Ukraine 31: Icarus Edition

[Zorral]

We who are concerned about and following this war may find the series here, accounts of a visit to Ukraine, of interest.

https://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2023/09/ukraine-diary-2-georgian-legion-higher-education-and-the-ukrainian-left

 

[Werthead]

Kadyrov's son has beaten up a Russian man who burned a Quran and the whole thing was filmed. A lot of Kadyrov fans seem to have only just realised he's (nominally, given his love of alcohol and drugs) a Muslim and this has spurred a major debate about remaining fans or indulging in some Islamophobia. The debate continues.

Ukrainian forces have resumed their advance from Robotyne, having cleared the southern approaches. Some forces seem to have penetrated beyond the south of the town and closed in on Novoprokopivka without too much trouble. That might be an indication the Russians have woken up to the idea of not fighting to the last man in open countryside between the lines and have actually pulled back to the next defensive line itself. Novoprokopivka is around the halfway mark from the jumping-off point at Orikhiv to Tokmak, the key defensive lynchpin of the line Ukraine needs to reach to make this offensive look like a reasonable success.

What is interesting is a shift of long-range Ukrainian fire towards Ocheretuvate, suggesting Ukraine wants to flatten out the line from Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Ocheretuvate and then cut north to Verbove, presumably to create a more defensible line, probably using Russia's own formerly defensive lines.

There now seems greater certainty that Admiral Sokolov, CiC of the Black Sea Fleet, died in the missile attack on Sevastopol. Sevastopol authorities have had to demolish several of the buildings in the area because they are too unsafe to use.

The DPR has been locked down. People can only leave Donetsk through special checkpoints, and police have been authorised to carry out wiretaps and read people's emails.

St. Petersburg has suffered a partial blackout after some reports of an explosion. Unclear what happened there, St. Petersburg is obviously a huge distance from Ukraine.

[Corvinus85]

3 hours ago, Werthead said:

St. Petersburg has suffered a partial blackout after some reports of an explosion. Unclear what happened there, St. Petersburg is obviously a huge distance from Ukraine.

So is Sudan. 

[Werthead]

Strong rumours circulating that Armenia is preparing to withdraw from the CSTO, and may encourage other members to likewise withdraw (Kyrgyzstan is particularly also annoyed, and Kazakhstan may be half-minded to consider it). Russia has issued a pretty strong condemnation of Armenia trying to sever its security ties to Moscow, despite such ties clearly being useless.

[Ser Rodrigo Belmonte II]

I read on the economist that the counter offensive has been a failure and barely been able to liberate even 1% of Russian annexed land. Does Ukraine have a concrete strategy for the next couple of years of inevitable war?

[SeanF]

7 hours ago, Werthead said:

Strong rumours circulating that Armenia is preparing to withdraw from the CSTO, and may encourage other members to likewise withdraw (Kyrgyzstan is particularly also annoyed, and Kazakhstan may be half-minded to consider it). Russia has issued a pretty strong condemnation of Armenia trying to sever its security ties to Moscow, despite such ties clearly being useless.

Since Russia did nothing to help Armenia, no surprise.

[Bironic]

2 hours ago, Ser Rodrigo Belmonte II said:

I read on the economist that the counter offensive has been a failure and barely been able to liberate even 1% of Russian annexed land. Does Ukraine have a concrete strategy for the next couple of years of inevitable war?

First for European standards ukraine is quite a large country (second largest in Europe after Russia, excluding French and Turkish territories outside of Europe) so liberating 1% is actually not so little. Obviously also not very much if you compare it to the roughly 18% that are still in Russias hands.

I think the offensive has several objectives: here the most important ones on top of my head:

- reaching tokmak: in media it is often portrayed as if they would need to retake it completely (like PMC Wagner did in Bakhmut) that is not necessary. they only have to widen the robotyne salient north of it(where they breached the first and second line of Russians surovikin line)and get a little closer so that they can start to shell the railway line there with artillery. (Artillery has usually ranges of around 10-50km). Russian logistics rely on railways not trucks. This railway is the only one that connects crimea to the Donbas so severing it would essentially make out of one big Russian army two medium sized ones. Now let’s say Ukraine attacks crimea atm, Russia can immediately reinforce the defenders with troops from Donbas and vice versa, once that railway is gone they can no longer reinforce from the other region. Cutting their army into two pieces. So far ukraine has not achieved this but they’re making slow and steady progress. 
 

- Bakhmut: Bakhmut has no strategic value on its own so why does Ukraine keep attacking it: it was the only major city that was conquered by Russia during their winter offensive (PMC Wagner did it, not the regular Russian military) so if the Russian military that is currently holding it loses it it will be a major symbolic, psychological, moral and propagandistic defeat for Russia and especially the military. This will widen the gap between the different „parties“ within Russia: the PMCs the military branches, the population, the milbloggers, state media etc. the Ukrainian objective here is not to actually liberate it but to regain the hills surrounding it in the south and north of the city and then shell the defenders in the city from 3 sides (roughly similar to what the Russians did to the Germans in Stalingrad), banking on that the Russians would rather put more men in this meatgrinder than retreating and losing face as stated above. Thus reducing russian manpower unnecessarily and force them to recruit more and more troops (which is overall unpopular in russia, Thus turning the sentiment of the people in russia against the military leadership). It also reduces the amount of troops Ukraine has to face in their tokmak offensive. Haven’t given that area much attention (so I might be incorrect, maybe someone in the board can enlighten me) but afaik Ukraine has managed to reach those hills. Objective reached 

-Crimea : again has a high symbolic meaning for russia but it also has strategic value: blocking the sea of asov and providing the Russians with some sort of unsinkable aircraft carrier group from which they can threaten Ukrainian grain exports (the only major source of income Ukraine has left) and being a stage area for missile, drone and air strikes on Ukrainian held territory. 
ukraine so far has scored some small but significant victories: they have taken out the radar station in the boiko towers (oil rigs to the west of crimea lost to Russia in 2015), This was done by boat (Ukraine has basically no navy, while Russia has the largest one in the whole Black Sea). This in turn allowed them to target air defenses in crimea taking out a couple of them (at least one S 400 the most modern russian system was destroyed). After these defenses were down they struck the navy hq in Sevastopol (killing and injuring several high ranking officers, Russia is a top down military if you take out the head chaos follows) they also struck the backup HQ and one airfield they use to attack Ukraine. The main goal here I think is to severe the bridges connecting crimea to the Ukrainian mainland (not the Kerch strait bridge, connecting crimea to Russia). There is one railroad bridge that was damaged once by an Ukrainian air strike. There are also three road bridges nearby. Destroying these bridges (especially the railroad one, cause logistics!) would basically make crimea a dead end street: Russia can send in troops through the Kerch strait bridge but they can not get out anymore. Objective partially reached 

-missile and drone strikes as well as sabotage and skirmishes in Russia: these have the idea that Russia has to relocate air defenses as well as other troops to places like Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kursk, pskow, belgorod, Sochi etc instead of using these troops and air defenses where it really matters: in Ukraine. It also has an adverse psychological effect on both the leadership and the lowly foot men, if they can not feel safe even in their own land. It also interrupts civilian air traffic, damaging the economy. So far Russia has been relocating military from places as far as Syria, Kuril Islands(next to Japan), the Norwegian border etc. seems that this is working…Objective reached

-if the people and the leadership around the world see that Ukraine is taking the offensive they will continue to support it. Ukraine has since the offensive started gotten storm shadow cruise missiles from UK and France and will get ATACMS (surface to surface missile with ranges around 170-300 km) from USA and F 16 fighter jets from Netherlands Denmark and Norway in the future. It might also  get Taurus cruise missiles from Germany. Thus giving them further offensive potential. Obviously it could get significantly more support from the roughly 50-60 countries that support it but at least they got more than before. Objective partially reached 

So to sum it up the offensive has not yet reached a strategic victory  (such as destroying the tokmak railway)and has certainly not been able to reach the sea of asov(which was unrealistic given the defensive advantages of the Surovikin lines and the military power of Russia, and the often reluctant western help) but it made progress and will continue to do so…

 

 

Edited September 26, 2023 by Bironic

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Wonder why the Ukrainians are so succesful at hitting stuff and high ranking staff in Crimea and the black sea?

Bribery. Crimea tartars claim to have bribed a number of not-so-well-off Russian officers, who are happily providing intel on their superiors and the plans. They didn't provide numbers, but only said what they are offering is well worth the risk for the officers involved and their families.

[Wilbur]

9 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Wonder why the Ukrainians are so succesful at hitting stuff and high ranking staff in Crimea and the black sea?

Bribery. Crimea tartars claim to have bribed a number of not-so-well-off Russian officers, who are happily providing intel on their superiors and the plans. They didn't provide numbers, but only said what they are offering is well worth the risk for the officers involved and their families.

And even if the Ukrainians DIDN'T do this, the story works out for them just as well, since it sows a tremendous amount of suspicion and paranoia in the officer corps and ranks of a Russian military who are already on the back foot.

Complete ownership of the information space, really.

[Maithanet]

9 hours ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

Wonder why the Ukrainians are so succesful at hitting stuff and high ranking staff in Crimea and the black sea?

Bribery. Crimea tartars claim to have bribed a number of not-so-well-off Russian officers, who are happily providing intel on their superiors and the plans. They didn't provide numbers, but only said what they are offering is well worth the risk for the officers involved and their families.

There's also plenty of human intelligence as Russia is operating in Ukrainian territory, and no doubt many of the locals who do things like prepare meals, empty trash, etc, are not happy with their new Russian overlords.

In addition, reports of Russian artillery losses continue to increase.  In the first year of the war artillery losses were approximately 150-200 per month.  That increased to nearly 700 per month since May of this year.  September is the worst month yet, with over 800 losses and the month isn't even over yet.  Ukrainian knowhow plus western weapons is winning the war against russian artillery.

[Werthead]

Sweden has barred all exports to Russia to replace its ageing mobile infrastructure. Ericsson was going to provide updated 5G networks to 27 Russian regions, including Moscow, but this has now been barred by Swedish court order. In addition, Ericsson has been blocked from providing repairs, upgrades or spare parts for their existing mobile networks. These are difficult to replace from elsewhere, and cannot be third-party imported as the tech needs to be tailored for each geographical location.

In a speech, Shoigu has said that he expects the "special military operation" to culminate by 2025 at the latest.

It now appears that Admiral Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, survived the attack on his headquarters despite some strong Ukrainian claims he had been killed or at least severely wounded.

A Russian logistics hub in Sorokyne, Luhansk has been destroyed. What's interesting here is that it seems to have been a heavy hit delivered 130km into the rear of the Russian lines. This is outside current HIMARS range and Storm Shadow has not been used to interdict logistics systems at long range before now in quite this fashion. Either there has been a change to Storm Shadow doctrine or this was a GLSDB or ATACMS strike, unadvertised. Russia moved logistics hubs back out of HIMARS range starting late last year, but had so far not relocated the new hubs out of Storm Shadow/ATACMS range because doing so would make resupply from those hubs to the front too logistically challenging. I wonder if this attack is Ukraine now trying to force them to make that change.

Ukraine seems to have developed a pretty good system for pairing radars and Gepard AA guns, allowing them to shoot down Shahed drones fairly reliably and at relatively low cost (Gepard ammo being far cheaper than AA missiles).

[Bironic]

I had a little bit of spare time to do that, I wasn't able to format it correctly to fit into this forum properly I am sorry for that... but maybe you find it interesteing nonetheless...

Russian manned Aircraft losses 1992-2023

Black Lost through accident unspecified

Orange Lost Through war in Georgia 1992-1993   Violet Lost in the first Chechen war 1994-1996

Light Blue Lost in the second Chechen war 1999-2000/2002 (Helicopter losses included until 2007) war was declared over in 2009

Red Lost in the Russo-Georgian war 2008

    Green lost in the Russian intervention in Syria 2015-2018     Grey Lost through war between Azerbaijan and Armenia 2020

Gold Lost during the invasion of Ukraine 2022-2023

Type	Number of losses					Entered Service	Produced	In Service/ Produced	Lost per type
Fighter /Attack aircraft	2022-2023 Crew /Others killed	2014-2022 Crew /Others killed	2009-2013 Crew /Others killed	1999-2008 Crew /Others killed	1992-1999 Crew /Others killed
Su 24 tactical bomber	+ 10	3 + 2 6	3	+ 2 + 2	1 2	1975	1967-1993	295 / 1400	7 + 3 *2 +10 = 23
Mig 31 Interceptor	4 + 1 1	2	1 2			1981	1975-1994	117-161 /519	7 +1=8
Su 25 ground attack	1 + 28 1	1 + 1	1 1	1 + 6 + 5	+ 6	1981	1978-2017	196/ 1000 plus	4 +18 +28=50
Mig 29 Air Superiority		5 + 1 1	1 1	2	3 1	1983	1981-2023	115-268/ 1600plus	11 +1=12
Su 27 Air Superiority		2 2	3 2/5	1	3 + 1 5	1985	1982-2023	154-412/680	9+ 1=10
Su 30 Air Superiority	2 + 11 4	1 + 1				1996	1992-2023	147/ 630	3 +1+11=15
Su 33 Naval Air Super.		+ 1		2 2		1998	1987-1999	35/ 22-35	2 +1=3
Su 34 Strike Fighter	+ 22 2					2014	2006-2023	149/ 155	22
Su 35 Air Superiority	+ 4 1	1	(1 prototype)			2014	2007-2023	110 plus/151 plus	1+ 4=5
Su 57 Air Superiority		1				2020	2019-2023	10/ 11	1
Total fighters	7 + 76 =83 9	16 + 6 = 22 9	9 6/5	6 + 8 + 7 =21 2	7 + 6 =14 8				149 34/5
Bomber Aircraft
Tu 95 Strategic heavy		1 3				1956	1952-1993	42/ 500plus	1
Tu 142 maritime patrol			1 11			1972	1968-1994	24/ 100 plus	1
Tu 22M medium Strat.	+ 1	2 6		+1		1972	1967-1993	64/ 497	2+1+1 = 4
Tu 160 Strategic heavy				1 4		1987	1984-1992	15/ 28	1
Total Bombers	+ 1	3 9	1 11	2 4	0				7 24
Transport / other Aircraft	2022-2023	2014-2022	2009-2013	1999-2008	1992-1999	Entered Service	Produced	In Service	Lost per Type
Ilyushin Il 18 Turboprop Airliner		2		1 86 total		1959	1959-1978	4/ 850	3
Ilyushin Il 20 COMINT/ELINT		+ 2 15				1969	1969-1976	24-29/ 31	2
Ilyushin Il 22 Airborne Command Post	+ 1 10-16							Included in Il 20 above	1
Ilyushin Il 76 Strategic Transport	1 + 4 5	1 8/2	2 22	1 18		1974	1971-2023	120/ 960 plus	9
Ilyushin Il 112V Tactical Transport		1 (prototype) 3				2023(planned)	2019-2023	0/3	1
Tupolew Tu 154 Jet Airliner		1 92 total				1972	1968-2013	4-21 / 1026	1
Antonov An 12 Tactical Transport					2	1959	1957-1973	64-109/ 1248	2
Antonov An 22 Strategic Transport					1 7 total	1967	1966-1976	3-11/ 68	1
Antonov An 26 Tactical Transport	+ 1	2 + 1 46		1 17	1	1970	1969-1986	142-234/ 1403	6
Antonov An 30 Reconnaissance			1			1968	1971-1980	15/ 123	1
Antonov An 124 Strategic Transport					1 8/ 60 plus	1986	1982-2004	4-26/ 55	1
Berijev Be 200 Amphibious aircraft		1 5				2003	2003-2023	1-        19	1
Embraer Legacy 600 Business Jet	1 2/8					2002	2002-2020	0/ 289	1
Let L 410 Small Transport		2 DOSAAF 23				1970	1971-2023	107-109/ 1200	2
Total Transport	2 + 6 = 8 26-32	10 + 3 = 13 Total 194	3 44 total	3 121	5 15/60 plus				32 400-406/60plus
Training Aircraft
Aero L 39	1 1	1 1				1972	1971-1996	119/2900	2 2
Total Aircraft losses	93 36-42	40 Total 218	12 61 total	26 127 total	19 23/60 plus				190 465-471/60plus
Type	2022-2023	2014-2022	2009-2013	1999-2008	1992-1999	Entered Service	Produced	In Service	Lost Per Ty pe
Type	2022-2023	2014-2022	2009-2013	1999-2008	1992-1999	Entered Service	Produced	In Service/numbers built	Lost Per Type
Attack Helicopter
Mil Mi 24/25/35 Attack & Transport	+ 14	+ 3 + 1	1 4	+ 13	+ 2	1972	1969-2023	330 /2648	34
Kamov Ka 50/52 Coaxial Attack	+ 40	+ 1	2 2		1 1	1995	1990-2023	119 /196plus	44
Mil Mi 28 Attack	+ 8 2	1 + 2 2				2009	1982-2023	112/126	11
Total attack helicopter	+ 62 2	1 + 6 2	3 6	13	3 1				89 11
Transport helicopter
Mil Mi 8 / Mil Mi 17 Medium Transport	3 + 24 6	1 + 2	2 8	+34 + 2	+ 19 + 2	1967/1977	1961-2023 /1977-2023	859-875/ 17000,12000	89
Mil Mi 26 heavy Transport				+ 3		1983	1980-2023	44/316	3
Total Transport Helicopter	27 6	3	2 8	34	19				92 14
Kamov Ka 27 maritime			1			1982	1979-2010	90 / 267	1
Unknown Helicopter	+ 7			+ 5					12
Total Helicopters	3 + 93 =96 8	2+8 +1 = 11 2	6 14	+ 55 + 2 = 57	1 + 21 = 24 1				194 25
Type	2022-2023	2014-2022	2009-2013	1999-2008	1992-1999	Entered Service	Produced	In Service Across all branches	Lost per Type
Total manned Aircraft & Helicopters lost	189 44-50	51 220 total	18 75 total	83 127 total	43 24/60 plus				384 490-496/60 plus

 

Edited September 28, 2023 by Bironic

[Bironic]

General Information & Analysis:
Timetable 1992-1999 is from January 1992 to July 1999, 1999-2008 is from August 1999 (Putin becomes minister President, second Chechen war breaks out, Putin becomes president in 2000) to December 2008 (Medvedev takes over as president in may 2008, war in Georgia is in august 2008), 2009 January to 2013 December (Second Chechen war is declared over, Putin becomes president again in may 2012), 2014 February 11,  to January 31, 2022 (Russia invades Crimea & starts the war in the Donbas 2014, military intervention in Syria from 2015), 2022 is from February 2022 to September 2023(since the invasion of Ukraine 24.2.2022 until today, 1 year & 7 months and 1 day). The Type description such as Fighter, Air superiority etc. means a general description of what was originally their main purpose, it doesn’t mean that the aircraft is incapable of performing another role.
Aircraft are designed with a specific amount of flight hours in mind. For Soviet Fighter Aircraft (ca. 1917/1945-1991/1994) these were mostly in the 2000-3500/4000 flight hours range. More modern Russian fighter aircraft are designed with a longer life span in between 4000-6000/8000 flight hours, roughly equivalent to western fighter aircraft. Thus, a lot of the soviet aircraft in both the Ukrainian military as well as the Russian military are reaching the end of their lifespan. This is true for all the Su 24 and Mig 31 that stopped production in the early 90s, but probably also for a significant amount of the Su 25, Su 27 and Mig 29 jets and maybe some of the Su 30 and Su 33 as well. This is also True for other Soviet Aircraft no longer in use by either military but by allies (Su 17/22, Mig 15/17/19, Mig 21, Mig 23/27, Mig 25 etc.) For the planes that stopped production in the nineties or earlier there is possibly also a lack of spare parts or an inability to produce more spare parts. Thus, all these losses are permanent and can not be replaced.
Aircraft and their parts etc. from western producers such as Antonov (Ukraine) or Aero, Let (Czech Republic), Boeing, Airbus, Bell, Sikorsky, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Cessna, Bombardier, Leonardo, BAE Systems, Kawasaki, Mitsubishi, PZL, Pilatus, KAI, Saab, AIDC, Dassault, Piper, Rutan, Thales, RTX, General Dynamics, L3Harris technologies, General Atomics, GE, Rolls Royce are no longer available to Russia due to Sanctions, while Aircraft from Mig, Suchoi, Ilyushin, Berijev, Tupolev, Mil, Kamov, Yakovlev, UAC are no longer available to Ukraine.
A number of things I found interesting when doing this list:
•    Russia lost 22 Su 34, one of their most modern aircraft (the Successor to the Su 24, as well at least partially the Su 25 and Tu 22M) out of a fleet of ca. 150, that’s 13-14% percent of the fleet. Not Sustainable losses IMHO.
•    An even more extreme example is the losses of the Ka 50/Ka 52, they lost 40 since 2022 and another one in the 2014-2022 period. Out of a fleet of ca. 120 That’s a third!!! In contrast they lost significantly less Mil Mi 28 (8-11) and Mil mi 24 (14-18) in the same time period. I wonder why?
•    As stated above the losses of Su 24 and Mig 31, Tu 22M, Il 18/20/22, An 26 etc. are permanent. They can’t produce more of those.
•    None of the Mig 31 lost have so far been shot down (they can fly faster and higher than any Ukrainian aircraft, and are capable of launching the long ranged Kinzhal AGM missile, but the numbers of them crashing has markedly risen over the past years. I guess they are definitely at the end of their lifespan.
•    They will also run out of Antonov’s, Aeros and Lets (and their parts) in general since they come from Ukraine and the Czech Republic.
•    They have so far not used the newest plane the Su 57 in their wars so we can safely say they are neither able nor willing to use it
As comparison:
If we include the Annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas (as well as the contemporaneous Syrian Intervention and other contemporaneous Russian military campaigns) as part of the greater Russo-Ukrainian war (lasting roughly 9 years and 7 Months as of now) the Russian military has lost 133 Airplanes and 107 Helicopters since February 11, 2014 due to various causes (mainly war).
During the 9 years 1 month 3 weeks and 1-day Soviet-Afghan war (24. December 1979- 15. February 1989), the Soviet Union lost around 118 Aircraft and 333 Helicopters according to Wikipedia. Among these were: 2 Il 76, 1 An 30, 4 An 26, 6 An 12, 23-26 Su 25, 74 Mi 24, 45 Mi 8, and several older models no longer in Service in either Russia or Ukraine (Mig 21, Mig 23, Su 17, Su 22, Mi 6, Mi 10 etc.). They lost according to various sources between 14500 and 16000 personnel, with some estimates as high as 26000 and some as low as 11800/13000. Obviously, the Afghan Rebels had significant less anti Air capabilities and support compared to Ukraine and had no Aircraft or Helicopters of their own. The geography, terrain, infrastructure, climate, weather, culture, technology, language, economy, finances, populations, education, politics, religion, media and style of war (asymmetric vs. conventional) were also very different.
Sources:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Russian_military_accidents 1992 -2023
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aviation_shootdowns_and_accidents_during_the_Syrian_civil_war 2011-2023
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Russian_aircraft_losses_in_the_Second_Chechen_War 1999-2007
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Russian_Mil_Mi-24_shootdown 2020
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Wagner_Group_plane_crash August 2023
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Abkhazia_(1992–1993) 1992-1993
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_Russian_military_aircraft
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:21st-century_aviation_accidents_and_incidents_in_Russia
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html Russian equipment losses invasion of Ukraine 2022-2023
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html Aircraft losses Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022-2023
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/06/chefs-special-documenting-equipment.html Wagner rebellion June 2023
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/11/russias-wars-listing-equipment-losses.html First Chechen war 1994-1996
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/11/russias-wars-listing-equipment-losses_22.html Second Chechen war 1999-2000
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/10/russias-wars-listing-equipment-losses.html Russo-Georgian war 2008
https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/08/the-uncounted-losses-to-russias-air-force.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Soviet_aircraft_losses_during_the_Soviet–Afghan_War
http://skywar.ru/afghanistanen.html  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet–Afghan_War

 

Edited September 28, 2023 by Bironic

[Wilbur]

Now that is some quality research and spreadsheet work.  The blessings of Saint Lotus of 1-2-3 be upon you.

[Bironic]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEWk4E5tpE4

Russian special landing operation in Mali

[Werthead]

According to Russia, the Su-57 has been used several times in the conflict, to launch Kinzhal and reportedly to test the network configuration mode (so 4-6 aircraft can be used as one unit to focus fire on one target). But that's about it. They have between 16 and 20 aircraft in total, but how many are fully flightworthy is unclear, and losing one over Ukraine would be incredibly humiliating, so they've kept them over friendly territory and not engaged in direct combat operations.

[Corvinus85]

Russian air defenses continue to win. 

I saw elsewhere it was a Su-35.

[Matrim Fox Cauthon]

It's Russian conscription time. It looks like Putin is gambling on the long-term game that wears Ukraine and its allies down. 

[Maithanet]

4 minutes ago, Matrim Fox Cauthon said:

It's Russian conscription time. It looks like Putin is gambling on the long-term game that wears Ukraine and its allies down. 

It's the annual conscription, not (as far as I've heard) a new mass conscription like they did in fall of last year.

From what I've read this probably means that they will rely on the men they get from the annual conscription until at least January, and possibly until after the sham Presidential elections on March 17.  If that proves to be the case, it is yet another example of Putin putting politics over good military sense, because they are going to need more troops than they will get at the annual mobilization. 

However, it is a fact that every round of conscription is harder than the last.  Each successive round has to draw deeper into men with productive jobs and from richer metropolitan areas.  I'm not saying it's the death knell or anything, but Russia's economy is already straining, and the more men in uniform and not working in useful civilian jobs, the greater than strain will become. 

[Zorral]

Ukraine Diary 4: Odesa, War, Society, and Perfume

Includes Links for Introduction, Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, of on the ground visit to Ukraine.  Great photos.

https://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2023/09/ukraine-diary-4-odesa-war-society-and-perfume

Quote

... Our guide had a clothing business (among several other ventures) that had turned to producing uniforms, flak jackets, and other textiles of war.  She had the opportunity to flee Odesa at the beginning of the conflict, but had decided she would only leave if Russian occupation became unavoidable.  Fortunately, Ukrainian forces stopped the Russian advance at nearby Mykolaiv in the second month of the war.  One product in particular involved a form of combat underwear held together with Velcro straps; in case the soldier suffers a lower body injury, the underwear can be removed rapidly without requiring too much movement of the legs. ...

 

Quote

.... In contrast to Kyiv, the people we met were “normal,” not in the sense that they represented a cross-section of Odesa society, but in that they represented civil society rather than the government.  Three things were apparent from our discussions.  First, civil society was enormously important to the prosecution of the war, in large part because the ongoing weakness of the central government.  This weakness has been baked in by years of Russian interference, corruption, and political infighting, and even at this late date it still exists. Many units at the front source equipment and supplies from private business all over Ukraine. Second, everyone we talked to acknowledged that they had been utterly astonished by the beginning of the war.  In contrast to Kyiv, no one in Odesa had believed that war was imminent, even on February 23.  Some rejected evidence from media and from relatives until the missiles began to hit and nearby communities began to fall to the Russian advance.  Third, everyone here HATED Russia, and HATED Russians.  Odesa was a predominantly Russian speaking city before the war, but while many folks continued to “think in Russian,” they now made a special effort to speak in Ukrainian.  The hostility, it is far to say, was not limited to the Russian government. ....

 

Edited September 29, 2023 by Zorral