Ukraine War: David And Goliath

[Werthead]

I think that takes us up to 20 Su-34s lost to date; with more than half of them lost in the first six months of the war. Russia has around 138 left (how many operational and how many have been damaged, cannibalised for parts etc is unknown), but they've been keeping them well back out of range, and only recently started losing more due to Patriot losses and being forced to fly closer to the front.

What Ukraine probably really wants to take out are the Tupolev bombers which are air-launching long-range munitions from well inside Belarusian or Russian airspace. Russia has relatively few (28, but only ~14 are believed to be airworthy) so taking out even a couple of them would have a huge impact on Russia's ability to launch long-range munitions at Ukrainian targets.

[Loge]

9 hours ago, Werthead said:

I think that takes us up to 20 Su-34s lost to date; with more than half of them lost in the first six months of the war. Russia has around 138 left (how many operational and how many have been damaged, cannibalised for parts etc is unknown), but they've been keeping them well back out of range, and only recently started losing more due to Patriot losses and being forced to fly closer to the front.

What Ukraine probably really wants to take out are the Tupolev bombers which are air-launching long-range munitions from well inside Belarusian or Russian airspace. Russia has relatively few (28, but only ~14 are believed to be airworthy) so taking out even a couple of them would have a huge impact on Russia's ability to launch long-range munitions at Ukrainian targets.

Well, those are strategic bombers from the 1950s. Russia uses them to launch mid-range missiles because the land-based variants, of which a lot existed during the Cold War, were banned by the INF treaty and subsequently destroyed. That treaty is no longer in force but Russia's inventory is still mostly post-Cold War, so most missiles are launched from planes or submarines.  From what I have read, those planes are quite expensive to maintain, too, each flight requiring three days of preparation. 

What's remarkable about the recent strike is that Russia used ten Kinshal missiles, one of Putin's much bragged-about wonderweapons. Not only are these missiles quite expensive and meant to carry nuclear warheads, they were all shot down too.

[Erik of Hazelfield]

I wonder how much deterrent the Russian nuclear program still is. Considering the state of the rest of the Russian military equipment and the maintenance needed to keep a nuclear arsenal in working condition, who knows how many of the nukes even work by now. We know the rampant corruption has led to people enriching themselves instead of doing their job. Couple that with an inability of the missiles to get past the air defence systems of the NATO countries and you start questioning if they actually have the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons like they say they can.

[A Horse Named Stranger]

1 minute ago, Erik of Hazelfield said:

I wonder how much deterrent the Russian nuclear program still is. Considering the state of the rest of the Russian military equipment and the maintenance needed to keep a nuclear arsenal in working condition, who knows how many of the nukes even work by now. We know the rampant corruption has led to people enriching themselves instead of doing their job. Couple that with an inability of the missiles to get past the air defence systems of the NATO countries and you start questioning if they actually have the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons like they say they can.

Problem is, that even a low number of someting like 30% of its nuclear arsenal working, we'd still be talking about nuclear weapons (and quite a lot on top).

So that's gamble nobody in their right mind would be willing to take. More reasonable assumption is, as long as Russia itself is not threatened (I don'T count occupied Ukraine as Russia) they will not resort to that.

 

[Erik of Hazelfield]

No, I agree it’s not a gamble worth trying. But this does make Russian nuclear threats more hollow. 

This is now a war of attrition, but while it doesn’t have a clear winner yet, it doesn’t follow that it’s a stalemate and that there will be no winner. 

The Russians now has a full wartime economy in place. Their path to victory lies in outpacing Ukraine and the West in weapons and ammunition production. Waning support from the West may well lead to a collapsing front due to Ukrainian lack of weapons and personnel. Ukraine’s path to victory is more unclear. They need much more military support than they’re currently getting while preserving their soldiers or they will run out of men before Russia does. An increased domestic production of drones and explosives could tip the scales in Ukraine’s favour but it’s very difficult at this point to see where the war ends. Most definitely not in 2024, that’s for sure. 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

38 minutes ago, Erik of Hazelfield said:

The Russians now has a full wartime economy in place.

That's the real issue. They are producing stuff, Europe really isn't (at least not anywhere the needed quantity). And with the US rethugs willing so sacrifice Ukraine for their election prospects, that means Ukraine is facing a really rough year.

[SeanF]

20 hours ago, Erik of Hazelfield said:

No, I agree it’s not a gamble worth trying. But this does make Russian nuclear threats more hollow. 

This is now a war of attrition, but while it doesn’t have a clear winner yet, it doesn’t follow that it’s a stalemate and that there will be no winner. 

The Russians now has a full wartime economy in place. Their path to victory lies in outpacing Ukraine and the West in weapons and ammunition production. Waning support from the West may well lead to a collapsing front due to Ukrainian lack of weapons and personnel. Ukraine’s path to victory is more unclear. They need much more military support than they’re currently getting while preserving their soldiers or they will run out of men before Russia does. An increased domestic production of drones and explosives could tip the scales in Ukraine’s favour but it’s very difficult at this point to see where the war ends. Most definitely not in 2024, that’s for sure. 

Russia’s manpower issues are probably more acute than Ukraine’s.

There was an item on the BBC that in Spring 2022, the typical Russian casualty was a 21 year old professional soldier.  Now, the typical Russian casualty is a 34 year old convict.

Russia’s economy is a long way from being a total war economy.

Edited January 7 by SeanF

[Erik of Hazelfield]

I hope you’re right about that. Russia definitely has problems, one of which is continuing horrendous losses. They lose on the order of 800-1000 soldiers per day. In addition, their economy is bad, inflation runs rampant (official Russian figures are way off) and the lack of technology is causing problems for things like civilian aircraft which cannot be serviced properly due to lack of spare parts. The reduction of workforce (young men sent off to war or fleeing the country) is also a problem. If we in the West can match the Russian arms race, then their problems may eventually make continued occupation unsustainable. Indeed, some even predict they’ll have problems to keep functioning as a country, but I’m not sure about that. 

[Werthead]

Russian anti-Putin forces have launched another raid into Belgorod Oblast, destroying a Russian encampment and then withdrawing quickly.

Russian counter-attacks on the Krynsky salient are continuing to be repulsed, with increased Russian complaints about being sent into a grinder where Ukraine has total drone and artillery superiority.

[Martell Spy]

Russia must be held accountable over Ukraine – we should seize its assets
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Kosenko
After the EU and US failed to agree aid packages, we must send a clear message to regimes waging wars

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/jan/08/russia-ukraine-seize-assets-us-eu

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Although seizing these assets would boost Ukrainian morale and finances, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are wary. As the New York Times recently reported, top US officials fear that setting such a precedent would deter other countries from depositing their funds at the New York Federal Reserve or holding them in dollars.

But the concern that other governments might become wary of keeping their funds in the US for fear of future seizures overlooks some key points. Seizing Russia’s frozen assets would not affect other countries’ assets or change the incentives of governments that are not planning a major war. Moreover, by not seizing these funds, western countries are signalling that governments waging brutal wars of aggression can violate international law and simultaneously benefit from it to escape the consequences of their actions. Instead, G7 leaders should send a clear message: no country can have it both ways. By deterring other bad actors from violating international law, such seizures could act as a peace-building measure.

The supposed negative effect of seizing Russian assets on other countries’ willingness to deposit funds in the US and Europe, were it real, would have become apparent when these funds were frozen in early 2022. Notably, there has been no capital flight from the US or Europe. This is partly because there are few safe alternatives to the established financial system. Assuming that governments do become wary of keeping their assets in the US, Europe, or Japan, where

 

 

[Maithanet]

On 1/7/2024 at 5:56 AM, Erik of Hazelfield said:

If we in the West can match the Russian arms race, then their problems may eventually make continued occupation unsustainable. Indeed, some even predict they’ll have problems to keep functioning as a country, but I’m not sure about that. 

This was is and has always been a matter of political will.  If the collective west decides that Ukraine will have what it needs to win, then that's it.  Russia's economy and military output cannot possibly compete.  The problem is whether or not there is indeed political will to deny Russia that win.  I am less optimistic about this than I was a year ago, but we shall see. 

[Kalbear]

1 hour ago, Maithanet said:

This was is and has always been a matter of political will.  If the collective west decides that Ukraine will have what it needs to win, then that's it.  Russia's economy and military output cannot possibly compete.  The problem is whether or not there is indeed political will to deny Russia that win.  I am less optimistic about this than I was a year ago, but we shall see. 

I don't agree. Ukraine doesn't just need firepower. That is a requirement but is not sufficient. 

For example, it is not clear that a NATO force could achieve air superiority in the region. That is a requirement of NATO tactics that is being shown to possibly be an error. Without that you don't have the mobility, without that you can't easily clear minefields, without that you can't go through. 

But even with that the problem is now the amount of Ukrainians that can fight. This is decreasing at a very bad pace and there are not replacements easily found. More long range weapons will make that better but it won't solve it, and Russia has the ability to send more people into the fight. Can Russia sustain a 3-1 or 4-1 ratio? So far the answer is yes, and if anything that is a win for Russia at that atrocious rate.

[Maithanet]

Russia has been able to make it through the first almost 2 years of war by drawing down huge stockpiles of Russian/Soviet equipment and a great deal of actions to shore up its economy in the short term.  Neither of those things can last forever.  If the West were to increase its support for Ukraine beyond 2023 levels, that would ratchet up the pressure far beyond what Russia has seen thus far, on both the military and the economy.  That doesn't mean Russia would collapse in a matter of a couple months, but collapse it would. 

Russia is basically "hanging in there" and hoping that Ukrainian support withers.  That may happen, it's still TBD.  But the idea that if Ukrainian support was tripled beyond 2023 levels for 2024-26 (something NATO+allies are unquestionably capable of doing) that Russia would still hold on to Ukrainian territory in 2027 strikes me as....extremely far fetched. 

[Kalbear]

Just now, Maithanet said:

Russia has been able to make it through the first almost 2 years of war by drawing down huge stockpiles of Russian/Soviet equipment and a great deal of actions to shore up its economy in the short term.  Neither of those things can last forever. 

That is exactly what was said last year, too, and it has still failed to pass.

Just now, Maithanet said:

If the West were to increase its support for Ukraine beyond 2023 levels, that would ratchet up the pressure far beyond what Russia has seen thus far, on both the military and the economy.  That doesn't mean Russia would collapse in a matter of a couple months, but collapse it would.

What support would that be? 

I'm quite serious. What does Ukraine need that they don't have as far as equipment goes? Especially equipment they can use? The only thing they don't have right now is major stealth fighters, and even if they got those they won't be able to utilize them for quite a while.

The thing they need more than anything right now is ammunition. And thats just to sustain what they can do.

As to economic pressure on russia there isnt much more that the west can actually do. Russia is successfully selling to china and india. Unless the west wants to stop trading with those countries there aint anything left..

Just now, Maithanet said:

Russia is basically "hanging in there" and hoping that Ukrainian support withers.  That may happen, it's still TBD.  But the idea that if Ukrainian support was tripled beyond 2023 levels for 2024-26 (something NATO+allies are unquestionably capable of doing) that Russia would still hold on to Ukrainian territory in 2027 strikes me as....extremely far fetched. 

And again I ask - what would tripling support do? Where are the Ukrainian soldiers who have the ability to use this equipment coming from? 

More support would allow Ukraine to be a bit more aggressive in offenses. More support is needed to avoid a Ukrainian collapse. But tanks, himars, Bradleys and f16s don't magically drive themselves.

[Maithanet]

What would they give Ukraine? A lot more of everything.  The US has vast stockpiles of ammo, vehicles, equipment, along with training facilities to use them.  The US could give over its vast stockpile of ATACMs instead of just like 10 or so that it actually handed over.  It could give over planes that are better than most of the Russian fleet, and in numbers far beyond what the Russians could match.  It could put in long term orders for vast quantities of ammunition of all calibers such that big defense contractors across the world would ramp up production without fear of having that production sit idle in a year or two. 

The idea that a collection of countries with nearly 20X the military spending of Russia would be unable to do anything to make things A LOT harder for Russia strikes me as extremely strange.  Ukraine still has a lot of people that it could train to use these weapons, if that quantity of weapons were made available.  Ukraine is nowhere near the bottom of the barrel in terms of manpower (Russia isn't either, but that's less relevant if we're talking about whether Ukriane could effectively use a huge infusion of NATO military tech). 

[Kalbear]

6 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

What would they give Ukraine? A lot more of everything.  The US has vast stockpiles of ammo, vehicles, equipment, along with training facilities to use them.  The US could give over its vast stockpile of ATACMs instead of just like 10 or so that it actually handed over.  It could give over planes that are better than most of the Russian fleet, and in numbers far beyond what the Russians could match.  It could put in long term orders for vast quantities of ammunition of all calibers such that big defense contractors across the world would ramp up production without fear of having that production sit idle in a year or two. 

And again, I ask - what would that accomplish? 

The best thing here is the planes, but the problem is not dogfights - the problem is that Russia has a very extensive, strong and useful anti-air capability that is specifically designed to deal with NATO forces. And that assumes you can get Ukraine trained on the fighters any time soon. As I said earlier the notion that even NATO could get air superiority or supremacy in this conflict is now doubtful. Russia certainly doesn't have it. 

The ammunition is a big deal, but it won't let Ukraine break through. It will let Ukraine maintain. 

6 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

The idea that a collection of countries with nearly 20X the military spending of Russia would be unable to do anything to make things A LOT harder for Russia strikes me as extremely strange.  Ukraine still has a lot of people that it could train to use these weapons, if that quantity of weapons were made available.  Ukraine is nowhere near the bottom of the barrel in terms of manpower (Russia isn't either, but that's less relevant if we're talking about whether Ukriane could effectively use a huge infusion of NATO military tech). 

Citation needed on Ukraine having people they can train on this stuff. Per reports Ukraine is really running out of people. They have gotten everyone they can who is volunteering. They are now looking to prosecute draft-dodgers and bring in more people. The veterans they have need rest and recuperation, and they have a very large amount of people that are injured or no longer able to fight effectively. 

As to the budget thing, the problem is the types of fights that NATO and the US are gearing up for that aren't as important in this conflict. Much of the US budget is spent on naval forces - something that is entirely irrelevant here. Aircraft is another massive spend, and that is also not nearly as relevant - certainly not in the short term, at least, since Ukraine doesn't have the training to use F35s even if they wanted to - and the US isn't going to be giving Ukraine those jets. Ukraine doesn't have the infrastructure to utilize those planes either. Unless you're suggesting that Ukrainian pilots fly sorties from Germany or Poland, and that would be a clear provocation that Russia would not let go unanswered. 

Again, show your work - what specifically is Ukraine needing in terms of capabilities that cannot be provided? The only thing I can see is ammunition, and that is a problem of logistics, not of supply - the West simply does not have the capacity to produce ammunition at the scale needed regardless of Ukrainian requirements. 

[Kalbear]

To answer my previous statement: this is what Ukraine needs - more Patriot missiles:

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/01/8/7436293/

The latest attack had Russia using ballistic missile trajectories, which can only be effectively dealt with by Patriot missiles - and those are in short supply. As a result, only 18 of 51 missiles were intercepted. 

[Werthead]

1 hour ago, Kalbear said:

For example, it is not clear that a NATO force could achieve air superiority in the region. That is a requirement of NATO tactics that is being shown to possibly be an error. Without that you don't have the mobility, without that you can't easily clear minefields, without that you can't go through. 

Russian anti-air denial is being prosecuted by the S-300 and S-400 platforms, which NATO is extremely knowledgeable about and comfortable dealing with, especially given much greater recent tactical knowledge about S-300 and 400 capabilities combined with modern radar directly from the Ukrainian battlefield. The US military is now extremely confident that the F-35 can evade the radar systems attached to both AA systems, detect their signatures and engage and destroy them with a high probability of success, opening the way to swarms of more standard fighters and bombers. There seems to also be reasonable confidence that even somewhat older F-22s could evade those radars.

Israeli F-35 test flights deep into Iranian airspace (Iran has bought some S-400s to defend its nuclear sites and critical government centres) without detection back that up. The S-500 might be a different issue, but so far only a tiny number have been produced for battlefield use and all have been tasked to defend Moscow. This backs up Russia's growing "tech gap," where its latest-generation technology it needs to combat comparable NATO capabilities is simply inadequate, as it is too expensive and Russia could not afford to keep up; this remains the case. The S-500, T-14 Armata and Su-57, which will be needed in a peer conflict against NATO, simply do not exist in sufficient numbers to do so.

I think NATO is very confident that if a larger conflict was to break out, its fleet of F-35s would be able to engage and destroy the relatively small number of S-400s available for use and the larger number of S-300s, after which Russian ground forces would be extremely vulnerable to aerial assault. Russian fighters of comparable generation capability are not available in the numbers required to effectively engage NATO airpower.

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But even with that the problem is now the amount of Ukrainians that can fight. This is decreasing at a very bad pace and there are not replacements easily found. More long range weapons will make that better but it won't solve it, and Russia has the ability to send more people into the fight. Can Russia sustain a 3-1 or 4-1 ratio? So far the answer is yes, and if anything that is a win for Russia at that atrocious rate.

 

This is an excellent point and I think a major issue developed in late summer when Ukrainian-Russian kill ratios dropped below the 7-1 or 10-1 which Ukraine had enjoyed during several of the most pivotal battles of the war (the original capture of Bakhmut saw Russia lose apparently in excess of ten times the number of troops Ukraine did defending it; this is primarily the reason why Ukraine made such a hard fight of it despite Bakhmut's dubious tactical value in and of itself). At several points it appears Ukraine may have lost more troops on some given days than Russia, which was utterly unsustainable, although maybe this was on just one day, probably not more than three or four. This has since reversed itself spectacularly - Russian losses on the Avdiivka axis have been astonishing - but Ukraine lost some ground in the war of attrition during that phase. How badly is unclear.

1 hour ago, Kalbear said:

That is exactly what was said last year, too, and it has still failed to pass.

Since Russia was forced to start drawing down its older equipment stocks, it has lost momentum on the front. Russian tank and mechanised losses only started falling when they literally ran out of those vehicles to put on the front. The Russians switched to a static front heavily focused on defence with the only offensives undertaken by infantry alone (sometimes not even supported by artillery, due to the very high success of the Ukrainian counter-battery offensive in summer 2023), or in conjunction with small numbers of armour and larger numbers of drones. The loss of the entire armoured column at Vuhledar to drone-spotted artillery fire seemed to be the last straw for the idea of the armoured column smashing through enemy lines.

Of course this goes both ways, with Ukraine suffering significant armour losses in their first strike on the Russian likes towards Robotyne and Tokmak. Ukraine learned much faster than the Russians and switched to infantry-led assaults with armour supporting instead, and the use of tanks in a defensive mode (i.e. a "mobile turret" or short-range artillery role). Ukraine did achieve several tactical breakthroughs with tanks thanks to the vastly superior firepower and survivability of western-supplied tanks, but these have been relatively minor and only possible where mines are not present in large numbers.

Russian civil aviation accidents increased tenfold in 2023 versus 2022 and, as predicated, their spart parts supply for their rolling stock has continued to degrade. Unfortunately, Russia can probably eke out another year or two before either problem becomes critical, and we cannot rule out Chinese-made replacement parts (so far ineffective) becoming more effective.

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As to economic pressure on russia there isnt much more that the west can actually do. Russia is successfully selling to china and india. Unless the west wants to stop trading with those countries there aint anything left..

The Russian rouble is currently less than one-third the value it was before the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russia's purchasing power on the open market has diminished significantly and its ability to sell things like armaments has also collapsed, as everything it is building is being funnelled into Ukraine. That's not to say that Russia is going to collapse tomorrow, but economically it can only really make deals work with countries significantly poorer or under more sanctions than itself (namely Iran and North Korea).

Russia can sustain this level for some time, but it is more limited than it wants.

[Erik of Hazelfield]

More ammunition would go a long way. Artillery, tanks and APCs. Drones. Air defence systems. All of these things would reduce Ukrainian losses and increase Russian, tilting the attrition war in Ukraine’s favour.

I agree that it seems unlikely right now with a huge Ukrainian breakthrough, but in war it’s often so that nothing happens for a very long time, then more nothing, and then everything happens at once. It’s utterly difficult to predict what could give way, but when it does, it could go fast and in any direction. 

[Kalbear]

1 minute ago, Erik of Hazelfield said:

More ammunition would go a long way. Artillery, tanks and APCs. Drones. Air defence systems. All of these things would reduce Ukrainian losses and increase Russian, tilting the attrition war in Ukraine’s favour.

And again, I ask - why would more equipment matter? How does it matter? 

Ammunition is really crucial but that's not being held up solely by Western politics - it's a logistical issue. Beyond that, what would make the actual difference? Why would APCs matter when you're dealing with minefields and artillery? Why do tanks matter when you're not even using the ones you have? 

The main way I see more equipment mattering is that it would allow Ukraine to be more daring and take bigger risks, but that still has one big problem - they are running out of people. Unless you're advocating sending them a bunch of Boston Dynamics robots you're not gonna solve that problem.

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

Russian anti-air denial is being prosecuted by the S-300 and S-400 platforms, which NATO is extremely knowledgeable about and comfortable dealing with, especially given much greater recent tactical knowledge about S-300 and 400 capabilities combined with modern radar directly from the Ukrainian battlefield. The US military is now extremely confident that the F-35 can evade the radar systems attached to both AA systems, detect their signatures and engage and destroy them with a high probability of success, opening the way to swarms of more standard fighters and bombers. There seems to also be reasonable confidence that even somewhat older F-22s could evade those radars.

Israeli F-35 test flights deep into Iranian airspace (Iran has bought some S-400s to defend its nuclear sites and critical government centres) without detection back that up. The S-500 might be a different issue, but so far only a tiny number have been produced for battlefield use and all have been tasked to defend Moscow. This backs up Russia's growing "tech gap," where its latest-generation technology it needs to combat comparable NATO capabilities is simply inadequate, as it is too expensive and Russia could not afford to keep up; this remains the case. The S-500, T-14 Armata and Su-57, which will be needed in a peer conflict against NATO, simply do not exist in sufficient numbers to do so.

I think NATO is very confident that if a larger conflict was to break out, its fleet of F-35s would be able to engage and destroy the relatively small number of S-400s available for use and the larger number of S-300s, after which Russian ground forces would be extremely vulnerable to aerial assault. Russian fighters of comparable generation capability are not available in the numbers required to effectively engage NATO airpower.

I hadn't heard that angle. Thanks!

I'm still pretty skeptical of it however. It's certainly possible that's true, but my understanding was that ECM and ECCM from Russia was significantly more advanced than what we (and Ukraine) had expected, and is very hard to defeat. That, plus the man-portable munitions has made it far more difficult. It also means that bringing in the non-stealth craft have problems from that same set of man-portable weaponry - it isn't just the large systems that need to be blown up, and there are a lot of hand-held launchers.

This has been the problem for Russian aircraft too, mind you, so it's not like it's an advantage on one side only. My suspicion is that NATO would have to rely more heavily on things like cruise missiles than aircraft - which they could do! - but that means it's not an answer for what could be given to Ukraine. 

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

Since Russia was forced to start drawing down its older equipment stocks, it has lost momentum on the front. Russian tank and mechanised losses only started falling when they literally ran out of those vehicles to put on the front. The Russians switched to a static front heavily focused on defence with the only offensives undertaken by infantry alone (sometimes not even supported by artillery, due to the very high success of the Ukrainian counter-battery offensive in summer 2023), or in conjunction with small numbers of armour and larger numbers of drones. The loss of the entire armoured column at Vuhledar to drone-spotted artillery fire seemed to be the last straw for the idea of the armoured column smashing through enemy lines.

Of course this goes both ways, with Ukraine suffering significant armour losses in their first strike on the Russian likes towards Robotyne and Tokmak. Ukraine learned much faster than the Russians and switched to infantry-led assaults with armour supporting instead, and the use of tanks in a defensive mode (i.e. a "mobile turret" or short-range artillery role). Ukraine did achieve several tactical breakthroughs with tanks thanks to the vastly superior firepower and survivability of western-supplied tanks, but these have been relatively minor and only possible where mines are not present in large numbers.

I don't think Russia is going to get momentum any time soon - unless Ukraine is not given ammunition which is a possibility. But I don't think that there's anything that you can give Ukraine to win anything, either. Again, without a way to deal with the minefields and defensive lines you're not going to get anywhere. You can make tactical strikes behind the lines and hurt Russia some, but it won't cause a breakthrough. And without the ability to end all the artillery defense of those minefields you won't be able to remove the mines quickly or easily, meaning that you either won't be able to break through without reinforcements being ready for those lines or you will be under constant fire when clearing the minefields.

The real tragedy, IMO, is that if we had given Ukraine the equipment we have given them this year last year Ukraine probably could have won the war or gone very far with it. HIMARS and modern armor and APCs last year could have caused major breakthroughs in the disorganized, sparsely defended lines, and well before Russia could have done a damn thing. Now though? Not so much. 

1 hour ago, Werthead said:

Russian civil aviation accidents increased tenfold in 2023 versus 2022 and, as predicated, their spart parts supply for their rolling stock has continued to degrade. Unfortunately, Russia can probably eke out another year or two before either problem becomes critical, and we cannot rule out Chinese-made replacement parts (so far ineffective) becoming more effective.

The Russian rouble is currently less than one-third the value it was before the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russia's purchasing power on the open market has diminished significantly and its ability to sell things like armaments has also collapsed, as everything it is building is being funnelled into Ukraine. That's not to say that Russia is going to collapse tomorrow, but economically it can only really make deals work with countries significantly poorer or under more sanctions than itself (namely Iran and North Korea).

Russia can sustain this level for some time, but it is more limited than it wants.

My point was that there isn't much more the West is going to be able to do to Russia that isn't already being done, not without causing a global depression. Russia has shown itself to be resilient enough and appears to be on the upswing from last year. That won't be sustainable forever as you say, but it's certainly sustainable for another couple of years. And in that time it's not clear if Ukraine will have any fighting capability left, regardless of Western supplied equipment.