Ukraine 31: Icarus Edition

[Werthead]

 

 

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

Putin had a myocardial infarction?

https://x.com/poland24com/status/1716410744206463146?s=46

[Werthead]

I'd take with a pinch of salt for now, but interesting.

[Kalbear]

9 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Putin had a myocardial infarction?

https://x.com/poland24com/status/1716410744206463146?s=46

Looks like mostly rumor at this point. Only fairly sketchy people are reporting on it. Would recommend not going for the clickbaity stuff. In particular the source for this is a telegram channel that routinely talks about how deathly ill Putin is.

Edited October 23, 2023 by Kalnak the Magnificent

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

1 minute ago, Werthead said:

I'd take with a pinch of salt for now, but interesting.

Hence the question mark… but… we’ll see.

[Kalbear]

3 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Hence the question mark… but… we’ll see.

And it's probably not worth sharing, since sharing it makes it more encouraged to share other sensationalist bullshit. 

[SeanF]

4 hours ago, Varysblackfyre321 said:

I always got the feeling mersimer want for the us to ally with Russia and abandon Ukraine was more idealogically beyond wanting the us to reign supreme. As in he fancies authoritarians and he’d like America to adopt Russian ethos.

 

He's had a bad war.

[Werthead]

Turkey is close to ratifying Sweden's NATO accession bid.

Meanwhile, the definition of a close call.

 

Edited October 23, 2023 by Werthead

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

Turkey is close to ratifying Sweden's NATO accession bid.

Meanwhile, the definition of a close call.

 

How many TOS-1’s do the Russians have left?

[Werthead]

18 minutes ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

How many TOS-1’s do the Russians have left?

45 were built before the war, Ukraine has destroyed, disabled or captured around a quarter of that number.

Some new TOS-1As were apparently built last year and Russia is trying to move to the longer-ranged TOS-2, but like a lot of Russia's next-gen weapons, it's unclear if that even exists outside of prototypes and mock-ups.

[Maithanet]

The latest Russian counterattacks in Avdiivka and around Kupyansk have been largely unsuccessful.  Both cities held, with minimal territorial losses and extremely high Russian casualties in men and equipment.  There is little reason to expect the attacks to be any more successful in the future, as Ukraine has had time to reinforce their already stout defenses.

However, zooming out the offensives paint a much less encouraging picture.  The Ukrainian offensive toward Tokmak has taken some territory, but it has been a grinding, brutal offensive and they're still a long way from the city.  While it is correct that the Ukrainian offensive will not necessarily need to stop as the weather turns, it has not accomplished much in the summer campaign season.  And if outside observers such as myself were hoping that the Russians were running low on reserves, then the attacks around Avdiivka tell another story.  Russia is not exhausted, and feels confident enough in its defenses to throw away entire units outside Avdiivka. 

This war isn't a stalemate, but it is increasingly one of exhaustion.  Ukraine needs additional aid from NATO to press forward.  Russia is hoping that aid will slow to a trickle.  And in the meantime, a great many people will die. 

[Bironic]

Russian military (or at least the Redut PMC) opens sniper and drone operator service for women. Training is scheduled to last one month. So far women in the Russian military could only serve in the kitchen or in medical roles. Pay is apparently similar to mens pay at 2200 dollars a month, 30000 dollars in case of injury and in case of death 50000 dollars is paid to the relatives. Especially the older demographic cohorts in russia have significantly more women than men. Russian women used to serve wth distinction in the Soviet Armed forces during the second world war. Average monthly salary varies greatly in russia but is generally believed to be between 300-800 dollars outside of Moscow, St. Petersburg and a select few other rich districts, making military service a very good financial option for large parts of the population. It's safe to assume that these measures (along with the ongoing recruitment of criminals, foreigners and illegal aliens) are meant to give the russian military enough man power that they don't have to resort to another unpopular round of mobilisation prior to the russian elections in march 2024.

If Erdogan and Orban do not come up with some last minute shenanigans Sweden is scheduled to become a NATO member by November 29.

21 hours ago, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

Putin had a myocardial infarction?

https://x.com/poland24com/status/1716410744206463146?s=46

This war can end rather quickly if Putin has a sudden change of heart...

Edited October 24, 2023 by Bironic

[Padraig]

6 hours ago, Maithanet said:

This war isn't a stalemate, but it is increasingly one of exhaustion.  Ukraine needs additional aid from NATO to press forward.  Russia is hoping that aid will slow to a trickle.  And in the meantime, a great many people will die. 

Right.  While Ukraine ended 2022 on quite a positive note, things don't seem to have gone well in 2023.  I'm not as clued in as other people here but almost 11 months into 2023, it is hard to see where a Ukrainian victory will come from.  Is there something NATO can plausibly give Ukraine that would make a major difference?  Neither side can seemingly overcome the defenses of the other (except marginally).  And while the Russian army is frequently mocked, it simply has the greater numbers to compensate for any silly mistakes.  Joke is on us really.

So I don't see how this is going to end positively.  Russia wouldn't stop because it presumably thinks that it can outlast Ukraine (and its not obviously wrong).  Ukraine wouldn't want to lose so much land to Russia but is it really still confident that it can retake significant parts of the occupied lands?  Or just hoping?  If so, there are a lot of people dying based on that hope.

Anyhow, another depressing world situation.  Hopefully i'm wrong.

[Bironic]

11 hours ago, Padraig said:

Right.  While Ukraine ended 2022 on quite a positive note, things don't seem to have gone well in 2023.  I'm not as clued in as other people here but almost 11 months into 2023, it is hard to see where a Ukrainian victory will come from.  Is there something NATO can plausibly give Ukraine that would make a major difference?  Neither side can seemingly overcome the defenses of the other (except marginally).  And while the Russian army is frequently mocked, it simply has the greater numbers to compensate for any silly mistakes.  Joke is on us really.

So I don't see how this is going to end positively.  Russia wouldn't stop because it presumably thinks that it can outlast Ukraine (and its not obviously wrong).  Ukraine wouldn't want to lose so much land to Russia but is it really still confident that it can retake significant parts of the occupied lands?  Or just hoping?  If so, there are a lot of people dying based on that hope.

Anyhow, another depressing world situation.  Hopefully i'm wrong.

According to some military analysts Ukraine could (and actually does) win a war of attrition by basically destroying and degrading the Russian military. That means maneuver warfare and gaining ground is less important, which is hard to sell to the public. Russia has some military advantages over Ukraine: Significantly more Artillery (towed artillery, self propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers), ballistic missiles and Aircraft (Planes, Helicopters and drones). These systems all had similar or higher range than the Ukrainian counterparts. In the last months we have seen a significantly reduced rate of fire by the Russian artillery (still higher than Ukraine though) and an increase in losses of artillery equipment compared to the period February 22-april 23. Another thing we have seen is a constant degradation of Russian armored vehicles (where we see more and more of the older models taken out of storage) and supply vehicles (trucks etc.), further straining one of the main weak points of Russia: the logistics. The analysts that I heard from think that Russia still has enough artillery ammunition in their stockpiles to continue to fire at a high rate for a very long time, even though there a few signs that they have to partially switch to smaller and less effective calibers, but given that they are now also supplied by North Korea they won't run out of ammo any time soon. What they are running low though is the actual gun barrels, they can't produce and replace them quickly enough and neither the actual artillery. Which means that the fire rate goes down more and more, not because they run out of ammo, but because they run out of gun barrels, there is no end in sight of this trend that will eventually rob Russia of its main advantage so far... Obviously a country like North Korea that has some of the worlds largest artillery stockpiles could come in handy in such a case, take note that the Artillery NK uses is generally believed to be of poorer quality(and there is proof of that assessment), but even if their ammo has a higher rate to dud compared to the Russian one, as long as you have enough it can still make an impact. Now will NK give them enough ammo though? Will they provide Russia with the much-needed gun barrels, or the actual artillery? I don't know... It is definitely possible...

I think what we could see in the future is less of what we saw last September when Ukraine plowed through in Kharkiv oblast in a spectacular fashion and more something like the Cherson offensive: making it clear to the Russians that they can no longer supply their troops on the front lines and that if they don't withdraw, they will slowly but surely die... The problem with that approach is that it takes a long time, leads to massive casualties on all sides and doesn't yield any spectacular gains of ground; which then degrades popular support for Ukraine in the West. We have already seen that happen this year in the USA, Slovakia and Poland. This problem will exacerbate the longer the war drags on. Russia is clearly banking on that.

In such a scenario the most important thing is how much artillery and ammo will we be able to provide to Ukraine, here there are again some caveats: most western nations have a strategy that focuses on air superiority (which Ukraine doesn’t have and will not have in any realistic scenario) rather than a prolonged artillery war. There are not that many western nations that have lots of artillery and some of these have provided very little in term of military aid. Basically, the country with the largest artillery power in the western world is not the USA but South Korea and they can or will not legally export weapons into active war zones and have only provided non lethal military aid to Ukraine. They have given the USA ammo, so that the US could replenish its stocks in some sort of “Ringtausch”. Two other nations that have significant artillery are Turkey and Greece, both are very reluctant in aiding Ukraine. The other nations have agreed to send significant amounts to Ukraine, and are expected to send more once production ramps up. This is overall a positive sign.

Now what other things can NATO give? The problem is less what can they give, but when do they give it and how much, and it can be roughly summarised so far they give too little too late. This is not true for all NATO countries of course, nor for all sorts of military equipment: for example MANPADS, small arms, small drones and infantry mobility vehicles were given very fast and in sufficient numbers. Some other things have been given in at least reasonable numbers and time as well: mainly the various forms of artillery and surface to air missile systems. What has been given very reluctantly (and only after delays that significantly reduced their value) were western Tanks (here Joe Biden is mainly to blame, even though Olaf Scholz takes also some responsibility), Western fighter Jets (again Joe Biden), longer ranged weaponry (again Joe Biden and to a lesser degree Olaf Scholz).

What will make a dent is the combination of ground launched ATACMS, GLSDB, that they now have/will get soon (and the GLMRS/HIMARS they have since last year), the problem here is again too little too late: you heard that Ukraine got “a few” old ATACMS with whom they have successfully destroyed a number of Russian helicopters, but what Russia can do now is move the ones that are left out of range and spread them out so that you can hit only one or two with each strike. Had they given them more (and more launchers) they could have taken out significantly more and thus not have given Russia the chance to adjust to the situation. Ukraine has stated they need hundreds of ATACMS, that is technically possible but not very likely atm.

The Ukrainians themselves have a number of longer ranged ground launched systems(Neptune, Tochka,Vilkha, Smerch, Uragan, S-200, Hrim-2, Tu-141) the problem with those is that they don’t have that many of them and can’t produce lots of them(or none at all), and western nations most often don’t operate these things.

Western fighter jets could also significantly improve Ukraine’s chances but here again exists a caveat: So far there has been no report of what weapons they will be equipped with: important would be long ranged missiles, so far Ukraine only has AGM 88 HARM (a missile that destroys enemy RADAR). The really important ones would be the AGM 84H/K SLAM-ER, the AGM 158 JASSM and the AGM 154 JSOW, as well as the new models of the AIM 120, none of those have been delivered to Ukraine. These weapons are all American like the F-16, so you would need a greenlight by the USA, which given the current status of US politics is not very likely before the election in November 24. Technically Joe Biden could deliver those weapons (he doesn’t need congress for that), but given his reluctance so far, I doubt he will. The F-16 seems to be intended more as a guarantee for a future for the Ukrainian Air Force (because the planes they operate now are old soviet ones, that will eventually be grounded for lack of spare parts and old age), rather than an actual system to win the war.

Those weapons when combined with ground based systems such as ATACMS would basically force the russian railways,bridges, logistic hubs, Aircraft, Ammo stores, staging areas, barracks, command posts etc. further back rendering the logistical support which is the major achilles heel of Russia impossible: they would either have to retreat or face destruction.

The only air launched long-range weapon other than the AGM 88 harm that Ukraine has, is the UK/French Storm shadow/Scalp cruise missile which can’t be launched from the F-16 (at least not yet). The much sought after Taurus from Germany that chancellor Scholz is not providing can’t either. Both of those weapons would have to be fired from old Su-24 bombers (Ukraine has very few of them left and they won’t get more).

There are some rumors that Sweden might provide Ukraine with JAS39 Gripen after they join NATO on 29 November, those could fire both weapons, but even if true training is at least six months and there are only very few Gripens that Sweden could provide (very unlike the F-16, which exists in the thousands), so I would not bank on any Gripens soon. The Gripen would also give Ukraine the possibility to use the MBDA Meteor, the longest ranged air-to-air missile in the western arsenal, thus counteracting somewhat the long-ranged weaponry of Russian airplanes.

The Tornado is an old European aircraft that could fire both the storm shadow and the Taurus, but again, I doubt that they will be given to Ukraine (it would require that the UK, Germany and Italy agree on it, since they are the original manufacturers and the current operators, while in the case of the UK it’s possible the other two would probably say no and again they only exist in limited numbers and are no longer in production).

Australia thought of sending about 14 F/A 18 A-D to Ukraine: USA, Finland, Canada and Spain are some other operators of the F/A 18 A-D, most of them have phased it out (like Australia) or are on the way of phasing them out, meaning instead of taking them apart they could just send the ones that are combat worthy to Ukraine. The USA has said they are open to the Australian proposal, but so far nothing came out of it. The F/A 18 is basically the US equivalent of the Ukrainian MiG-29, so it would be a perfect replacement, but again I don’t think there will be any progress on that front before the US election in November 2024 (since the US would have to greenlight such a deal because it’s an American aircraft). I know too little about Australian politics to decide if that was more a thought experiment or an actual policy (I assume it’s the former).

There are some other things that would improve Ukraine’s chances to win the war: Antirunway munitions (BLU 107 Durandal, BAP 100), Bunker busting bombs such as the Paveway 24 and 27, more amphibious warfare capabilities that would allow them to cross the Dnipro, more mine clearing equipment of various forms, attack helicopters, more antiship/submarine warfare equipment, more anti-drone/air capabilities, more advanced UAVs such as the MQ1 Predator, more drones, more military training… Some of it will certainly be provided others I doubt it…

Edited October 25, 2023 by Bironic

[Maithanet]

15 hours ago, Padraig said:

Right.  While Ukraine ended 2022 on quite a positive note, things don't seem to have gone well in 2023.  I'm not as clued in as other people here but almost 11 months into 2023, it is hard to see where a Ukrainian victory will come from.  Is there something NATO can plausibly give Ukraine that would make a major difference?  Neither side can seemingly overcome the defenses of the other (except marginally).  And while the Russian army is frequently mocked, it simply has the greater numbers to compensate for any silly mistakes.  Joke is on us really.

The answer to this is a definitive yes.  The US has vast stores of hugely valuable military hardware that is not being used, and almost assuredly never will.  Most of that hardware is as good or better than anything the Russians have.  The Europeans likewise have huge stores of military equipment that they have not provided to Ukraine (probably not quite as much as the US, but nonetheless a great deal).  The US GDP is like 12X that of Russia.  NATO Europe has a similar economic advantage.  If they commit to overwhelming Russian resources, then no amount of Russian sacrifice will make any difference. 

The impediment for Ukraine is lack of political will.  The US is worried about giving away too much material when a potential conflict with China is possible.  Likewise European countries worry about shipping too much to Ukraine and leaving their own stocks bare.  IMO those fears are mostly unfounded.  The US has plenty of equipment that is unlikely to be used in any realistic war scenario.  Most European countries are more threatened by Russia than any other nation, and thus sending their equipment to check Russian aggression is getting the benefits of military spending without the huge human cost of fighting a war (for NATO, not for Ukraine, obviously). 

I felt that Biden's slower "boil the frog" approach to military aid was a reasonable choice in 2022, but it seems like the temperature has been holding steady for a while now and I'm really hoping we can give Ukraine more help soon.  I understand Congress has something to say about this as well, and that news has not been good of late. 

[Padraig]

Thanks for all that.  It seems that there are weapons that could make a difference but it doesn't seem likely that they will reach Ukraine in a timely way or in sufficient numbers.  (And things could get worse depending on elections in 2024).

And while  Ukraine could win a war of attrition, this presumably would take years.   And even then, no guarantees (I remember Werthead posted about how the casualty ratio between Russia and Ukraine was dropping significantly when Ukraine started seriously attacking.  Maybe less so now that Russia is going on the offensive again but as mentioned, it will be tough to sell defending as a long term strategy in order to wear Russia out, especially as it gives Russia more time to embed the occupied territories into its fiefdom). 

Geography really favoured the Kherson victory last year.  I'm not sure there is anything close to that left in occupied Ukraine.

Admittedly, I've never been particularly optimistic about this war but i'm really pessimistic these days.

[Maithanet]

Russia has been operating on the assumption that they will win a long war.  However, I think that in many respects that is an assumption made because they don't have any choice.  Putin cannot accept defeat and Russia cannot win the war quickly, so Putin and his generals assume that through perseverance they will eventually emerge victorious. 

I will freely admit that it is difficult to determine exactly how much staying power either the Russian military or the Russian economy has.  But both are under great strain, and that will only get worse as time goes on.  I am personally doubtful that Russia can continue to fight at this level for another 16 months (ie the earliest Trump could possibly take office).  Perun did a great video on this topic last month, which I summarized on page 10 of this thread.  The main takeaway is that Russia is not capable of ramping up production to a level anywhere near what they are losing.  Russia can only pull old equipment out of warehouses for so long before there simply isn't anything useful left.

Edited October 25, 2023 by Maithanet

[A Horse Named Stranger]

Just now, Maithanet said:

Russia has been operating on the assumption that they will win a long war.  However, I think that in many respects that is an assumption made because they don't have any choice.  Putin cannot accept defeat and Russia cannot win the war quickly, so Putin and his generals assume that through perseverance they will eventually emerge victorious. 

I will freely admit that it is difficult to determine exactly how much staying power either the Russian military or the Russian economy has.  But both are under great strain, and that will only continue as time goes on.  I am personally doubtful that Russia can continue to fight at this level for another 16 months (ie the earliest Trump could possibly take office).  Perun did a great video on this topic last month, which I summarized on page 10 of this thread.  The main takeaway is that Russia is not capable of ramping up production to a level anywhere near what they are losing.  Russia can only pull old equipment out of warehouses for so long before there simply isn't anything useful left. 

That all presumes, that the west is willing to continue to support Ukraine.

There are some questions marks in order. How weary are the populations in the west of that war? The sanctions cut both ways, so there are some voices that want to lift them. Then with the House Republicans there's also the question how willing are they to grant funds/weapons ofr Ukraine? How much of "Ukrainian resources" of the alliance will be diverted to Israel after the Hamas strike (esp. US military hardware). And how much air will the middle East suck out of the air waves?

The US are the key backer, take them out of hte equation and Ukraine will face great difficulties.

[Maithanet]

That remains to be seen, but I don't think I'm taking it as a given.  I think that European support for Ukraine will continue even without the US.  European leaders have definitely gotten the memo that the Republican party is probably going to abandon them, and they need to be planning accordingly.  Cutting Ukraine off and giving Putin a big win would make that dramatically harder, not easier. 

US policy isn't going to change dramatically prior to Jan 2025, although there probably will be less US funding in 2024 than in 2023.  And I was mostly talking about the next 16 months.  I think it is quite possible that Russia's ability to fight will wane significantly in that time. 

[Werthead]

I think the only western country with a great deal of weariness of the war is the US, and that's down to their experience from Afghanistan and Iraq. I also think the USA, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan all have a serious concern about a conflict with North Korea (or, maybe less likely, and maybe a few years further away, China) which modifies their strategic thinking.

OTOH, all of Europe, from Ireland to Estonia, has a very strong concern over Russia. It's the nearest and more imminent threat, they've already said they plan to attack the Baltic States and Poland if Ukraine falls, and Eastern European countries have long memories over what being under (effective) Russian occupation was like. War weariness in, say, Poland, is unlikely to kick in when the public is facing a choice between funding a defence against Russia in Bakhmut versus fighting the Russians directly on the outskirts of Warsaw. Even in Britain there is some concern (if not imminent) about the country coming under actual physical attack from Russian missiles.

Edited October 25, 2023 by Werthead