Ukraine: Ongoing…

[The Anti-Targ]

Farmgate prices are not retail prices, though there should at least be some correlation. So indeed, it would be nice to see grain prices come down generally. But since farm costs have risen as part of the inflationary cycle, bringing down farmgate grain prices will cause a squeeze on farm incomes. The correct response to rising prices is rising incomes not lowering incomes, so farmgate prices should be rising at the same time as general wages and salaries rising so that people can afford the higher prices of food. Also, Ukranian farmers should be being paid more for their grain instead of some bastard corporations taking advantage of desperate Ukranian farmers to get their hands on cheap wheat.

[kiko]

1 hour ago, The Anti-Targ said:

Farmgate prices are not retail prices, though there should at least be some correlation. So indeed, it would be nice to see grain prices come down generally. But since farm costs have risen as part of the inflationary cycle, bringing down farmgate grain prices will cause a squeeze on farm incomes. The correct response to rising prices is rising incomes not lowering incomes, so farmgate prices should be rising at the same time as general wages and salaries rising so that people can afford the higher prices of food. Also, Ukranian farmers should be being paid more for their grain instead of some bastard corporations taking advantage of desperate Ukranian farmers to get their hands on cheap wheat.

No idea but are they able to have cheaper prices because they have better conditions? Assuming normal circumstances. Black soil and huge flat space might enable higher efficiency. Considering that Ukrainians, together with other East and Southeast Europeans are taken advantage of inside the EU too, it maybe is a better deal to use their manpower and compete on the product market instead on the labour market.

[Matrim Fox Cauthon]

14 hours ago, Padraig said:

There actually is a possibility that Erdogan may lose.  I mean, I shouldn't have even checked since I will now be even more disappointed by the results but it might be the easiest way for Sweden to join NATO.

Doubtful. The expat Turkish voting population in Germany and Austria loves him for some reason. 

[Padraig]

11 hours ago, Ser Reptitious said:

People said the same thing about Orban in Hungary last year (before he got re-elected in a landslide). Much as I would like that to be the case, with both of them basically in complete control of the media, I don't buy it. The word "possibility" carries a lot of weight here, sadly.

In fairness, Hungary was pure wishful thinking (people thought Orban’s connection with Putin would work against him).  But anyone looking at what was going on in Hungary could see he was going to win.

In the same way, Poland will see the current government retain power there (if I understand politics there correctly).

But the polls in Turkey are not as clear cut.  Sure, Erdogan will presumably win (that is why I said I’ll be disappointed) but at least there is some basis to thinking the opposite, not just wishful thinking.  Feel free to be pessimistic though.

I find it interesting that people are complaining about food prices going down in those countries.  I wonder what the comparator is?  Last year, prices went up a lot because of the war.  So are people now comparing with those increased prices or 2021 prices?

Good that food is getting out of Ukraine anyhow.  That was a serious concern last year.

[Gorn]

22 hours ago, Corvinus85 said:

While most Americans have been focused on a certain clown in NYC today, Finland has officially joined NATO today. This effectively doubles Russia's border with the alliance. Congratulations to President Putin are in order.

To be fair, the expansion of NATO is irrelevant to this war. NATO will never invade Russia, and Russia will never dare to invade a NATO country.

All the tankie "arguments" about "spheres of influence" and "respecting Russia's security needs" and "not pushing them into a corner" are and always have been nonsense. Putin didn't invade Ukraine because of NATO expansion, Putin invaded Ukraine because he wanted to conquer their land.

[Wilbur]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has indicated that the government plans to issue sovereign debt denominated in foreign currency.

UK Defense Ministry: Russia likely expecting 'friendly' nations to purchase its state debt (yahoo.com)

There are so few ways that this could actually work out in Russia favor in the end.

 

[A Horse Named Stranger]

8 hours ago, Matrim Fox Cauthon said:

Doubtful. The expat Turkish voting population in Germany and Austria loves him for some reason. 

Yeah, but he is more vulnerable than he was in the past.

The Turkish economy is not doing well, he was criticized for his handling of the aftermath of the earthquake. Not to mention that it showed severe issues in the real estate sector and controls wrt the safety of buildings being safe during an earthquake.

He has hugely benefitted from the real estate boom and rising economy in the past, those factors are now rather working against him. I also suspect he will re-election, but it's not a done deal.

[Werthead]

Girkin has founded the "Angry Patriots Club," apparently a pre-emptive move to react to any "pro-defeatist liberal coup." That in itself is interesting, suggesting that there are somewhat sane factors floating around the Russian political landscape looking to end the war in a reasonable fashion if circumstances present, and Girkin thinks they are a real enough danger to pre-empt. Although it could be an excuse to set up yet another paramilitary group (Girkin is probably working for someone higher up in the security system, unclear whom though) and he may have even been behind taking out Tatarsky.

The current thinking seems to be that Russia is switching to a "forever war" mode by trying to prolong the war beyond Ukraine's supporters' ability to sustain it. However, there seems to be severe doubts over the viability of that plan. Whilst Russia can feed fresh recruits into the conflict on a semi-regular basis, its equipment stocks cannot be replenished that fast. There seems to be some real fear in more realistic (and, at present, utterly un-influential) Russian circles that they are simply going to lose half a million or more lives in Ukraine and eventually be forced to either concede in full or almost so with next to nothing to show for it. The gamble seems to be mainly aimed at the next US election in late 2024. So, once again, the priority is for Ukraine to undertake a successful counter-offensive in the near-ish future that either destroys a lot of Russian equipment or retakes a reasonable amount of ground.

To that end, Poland is apparently considering releasing its remaining MiG stock to Ukraine in full.

[Padraig]

5 hours ago, Gorn said:

To be fair, the expansion of NATO is irrelevant to this war. NATO will never invade Russia, and Russia will never dare to invade a NATO country.

I essentially agree with you but I view it more in terms of risk.  Joining NATO permanently reduces the risk of invasion.  Things may change for better or worse in future (who really knows) but the risk remains lowered compared to the alternative.

[3CityApache]

19 hours ago, Padraig said:

In the same way, Poland will see the current government retain power there (if I understand politics there correctly).

 

I already have three bets with my friends pending that we won't, but recent polls show a tide slightly shifting in their favor, so it is a real possibility, sadly. Still hope it won't happen.

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

@Zorral

And this is why I’m not fond of Lula while favoring him over Bolosarno:

 

[Werthead]

There's been a data leak of US intelligence assessments of the war. They are quite interesting, although clearly the security breach is concerning. The good news is that about 90% of it is stuff that we already knew, or had guessed. The Ukrainians have also not given a lot of information to the US, leaving them in the dark on precise casualty figures and where exactly future offensives will be launched.

The main takeaways:

• The US assesses total Russian casualties in excess of 223,000, which tallies with Ukrainian estimates (as noted before, Ukrainian estimates are based on Russian intercepts). However, the US is only prepared to estimated 71,000 Russian KIA, although on low confidence (Ukrainian estimates, based on those same intercepts, are around 160,000-170,000).
• Ukrainian casualties are estimated at around 130,000, combined military and civilian casualties, which tallies with previous estimates. Ukrainian military dead are estimated at 17,000, which feels pretty low (other estimates are between 30,000 and 50,000). It's likely the battle for Bakhmut, which may turn out to be the bloodiest battle so far for both sides, was not factored into these figures as they seem to come from several weeks ago.
• A rather shitty photoshop is doing the rounds which flips the figures to make the Ukrainian losses seem much heavier than the Russians. However, the original, unaltered version was doing the rounds earlier.
• The US has a rather advanced mapping and timeline system about when and where the mud clears in eastern Ukraine based on the weather and typical conditions.

There's also been some heavy research focused on the city of Kostroma, home to the 331st Guards Parachute Regiment. The BBC has confirmed that the unit took 39 fatalities in March and April 2022, 62 by late July and 94 by last month. They did this with on-the-ground reporting, visiting the military cemetery and combing Russian social media. They also note this only applies to people from the city itself; a large proportion are from the surrounding countryside and the unit has been reconstituted several times with conscripts from all over Russia. Taking that into account, the unit may have lost as many as 500 troops killed and injured enough to not be able to return to duty: the unit originally constituted 1,200 troops but based on various records, around 1,700 names are currently listed as having gone through the rolls, suggesting it has had to recruit 500 new troops to get back up to strength. Other sources suggest that only 300-400 troops from the original 1,200 remain, with some soldiers leaving service through various legal means as well as being killed or injured.

The unit seems to have been hammered by moving between Izyum, Kherson, Donbas and most recently Kreminna. It's also lost most of its vehicles, and recent photos suggest it only has 3 operational BMD armoured vehicles.

[The Anti-Targ]

On 4/8/2023 at 4:14 AM, Ser Scot A Ellison said:

@Zorral

And this is why I’m not fond of Lula while favoring him over Bolosarno:

 

Some of what Lula is saying is legit. Ukraine is asking a lot of the world in support of its defence against Russian aggression, and so it has a responsibility to its supporters. How many billions in military and non-military aid has it received? The good will remains but it may become stretched if Ukraine wants to prolong the conflict until it takes Crimea back under its control.

The world more or less rolled over and showed its belly to Russia when it took Crimea, rightly or wrongly it's just a fact of history now. Ukraine's principal military supporters may not be inclined to support retaking Crimea as part of its defensive efforts. It would not surprise me at all if Europe and the US are inclined to only want to give military support for Ukraine to push Russia back to the 1 Feb 2022 boundaries and to defend those borders, Ukraine needs to entertain the possibility that it needs to modify it's ambitions in this respect.

The need for a tranquil world involves a lot more than sorting out this war, and I doubt Lula is really suggesting it's all on Ukraine's shoulders. But finding an end state and bringing the war to an end is going to help with the general state of tension in the world.

Not that I think Russia is in any way inclined to accept a peace treaty on the basis that it gets to only keep Crimea. So it's a bit of a moot point right now. Russia is going to have to be further resource and manpower depleted and pushed back from a lot more occupied territory before it is going to agree to anything that doesn't involve keeping some of what it claimed in 2022.

[mormont]

4 hours ago, The Anti-Targ said:

The world more or less rolled over and showed its belly to Russia when it took Crimea, rightly or wrongly it's just a fact of history now.

Wrongly. Definitely wrongly. There is no suggestion that it is rightly, I hope?

And facts of history aren't immutable. Russia took Crimea and that changed the facts. If Russia lost Crimea again, that would also then be a fact of history. If Ukraine want to re-take Crimea, I for one would back that: I've said before that it's quite reasonable to conclude that not doing so would undermine the long term security of Ukraine and risk the conflict re-starting.

4 hours ago, The Anti-Targ said:

Ukraine needs to entertain the possibility that it needs to modify it's ambitions in this respect.

I'm fairly sure they've entertained the possibility, but they're entitled to aim for retaking Crimea meantime.

People still seem to underestimate how far the current Russian regime is dedicated to expansion and control of the 'near abroad'. They've moved to doing this by military means because the tools they were using, corruption and blackmail, stopped working, as simple as that. No peace treaty will be change their ambitions. They view control of countries like Ukraine as a right. They've shown they'll use any means necessary and won't voluntarily stop.

[The Anti-Targ]

Yes, definitely wrongly from my perspective, but that's not a universally shared opinion.

I guess since none of us are major military backers of Ukraine our support for Ukraine's decisions don't amount to much, and enough public opinion will be swayed by whatever those powers to do provide Ukraine military support decide that either retaking Crimea or not retaking Crimea will end up gaining enough public support in those countries for them to continue or pull back on military support. IMO Ukraine's major military backers are going to see how this spring and summer play out to decide whether supporting the retaking of Crimea is worth the cost. If Ukraine can't substantially roll back the Russian occupation and have a realistic chance at entering Crimea in Autumn then I think the appetite to end the southern campaign at the...hold for Google search please... Perekop Isthmus will be pretty strong.

If kicking Russia out of Ukraine back to the Jan 2022 borders isn't enough of a message to Russia to cut it out with the military expansionism, then I think the only thing that would send that message is marching troops all the way to Moscow and delivering the message personally.

[James Arryn]

On 4/5/2023 at 1:48 PM, Gorn said:

To be fair, the expansion of NATO is irrelevant to this war. NATO will never invade Russia, and Russia will never dare to invade a NATO country.

All the tankie "arguments" about "spheres of influence" and "respecting Russia's security needs" and "not pushing them into a corner" are and always have been nonsense. Putin didn't invade Ukraine because of NATO expansion, Putin invaded Ukraine because he wanted to conquer their land.

It doesn’t have to be either/or. On the one hand Putin is a dangerous and aggressive leader whose continued rule threatens global security and he absolutely intended to conquer the Ukraine to add it to his domain, without his invasion there is no war, period. But on the other he can (and does, often) rightfully complain about aggressive NATO expansion beyond agreed/intended lines and even a casual appraisal of US efforts in the area would show that there is more than one power looking to expand it’s interests. 
 

It’s hard to say how much point 2 helped motivate point 1, if at all. I myself think Putin was likely to find pretexts for expansion regardless, but it’s just possible that he was originally ~ triggered by that traditional Russian fear of incursion by NATO treating their agreement like a US/native treaty. That said, it’d have to be a macro point because by the time he invaded the Ukraine he was following a clearly established pattern of behaviour  that had by now taken on it’s own momentum regardless of original motivations. 
 

However I will say that point 2 does provide fuel for Putin’s propaganda and ability to generate and sustain fairly remarkable domestic support for the war, and the best lies are built on a kernel of truth. Insisting it’s entirely irrelevant is probably never going to address how Putin can sustain this, or potentially further steps. It’s definitely not irrelevant to around a million Russians. We’re (hopefully) not going to engage in direct military engagement with Russia, so any mitigation of Putin’s power is going to require major Russian participation to say the least. 
 

edit: to be clear, none of this is on Ukraine or should be accounted for by them. They absolutely deserve their freedom, and even if a broken deal had the slightest role to play in this, they were not part of that agreement. 

Edited April 11, 2023 by James Arryn

[Ser Scot A Ellison]

1 hour ago, James Arryn said:

NATO expansion beyond agreed/intended lines

What “agreement” are you referring to?  When was it made?  Who was it made by?  What was promised?  

Edited April 11, 2023 by Ser Scot A Ellison

[Werthead]

There was never an agreement between Russia and NATO to not expand eastwards (there's been some talk of backroom promises, but those are heavily disputed). Early on, Putin discussed Ukraine being in NATO as not being a problem (as with the Baltic States, Poland and Romania) and even briefly floated the idea of Russia joining NATO as part of a broader global anti-terror/anti-expansion alliance (which makes me wonder if he went through a brief phase of seeing China as a potential threat). Russia also said it saw no threat from NATO because its nuclear weapons gave it effectively an invulnerability shield (not to mention I doubt anyone in Russia saw a real possibility of NATO countries invading Russia for zero motivations). He radically and almost abruptly changed his tune on that in the early 2000s and by the early 2010s was citing NATO "expansionism" as a major problem.

I agree that there is a Crimea blindspot in a lot of countries' views, and if Putin argued for peace based on a recognition of Crimea and a withdrawal to February 22nd borders, then a lot of backers for Ukraine might argue strongly for that (Ukraine itself negotiated at least partly on that basis in February/March 2022, with the proviso of a UN-based referendum for Crimea). The problem is that Putin has overreached and tried to establish terms that are blatantly unworkable, so until there is some movement on the annexed territories (and it does not sound like there will be), the point is moot.

What's happening right now is the question of whether Ukraine can retake a lot of territory. If it cannot, then faced with the war grinding on indefinitely and support waning, it might have to consider less palatable options, like accepting some loss of the territory since the start of the invasion, as horrendous a message as that sends.

[Padraig]

3 hours ago, James Arryn said:

However I will say that point 2 does provide fuel for Putin’s propaganda and ability to generate and sustain fairly remarkable domestic support for the war, and the best lies are built on a kernel of truth.

It is difficult to see how this could be overcome though?  Even if one has a great argument against it, it is almost impossible to convey that information to the Russian people, given the controls over media there.

There are two related questions for me.

1) What is the legitimate reach of any one country.

2) Should neighbours be treated differently.

The first question is quite simple.  There are no limits. Countries are always encouraging other countries to follow their advice.  Tradition or distance doesn't stop them.  To take an example, while France has traditionally been very prominent in the Sahel region in Africa, over the last few years Russia has extended its reach into a number of countries there, leading to the withdrawal of French troops and the entrance of Wagner troops.  Russia didn't shy away from this opportunity when presented with it.

COVID vaccines was another example of this with Russia and China selling vaccines into Hungary (and South America) to increase their influence there.  Conversely, was the US wrong to encourage democracy in Ukraine and membership of the EU?  To me, there was nothing particularly unusual about any of this activity.

The second question is more complex.  Russia feels Ukraine should be under its thumb because of certain historical ties.  But the question can also be reduced to a very simple idea.  Can one country tell another what it is allowed to do and if it refuses to listen, invade.  The first part of that sentence is simply restating question one above.  People sometimes ask how would the US feel if Mexico or Canada suddenly jumped into China's or Russia's sphere of influence (I'm ignoring Cuba).  While the question is somewhat stupid, it is also quite instructive.  Why don't they?   Its not that they fear invasion.  Its simply that they realise they benefit hugely from their current arrangement with the US.

Russia should have been able to offer Ukraine something similar (a large market on its border, with shared historic, religious and language ties).  But Ukraine realised that it would gain more from pursuing EU membership.  And it was prospective EU ties (not NATO) that kicked things off in 2014.  And then the question becomes, is it ok for Ukraine be significantly worse off because Russia is so corrupt that it can't offer Ukraine anything constructive?

As Mormont said, Russia used corruption and blackmail to maintain control and when that didn't work, it had nothing to offer except war.  Because yes, Russia should have good links with Ukraine (and all its other neighbours).  But Russia doesn't seem to able to create those links except via a master/slave type relationship.

I can see why the Russian population sees that it is wrong that their near neighbour has turned its back on them but the problem isn't Ukraine.  Its very difficult to persuade a country that the problem is themselves though.

[Rippounet]

18 hours ago, Werthead said:

There was never an agreement between Russia and NATO to not expand eastwards (there's been some talk of backroom promises, but those are heavily disputed).

"Heavily disputed" by whom? Alex Jones? Mickey Mouse?

Quote

 

Page 6 of this discussion between Secretary of State James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev:

Baker: We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a [military] presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16116-document-05-memorandum-conversation-between

 

That's just the most famous line. Cold War historians can tell you there are many documents that show that NATO not expanding eastward was a pretty explicit condition for the Soviet Union facilitating the reunification of Germany. I'd found a couple of such documents myself back in the day, but I'm too lazy to go through my old research, and this page lists a number of such documents: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early

On the other hand, there was in fact a deliberate effort to deny this ever happened in order to whitewash the US's Russian policy after 1992, most notably by Mark Kramer. But Kramer's arguments are just plain dumb. Anyone reading these documents with some knowledge of the historical context knows what they mean, and if you want someone with actual historical credence, just look to Jack Matlock, who knows what he's talking about.

Of course, the context makes the whole thing almost laughable. At the time it was a given that the Soviets didn't want NATO to expand, but the West was worried NATO could crumble, and the Soviets were not closed to the idea of joining NATO themselves! So the whole point is almost moot. The question is really about the US's Russian policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to some extent, whether depriving Russia of Crimea became a secondary objective of the US strategy, as had been advocated in the 1980s.