Ukraine 13: Pavlov's Bellum

[Kalbear]

2 hours ago, Gorn said:

A thread by Kamil Galeev, relevant to the recent discussion:

https://unrollthread.com/t/1516162437455654913/

 

I'm especially interested in the parallels here of how Russians genuinely believed they would be viewed as liberators and how this is so similar to US wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Something even I believed at one point. For those who think how insane it is that Russians would think this way - how many US folks still think Afghanistan needs to be liberated?

[karaddin]

I'm really quite confused by the discussion of what should be done and that we should somehow end this war. The only people who get to say when Ukraine should stop fighting to defend itself are Ukrainians. We don't have a choice to make here in terms of the war - it will continue as long as Russia is intent on continuing the invasion and Ukraine is intent on defending itself, the only choice to make is whether to support the country defending itself or hang it out to dry and the latter option does not reduce future wars. 

Self determination is the key here and if Ukraine decided tomorrow that too many civilians are dying and they want to surrender then we would need to respect that, but as long as they want to keep fighting to protect themselves that should be respected as well. 

[Kalbear]

I mean, I guess there is an option - we can tell Ukraine that they can go fucking die and give them nothing and let them die a whole bunch.

That is a choice too! I just don't know why this would be considered a reasonable or good one. Ain't like it'd stop Ukrainian civilian deaths. I guess it might stop some random buildings being blown up? 

Ah, there ya go. It's the absolute best choice to advocate for if your biggest concern is for the Russian soldiers and their lives. Now it makes sense.

[Toth]

34 minutes ago, Kalibuster said:

I mean, I guess there is an option - we can tell Ukraine that they can go fucking die and give them nothing and let them die a whole bunch.

That is a choice too! I just don't know why this would be considered a reasonable or good one. Ain't like it'd stop Ukrainian civilian deaths. I guess it might stop some random buildings being blown up? 

Ah, there ya go. It's the absolute best choice to advocate for if your biggest concern is for the Russian soldiers and their lives. Now it makes sense.

The only reason I have come across is "Because of my strict pacifism I don't want to prolong the war or get involved in it in any way, so the Ukrainians should just surrender", which is a baffling combination of pig-headedness in ideology, comfort as they would be glad if the massacres wouldn't make headlines anymore as they move into FSB torture cellars and a heavy amount of smug paternalism as they complain why Ukraine can't accept their own security concerns should be thrown under the bus in the face of us not wanting to confront an invading Russia.

Also of course the drones who still blame the US for 'pushing Russia into a corner' after their poor misunderstood landgrab 2014.

[SeanF]

7 hours ago, Kalibuster said:

Seems relevant

 

I’ve encountered that argument quite often.  The Ukrainians are responsible for all the death and misery, due to their refusal to surrender.

[broken one]

Put your head in the noose and spare us the ugly pictures.

[kiko]

1 hour ago, Toth said:

The only reason I have come across is "Because of my strict pacifism I don't want to prolong the war or get involved in it in any way, so the Ukrainians should just surrender", which is a baffling combination of pig-headedness in ideology, comfort as they would be glad if the massacres wouldn't make headlines anymore as they move into FSB torture cellars and a heavy amount of smug paternalism as they complain why Ukraine can't accept their own security concerns should be thrown under the bus in the face of us not wanting to confront an invading Russia.

Also of course the drones who still blame the US for 'pushing Russia into a corner' after their poor misunderstood landgrab 2014.

I think as a pacifist you absolutely believe in the good in all people. So what Russia is doing is an aberration. So it might be better to roll over to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and then wait for the forces of good to sort it out. Probably Russian are not mordor orcs but just temporarily misguided and will soon come to their senses (guided by our loving care and understanding) and apologize.

This is a very positive world view but as usual if you think in absolutes, you will probably fail. I'm reasonably sure that Russians love their children too, but don't think this is the time to prove it.

[Heartofice]

I think there is a level of naivety on both sides of the argument really. 
 

It’s naive to think that Russia will just sit down at a table and stop the war because we asked nicely and because everyone talked about wanting peace. It’s also naive to think that Ukraine can really ‘win’ this war without losing a chunk of their country and giving stuff up to Russia.

It really does seem like a really impossible situation. Does anyone have a good solution? 

[ThinkerX]

15 minutes ago, Heartofice said:

I think there is a level of naivety on both sides of the argument really. 
 

It’s naive to think that Russia will just sit down at a table and stop the war because we asked nicely and because everyone talked about wanting peace. It’s also naive to think that Ukraine can really ‘win’ this war without losing a chunk of their country and giving stuff up to Russia.

It really does seem like a really impossible situation. Does anyone have a good solution? 

Just the obvious - the longer this war drags on, the weaker Putin looks to ambitious underlings. And it is highly doubtful (to me, anyhow) that this war can last for more than a few months without a near total collapse of Russia proper - and this includes the 'slow motion war' scenario. Likewise, Putin cannot accept a negotiated settlement that makes him look weak - failing to take significant Ukrainian goals - without endangering his own life.  The whole 'president for life' thing - he's either president, or he's dead.

[Heartofice]

3 minutes ago, ThinkerX said:

Just the obvious - the longer this war drags on, the weaker Putin looks to ambitious underlings. And it is highly doubtful (to me, anyhow) that this war can last for more than a few months without a near total collapse of Russia proper - and this includes the 'slow motion war' scenario. Likewise, Putin cannot accept a negotiated settlement that makes him look weak - failing to take significant Ukrainian goals - without endangering his own life.  The whole 'president for life' thing - he's either president, or he's dead.

At some point Putin will accept peace, but the ‘off ramp’ for Putin will probably include bits of Eastern Ukraine. The only way that doesn’t happen is if Ukraine can mount a huge counter offensive, and I’m not sure anyone sees that happening.

I think Putin is adept enough at holding onto power that he won’t be seriously threatened for a while, and will be desperate to stay in power, as stepping down will mean death for him.

[broken one]

41 minutes ago, Heartofice said:

I think there is a level of naivety on both sides of the argument really. 
 

It’s naive to think that Russia will just sit down at a table and stop the war because we asked nicely and because everyone talked about wanting peace. It’s also naive to think that Ukraine can really ‘win’ this war without losing a chunk of their country and giving stuff up to Russia.

It really does seem like a really impossible situation. Does anyone have a good solution? 

It is up to Ukrainians to decide when it is enough, but I think best solution would be to bleed Russia as much as possible, give them as little territory as possible to postpone the next war as much as possible. And sustain sanctions, strangle the economy. It may happen Russia completely breaks down (falls into pieces maybe) during preparations to the second round.

I think Ukraine could win this war without loosing any chunks of land if some NATO members intervene and make Russians leave the country. I'd rather not take the risk and see what happens then, it also seems abslutely impossible right now but who knows where it all will go. 

 

[Heartofice]

3 minutes ago, broken one said:

It is up to Ukrainians to decide when it is enough, but I think best solution would be to bleed Russia as much as possible, give them as little territory as possible to postpone the next war as much as possible. And sustain sanctions, strangle the economy. It may happen Russia completely breaks down (falls into pieces maybe) during preparations to the second round.

I think Ukraine could win this war without loosing any chunks of land if some NATO members intervene and make Russians leave the country. I'd rather not take the risk and see what happens then, it also seems abslutely impossible right now but who knows where it all will go. 

 

Is Russia really being bled though? There might have been some initial shocks but it can pivot east and switch to China and India as trading partners, something that is going to happen anyway more than likely ( if Russia is still a thing) plus the EU is throwing cash at Russia for Oil and Gas and it will take a long time to stop doing that. Are we also being naive about how much pressure Putin is under? We presume the world disapproves of Russias actions and I turning them into a pariah, but we are only talking about the West for the most part. 
 

If NATO gets involved in actual war then that is something very different and I’m not sure we should be contemplating that 

[Werthead]

7 hours ago, Kalibuster said:

I'm especially interested in the parallels here of how Russians genuinely believed they would be viewed as liberators and how this is so similar to US wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Something even I believed at one point. For those who think how insane it is that Russians would think this way - how many US folks still think Afghanistan needs to be liberated?

I think there were differences. Afghanistan was in a state of civil war in 2001, the Northern Alliance had made some inroads against the Taliban and there were smaller uprisings, guerrilla warfare etc across the country. There was widespread discontent with the Taliban. Ironically, the thing that really tipped the balance of power towards the Alliance and allowed them to take Kabul was, maybe even moreso than US air strikes, the Russians giving the Alliance heavy weaponry, tanks, small arms and ammunition (all with US support). The Afghans were showing in 2001 and even earlier that they wanted to be liberated with events on the ground. One of the given reasons for the US withdrawal last year was that they US no longer believed that was the case and the forces in Afghanistan fighting and opposing the resurged, "moderate" Taliban were minimal.

In Iraq it was different because the areas of the country opposed to Saddam had more or less already achieved autonomy and those that had not were not showing signs of a widespread uprising, despite the fact it was clear that Saddam was widely despised.

In Ukraine you can argue that there were a pro-Russian minority who wanted to be "liberated," but the problem was that Russia effectively "liberated" them in 2014. The rest of the country became much more staunchly pro-Ukrainian. Ironically if Russia had not intervened and had left the Crimea and Donbas as part of Ukraine, there'd be a much stronger pro-Russian party within Ukraine (who could have swung post-2014 elections just as they had earlier on) and the arguments for intervention might have become stronger, at least in the warped view of the Kremlin.

Quote

I think Ukraine could win this war without loosing any chunks of land if some NATO members intervene and make Russians leave the country. I'd rather not take the risk and see what happens then, it also seems abslutely impossible right now but who knows where it all will go. 

There's a strong interventionist argument being made in Poland now, to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltics. They are not really going to intervene, of course, mainly because them unilaterally intervening would not necessarily trigger Article 5, leaving them hanging on a limb without NATO support. However, there has been some speculation that the intervention of outside forces on Russia's side - say Belarus invading Ukraine - could trigger a reciprocation, even just by Poland by itself (which shares a border with Belarus, has a military almost four times the size and has a serious beef with the way Belarus has been trying to weaponise refugees and send them over the border), and that may also be a reason Belarus has not intervened in the conflict. That's actually a useful bit of realpolitik intervention, if it has happened.

Quote

Is Russia really being bled though? There might have been some initial shocks but it can pivot east and switch to China and India as trading partners, something that is going to happen anyway more than likely ( if Russia is still a thing) plus the EU is throwing cash at Russia for Oil and Gas and it will take a long time to stop doing that. Are we also being naive about how much pressure Putin is under? We presume the world disapproves of Russias actions and I turning them into a pariah, but we are only talking about the West for the most part. 

The US is engaging in some solid diplomacy with India at the moment. India now sees China as its main rival for power and influence in the region and their mountain border dispute as a potential flashpoint into a larger conflict. For these reasons, India entering into an alliance with the United States is seen as extremely tempting and attractive, since India increasingly sees Russia as an ally of China. India has not also forgotten the oft-repeated line that Russia believes it should stretch to the Indian Ocean (presumably at the expense of India, Pakistan or Iran). However, Russian military equipment is cheaper than American counterparts and in very isolated areas (particularly AA), marginally superior. India has been dramatically reducing its support on Russia in the last few years in favour of getting more military equipment from the west, though more Israel and France at the moment than the USA.

India does have issues with the US as well, including US support for Pakistan. There is also the growing Hindu nationalism in India which is enflaming tensions with the Muslim minority (albeit a minority half again larger than the entire population of Russia) and could enflame tensions with Pakistan. There has been some level-headed Indian political suggestions that India could pivot hard and even resolve tensions with Pakistan, possibly even in favour of a broad cooperation to counter China in the region. That's all much more up in the air, though, and it's hard to see such an old enmity being negated quickly.

In terms of being bled, I think the reference was more to the military situation: Russia has verifiably lost at least 25% (and by now maybe closer to 30%) of its entire war-ready stock of tanks in Ukraine by itself, and probably not that far off in terms of infantry fighting vehicles and medium-range rocket launchers. It's also lost an uncomfortable number of its workhorse fighter and fighter-bombers, though not as high. It has also lost possibly one-twelfth of its war-ready army killed and two to three times that injured, and cannot replace that without mobilisation, which is seen as politically very risky in Russia and for Putin.

[broken one]

3 minutes ago, Heartofice said:

Is Russia really being bled though? There might have been some initial shocks but it can pivot east and switch to China and India as trading partners, something that is going to happen anyway more than likely ( if Russia is still a thing) plus the EU is throwing cash at Russia for Oil and Gas and it will take a long time to stop doing that. Are we also being naive about how much pressure Putin is under?

It is questionable if the West holds the santions long enough and stops buying fuels, I agree. But if it will - I believe in some (arther short) time it will cause enormous problems for Russia and third world won't help much.

[Loge]

 

15 minutes ago, Heartofice said:

Is Russia really being bled though? There might have been some initial shocks but it can pivot east and switch to China and India as trading partners, something that is going to happen anyway more than likely ( if Russia is still a thing) plus the EU is throwing cash at Russia for Oil and Gas and it will take a long time to stop doing that. Are we also being naive about how much pressure Putin is under? We presume the world disapproves of Russias actions and I turning them into a pariah, but we are only talking about the West for the most part. 
 

If NATO gets involved in actual war then that is something very different and I’m not sure we should be contemplating that 

Russia is being bled on the battlefield. Badly. 

Ukraine claims to have destroyed more than 800 Russian tanks now. And that's battle tanks only, not all armoured vehicle.

https://twitter.com/MFA_Ukraine/status/1516341741439303681/photo/1

Even if these figures are overestimates, the Russian losses are brutal. They can't keep this up and they can't replace their losses under the sanctions. 

[Werthead]

3 minutes ago, broken one said:

It is questionable if the West holds the santions long enough and stops buying fuels, I agree. But if it will - I believe in some (arther short) time it will cause enormous problems for Russia and third world won't help much.

The impact on western economies of the sanctions so far imposed on Russia has been limited, so I think the current sanctions can be held indefinitely. I think there's also an argument of a "punch" sanction on oil and gas that could be imposed at a different stage of the conflict, maybe in the summer when European reserves will hold until after the 2022-23 winter. That's a risky move, but it could do a lot more damage to the Russian economy.

[3CityApache]

Even if EU is still reluctant to impose a ban on Russian oil and gas, some individual EU members (if not most of them) are already taking steps to cut their dependance on Russian fossil fuels. In some cases it is not easy of course and will take some time, but eventually we will get there. Poland, for what it's worth, declared it will stop imports of Russian oil by the end of 2022, and imports of Russian gas will stop next year anyway, thanks to completion of Baltic Pipe, allowing corresponding imports from Norwegian Continental Shelf, and the termination of multi-year so called Yamal contract with Gazprom.

[broken one]

3 minutes ago, Loge said:

 

Russia is being bled on the battlefield. Badly. 

Ukraine claims to have destroyed more than 800 Russian tanks now. And that's battle tanks only, not all armoured vehicle.

https://twitter.com/MFA_Ukraine/status/1516341741439303681/photo/1

Even if these figures are overestimates, the Russian losses are brutal. They can't keep this up and they can't replace their losses under the sanctions. 

I've read that, because of the losses, Russians will not pose serious threat to NATO countries and NATO supported Ukraine for about 5-10 years, even if the war ends today, leave out the sanctions.

[Liffguard]

6 hours ago, karaddin said:

I'm really quite confused by the discussion of what should be done and that we should somehow end this war. The only people who get to say when Ukraine should stop fighting to defend itself are Ukrainians. We don't have a choice to make here in terms of the war - it will continue as long as Russia is intent on continuing the invasion and Ukraine is intent on defending itself, the only choice to make is whether to support the country defending itself or hang it out to dry and the latter option does not reduce future wars. 

Self determination is the key here and if Ukraine decided tomorrow that too many civilians are dying and they want to surrender then we would need to respect that, but as long as they want to keep fighting to protect themselves that should be respected as well. 

I agree with all of this, but in regard to the bold, my concern is that western governments may not respect that. At the moment, Ukrainian interests and intentions (to resist the invasion with force) align with the interests of western governments (to see Russia's military sustain damage, to see Russian influence and reputation weakened). If that ever stops being the case, if we reach a point when it does become in the interests of the Ukrainian people to offer concessions, or even some kind of conditional surrender, then I strongly suspect our governments in the west would not encourage that.

[Werthead]

Reading various ideas and experts. It appears two outcomes are generally now believed to be plausible:

1. Russia advances as far as it can by around 5 May and then declares victory on those lines, holding its parade on 9 May. If all or most of Donbas is taken and the land bridge to Crimea is completed Putin announces completion of the successful operation and hails Ukraine's agreement not to join NATO and sign a neutrality pact (if that still holds) as a sign of victory. He believes the west will lift sanctions in a matter of weeks to months and, if they do not, that will be a sign of hostility and Russia will begin a military buildup in response (even if that's a bluff or he means it but it will take years). This will be seen by some as a VINO (Victory In Name Only) but it does achieve Russia's stated strategic goals before the operation and gives Russia room to start rebuilding as well as expending political capital in other theatres (the Balkans) to keep NATO off-balance. The results of the French election may play into this as well (Le Pen is seen as a potential ally). Russia is aware that many actors, including some in NATO, some Ukrainians and a lot of neutral countries, will accept this outcome as it restores peace in the meantime.
2. Russia is repulsed in Donbas or does not achieve much more than it has already, or if Ukraine mounts successful counter-offensives (especially if they retake the land bridge to Crimea or cut off Crimea again). Russia is unable to present even the vaguest idea of a VINO. Russia will then declare general mobilisation and go "all-in" with a fresh offensive in a few months to take not just Donbas but all of Ukraine. Russia may make much more bellicose threats than before to reduce NATO interference. In an extreme case, they may even consider a limited naval operation to take Gotland and put NATO in the Baltic on the back foot before Sweden and Finland can join the organisation. There may also be a maximal escalate-to-deescalate element to this. If Russia then proceeds to show signs of losing these engagements as well it will consider using tactical nuclear weapons.

Mobilisation is considered risky for the regime but also others: if it triggers widespread public disorder in Russia, Russia may abandon the idea and consider the use of WMD to subdue Ukraine.

There are a lot of other factors for Russia to consider, including the benefits of further disorder in the USA following the 2022 midterms and 2024 elections versus waiting for Germany to rearm significantly and Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Putin's age and the increasing likelihood of him not living to see a reunified Greater Russia is also a consideration (for him, if not Russia as a whole).

11 minutes ago, broken one said:

I've read that, because of the losses, Russians will not pose serious threat to NATO countries and NATO supported Ukraine for about 5-10 years, even if the war ends today, leave out the sanctions.

Well, Russia's nuclear forces obviously would. If Russia manages to convince China of the benefits of an anti-NATO alliance needing to be formed, then that would change the equation as well (North Korea and Syria would join such an alliance immediately, and Iran would strongly consider it as well). However, China is wary of Russian unpredictability and Russia would have to accept being the junior partner in such an alliance, which would be a bitter pill to swallow.