presidential elections have on the situation.

I have a hard time using anecdotes from any one encounter as proof of anything. I'm sure a lot of the footage Ukraine releases is that which they want us to see to keep support alive, and similar with footage Russia releases. In such a long front, it may be helpful to observe these encounters in some manner, but I caution against reading into them too much. 

The Progozhin rebellion was one of the wildest moments of the war hahaha, honestly was cheering for them to reach Moscow and let come what may. Tragic that it didn't come to pass. Personally, I'm waiting till Hollywood makes a John McAfee, Prigozhen and Nalvany bro-comedy about them on a tropical island a la the Hangover.

All jokes aside, it certainly is possible that Russia will collapse from internal discontent if a faction of oligarchs decides Putin's time is over, but for planning purposes I put about as much stake in that possibility as the continued rumors of Putin having cancer. The West can't meaningfully affect any potential rebellion (perhaps Putin's successor would be worse!), and we shouldn't plan as if it's a real possibility.

Don't get me started on the shape of domestic US politics, but if I were a betting man, I'd say Trump will win in November. 

[mormont]

2 hours ago, Stark Revenge said:

All jokes aside, it certainly is possible that Russia will collapse from internal discontent if a faction of oligarchs decides Putin's time is over

My understanding is that the Putin-oligarch power relationship is in practice the opposite of this. They're his creatures.

Which is not to say that there are no others in Russia who could decide Putin's time is over.

[Maithanet]

Just now, mormont said:

My understanding is that the Putin-oligarch power relationship is in practice the opposite of this. They're his creatures.

Which is not to say that there are no others in Russia who could decide Putin's time is over.

If we're talking about a realistic collapse of Putin's power, I agree that the oligarchs probably aren't the most likely.  More likely is a coup coming from either the internal security services or some colonel/lower level general with a group of loyal troops behind him.  Important to remember that when it comes to both the security services and the military, Putin is pretty careful to value loyalty over competence, which helps him hold power and avoid popular rivals. 

We've already seen that in such a case, much of the Russian power structure will simply stand aside rather than fight for Putin. If a committed attempt was made, it could succeed.  Hell, if Prigozhin had some semblance of a plan, he would have had decent odds of pulling it off himself, and he wasn't even trying to depose Putin. 

[Altherion]

20 hours ago, Stark Revenge said:

This comes back to the idea that the West has not had a viable strategy to deal with the Russian invasion - even two years into the war.

There is a strategy, it's just not a very pleasant one. Ukraine has been given just enough weapons to mostly drive the Russian forces back, but no more than that. The West gets to sit back and watch the destruction of Russian ships, tanks and planes (mostly mediocre ones, but also some that are pretty advanced) with no risk to Western lives or even the need to demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of our own advanced weapons (the stuff we give to Ukraine is from the previous generation at best).

[SeanF]

13 hours ago, Maithanet said:

If we're talking about a realistic collapse of Putin's power, I agree that the oligarchs probably aren't the most likely.  More likely is a coup coming from either the internal security services or some colonel/lower level general with a group of loyal troops behind him.  Important to remember that when it comes to both the security services and the military, Putin is pretty careful to value loyalty over competence, which helps him hold power and avoid popular rivals. 

We've already seen that in such a case, much of the Russian power structure will simply stand aside rather than fight for Putin. If a committed attempt was made, it could succeed.  Hell, if Prigozhin had some semblance of a plan, he would have had decent odds of pulling it off himself, and he wasn't even trying to depose Putin. 

Power can collapse very suddenly, in the kind of tyranny where a tyrant depends, largely,  upon threats and bribes to keep control.  Beria and Ceaucescu found that out.

[Padraig]

4 hours ago, SeanF said:

Power can collapse very suddenly, in the kind of tyranny where a tyrant depends, largely,  upon threats and bribes to keep control.

True.  But it can also last till the guy dies of old age.  Speculating about it seems kind of pointless given it is unknowable until something happens.  If it ever does.

[Bironic]

Yes in a war you can not base a strategy on something like that. Yes maybe a miracle of house brandenburg happens, but more likely it will not.

17 hours ago, Altherion said:

There is a strategy, it's just not a very pleasant one. Ukraine has been given just enough weapons to mostly drive the Russian forces back, but no more than that. The West gets to sit back and watch the destruction of Russian ships, tanks and planes (mostly mediocre ones, but also some that are pretty advanced) with no risk to Western lives or even the need to demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of our own advanced weapons (the stuff we give to Ukraine is from the previous generation at best).

Clearly that's not the case: Russia still occupies around 20% of Ukraines territory and there hasn't been much change in the frontlines since November 2022. Since October 2023 Russia is regaining momentum and seems to be able to push the Ukrainians back from some of their positions: Avdiivka(held since 2014!), Kryynki, Robotyne, Bakhmut etc. The fact that Ukraine is running out of ammo (and not the first time! remember the shortages of ammo before cluster ammo came round last year, or the shortage of anti air systems once russia started to mass bombard the ukrainian cities etc?) means that the West has not prepared for a long drawn out war which is exactly what happens since april-november 2022. The fact that Ukraine support relies on the US not electing republicans in any position of power (House of reps, White House, Senate, which means that ca. every 2 years Ukraine is fucked), the fact that Ukraine still waits for western fighter jets right now, while it was clear from the start they wouldn't be able to get any more soviet-russian ones(you could insert here almost every soviet-russian weapon system they had at the start and have not been able to completely replace with western ones) etc., the fact that we never really say what the end game is and how we are supposed to get there, the fact that Macron now talks about using Nato troops and is backed by lithuania and no one else, the endless and if they weren't so deadly serious, comically long debates about every single weapons systems(the most recent one with Scholz saying that TAURUS can not be sent because german personnel can't become involved in targeting and programming those things in Ukraine like the UK does with Storm shadow, only to have this story debunked by the UK government the next day), the insane long accession of Sweden into Nato, the completely unlcear path of Ukraine into either NATO and EU. The fact that there is no long term plan to finance the war effort, no long term plan to finance the the ukrainian government, no plan what happens after the war etc.. All this means that there is no long term planning, no realisation of what putin wants and how he wants to achieve it, that there is no common ground among the various supporters of Ukraine. It's always russia acts and then the west with some delay reacts somehow, but only after the Ukrainians have paid an unnecessery high price, that could have been prevented if we had planned ahead instead of waiting until the ukrainian position is untenable and the act in some sort of emergency fire fighter rescue to put out the fire...

I am not saying that no politicians in the west have some or even all of the above in their sights, it's just that most of the big hitters (USA, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Belgium, Greece, Romania) don't have it or that there is not enough popular support for it... and then there's the obvious fuckups like Orban (EU & NATO) and Erdogan (NATO) as well as some minor ones like Fico(Slovachia), Vucic (Serbia-balkans), who seem to play more into Putins hands then anyone elses.

On the other hand you have a leadership (Putin), a government who has a goal, a strategy and a long term plan, the determination to follow through on that and the means to achieve it, as well as some useful and steadfast supporters (North Korea, Belarus, Iran, Syria, and some minor countries) to actually win.

The bolcheviks didn't win the Russian civil war because they had more men, better weapons etc. but they had a unified leadership that was willing to go all the way...

[Werthead]

The latest EU funding deal allows for funding of Ukraine for the next four years, enough to pay all of the civil service and I believe the military salaries, as well as a ton of things on top. That's actually a big burden off Ukraine's shoulders.

Ironically one of the biggest threats to Putin's rule might be simple internal dissent with not providing basic services. A dozen or so Russian cities had exploding water pipes, collapsing infrastructure, electricity blackouts (rolling blackout even in Moscow for a time) and so on. Russia suffered worse infrastructure losses this last winter than Ukraine did. These are probably much more dangerous to Putin's regime than anything else.

[Kalbear]

Interesting story on the Russian wave attacks in Ukraine and how they're working:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/26/modern-banzai-russian-troops-pile-onto-vehicles-speed-toward-ukrainian-lines--and-die-but-the-tactic-is-helping-russia-advance/?sh=5d059a89b5ef

Quote

So the Russians tried again the next day, this time rolling three BTR-82 wheeled IFVs toward Robotyne. A Ukrainian mine popped one of the BTRs. A Ukrainian soldier reportedly from the 118th Mechanized Brigade hit a second BTR with a rocket-propelled grenade, at least temporarily halting the assault.

The banzai attacks are extremely costly for the Russians, and help to explain why the Russians are losing around 800 troops a day, according to the Ukrainian defense ministry. And why the Russians have, in the estimation of open-source analyst Andrew Perpetua, written off or abandoned 19 BMPs and BTRs in just the last two days.

I think this in particular is a really good point:

Quote

Infantry-first “meat assaults” are nothing new in Russia’s wider war on Ukraine, but the tactics are evolving. Noting the Ukrainians’ desperate shortage of artillery ammo, the Russians are betting that back-to-back-to-back waves of troops, riding in or on infantry fighting vehicles, can deplete Ukrainian firepower faster than the Ukrainians can deplete Russian manpower.

Man, if only the Ukrainians put more than 1 ton of ammo on their mechs for the LRMs

[Altherion]

4 hours ago, Bironic said:

Clearly that's not the case: Russia still occupies around 20% of Ukraines territory and there hasn't been much change in the frontlines since November 2022. Since October 2023 Russia is regaining momentum and seems to be able to push the Ukrainians back from some of their positions: Avdiivka(held since 2014!), Kryynki, Robotyne, Bakhmut etc

That is why I said "mostly". They have not fully driven them back, but the areas that the Russians still hold are much less than they held in the beginning of the war. Also, the Russians have some momentum, but in absolute terms, the land they have recently captured is likewise much, much less than in the initial advance.

4 hours ago, Bironic said:

The fact that there is no long term plan to finance the war effort, no long term plan to finance the the ukrainian government, no plan what happens after the war etc.. All this means that there is no long term planning, no realisation of what putin wants and how he wants to achieve it, that there is no common ground among the various supporters of Ukraine.

Well yes -- long term planning is a forgotten art in many (most?) Western governments. It certainly no longer exists in the US (which is by far the single biggest arms manufacturer supporting Ukraine). There is some long term planning for after the war (a while ago, JP Morgan Chase signed some agreements with Ukraine regarding the rebuilding once the war is finished), but it's sporadic. There's no leader or group of leaders who are capable of creating and executing a grand plan that is more than 1-2 years in scope.

That said, that doesn't mean that there is no plan at all. As I said, the idea is to let the Russians expend their arsenal against Ukraine and that seems to be working quite well. The distant (i.e. past the next election) future is not really something today's politicians plan for.

[Hmmm]

3 hours ago, Kalbear said:

Interesting story on the Russian wave attacks in Ukraine and how they're working:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/26/modern-banzai-russian-troops-pile-onto-vehicles-speed-toward-ukrainian-lines--and-die-but-the-tactic-is-helping-russia-advance/?sh=5d059a89b5ef

I think this in particular is a really good point:

Man, if only the Ukrainians put more than 1 ton of ammo on their mechs for the LRMs

It is likely that at least 60 percent of all combat casualties in the Ukraine war has come from artillery. It could well be 70 or 80 percent. So running low on artillery ammunition is an enormous drawback. I really hope that Czech deal for 800 000 rounds goes through. 

I have seen several analysts writing that the Biden decision to send a couple of hundred thousand cluster munition rounds to Ukraine in the autumn may well have been the most beneficial package of military aid that they ever got. And that if it had come sooner the Russians might never have succeeding in taking Bakhmut. If I recall correctly US studies during the Vietnam War showed that cluster munitions where something like 5-6 times more effective than regular artillery rounds against troops in the open. 

[Rippounet]

I shouldn't, but I have to point out that Macron is now widely considered a joke in France, precisely because he increasingly tends to throw wild ideas and propositions out there - often in an attempt to distract from something else (in this case, huge budget cuts that were recently announced, I reckon).
His proposal of sending troops to Ukraine was shot down hours later by the minister of Defense addressing Parliament. Not a single opposition figure supported Macron, and many openly suggested he should think twice before spouting out that kind of thing. Whatever you think of the proposal itself, the dumbass didn't do the work to make anything out of it, it was all political theatre, an empty idea from a lame-duck president.

On 2/27/2024 at 9:38 PM, Altherion said:

The West gets to sit back and watch the destruction of Russian ships, tanks and planes (mostly mediocre ones, but also some that are pretty advanced) with no risk to Western lives or even the need to demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of our own advanced weapons (the stuff we give to Ukraine is from the previous generation at best).

Something I pointed out at least a year ago, but I vaguely remember that underlining how cynical the Western strategy was proved quite unpopular at the time. Though to be fair, the strategy makes sense if you take Russian nukes seriously.

[Bironic]

16 hours ago, Rippounet said:

I shouldn't, but I have to point out that Macron is now widely considered a joke in France, precisely because he increasingly tends to throw wild ideas and propositions out there - often in an attempt to distract from something else (in this case, huge budget cuts that were recently announced, I reckon).
His proposal of sending troops to Ukraine was shot down hours later by the minister of Defense addressing Parliament. Not a single opposition figure supported Macron, and many openly suggested he should think twice before spouting out that kind of thing. Whatever you think of the proposal itself, the dumbass didn't do the work to make anything out of it, it was all political theatre, an empty idea from a lame-duck president.

Something I pointed out at least a year ago, but I vaguely remember that underlining how cynical the Western strategy was proved quite unpopular at the time. Though to be fair, the strategy makes sense if you take Russian nukes seriously.

Macron seems to be all bark no bite, which, pardon my French, seems to align rather well with the French presidents/politicians I remember (from Chiracs first term onwards, the exception being Hollande who was no bark no bite). 

There’s no unified western strategy. If the strategy was to slowly bleed out the Russians over the years, Ukraine would not face a critical shortage of artillery ammunition (for the second time!) and shortages of other systems in the last 2 years.

The fact that it looks somewhat like that at first glance is because we lack unified leadership and strategy not because we have it. Together with the fact that Russia has proven to be a far less effective military power than expected, Ukraine has proven the opposite and modern drone & satellite technology making a huge difference on both sides.

Belgium will contribute 200 millions and the Netherlands 100 millions to the Czech effort to buy around 800000 155 mm shells in South Korea and South Africa, Macron supports that effort verbally (here we go again, I mean if les petits belges can spare 200 millions sure la grande nation has some Sous lying around)…

Finland has confirmed that Ukraine is allowed to use their equipment for attacks on Russia proper, which is unheard of so far (but completely legal), wonder if/how Russia reacts to that.

Ukraine has lost its first M1 Abrams tank. 
 

Edited February 29 by Bironic

[Werthead]

Three Su-34s destroyed in the last 48 hours. Impressive going.

Edited February 29 by Werthead

[ThinkerX]

I am starting to wonder about something here...

The claim is Russia now has momentum, owing in part to Ukraine's munition shortage.

Yet, suppose, just suppose, this munitions shortage is not as severe as advertised. Suppose that this is 'public knowledge' because Ukraine is setting the Russians up for a sucker punch - they let the Russians advance, and fall back, with comparatively modest artillery fire. Then, the Ukrainians launch a devastating counterattack with long-range munitions that are supposed to be expended. Suppose this attack cost the Russians 100,000+ troops over a day or three. What might the effects be?