Ukraine War: David And Goliath

[Kalbear]

They can't fight in the NATO way because they do not and will not have air superiority and a lot of NATO doctrine is predicated on that. 

In addition there are a whole lot of reports that the NATO way is outmoded and a problem in an age of drones, satellites, mines and trenches. NATO is going to have to learn some hard lessons about logistics, supplies, abilities to make weapons and use of weapons going forward too, and it's likely NATO will have to start fighting the Ukrainian way.

[A Horse Named Stranger]

5 minutes ago, Kalbear said:

and it's likely NATO will have to start fighting the Ukrainian way.

That's overstating it.

For as long as NATO has the USAF backing it, it will have aif superiority/air supremacy. So those trench wars will not be a NATO issue.

Yes, NATO handbook will be updated to take drones into accounts, but the basic strategy:

1. Scout

2.Take out air defense/opposing Air Force.

3. Send in bombers

4.Mop up the rest with tanks/mechanised infantry

will stay in place.

[Kalbear]

I don't think that's true. Air superiority is not a given in future wars, though not for the reason you think.

NATO (and the US) has a long standing plan of having the best, stealthiest and most well-trained air force out there, outcompeting a similar air force. Russia has tried to do something similar but also relies on a lot of advanced anti-air systems in depth + electronic warfare.

China, however, is going the route of attrition via economy. What they are focusing on is having enough cheap weaponry that can take out high value targets (carriers mostly, but also air bases and actual planes) to make air superiority simply unsustainable. They are focusing on drones and cheaper missiles and a lot of ecw to simply overwhelm a target or targets. Combine that with cheaper man-portable anti-air weapons and you have something similar to what Russia is facing against Ukraine now - where they cannot use aircraft because they are simply too expensive to use.

[Derfel Cadarn]

I think NATO and the west will fsce issues with stockpiles. If anenemy goes the Russian route and just keeps sending in waves of cannon fodder then sooner or later NATO will run out of all thise expensive weapons.

[A Horse Named Stranger]

@Kalbear

I think you are wrong.

Most countries don't have China's pockets for such approach, and we all better hope that NATO and China do not directly clash, we are talking about nuclear powers here.

And there are limits to that approach anyway.

As for future of drones and carriers. You'd assume that there will be drone counter measures in place, a) on the carrier itself and presumably b) using the carrier as part of a fleet, with vessels especially designed to protect the carrier from drones.

As for the planes itself. Question is where the R&D is going there in terms of automation (AI pilots?) or remote operations.

I think those things will shift the balance back into an US backed army's favour.

Edit: THere's also the issue of limited range for drones.

Edited November 14, 2023 by A Horse Named Stranger

[Kalbear]

1 hour ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

@Kalbear

I think you are wrong.

Most countries don't have China's pockets for such approach, and we all better hope that NATO and China do not directly clash, we are talking about nuclear powers here.

That's kind of the point though - Ukraine doesn't have that deep of pockets either nor are they getting that much in the way of equipment (especially early on), but their anti-air capabilities - particularly man-portable ones - were cheap and numerous enough that the entire Russian air force has been basically sidelined except for indirect fire missions. 

And, honestly, NATO better start prepping for wars against China. Beating Iran isn't going to be special. NATO's whole point is to be fighting against fairly significant threats and otherwise being a massive deterrent to anyone who would attack.

1 hour ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

As for future of drones and carriers. You'd assume that there will be drone counter measures in place, a) on the carrier itself and presumably b) using the carrier as part of a fleet, with vessels especially designed to protect the carrier from drones.

I don't assume anything of the sort. But there is at least so far a limit to that direction and the US is very far behind in terms of making their navy successful in that regard. So is Russia for that matter, as we've seen with the remnants of their fleet in the Black Sea. 

And again if what you say is true then yay, because NATO will  have at that point become more like Ukraine. Which was the starting point of my conversation to begin with. If they have smaller, more numerous resources that are expected to deal with heavy amounts of cheap weaponry and work in concert instead of having flagships with all their eggs in one basket that is PRECISELY the kind of strategic change I'm expecting to see. 

1 hour ago, A Horse Named Stranger said:

As for the planes itself. Question is where the R&D is going there in terms of automation (AI pilots?) or remote operations.

I think those things will shift the balance back into an US backed army's favour.

Edit: THere's also the issue of limited range for drones.

There's a lot of open questions on how best to use things and what the future of warfare will hold, but that's entirely my point - NATO as it is, with the strategy entirely based on air superiority, carrier attack groups, expensive weaponry and small groups of highly-trained forces - is likely not going to work well against many of the next generation threats. That's what both Ukraine and Russia have learned, and they're adapting. NATO needs to adapt as well. 

[Werthead]

A Russian press release was issued yesterday saying that Army Group Dnepr was relocating from the left bank of the Dniprio to "a more favourable defensive position". This was retracted soonafter. It appears to be a genuine press release prepared in a contingency and released in error. The takeaway: Russia does not believe its position in SW Kherson Oblast is viable under massive Ukrainian drone, artillery and HIMARS bombardment of key logistics and is considering a pullback to an unclear new line. Potentially massive if they really follow through on that, but it's dangerous as it allows Ukraine to build further momentum south of the Dnipro, where even a moderately successful push could simply cut off Crimea from the rest of Russian-occupied territory. Right now, Russian forces are not moving but their position is starting to look tenuous.

A Russian captive from Buryatia has said that Putin has committed genocide against the Buryats by sending them to die in Ukraine in their tens of thousands, with the overwhelming majority of losses not reported officially.

There have been rumblings of discontent in Buryatia with how their conscripts have been fed into the grinder in Ukraine, although to date these have been modest compared to the greater discontent seen from other oblasts.

In that vein, the Kamchatka Battalion has been voicing complaints about extremely heavy losses and newly-arrived troops being sent into battle with no training.

Russia's budget has increased by $37 billion this year, which is a bit of a problem given its economy has been heavily hit by the sanctions regime and internal problems, such as civilian labour shortages as young men are vectored into the war effort instead. Additional inflationary pressures are likely.

The US is targeting Russia's startup LNG sector. Previously the US had held fire on sanctions against Russia's nascent LNG industries, but now it's said fuck it and gone after them.

Speaking of blowing up mines from the air, Ukraine is getting better at it. Though it helps if they can find the mine stockpiles before deployment:

 

[Maithanet]

16 minutes ago, Werthead said:

A Russian press release was issued yesterday saying that Army Group Dnepr was relocating from the left bank of the Dniprio to "a more favourable defensive position". This was retracted soonafter. It appears to be a genuine press release prepared in a contingency and released in error. The takeaway: Russia does not believe its position in SW Kherson Oblast is viable under massive Ukrainian drone, artillery and HIMARS bombardment of key logistics and is considering a pullback to an unclear new line. Potentially massive if they really follow through on that, but it's dangerous as it allows Ukraine to build further momentum south of the Dnipro, where even a moderately successful push could simply cut off Crimea from the rest of Russian-occupied territory. Right now, Russian forces are not moving but their position is starting to look tenuous.

The whole situation is pretty curious and is one area where I really struggle to understand this conflict.  Surely fighting south of the Dnipro is harder for Ukraine (having to cross the river with only limited pontoon bridges and riverboats) than it is for Russia (having to come east from Zaporizhia or north through Crimea).  Why wouldn't Russia welcome a fight here?  It seems like far more favorable ground than banging their heads against the Avdiivka fortifications. 

Surely Russia can see the danger of allowing the Ukrainians to become well entrenched and start expanding their foothold.  I read that Ukraine has been putting a lot of drone/artillery resources here to drive the Russians out, but why would it be anymore effective here than outside Tokmak?  It is just that the Russians don't have a bunch of mines/bunkers built?  And if so, why don't they build them now?  It's not like this is some lightning attack, Ukraine has been creeping forward for months. 

Edited November 14, 2023 by Maithanet

[Makk]

11 minutes ago, Maithanet said:

The whole situation is pretty curious and is one area where I really struggle to understand this conflict.  Surely fighting south of the Dnipro is harder for Ukraine (having to cross the river with only limited pontoon bridges and riverboats) than it is for Russia (having to come east from Zaporizhia or north through Crimea).  Why wouldn't Russia welcome a fight here?  It seems like far more favorable ground than banging their heads against the Avdiivka fortifications. 

Surely Russia can see the danger of allowing the Ukrainians to become well entrenched and start expanding their foothold.  I read that Ukraine has been putting a lot of drone/artillery resources here to drive the Russians out, but why would it be anymore effective here than outside Tokmak?  It is just that the Russians don't have a bunch of mines/bunkers built?  And if so, why don't they build them now?  It's not like this is some lightning attack, Ukraine has been creeping forward for months. 

Avdiivka is really a gift for Ukraine. Russia are throwing massive forces at it for political rather than strategic reasons, Putin wants to show progress before announcing his re-election bid. It's a good chance to inflict damage on the Russian forces. I'm not sure how easy it will be for Ukraine to hold the flanks, Russia has shown gradual progress in cutting off the roads and getting into the small town town just north of the mine. Ukraine is definitely getting good value from their artillery and drones in this defense though. 

Trying to establish a foothold across the Dnipro is just as dangerous for Ukrainians as it is the Russians. It would make sense for Russia to defend a bit deeper so long as they can still target any bridge that is built/repaired. Ukraine has higher elevation on the right bank of the river so has an even bigger advantage in the accuracy and range of their artillery. The Russians want to be out of range of regular howitzers and Ukraine still can't commit too many forces at the moment because they can't do anything about Russia's aviation. Their only defense at the moment is to have their forces so sparse that the glide bombs don't do too much damage. Ukraine also can't retreat in good order so it is very dangerous to over commit. The Russians probably are constructing defenses further south and east but static defenses have to be very extensive or you can just go around them.

[Werthead]

2 hours ago, Maithanet said:

The whole situation is pretty curious and is one area where I really struggle to understand this conflict.  Surely fighting south of the Dnipro is harder for Ukraine (having to cross the river with only limited pontoon bridges and riverboats) than it is for Russia (having to come east from Zaporizhia or north through Crimea).  Why wouldn't Russia welcome a fight here?  It seems like far more favorable ground than banging their heads against the Avdiivka fortifications. 

Surely Russia can see the danger of allowing the Ukrainians to become well entrenched and start expanding their foothold.  I read that Ukraine has been putting a lot of drone/artillery resources here to drive the Russians out, but why would it be anymore effective here than outside Tokmak?  It is just that the Russians don't have a bunch of mines/bunkers built?  And if so, why don't they build them now?  It's not like this is some lightning attack, Ukraine has been creeping forward for months. 

Someone posted that link a few pages back to an analysis of the exposure of the area.

The long and short of it was that Russia never prepared defences in depth, because it regarded the Dnipro as being too hard to cross. They did start building some defences, but those were destroyed when the Kherson dam blew and flooded the lower area (killing at least dozens and possibly hundreds of Russian troops in the process). The ground was then too sodden for months for them to build new defences. Russia also decided that the ground was too horrendous to be used for offensive operations, and drew troops away from the area to help reinforce the Tokmak axis.

The issues now are that, although it took months, the ground did eventually dry out, the new, post-dam configuration of the river and land is more favourable than originally thought, and the advent of HIMARS and ATACMS has given Ukraine massive fire control all the way to the opposite coast on the Sea of Azov. This means anything that enters the area is toast, ATACMS is forcing Russian choppers to sit well out of support range and the resupply routes to the front once you move west of the main highway are dogshit. Reinforcing the riverbanks is tough once Ukraine took out Russia's river resupply boats (especially the ones armed with SAMs). Ukrainian forces are also well within the protective umbrella of not just HIMARS but also standard artillery mounted just across the river in and around Kherson city.

Having fire control over the isthmus - Ukraine has destroyed and damaged both the rail and road links from Crimea into occupied Ukraine proper many times - is allowing Ukraine to do what it did around Kherson city a year ago.

It should also be noted that a major victory on this end of the front would allow Ukraine to claim a huge success and encourage their allies to keep supplying them.

All of that said, it still took months of these tactics for Russia to withdraw from Kherson city and there were logical next lines for it to withdraw to, which are not the case here: the next logical lines would be to withdraw to Crimea's borders in the south and who-knows-where-the-fuck in the north, cutting Russian-held territory in two. It would also presumably take even longer to inflict such a defeat on Russia as last year, and Russia has additional reinforcement capacity. Ukraine might need several times as many HIMARS launchers as it currently has and a shit more ammo to really make logistics starving viable in this area.

[ThinkerX]

To me, it looks like lots of cheap, hand-held anti-tank weapons and cheap drones are going to be the wave of the future - especially if said cheap drones are autonomous.

[Wilbur]

3 hours ago, Werthead said:

Someone posted that link a few pages back to an analysis of the exposure of the area.

The long and short of it was that Russia never prepared defences in depth, because it regarded the Dnipro as being too hard to cross. They did start building some defences, but those were destroyed when the Kherson dam blew and flooded the lower area (killing at least dozens and possibly hundreds of Russian troops in the process). The ground was then too sodden for months for them to build new defences. Russia also decided that the ground was too horrendous to be used for offensive operations, and drew troops away from the area to help reinforce the Tokmak axis.

The issues now are that, although it took months, the ground did eventually dry out, the new, post-dam configuration of the river and land is more favourable than originally thought, and the advent of HIMARS and ATACMS has given Ukraine massive fire control all the way to the opposite coast on the Sea of Azov. This means anything that enters the area is toast, ATACMS is forcing Russian choppers to sit well out of support range and the resupply routes to the front once you move west of the main highway are dogshit. Reinforcing the riverbanks is tough once Ukraine took out Russia's river resupply boats (especially the ones armed with SAMs). Ukrainian forces are also well within the protective umbrella of not just HIMARS but also standard artillery mounted just across the river in and around Kherson city.

Having fire control over the isthmus - Ukraine has destroyed and damaged both the rail and road links from Crimea into occupied Ukraine proper many times - is allowing Ukraine to do what it did around Kherson city a year ago.

It should also be noted that a major victory on this end of the front would allow Ukraine to claim a huge success and encourage their allies to keep supplying them.

All of that said, it still took months of these tactics for Russia to withdraw from Kherson city and there were logical next lines for it to withdraw to, which are not the case here: the next logical lines would be to withdraw to Crimea's borders in the south and who-knows-where-the-fuck in the north, cutting Russian-held territory in two. It would also presumably take even longer to inflict such a defeat on Russia as last year, and Russia has additional reinforcement capacity. Ukraine might need several times as many HIMARS launchers as it currently has and a shit more ammo to really make logistics starving viable in this area.

Thinking about this analysis, it will be interesting to see if, once they have trained pilots and armed planes, Ukraine will use them to leverage their presence in this area between Crimea and Kherson.

It does seem like it wouldn't take much more to eject the Russians from it, if splitting the Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine in twain makes strategic sense for the Ukrainians.

[The Wondering Wolf]

Meanwhile in Germany, the first major journalist has been linked to payments from Putin's circle. Hubert Seipel, who did several interviews with Putin and wrote books about him and Russia which were considered surprisingly favourable to the regime, has received 600k (€) for one of the books, and it seems he got money for another book, as well. He is one of the guys who heavily biased people's opinion on Putin and Russia. But I guess he is just one out of many more. 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/14/german-journalist-putin-hubert-seipel

[Makk]

I highly doubt the Russians will pull forces south of the Dnipro all the way back to Crimea straight away. Himars with ATACMS have given Ukraine the ability to hit anything in the area all the way down to the coast, but that isn't fire control because of the scarcity and cost of the ammunition. They will only be used on very high value targets and pulling all the way back to Crimea actually means Russia won't have any safe supply depot or airfield inside Ukraine at all. It would also be such a massive morale swing which is very important for both sides at the moment.

If they do retreat I think it more likely they will just drop back in a rough line 30-50 kms to the south and out of range of the conventional artillery. They would probably want to keep the road between Hladkivka and Radensk. The Dnipro is still a significant obstacle for Ukraine to launch a full offensive and putting too many forces across is a big risk because they cannot retreat easily.

If the Russians were really short on manpower they could drop back to the T2210 which starts at the (former) Nova Kakhovka damn and angles down in a south south west direction but that will also put a lot of Crimea in Himars range.

Edit - Also in the last 24 hours I see Ukraine shot down another SU-25 around Avdiivka, I would love to know what they shot it down with.

Edited November 15, 2023 by Makk

[Werthead]

Russian forces in occupied Luhansk are being driven to a state of extensive paranoia by everything - food, drink, vapes, alcohol, energy drinks - being poisoned by partisan forces.

Also, the vapes and lighters they get locally sometimes just explode when they ignite them.

 

Edited November 15, 2023 by Werthead

[Werthead]

Finland has closed 5 of 8 border crossings with Russia, citing Russia driving undocumented migrants across the border, and is erecting a new border fence along parts of the border.

The former commander of the 6th Army of the Russian Air Force and his wife were found dead in Andzhiyevsky, Stavropol Kai. No cause of death identified.

This is pretty insane.

 

[Which Tyler]

5 minutes ago, Werthead said:

The former commander of the 6th Army of the Russian Air Force and his wife were found dead in Andzhiyevsky, Stavropol Kai. No cause of death identified.

Any high windows nearby?

[Kalbear]

OH NO DRONE, NOT LOW BATTERY

[Werthead]

Putin may be facing another indictment by the International Criminal Court. They have mounting evidence that Russia planned to forcibly export Ukraine's stocks of food in the result of a successful invasion, leaving most of the civilian population to starve. Russia bought three new bulk cargo ships to ship immense amounts of grain out, and food infrastructure has been reportedly targeted during the conflict.

Russia's attempts to encircle Avidiivka are still being thwarted (despite some hairy moments), but they decided to launch a series of head-on main assaults on the town's heavily-fortified industrial zone. This resulted in the devastation of the attacking forces. Some suggestions that Russia wants to seize the town as early as possible for PR purposes. This is a huge mistake, as Russia is better to try to complete the encirclement before trying to storm the centre.

Ukraine has acknowledged that its activities in Kherson now constitute a further arm of the counter-offensive effort, and have made significant gains along and beyond the south bank.

Kadyrov interviewed at a firing range teaching his 15 and 18-year-old sons to shoot (in a Guccia tracksuit). He said he is preparing for war and "the best part is ahead," although not specifying war against whom.

The wives of Russian servicemen killed in Ukraine, seeking the repatriation of their bodies, have been told to go to the front and dig them up themselves.

Ukrainian HIMARS systems have been deployed to the Luhansk front to shore up the regained territories up there. In particular, they've been hitting Russian ammo depots and even convoys on the move. A Russian armoured assault attempted a truly deranged breakout towards Kupyansk but was torn to pieces by antitank platoons armed with Javelins attacking their unguarded flanks.

The FT has received information from confidential Chinese sources - possibly a deliberately-permitted leak for political purposes - that the Chinese government is unhappy with the global destabilisation caused by Russia's invasion (this coincides with some UK and US intelligence assessments that China was/might still be planning a military operation against Taiwan later this decade and absolutely did not want NATO arming like a motherfucker years before that could happen, as is now the case). China was notified by Russia ahead of the invasion that the situation in the Donbas had become more serious and Russia was planning preventative measures to stop the war spreading to Russian soil, which China interpreted as serious bullshit designed to cover options ranging from additional "little green men" Russian forces entering Ukraine to an open-but-limited Russian offensive in the Donbas only. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine from three fronts took China by surprise, and apparently irritated the Chinese leadership by making it appear (via the "no limits" joint statement) that China was backing the invasion. A senior Chinese intelligence official was demoted by two full levels for apparently not catching that Russia was about to launch the invasion.

Chinese sources have said they now consider Russia's outright defeat in Ukraine is possible, or an incredibly costly victory which they will struggle to benefit from. China's recent diplomatic pivot to lessening tensions with the US, Australia and Europe can be seen as a sign that China is distancing itself from Russia's problems whilst attempting to shore up its faltering economy.

[House Balstroko]

One thing that’s been on my mind ever since the October 7th attacks, is how the Arab world will perceive this conflict. 
 

It seems like Russia is trying to distance itself from Israel, with public statements at the UN claiming that the country has no right to defend itself. Is Putin hoping that the West’s near unilateral support of Israel is going to cause Arab nations to take drastic measures against Ukraine?